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Abstract
Ever since the human animal devised a system of technologies for abstract thought 
through language, the war on wilderness has become a one way path towards alienation, 
civilisation and  literature.  In  this  work,  I  examine  how the  civilised  narrative  orders 
experience by means of segregation, domestication, breeding, and extermination; whereas, 
I argue that the stories and narratives of wilderness project chaos and infinite possibilities 
for experiencing the world through a diverse community of life.
One of my goals in conducting this study on children's literature as knowledge, 
culture and social foundation has been to bridge the gap between science and literature and 
to examine the interconnectedness of fiction and reality as a two-way road. Another aim 
has been to engage these narratives in a dialogue with each other as I trace their expression 
in the various disciplines and books written for both children and adults as well as analyse 
the  manifestation of fictional  narratives  in  real life.  This  is  both an inter-  and  multi-
disciplinary endeavour  that  is  reflected in  the combination of research methods drawn 
from anthropology and literary studies as well as in the content that traces the narratives of 
order and chaos, or civilisation and wilderness, in children's literature and our world.
I have chosen to compare and contrast three fictional children's books that offer 
three different  real-world socio-economic paradigms, namely, A.A. Milne's  Winnie-the-
Pooh projecting a civilised monarcho-capitalist  world,  Nikolai  Nosov's  trilogy on  The 
Adventures of Dunno and Friends as presenting the challenges and feats of an anarcho-
socialist  society in  evolution from primitivism towards technology,  and Tove Jansson's 
Moominbooks depicting chaos, anarchy, and wilderness that contain everything, including 
encounters with civilisation, but most of all an infinite love for the world.
Stemming from the basic question in research methodology on how we know the 
world,  I  first  examine  the  construction,  transmission,  and  acquisition  of  knowledge, 
particularly through the lens of Bourdieu's  theory of  praxis,  as well as the critique of 
language and literacy through Zerzan's, Ong's, and Goody's studies on the links between 
literacy, debt and oppression. Regarding children's literature depicting the three socio-
iv
economic  paradigms,   I  chose  three  books  with  which  I  have  been  familiar  since 
childhood, i.e. in whose narratives I have “native fluency” and, in this sense, this work is 
also about “anthropology at home”. Moreover, I compared and contrasted the underlying 
premises not only in the three books, but also with the unfolding narratives of wilderness 
and civilisation in  real life,  that  I  inserted in  the form of ethnographic/journal entries 
throughout  the  dissertation.  As  I  examine  the  very  nature  of  literature,  culture,  and 
language and the civilised structures that domesticate the world through the threat of death 
and the expropriation of food, I also trace the presence of these narratives in the scientific 
(the Malthusian-Darwinian narrative),  religious,  and other cultural expressions  and the 
challenges provided by anarchist science and theory (Kropotkin) as well as wild children's 
books such as Jansson's Moomintrolls.
Keywords:  children's  literature,  anthropology,  anarchy,  civilisation  critique,  chaos, 
narratives, literary theory, primitivism, ontology, epistemology.
vTitre:
L’ordre et la mise en scène littéraire du chaos: la littérature pour enfants comme savoir,  
culture, et fondation sociale
Résumé
Depuis  que l'animal humain a conçu un système de technologies pour la pensée 
abstraite grâce au langage, la guerre contre le monde sauvage est devenu une voie à sens 
unique vers l'aliénation, la civilisation et la littérature. Le but de ce travail est d'analyser 
comment les récits civilisationnels donnent une structure à l'expérience par le biais de la 
ségrégation, de la domestication, de la sélection, et de l'extermination, tandis que les récits 
sauvages démontrent les possibilités infinies du chaos pour découvrir le monde en toute sa 
diversité et en lien avec sa communauté de vie.
Un des objectifs  de cette thèse a été  de combler  le  fossé entre  la  science et  la  
littérature, et d'examiner l'interdépendance de la fiction et la réalité. Un autre objectif a été 
de mettre ces récits au cœur d'un dialogue les uns avec les autres, ainsi que de tracer leur 
expression  dans  les  différentes  disciplines  et  œuvres  pour  enfants  et  adultes  mais 
également d’analyser leur manifestations c’est redondant dans la vie réelle. C'est un effort 
multi-disciplinaires  qui  se  reflète  dans  la  combinaison  de  méthodes  de  recherche  en 
anthropologie et en études littéraires.
Cette  analyse  compare  et  contraste trois  livres  de  fiction  pour  enfants  qui 
présentent trois différents paradigmes socio-économiques, à savoir, «Winnie-l'Ourson» de 
Milne qui met en place un monde civilisé monarcho-capitaliste, la trilogie de Nosov sur 
«les aventures de Neznaika et ses amis» qui présente les défis et les exploits d'une société 
anarcho-socialiste dans son évolution du primitivisme vers la technologie, et les livres de 
Moomines de Jansson, qui représentent le chaos, l'anarchie, et l'état sauvage qui contient 
tout, y compris des épisodes de civilisation.
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En axant la méthodologie de ma recherche sur la façon dont nous connaissons le 
monde,  j'ai  d'abord  examiné  la  construction,  la  transmission  et  l'acquisition  des 
connaissances, en particulier à travers la théorie de praxis de Bourdieu et la critique de la 
civilisation  développée  dans  les études  de  Zerzan,  Ong,  et  Goody sur  les  liens  entre 
l'alphabétisation, la dette et l'oppression. Quant à la littérature pour enfants, j'ai choisi trois 
livres  que  j’ai  connus  pendant  mon enfance,  c'est-à-dire  des  livres  qui  sont  devenus 
comme  une  «langue  maternelle»  pour  moi.  En  ce  sens,  ce  travail  est  aussi  de 
«l’anthropologie du champ natif».
En outre, j’analyse les prémisses sous-jacentes qui se trouvent non seulement dans 
les trois livres, mais dans le déroulement des récits de l'état sauvage et de la civilisation 
dans la vie réelle, des analyses qui paraissent dans cette thèse sous la forme d'extraits d’un 
journal ethnographique.  De même que j’examine la nature de la littérature ainsi que des 
structures civilisées qui domestiquent le monde au moyen de menaces de mort, je trace 
aussi  la  présence  de  ces  récits  dans  l'expression  scientifique  (le récit malthusien-
darwinien),  religieuse,  et dans  autres expressions  culturelles,  et  réfléchis  sur  les  défis 
présentés par la théorie anarchiste (Kropotkine) ainsi que par les livres pour enfants écrits 
du point de vue sauvage, tels que ceux des Moomines. 
Mots-clés:  littérature pour enfants, anthropologie, anarchie, critique de civilisation, chaos, 
théorie littéraire, primitivisme, ontologie, epistemologie, sociologie.
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An Acknowledgement and dedication
Since the day I was born, my meandering fate has been taking me through a wild 
range of geographic,  occupational,  political,  and social contexts in  which questions of 
language and literacy continually presented themselves with a persistent urge. I began to 
speak late and it was a concern for my mother, because she always mentioned that, unlike 
her other children, I uttered my first word at the age of three years and half. 
I  was born in  Moscow, a megapolis,  to two inter-racial,  inter-continental,  inter-
cultural,  and  multi-lingual  students  and  so  chunks  of  my  early  childhood  alternated 
between passionate university student  life  and solitude in a dorm room, other chunks I 
spent  in  a five-days-per week boarding daycare.  But,  the most  memorable and intense 
experiences I lived in  a  tiny village  surrounded by forests,  rivers,  and fields with my 
grandparents. My brightest, happiest memories come from that silence, that era, that pre-
lingual universe and its forest.
Questions of language and literacy have followed me throughout my life, even if I 
was not always aware of them, because, apart from my favourite pass-time of being in the 
wilderness  and  in  the  company  of  animals,  I  enjoyed  painting,  observing,  listening, 
reading, and writing, which opened doors into the “hard” and other sciences, humanities 
and the arts and mapped a special place in my heart for zoology and ethology. 
The kindness of animals and the wilderness I have known stood in stark contrast  
with the violence I have experienced and witnessed at the hands of civilised people: I have 
worked in refugee death camps and have come face to face with perverts and serial killers 
(both,  the legal-military types and the illegal-warped ones).  I  have seen anthropogenic 
deforestation crawl up in front of my eyes in Africa and in Europe and have understood 
what  it  is  like  to  suffocate from agrarian chemicals  and poisons  in  the overpopulated 
countryside of Asian lands. And, throughout my life, ever since I understood where meat 
came from at the age of four, my concern was to learn how to live right in this world 
which meant, how to take care of it, not cause it pain and be happy with it. 
In  all  of my undertakings,  I  sought  this  synchrony with  the  wilderness I  have 
known and this has driven me to abandon my studies in civil engineering, then fine arts, 
xthen political (war) journalism in  Africa,  then anthropological research in  Europe, and 
guided me through my explorations of North and Central America, Australia,  and Asia. 
The various pieces I have collected from these multi-dimensional voyages have fallen into 
place when my daughter came into my life and set me off on my most important quest of 
finding out what do I really have to offer the generations to come. Epistemology, ontology 
and anthropology should have taught me how to live in this world full of human hatred, 
discrimination, deforestation, pollution, and war. But the only direction they pointed me to 
was back to wilderness.
We are force-fed with literacy and literature from our first day because we are told 
that we cannot live without learning how to read and write. But if my own reading and 
writing stemmed from a desire to hear, understand, and relate the truth, I realised that, 
apart from the pressures of censorship and social demands, there remained the question 
that what we read or hear is often in dissonance with what the author or the speaker means 
or even wants. And if I meant to live by my words, I needed to understand better what it  
was I was saying and offering my daughter and the world. What is this language? This 
written  culture?  This  knowledge  that  confuses  us,  contradicts  our  wild  purpose  and 
innermost desires yet to which we cling with our teeth and which we adamantly insist on 
transmitting to our children? Most important, what is the state of the world that we leave 
them with after we have approached it with our knowledge and culture?
I, therefore, acknowledge that  this research is  not  disinterested.  I  firmly believe 
that no work of science or art is without an agenda, usually formulated as intent, research 
questions, and methodologies. This dissertation on children's literature and the knowledge 
on which it is based is no exception. 
This is my gift to Ljuba. 
I thank you, my angel, for all you have taught me, for your gift  of compassion, 
understanding, patience and love. I have done everything in my power to live by what I 
firmly believe, but I have no power over others to convince them to stop and question their 
knowledge and their humanity. I can only offer my argument, which I dedicate to you, my 
child, and to the children who will regain the wilderness lost.
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Introduction
The Root of It All: Theory of Literature and Life
This work is about stories. It is  about the stories we tell our children, which are 
more about ourselves than anyone else and thus are also stories for ourselves. We live with 
these stories and revisit them as we grow, accumulate experience, and derive new sense 
out of them. Yet at the same time, how much does our understanding of the themes, tropes, 
and  topoi  and  our  revision  of meaning  throughout  our  lives  impact  our  actions  and 
“culture”? Why is  there a  persistence of certain tropes for racism,  sexism,  speciesism, 
stratification, poverty, violence (legal violence known as war and illegal expressions of the 
same rationale), etc., in civilised society and in the fictional narratives we dream? How is 
it  that  most  human  animals  today associate  civilisation with  order,  decency,  fairness, 
peacefulness and are horrified by the mere mention of wilderness,  anarchy,  and chaos 
which they a priori dismiss as violent, disorderly and unpredictably hostile whereas, in 
fact, historical records demonstrate that the scale of violence, particularly in its organised 
warfare state, in civilisation has reached an unprecedented scale and becomes most brutal 
the  more  “civilised”  and  “orderly”  a  group  of  people  become?  One  does  not  need 
Wikileaks to see this pattern; the images broadcast daily ever since the invention of print 
and television media have made Goya's paintings of war seem to originate in the realm of 
tales for children, an Alice in Wonderland adventure, a nightmare which we can blink off 
and from which we think that we can wake up only to step into an even more horrible 
reality1.
These questions have prompted my comparative approach as I set out to analyse 
the underlying concepts that form the basis of our knowledge about ourselves, others, and 
the world and to trace their expression in children's literature. After having examined a 
1 One only has to look at the pictures of Rwanda, Serbia, Bosnia, the former U.S.S.R., Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan, et al.
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wide variety of fictional, scientific, theological, “realist”, and other narratives addressed to 
various audiences (adults and children), I have concluded that knowledge is constructed 
from specific  perspectives,  usually  with a  specific  end.  These perspectives  inform the 
various narrative versions that define the specific narrativity on which knowledge is based 
and these narratives stand on two distinct ontological (pro)positions that provide the basis 
for three socio-economic and political paradigms. Namely, an epistemological inquiry into 
the history and the processes by which means bodies of knowledge get constructed reveals 
three anthropological models for social relations. These ontological principles provide the 
basis for our understanding and offer specific explanations and reasons for the existence of 
humans and the world.  Moreover,  these precepts prompt  us to build  specific  bodies of 
knowledge that feed the rationale behind communal and individual actions (culture).
The two basic ontological positions are those of wildness and domestication. These 
positions  define the  spectrum of possibilities  for  cultural expressions  and  the  ensuing 
socio-economic  systems,  with  anything  in  between  them amounting  to  a  negotiation 
between these two ends, e.g. the various expressions of socialism, communism, etc., or 
models that attempt a compromise between the two perspectives.
As all words do, the various terms regarding the nature of the world, of life,  of 
human  and  non-human  persons,  the  words  wilderness,  civilisation,  nature,  and 
domestication have  been adapted to  the political and socio-cultural  contexts in  which 
people have been using them. Here, instead of inventing new terms, I use the word “wild” 
to denote those who have not  been incorporated into the system of servitude either as 
natural resource for industrialisation, technology, social and symbolic capital, etc., or as a 
labour  resource,  or  for  consumption  as  food  or  pleasure.  In  this  respect,  wilderness 
presents a spacial dimension for the existence of living and non-living beings sharing that 
space  and  time  without  infringing  on  each  other's  purpose  for  existence.  Wildness 
identifies  the  character  of  such  untamed  individuals  and  their,  usually  diverse  inter-
species, communities of life and non-life. The term “nature” here denotes the character of 
these  relations.  In  this  sense,  it  is  in  the  “nature”  of wild  relationships  to  follow the 
concept of chaos theory: a complex and highly dynamic system that consists of a large 
number and variety of particles in movement and their relationships with the movement of 
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others. In other words, the nature of wilderness is constant improvisation and movement. 
Its universe consists of particles whose interests,  conflicts,  and spontaneity usually get 
resolved as an unpredictable, yet harmonious cosmic dance.
This leads to the definition of the term “nature”, which I use to designate the way 
in which things function: the nature of civilised or domesticated humans is  going to be 
different from the nature of wild beings, for instance. I do not use it to indicate a spacial 
construct of tamed “wood” or tamed landscape that the civilised literature often refers to; 
for example: “let's have a picnic in nature”. My definition of wilderness and civilisation 
precludes the usage of this highly problematic term and hence I designate “wilderness” for 
the spacial aspect of chaos, “wildness” for the character of the untamed and nature as a 
descriptive term of relationships and their systems. As for domestication and civilisation, I 
use these terms interchangeably, for civilisation is a system of domesticated relationships 
with everything material and symbolic that comes out of the labour and consumption that 
such a system allows. In other words, the basic premise in the ontology of wildness is that 
everyone  – human or non-human, child or adult, male, female, intersexual, bisexual, or 
asexual, whatever the species, the ethnic background or race (all of which are important 
classifications for civilisation only) – is considered to be an agent of her life, driven by 
desires that play into the cosmic harmony of plurality. The wild see the world as existing 
for its own reasons, its space and time untamed and solely its own, whether it  has been 
created by an external divine force or generated through its own exploded forces. 
The ontology of domestication, on the other hand, views the world as a resource in 
need of manipulation and control and therefore classifies all living and non-living matter 
into categories that basically amount to “subjects” and “resources”.  Whether created by 
God or through Natural Selection, the civilised see the world as existing to be tamed and 
consumed by those who have been chosen by the divine force or who have evolved to be 
the masters of the universe—they see the world as a space that must be colonised, its time 
and energy rationed and exploited. In other words, the purpose of everything is calculated 
in  terms  of  consumption.  This  utilitarian  humanist  principle  finds  its  expression  in 
anthropological categories  such as  professionalisation,  segregation,  discrimination,  and 
stratification. 
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The  third  compromise  position  between  these  two  ontologies  allots  space  for 
humans and space for wilderness. It sees the purpose for the existence of human resources 
in work for the “higher” social good but not for hierarchical ends. The conflict between 
the need to oversee the working masses and to educate them (i.e. to modify their desires 
and steer them towards choosing to fulfil functions that they would not have otherwise 
chosen), however, remains unresolved as this compromise ontological position presumes 
that there are some people who know where the others should be herded and that therefore 
some  are  designated  to  guide  while  others  to  work  and  be  guided.  Thereby  the 
compromise  narrative  fails  to  offer  an  explanation  for  the  genesis,  reasons  or  the 
mechanisms of socio-economic inequalities when its claimed end is equality. Furthermore, 
it  focuses on humanism stressing the equality of “human rights” between people in their 
gender and ethnic variation but excludes non-humans from the equation of equals, even if 
it allows them their space. This compromise position also fails to explain another conflict 
that concerns colonisation, for, even though the colonising pace of communist or socialist 
systems  is  slower  than  that  of  the  capitalist/humanist  consumption  of  wilderness,  it 
remains  present  and  necessarily  expanding  due  to  the  very  nature  of  civilised 
consumption; yet this problem does not receive the due recognition in its narrative.
These ontological premises  inform our  dispositions,  decisions,  and  actions  that 
issue  a  social  order  which  has  a  direct  effect  on  the  environment  and  on our  own 
physiological landscape that find expression in our habitus , body hexis, doxa, and praxis.  
Habitus, according to Pierre Bourdieu (1990), is the flux of history and anthropology and, 
concomitantly,  a  vector  of  the  dialectical  forces  of  revolution,  permanence,  and 
reproduction  of  events,  knowledge,  bodies,  and  esprits2 since  habitus is the  sum of 
information  that  a  person  absorbs  from  personal  experience,  social  relationships, 
education,  and  cultural  heritage  of  whole  epochs.  All  of  these  experiences  and 
“information” get encoded in the flesh forming a person's durable dispositions, informing 
choices, and mapping behaviour usually in accord with the social group to which a person 
“belongs”. As each person internalises previous – her own and her ancestral – experiences, 
she becomes aligned with the cultural heritage and, through these dispositions,  beliefs, 
2 Like ande in Swedish, the French term esprit incorporates both mind and spirit and hence linguistically 
renders the relationship more holistic than the separate terms for  “mind” and “spirit” in English and 
Russian, the languages with which I will be predominantly concerned in this work.
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feelings, body, and mind, becomes part of the mechanism of the economy of effort, the 
effort that would have been needed to (re)invent new solutions on every new occasion. 
This economy of effort sets in motion the mechanism that reproduces cultural and social 
institutions. Instead of making new decisions, the person economises effort and through 
habitus and doxa (the underlying knowledge and beliefs of which the person is not aware) 
re-enacts the already established cultural and social patterns of behaviour by applying the 
previously deduced formulae or conclusions that  have been inscribed into our personal 
body hexis.
Furthermore,  Bourdieu's  understanding of this “economy of effort” explains the 
mechanisms  by  which  institutions  proliferate  even  through  revolutions,  and  make 
particularly clear sense when examined through the work of Mary Douglas (1986),  How 
Institutions Work. Institutions consist  of individuals with their  experience,  dispositions, 
interests,  worldviews,  personalities,  ontologies,  relationships,  desires,  anger,  generosity, 
greed, pain,  praxis, dispositions, and habitus. Yet when these individuals act on behalf of 
the institutions that  “represent” them and structure their lives,  they re-enact  a  specific 
scenario or the narrative of those institutions heeding the institutional interests which, in a 
hierarchical  socio-economic  system,  often conflict  with  their  own needs,  desires,  and 
welfare (AbdelRahim, 2009b). 
The major mechanism for the proliferation of institutions (which necessarily are 
civilised, for in the multiplicity of wild forces, desires, voices and needs there can be no 
centralised effort  for  uniformity)  is  language and symbolic  culture since the ensemble 
provides the grammar that structures the exchange of symbolic capital; it offers formulae 
that impose strict codes in the unequal exchange in the economy of individual effort and 
of social interactions—formulae that inform the doxa or the knowledge that the individual 
does not know that he or she knows. The most important dialectic in civilisation, thus, 
resides in the antagonisms between the interests of institutions and the interests of the 
majority of individuals who re-enact the social habitus of these institutions through body 
hexis, personal  habitus and  doxa, as Mary Douglas argues, often at the risk of personal 
peril or harm.
The two  ontological premises of wildness and  civilisation and  the compromise 
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position between them provide the foundation for the anthropological expression of three 
socio-political  and  economic  paradigms,  namely:  (a)  the  anarcho-primitivist,  (b)  the 
civilised or the agricultural-capitalist (monarchist, feudal, totalitarian, democratic systems, 
etc., fit this model), and (c) the spectrum ranging from the anarcho-socialist to communist 
systems. These anthropological expressions and political paradigms are projected in their 
respective  narratives  that  order  events  and  propel  specific  evolutionary  trajectories 
providing the rationale for each corresponding system. In this way,  even when applied 
creatively and in novel ways, stories follow the established patterns of “the economy of 
effort”  (Bourdieu’s  praxis) in  finding  ways  to  deal with  disruptions  of an established 
routine  (socio-economic  or  cultural  system)  and  inscribe  themselves  through  time, 
direction, and plot into the cultural narrative. 
One  can say,  hence,  that  narrative imposes  a  linear  continuity,  even in  such a 
seemingly disruptive and shattered understanding of experience as projected by “cubism” 
and  “surrealism”  or  their  larger  narrative  of  “postmodernism”,  whose  logic  roughly 
amounts to: “first there was primitive man, then there was civilisation – a great promise 
that liberated man from the misery of constant death – but then war happened (WWI for 
instance)  and so people's  sense of self collapsed followed by the shattering of artistic 
expression that  depicted the acute sense of fragility;  but  finally  came  postmodernism, 
which, according to postomodernist theoreticians, such as Lyotard (1984), gave us a sense 
that  everyone  and  every  voice  mattered.  Therefore,  through  the  great  contradiction 
inherent in a reality built of a multiplicity of truths, we are in the narrative of progress and 
so  are  still  heading  forward  into  the  promised  bright  future  of  multiculturalism  and 
multivoicism”. 
This  underlying  narrative  permeates  a  variety  of  disciplines:  it  inheres  in  the 
monotheistic promise of punishment and reward; it  is present in the Darwinist theory of 
evolution; it is predicted in the bright future of communism and equally of capitalist vision 
of prosperity. Its sense of continuity has provided the means to gloss over the uneven parts 
and to silence the voices that were not authorised to challenge the civilised narrative and 
its mythology, thereby providing the mechanism that renders knowledge chrono/logical, 
its meaning continuous and based on the concept of credibility that is loosely associated 
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with truth. The pivotal aspect of this knowledge became the logic of “con/sequences” that 
contains the notions of sequence (continuity) and punishment. This crucial link between 
logic, punishment, and the concept of continuity, which ultimately flows into the concept 
of permanence, establishes the agenda of civilisation and informs its principal meaning, 
criteria  and  direction  and  in  civilisation  grounds  it  in  the  context  of  authorship  and 
authority.
The stories we hear and tell and the larger narratives in which they are inscribed 
thus transcend us. Since individuals embody the social structures and their institutions that 
the  stories  articulate  and  the  narratives  channel,  in  the  context  of civilisation,  people 
become  the  vectors  that  ensure  the  perpetuity  of  historical  institutions,  while, 
simultaneously, render them personal and prone to individual improvisation.  Narratives 
hence also contain internal contradictions revealed by the tendency of  habitus to drive 
individuals to make their decisions and choices in favour of established institutions. Such 
decisions and choices in favour of the institution, that by its nature oppresses its members, 
reveal the doxa or the underlying knowledge of which the individuals are not aware. The 
doxa ensures the permanence of the past while, at the same time, individual desires and 
praxis provide the space for surprise.
The  ontological  foundation  of  a  cultural  narrative  anchors  the  mechanism for 
controlling the checks and balances of the elements of chaos by suppressing improvisation 
and  surprise  in  favour  of order  and  permanence  of the  structure  of  civilisation,  thus 
maintaining  the tenacity of civilised institutions  despite  the unprecedented numbers of 
victims of anthropogenic extinctions of species and genocides. According to Donald A. 
Levin and Phillip  S.  Levin,  “on average, a distinct species of plant  or animal becomes 
extinct every 20 minutes” (University of Texas report, Austin, 2002). 
Institutions are the particularity of civilisation, because they order space and lock it  
in a construct of permanence, thereby creating the concept of time and with it a sense of 
finality that thrives on the fear of that same finality. Thus these narratives are different not 
only ontologically, but also anthropologically. For instance, in terms of plot development, 
narratives of wildness3 do not have a grammar for resolving conflict in a standard, routine, 
3 Throughout this work, I use wilderness to denote a spacial topos that could be mapped in the emotional, 
psychological or  physiological space of beings, while  wildness to specify the characteristic aspects of 
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or  formulaic  way,  because  each  situation  is  a  moment  in  chaos  that  needs  to  be 
comprehended in its entirety with all of one's senses and knowledge, both the knowledge 
of habitus and of doxa. In other words, these narratives do not project any one group or a 
set of exemplary actions or qualities as always leading to “goodness” nor do they punish 
the  “evil”.  Narratives  of  wilderness  resolve  conflicts  in  favour  of  diversity  and  the 
proliferation  of  communities  of life.  The  narrative  of civilisation,  on the  other  hand, 
resolves  these  conflicts  in  favour  of  homogeneity,  human  control  of  wilderness, 
domestication, and the exploitation of resources.  In  this  sense,  narratives express and, 
concomitantly, shape our scientific, religious, and cultural views as well as dispositions 
and knowledge. 
Among the various possibilities of projecting the basic foundations of these larger 
narratives, works for children, like all stories, relay to us specific worldviews, articulate 
desired  trajectories  for  our  personal  and  social  lives,  warn  us  of  dangers,  veil  our 
contradictions and have the power to channel our doxa into the status quo, wreak havoc, or 
bring revolutions. Children's literature, thus, occupies a critical position at the nexus of 
memes,  genes,  doxa and  habitus directing  the  flux  of  ontologies,  epistemologies  and 
anthropologies at a period of life – childhood – when the rate of assimilation of conscious 
knowledge  (ideology)  and  unconscious  knowledge  (doxa),  as  well  as  the  negotiation 
between personal interests with the conflicting interests of the institution (habitus) are 
most  intense.  The ontological basis absorbed, particularly,  during this period forges the 
body hexis (the way the body carries itself,  moves and interacts with one's space),  the 
habitus,  and  provides  a  powerful  impetus for  individual  expression of  praxis thereby 
determining subsequent trajectories through socio-economic and cultural paradigms and 
the ensuing anthropogenic modifications of the environment (Arshavsky and Nikitina in 
AbdelRahim, 2009b).
The civilised have recognised this potential of children's  literature thousands of 
years ago and, just as with its adult counterpart, put the different works for children to 
“practical” use. For example, the Pañcatantra in India constituted a bible of instruction for 
the child-prince, the future ruler; it was an important part of the oral tradition prior to 200 
being wild.
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BC and was written down after that date. The tradition of providing educative stories that 
conveyed specific morals through anthropomorphic animals with the explicit purpose of 
instilling  a  specific, civilised  habitus  appeared  later  in  Aesop’s  Fables,  as  well  as  in 
Krylov's and de la Fontaine's, or in the animal stories of Afansiev, the magical tales of the 
Arabian Nights, the Canterbury Tales and ancient Chinese and Japanese works of morals 
and ethics. More recent books, such as  Alice in Wonderland, regardless of whether they 
may appear  to  be  mocking  the  civilised  social  norms  and  exposing  the  absurdity  of 
hierarchical,  civilised  language  and conventions,  nevertheless end up reconfirming  the 
social  habitus of  the  senseless  culture  that  the  books  ridicule.  In  the  case  of  Lewis 
Carroll's work, this is expressed at the end, the moment when Alice wakes up back in her 
world  and  exhales  a  sigh of:  “O'  thank  goodness,  I'm home,  back  to  that  habitus of 
oppressive, yet familiar and therefore dear order; for, that dream was madness and chaos 
and home, no matter how ridiculous, nonsensical, even abusive, is always best”. In other 
words, through a narrative that promises to venture beyond the civilised frontiers into a 
new and untamed territory, where meaning is discarded and paradigms are broken, these 
stories  become  the  vehicles  for  the  larger  narrative  that  reconfirms  the  institution  of 
civilisation and its language.
The precarious nature of children's literature is further exacerbated by the role of 
literacy in domestication, stratification, and oppression (Walter Ong, 1982 and 1986; Jack 
Goody,  1968,  1977 and 1987;  John Zerzan 2002,  inter  alios), and the central  role  of 
literacy  in  education  today.  First,  the  very  notion  of  education  can  exist  only  in  a 
domesticated  society  that  perceives  as  normal  the  eradication  of  all  traces  of  will, 
idiosyncrasies, and wildness and that makes a conscious effort to engineer the body hexis, 
habitus, dreams, minds, and  praxis according to a uniform standard. Pedagogies cannot 
exist in wild societies, because the ontology assumes that if beings are born to live, then 
they must be hardwired to learn how to live, and that the reason for them living is simply 
to enjoy life. The fundamental assumption in wilderness is that the world is good for life, 
and that living beings know what's best for them, and, since they cannot thrive in a dying 
environment, the best for living beings is a balance in the community of life.  Civilised 
societies, on the other hand, impose education – or the strenuous modification, through 
punishment  and  reward,  of  children's  natural  behaviour  and  the  suppression  of  wild 
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impulses for life. This modification of one's purpose and being becomes the focus of inter-
generational relations and constitutes the most characteristic experience of childhood that  
lasts,  at least, until early adult  years,  if  not  later,  because the basic  assumption is  that 
children  will  not  learn  how to  live  (in  civilisation)  by  serving  others  as  resources.  
When a child appears, she does not learn through language but through interaction 
and experience. Her purpose is  to try, test, and experience herself and her surroundings 
with  an innocent  sincerity  that  challenges  the  grammar  of civilised  relationships  and 
epistemology. Since children are born wild and illiterate, it becomes crucial for civilisation 
to domesticate and turn them into resources through an intensive and lengthy process of 
education. Hence, children are confined to teaching institutions for decades in which they 
are domesticated and taught that they cannot be free, that they have to complete specific 
tasks to earn points that will eventually allow them to work for someone and thus live by 
being consumed. Non-domesticated societies of non-human and human animals,  on the 
contrary,  allow the child  to  develop her  instincts and biodiverse relationships through 
experience and self-realisation, no matter how obscure that self-realisation may appear to 
others.
Like never  before,  the last  century has  seen an unprecedented globalisation of 
obligatory  schooling  where  the  formation  of  civilised  children's  habitus has  become 
largely confined to the classroom where obedience of higher ranking persons of authority 
(e.g. teacher or appointed class leaders) is  demanded and where the children's learning 
takes  place  through listening  to  the  teacher  and  through reading  and writing,  thereby 
eliminating the possibilities of children experiencing the chaos of everyday life in the real 
world and of building a wide range of meaningful relationships with human and non-
human persons outside of school walls. In the last century, literacy and imperial languages 
have been imposed on children around the world regardless of their cultural background or 
the work they end up seeking.  Particularly in  recent  years,  there has been a tendency 
toward  the  virtualisation  of  children's  experience  and  education  through  books  and 
technologies, not least of all the internet. With this totalitarian imposition of literacy, the 
mode of transmission of  habitus and cultural guidelines underwent  a transformation in 
terms of the degree of sophistication of contradictions and nuances depicted in books. The 
apparent  paradox is  that  the narrative and the ontological premises are by themselves 
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sufficient  to  course through the high flux of white  noise.  Simplistic  propaganda is  no 
longer necessary or even an efficient  proliferation strategy of any given institution, for 
instance, such as the capitalist  paradigm. A complex text  that successfully conveys the 
inherent contradictions of a society whose foundation is rooted firmly in the ontological 
premises of a civilised/domesticated world proves to be more effective as a “pedagogical” 
tool or “propaganda” when it acknowledges difficulties and contradictions while tapping 
into the fears and ignorance of other possible solutions. All the while, it comforts the fears 
by imposing sanctioned resolutions that have been worked out by that specific social or 
historical habitus and into whose world the text invites the reader4. 
Yet, in spite of this totalitarian domestication via literacy, childhood promises to be 
this place of wilderness.  The possibility of reaching the internal and external space by 
interacting with children, including with the ideological child of the cultural imaginary as 
well as with the doxic child inside oneself, opens the door to a dimension of wilderness 
that beckons the reader and the author who, by addressing this imaginary child, attempt to 
negotiate their own sphere of agency and concurrently contest the civilising pedagogies. In 
this respect, children's literature is particularly interesting for understanding the constructs 
and  processes  of  identification  and  alienation  and  the  underlying  anthropological, 
epistemological, and philosophical assumptions at the basis of knowledge. Often, writers, 
whose works are considered as children's books, state explicitly that the books they have 
authored were intended for the child within the adult. Alan Alexandre Milne's Winnie-the-
Pooh is one such book. Tove Jansson's first Moomin story, The Little Trolls and the Great  
Flood5, was another tale written during World War II as an alternative world of tolerance 
and warmth where evading conflict proves to be a better strategy for life and happiness 
than war.
The multiplicity of levels of references, questions, problems, and information, as 
well as the unintentionally imbued knowledge, or the doxa, of some literary works make it 
4 These historically honed civilised narratives provide the formulae for  praxis and explain how complex 
and overtly questioning stories can be domesticated within the civilised meta-narrative. For instance, 
critical T.V. series such as “In Living Color”, the Simpsons, Futurama, or  House M.D. can be safely 
broadcast on one of America's most conservative television stations, the Fox channel, without posing a 
threat to the conservative version of the civilised narrative that the owners and directors of the channel 
officially promote.
5 Original Title: Småtrollen och den stora översvämningen (1945).
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difficult to identify the books as geared for any specific audience, even though they may 
be marketed in some countries as books for adults or for children.  No wonder, then, the 
most significant stories for children have always been the ones whose age demarcations, if 
there at all,  have been hazy and the intentions behind their creation not always clearly 
articulated or even in the realm of consciousness of the authors themselves. In fact, most 
often,  they  have  been  originally  intended  for  adult  or,  at  least,  multiple  audiences: 
Aucassin  and  Nicolette,  folk  tales,  animal  tales,  Robinson Crusoe,  Gulliver's  Travels, 
Huckleberry Finn, Treasure Island, many of the stories by Hans Christian Andersen, not to 
mention religious lore, scientific tales, and many more. 
In examining culture, society, literature and narrative ultimately one stumbles on 
the most fundamental of all problems: language. The most pervading topos of civilisation 
is  that  humans are different  from other  animals  because they presumably have special 
characteristics (such as a large brain), capacities (such as language), the ability for abstract 
thinking,  and  the  posture and  skill  to  build  technology.  The  ramifications  for  a  wild 
ontology are far-reaching when we consider the evidence that language, abstract thought, 
and upright posture have been available to other, non-civilised humans and animals (which 
I discuss in-depth in  the third part  of this work), and yet  not everyone has chosen the 
civilised language and way of knowing and relating to the world.
Language and narrative articulate the mythology that becomes the main vehicle for 
propagating  civilisation by whose  means  domestication has  been  able  to  colonise  the 
planet. While most scholars have focused on the positive aspects of language in terms of 
creativity, communication and narrativity, in this work, I invite the reader to explore the 
darker side of language and to challenge some of the commonly held assumptions that 
attribute a superiority to the human animal for his ability for language, which ability is 
usually taken to distinguish and thereby separate human animals from non-human people. 
Such a critique of humanism and language, I argue, is  fundamental for our capacity to 
imagine different ways of communication with others, of community, and of being, since, 
as the studies on animals discussed in part three demonstrate, wild beings enjoy a safer, 
more compassionate and diverse community than the statistics of the casualties at  the 
hands of humans indicate: as the above mentioned University of Texas report states, “a 
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distinct species of plant or animal becomes extinct every twenty minutes”, oceans and land 
are desertifying on an unprecedented scale, and the billions of humans perished in wars 
beat even the number of causalities of the most vicious of viruses and cancers that the 
civilisation has bred itself. What if, I ask, we are able to build community and to preserve 
some of our wilderness not because of language, but rather in spite of it?
Most of the blame or credit (depending on which way one looks at the end result)  
for the rise of civilisation has usually been placed on the Neolithic Revolution which has 
been propelled by the concept of “resources” shifting human livelihood from gathering to 
hunting and “finally” to agricultural civilisation. The concept of resources also made it 
possible  to  conceive  of property:  namely,  who  owns  the  resources  and  who  or  what 
constitutes the resources for the owners and thus made possible the institution of social 
hierarchy with its inequalities, poverty and wealth, ultimately leading to organised warfare 
among humans and between civilised humans and wilderness leading to the extermination 
of  a  wide  range  of  human  and  non-human  cultures  and  other  forms  of  perceived 
competition, be it  weeds, mice, birds, and any wild others, including (civilised) humans. 
Even today, individual farmers as well as the institutions in charge of agriculture, such as 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) purposefully poison thousands and 
millions of animals and birds (Wisniewski, 20th January 2011). Historically speaking, in 
the blink of an eye,  it  has taken approximately seven thousand years for civilisations, 
whether Mesoamerican or Middle Eastern, to mushroom after the first steps towards the 
domestication  of  dogs,  horses,  and  crops  (Ellen  in  Ingold,  1997;  Sunderland,  1973; 
Dickens, 2004) and to create a body of “knowledge” based on three myths.
The three myths of civilisation are: (1) civilisation is natural and naturally superior 
to other forms of community and existence and is a state that all beings allegedly strive to 
achieve,  whether by means of natural selection or by obeying the divine decree to  be 
rewarded with humanism and its attributes (reincarnation into the higher human form or 
the  monotheistic  view  of  the  role  of  humans  on  earth  are  expressions  of  the  same 
domesticating  premise); (2)  the myth that,  contrary to  wilderness,  civilisation offers  a 
better, longer, healthier, and safer life for all human and non-human animals and which, 
therefore,  all human and non-human animals prefer  and for  whose “benefits”  they are 
24
“willing” to forfeit  independence, movement,  and self-determination; (3) the myth that 
civilisation is moral, ethical, and compassionate and that wilderness is brutal, amoral, and 
ruthless. I discuss the narrative of these myths in-depth in the third part of my research.
These myths provide the backbone for the epistemological narrative and offer a 
system of justification for coercive and abusive relationships that constitute the culture of 
civilisation with its epistemology, ontology, and anthropology. I refer to this narrative with 
its  inverted  definitions,  postulates,  and  interpretations  of  reality  as  unknowledge,  the 
ignorance that forms the axis of civilised habitus,  doxa, and praxis with a severe impact 
on the social and natural environment.
In this way, I endeavour to offer a comparative analysis of scientific narratives and 
children's literature. Relying on an interdisciplinary approach that draws on anthropology, 
literary  theory,  literature,  and  education,  this  research  examines  the  conflicts  and 
contradictions  between  the  colonising  ontology  of  civilisation  and  the  all-inclusive 
ontology of wilderness in children's books. This leads to a range of observations, including 
about the nature of the relationship between domestication and demographics and their 
relationship to the control of pleasure, gender, sexuality, and reproduction; or, the problem 
of ownership, access to and the distribution of food, resources, and the interconnectedness 
of labour and poverty; or, the premises informing the socio-economic infrastructures and 
the politics of classification, identity, and forged desires.
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Presentation of the Project, Its Structure and Outline
As discussed in the introduction, narratives of wilderness have no singular format 
or predictable outcome. They do not have a plot and they accept a multiplicity of voices 
and  perspectives.  Relationships  in  the  wild  are  governed  by  chaos  and  reciprocity. 
Empathy allows for imagination and intelligence regarding the ways of the world, whereas 
in  civilisation  relationships  are  governed  by  concrete  interests  that  lock  beings  into 
claustrophobic  cells  of  dependence  defined  by  such  categories  as  “resources”  and 
“owners”.  Having  introduced  the  problem of  domestication  by  means  of  identifying 
groups as resources for others in the context of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of knowledge, 
social and material capital, and  praxis, I have proceeded in three methodological steps, 
each of which is  taken up in  one of the three parts of the dissertation that  reflect  the 
epistemological, ontological and anthropological nature of this inquiry.
The first part, entitled “Epistemologies of Chaos and the Orderly Unknowledge of 
Literacy”, examines the context for the existence of and the need for literature as a system 
of representation that made it possible for civilised human animals to substitute artificial 
symbols for reality. This separation from the real by means of symbols and literature was 
propelled by the possibilities for abstraction that were made available by the confining 
power of grammar or language. The twelve chapters that constitute this part approach the 
problem  of  confinement  from  various  perspectives  and  disciplines,  such  as  medical 
anthropology, legal concepts of justice, and anarchist theory. Chapter  1  begins  by 
situating the methodological problems of knowledge, in which I argue that all knowledge 
as  well as ignorance are cultural constructs stemming from a person's experience and 
position in either civilisation or wilderness. This chapter consists of nine parts in which I 
explain the experiences that have guided me to formulate my understanding of the world 
and  the  methodologies  for  accumulating  and  analysing  information  as  well  as  the 
importance of the biographies of the three authors whose works for children exemplify 
three different socio-economic and cultural paradigms: the monarcho-civilised system of 
socio-economic relations, the anarcho-socialist, and the anarcho-primitivist. 
Having situated my own methods as well as the authors and their works, I proceed 
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to chapter 2 in which I discuss the sociological ramifications of narratives, language(s) 
and literacy,  inspired  particularly by questions  from anthropological studies  of control 
narratives  (Mattingly  and  Garro,  2000)  and  the  sociological  theory  of  knowledge 
(Bourdieu, 2001). Namely, I argue that there is a fundamental difference in the underlying 
premises of oral traditions, wild stories, and civilised, literary narratives, a discussion that 
leads to chapter 3 on the nature of language and its role in the civilised order as a source of 
organised  violence.  Here,  I  examine  John  Zerzan's  (2002)  critique  of  language  and 
civilisation and draw on anthropological and historical research by Jack Goody and Ian 
Watt (1963) on the effects of literacy on the brain of civilised humans.
Chapter 4 focuses on literacy as a tool of domestication and oppression, developing 
further connections between Zerzan's critique of language as a technology of violence and 
research by Walter Ong and Jack Goody on the differences between social relationships in 
literate societies as based on debt that contrast with oral societies that, according to Goody 
and Ong,  are founded on memory,  presence  and reciprocity.  In this  context,  I  discuss 
Lyotard's (1984) concept of the legitimating power of narratives while warning against the 
limitations of approaching the critique of narratives through Lyotard's argument. Lyotard's 
observations, however, become valuable when complemented by Pierre Bourdieu's (2001) 
theory of practice and Michel Foucault's (1961; 1963; 1972; and 1979) critique of power. 
The normalising and confining power of grammar and language becomes prominent when 
Lyotard's  concept  of  the  legitimating  meta-narrative  is  examined  in  the  context  of 
anarchist  theory,  particularly as it  is  articulated in  Peter Kropotkin's  (2002) critique of 
prisons and mental institutions and Michel Foucault's (1961 and 1963) studies on hospitals 
and the power of the medical gaze. In this regard, Nosov's book for children depicting the 
adventures of mites in an anarcho-socialist town articulates these critiques of power in a 
most creative literary fashion leading to the discussion in chapter 5 on the doctor's role in 
civilising  and  controlling  individuals  and  social  groups.  Here,  David  Rosenhan's 
experiment “On Being Sane in Insane Places” helps frame the discussion of diagnosis of 
mental “deviance”  and  “disability”  as  a  mechanism of identification and  recycling  of 
labour resources. In both the scientific literature and the literary children's text, questions 
of confinement and order stem from the need of civilisation to control resources and to 
extract the maximum profit from them. 
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In order  to  test  this narrative against  real-life  practices,  chapter 6 discusses the 
issues raised in Nosov's Dunno trilogy and the theoretical texts by Kropotkin, Rosenhan, 
and Foucault in light of my anthropological observations on the integration tactics adopted 
by Sweden's social workers and medical sector for Somali immigrants and the role  of 
literacy and Swedish children's books in the domestication of oral traditions. This example 
from the “field” illustrates the underlying concepts of control of movement and difference 
by  constructing  “foreignness”  as  deviance  thereby  controlling  immigration  by 
“medicalisaing” the “immigrant ghetto” as they are revealed in the underlying narrative of 
A.A.  Milne's  Winnie-the-Pooh as  well  as  in  real  life  immigration  policies  of  the 
“developed” world.
The issues arising from the role of medical authority in the legitimising narrative of 
civilisation lead to the question of authority and the methods of domestication by “curing” 
and “reforming” in order to (re)integrate and control of “resources” examined in chapter 7. 
Several “integrational” children's narratives, such as the Caillou series for pre-schoolers, 
illustrate the tactics that inform the civilised plot in the same way as does the legislature 
articulating the legal code for punishment. My case study here is the Canadian “spanking 
law”. 
Chapter  8  continues  with  the  problem  of  domestication  of  children's  inner 
wilderness by means of punishment in the underlying narrative of civilisation in children's 
literature. My case study here is Maurice Sendak's Where the Wild Things Are, which, in 
chapter 9,  I compare with the structure of relationships in  Winnie-the-Pooh's  100 Aker 
Wood and, which in chapter 10, I contrast with the anarcho-socialist perspective on justice 
in Nosov's trilogy tracing these concepts to Errico Malatesta (1984) and Kropotkin (2002). 
Namely, justice cannot be enforced by authority in a hierarchical setting, but is driven by 
one's conscience not to do harm and the desire for mutual relationships of community and 
support. In contrast, the uncompromising narratives of wilderness, as analysed in chapter 
11, see justice as based on randomness and yet rooted in the need for a person's place in 
the world and an intricate community of life as is depicted in Tove Jansson's court trial in 
Finn Family Moomintroll.
Finally, chapter 12 concludes the epistemological study of narratives of wilderness 
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and civilisation and the ways in which they project order and chaos, making a transition to 
part  II  of  my  research  on  the  genealogical  aspect  of  wilderness  and  domestication 
narratives and their ontologies.
The second part of my inquiry, entitled “Genealogical Narratives of Wilderness and 
Domestication:  Identifying  the  Ontologies  of  Genesis  and  Genetics  in  Children's 
Literature”,  also consists of twelve  chapters and deals  with the underlying  ontological 
premises  about  our  origins  and  the  effects  of  these  concepts  on  the  anthropological 
constructs as projected in the narratives of wilderness and civilisation in literature and in 
life.  I  proceed by looking at the “genesis” of the textual worlds of the three children's 
books as the opening of each demonstrates the structural importance of both the ontologies 
of genesis and the form in which they are conveyed. Here again, narratives of wilderness 
reveal  their  all-encompassing  essence  because  they stem from a  position of common 
origin of all living and non-living matter, while the narratives of domestication are based 
on the principle of categorisation, separation and hierarchical relationships of exploitation. 
Chapter 1 in this part analyses the premises of genesis in Jansson's moominbooks, 
pointing to the importance of trees and biodiversity in the community of life and tracing 
the “evolution” of the concept of the “tree of life” through wilderness and civilisation. As 
chapter  2  demonstrates,  the  principles  of  wilderness  are  learnt  from early  childhood 
through presence and empathy. Jansson shows the necessity to embrace the other and to 
overcome the fear of the other through acceptance. Empathy leads to understanding the 
loneliness and suffering of the fearsome as it  is  personified by the terrible  Groke and 
depicts  her  as  melting  when  little  Moomintroll  extends  a  hand  of  friendship.  The 
knowledge  that  is  acquired  through empathy and  the  ability  to  feel  and  imagine  the 
experience of others leads characters to develop their inner voices, which becomes their 
conscience guiding them to make the right decisions, even as they err, which I take up in 
chapter 3.  As Moominmamma leads the children through a false paradise of abundant 
sweets and artificial landscapes and light, she allows the children to experiment and decide 
for themselves that it is the real community, life, and sunshine that they are looking for. In 
this  respect,  the  Garden  of  Eden  or  the  lush  paradise  of  wilderness  is  not  about 
consumption but about moderation and letting life be.
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In  chapter  4,  I  contrast  the  moomintrolls'  rejection  of  the  false  paradise  of 
abundance  with  the desirable  chocolate  bliss  of Roald  Dahl's  (1973)  Charlie  and the 
Chocolate  Factory.  Dahl's  book  illustrates  the  logic  of  a  civilised  narrative  as  it  
domesticates and appropriates space, labour, resources and lives through a structure that 
institutionalises racism and speciesism, a system of rationalisation or abuse that shares the 
same  ontological  origins  with  all  the  forms  of  “management”,  exploitation,  and 
discrimination in the civilised narrative. Categorisation leads to the notions of “purity” and 
“cleanliness”  discussed  in  chapter  5  for  which  discussion  I  draw  on  Mary Douglas' 
concept of cultural purity, where again, the narratives of wilderness uphold biodiversity 
even  in  questions  of  personal  hygiene,  whereas  the  narratives  of  civilisation  present 
cleanliness in a hierarchical fashion, particularly pertaining to the categories of “human” 
and  “civilised”.  Here,  Winnie-the-Pooh stands  in  stark  contrast  to  the  diversity  of 
moomintrolls  and  the  question  of  food  becomes  relevant  from  both  the  religious 
prohibitions (Douglas, 1988) and the civilised scientific conception of what constitutes a 
proper human diet: the lives of others. In this respect, Winnie-the-Pooh's opening on zoos, 
domestication and oppression is consistent with the avarice that is presented as funny and 
desirable  for  a  chosen  few  and  is  based  on  the  principles  of  sado-masochistic  and 
voyeuristic pleasure. In other words, the civilised narrative is not only based on the gaze 
of control, but also on the practice of observing the tamed other for the pleasure of the 
agent or the owner. 
Chapter 7 compares the attempt of Nosov at a compromise between the ontologies 
of wilderness and civilisation. The genesis of Dunno's trilogy is rooted in the forest. The 
mites are depicted as vegan gatherers, but the author accepts the unfolding of the civilised 
narrative towards human evolution into a humanist and technological reality and hence the 
ineluctable separation of humans  from the animal world.  This  alienation proves to  be 
stronger  than  the  author's  intention  to  convey  the  ethics  of  kindness  to  animals  and 
wildlife  as required by a  universal code of morality.  Here,  conscience  and  ethics  are 
reminiscent of the moominwilderness, but the trilogy speaks clearly against confusion of 
species. Chapter 8 discusses the meaning of transformation between animal and human 
forms  in  the non-domesticated traditions as they compare and  contrast  with  the taboo 
against  transformation into non-human forms in civilised narratives that I follow up in 
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chapter  9.  Chapter  10  looks  at  the  meaning  of transformation  in  the  Moominvalley, 
demonstrating,  once  again,  the acceptance  and  recognition of a  universal essence  and 
belongingness regardless of one's form and whose nature it  is  to change. As chapter 11 
shows, such transformations are feared and taken to confuse the civilised order when the 
assumed genesis of beings is that of difference and unfamiliarity, as Dunno's experience in 
Sunny City proves.
In the final chapter 12 of this part, I discuss the philosophical and anthropological 
ramifications of these ontologies  and the importance of understanding how the narrative 
of civilisation is implicated in the pain of colonised wilderness and the domesticated lives. 
This  discussion  leads  to  part  III  of  my  research  that  deals  with  the  anthropological 
narratives in fiction and life.
The final part entitled “Anthropological Narratives in Fiction and Life” consists of 
seven chapters. Chapter 1 traces the critique of civilisation and the underlying premises of 
wilderness discussed in the previous two parts of my research and identifies three myths 
of  civilisation  that  impose  the  fictional  narrative  on  reality  through,  what  Lyotard 
identifies as, the legitimating power of the meta-narrative – in the case of contemporary 
civilisation,  this  meta-narrative  is  that  of science  –  namely,  the  Darwinian  theory of 
evolution and the civilised interpretation of Christianity. This narrative received serious 
challenges  from anarchist  perspectives  and  understanding  of  wilderness,  which  have 
nonetheless  been largely ignored or  silenced by means  of the civilised  mechanism of 
identification and alienation. The mechanism of domestication is structured by a complex 
mythology and subversion of facts, such as the claims that: (1) exploited beings choose to 
be exploited because in this way they improve their chances of survival; (2) the exploited 
human  and  non-human  slaves  are  happy;  (3)  that  domestication  renders  them more 
beautiful and perfect; (4) that civilisation is  part of a natural evolution towards a better 
stage through conflict and violence against hostile nature. However, studies of wilderness 
and civilisation by Peter Kropotkin, Darwin's contemporary, indicate that relationships in 
the  wild  are  governed  by mutual  aid  and  empathy,  whereas,  in  civilisation,  they are 
consistently ordered by both the fictional narratives promoting hierarchical relationships 
and the scientific rendering of the civilised narratives that focus on violence and predation 
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and, ignoring the prevalent reality of mutual aid and empathy, thereby justify violence and 
predation. Subsequent chapters provide an indepth analysis of these narratives. Chapter 2 
discusses the availability of data that point to the fact that animals are capable of choosing 
the  civilised  way  of  life  that  is  also  chosen  by  certain  viruses  and  a  few  bacterial 
epidemics, but nevertheless they tend to choose wild relationships that favour community 
and biodiversity.
Chapter 3 traces the projection of the scientific narrative for a civilised choice in 
Lucy Maud Montgomery's  (1983) children's  book,  Anne  of  Greene Gables.  Chapter  4 
discusses  Kropotkin's  studies  and  animal  psychology and ethology with  regard to  the 
choice  to  be  wild,  as well  as  Jeremy Bentham's  formulation of the  legal  question of 
personhood of animals in terms of sentience. I argue here that the question of humanism 
itself is  the main culprit  of oppression, exploitation, and discrimination which leads to 
chapter 5 that consists of three parts. The first section discusses the civilised myth that 
holds that the exploited beings are satisfied with their lot, an understanding that silences 
the cries of pain. The second section looks at the rationalisation of the myth that  justifies 
governance of humans and non-humans by drawing parallels with the training of horses 
and dogs (Patton in  Zoontologies) and ignores the wild purpose of beings, claiming that 
domestication and exploitation by humans actually improves the beings themselves and 
makes  them  beautiful.  I  also  trace  this  narrative  as  it  informs  the  relationship  in  a 
children's poem by Shel Silverstein (1964) “The Giving Tree”. The third section examines 
this narrative from the concept  of the machine and the ontological basis of limbs and 
technology. In this part of the research, I compare the narrative that justifies servitude and 
the critique of these ontologies in a variety of scientific, literary, and cinematic texts. My 
main focus here is on Haraway's Cyborg Manifesto, Nordlund's “The Foundations of Our 
Life:  Reflections  about  Human  labour,  Money  and  Energy  from  Self-sufficiency 
Standpoint”, and Dick's  Do Androids Dream of  Electric Sheep. My own critique stems 
from the proposition that had the world been hostile to life, life would not have happened. 
But since life happened, it has all the tools at its disposition to live in the world and the 
dependence on others to serve only deteriorates the chances for independence and the 
experience of meaningful relationships in the world. Kropotkin's observations support the 
fact  that  life  favours  the  diversity  of  species  and  beings  and  their  community  of 
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cooperation.
In chapter 6, I analyse how civilisation's promise of a safe, long, and prosperous 
life  for all if  they sacrifice their  time and lives perverts relationships and achieves the 
opposite, namely, suffering, illness, and high early mortality rates. I trace the formulation 
of the Darwinian narrative to the articulation of a racist and oppressive justification for 
starvation and genocides that Thomas Malthus (1798 [1998]) had provided and compare 
this narrative with the sociological, palaeontological, and medical data that disprove the 
civilised mythology and identify the civilised categorisation of beings into “agents” and 
“resources”,  along  with  the  agricultural  revolution,  as  the culprit  in  the  unsustainable 
population growth,  extermination of species,  and  genocides of human and non-human 
groups.
Finally,  in  conclusion,  I  demonstrate  how  the  Darwinian-Malthusian  narrative 
informs the civilised relationships on all levels of social organisation and is disseminated 
in pedagogical methods, children's literature, scientific texts, and film.
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I
Epistemologies of Chaos and the Orderly Unknowledge of Literacy
Chapter 1: Questions of Biography, Epistemology and Methodology
   1.1. I read therefore I am: a biographical perspective
Stockholm,  autumn 1997. Don Kulick ends presenting his research on trans-
gender prostitutes in Brazil. The presentation was interesting and raised many 
challenging issues. “Any questions,” asks Don. The first question accompanied 
by omnipresent even if quiet giggling: “was your research based on participant 
observation?”6
“Participant observation” – what is it? Does it  mean that there exists a method of 
“non-participant  observation” or perhaps “participant  non-observation”? Apart from the 
reasons that  drive us to participate and observe,  there is  also the question of how we 
participate  and  observe  or  how we  can  avoid  participation or  observation.  Does  one 
method have an advantage over the other in terms of accuracy or scientificity? 
These questions have been explored in numerous studies on methodology in social 
sciences.  Whole  university  courses  on  research  methods  comprise  the  obligatory 
curriculum in anthropology, sociology, and education. In studies on literature, questions of 
method are no  less pertinent  and their  impact  on the research and the efficiency with 
which literary analysis can divulge the secrets of the ways of the world are as important  
and as difficult to evaluate as they are in the 'hard' and 'social' sciences. 
For instance, in a comparative literary work it  may appear that the researcher is 
limited to participating in the observation of extensive bibliographic records of those who 
have made it in the print-capitalist world and got published. Oral and internet sources are 
accepted in anthropology and sociology as “field study” but not as authority. In all our 
endeavours to represent, challenge, or understand the world and ourselves, personal and 
6  Fieldnotes on The Encounter, anthropological research in Stockholm 1996-98.
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social factors as well as conscious and unconscious knowledge all play a vital role in the 
formation  of  our  beliefs,  attitudes,  “durable  dispositions”,  knowledge,  society,  reality 
itself, and of course our perspectives.
Pierre  Bourdieu's  anthropological  and  sociological  work  offers  a  most 
comprehensive theory of the inter-connectedness of the personal and the social factors in 
forging the symbolic, scientific, artistic, literary, and economic culture. In  The Logic of  
Practice (1990),  Bourdieu explains that  the  doxa,  or the taken for granted knowledge, 
which individuals are not aware of possessing, has been formed based on the perspectives 
and on behalf of the interests of the owners, masters, and agents who are in control of their 
own destiny as well as of the destiny (and hence of education) of their human and non-
human resources. The values, norms, and goals are set by these human people who are 
“agents”.  The reality,  norms,  and goals of those who are left  outside this category are 
limited in scope and controlled to the effect that they fulfil their role as resources for the 
“institution”.  This mechanism of the production of overt knowledge or ideology and of 
doxa goes hand in hand with the mechanism of regulation of the parasitic relationships 
that define civilisation. Civilised relationships entail the domestication of resources, which 
means that those in charge of domestication possess agency over their lives and over the 
lives  of the  domesticated  human  and  non-human  people.  The  doxa and  the  ideology 
guarantee  that  the  domesticated  resources  surrender  their  agency  and  believe  in  the 
normalcy and legality of their lack of access to symbolic and material capital, food, space, 
and other “resources”—an economic system that is regulated by the constant inflation of 
symbolic  value  attached  to  manners,  cultural  references,  symbolic  representation, 
language,  meaning,  among  other  elements  of  social  wealth.  In  Distinction,  Bourdieu 
(1979)  argues that  this  process  explains  the persistence of the pyramidal hierarchy of 
socio-economic relations. The doxa imposed by this hierarchical structure on members of 
a civilised “society” induces the majority of the dispossessed classes or groups to admire, 
trust, and dream of aligning their worth with the (upper) middle-class values, thereupon 
ensuring  their  participation in  this  system of resources  and  abuse,  which  explains  the 
durability of civilised dispositions and institutions.
In other words, 
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doxa is what agents immediately know, but do not know that they know. Or, as Bourdieu 
cleverly expresses this idea, it “goes without saying because it comes without saying” 
(1992:  167).  Moreover,  these  unrecognized  or  doxic  beliefs  are  shared  to  as  “an 
unquestioned and unified cultural 'tradition'” (Bourdieu and Wacquant: 248 n. 45; and 
see Bourdieu, 1998: 67, 1982: 156, 1997: 22, 123). Beate Krais notes: “Every mode of 
domination, even if it uses physical violence, presupposes a doxic order shared by the 
dominated and the dominants” (169). The question one might legitimately ask is: where 
does doxa come from? Bourdieu addresses this query with some clarity in Practical 
Reason: “Doxa is a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant, which 
presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view—the point of view of those who 
dominate  by dominating  the  state  and who have  constituted  their  point  of  view as 
universal by constituting the state” (1998: 57). This elliptical remark would seem to 
indicate  that  doxic  beliefs,  although  shared  by  all,  are  themselves  produced  and 
reproduced  by the  dominant  class.  What  is  odd,  however,  is  that  this  group  never 
deliberately planted them in a given field's  epistemological soil.  Doxic assumptions, 
then,  are  a  sort  of  unseen  and  unintended  support  for  the  rule  of  the  dominant 
(Berlinerblau, 1999).
Bourdieu's  theory of practice  provides  valuable  terminology and  offers  helpful 
distinctions for an analysis of the underlying knowledge in children's  literature since it 
acknowledges both the voluntaristic and deterministic factors of this encounter in which 
the past meets the future, or in which the individual faces history and “culture” through 
the  conscious,  unconscious,  personal,  and  social constructs  of knowledge.  The  theory 
explains  the importance  of the  basic,  underlying  premises in  any creative,  theoretical, 
applied, or manual work and accounts for both the role of individual agency and the role 
of the forces through which the Institution of civilisation proliferates.  An endeavour to 
uncover the basic principles that drive us to read, work, dream, write, or react exposes the 
basic tenets of our becoming not only as individual and social beings, but also as entities 
within the scope of cosmos. 
In this light, to look inside the me-at-the-time today is an important exercise in an 
attempt  to  uncover  my own epistemology as  well  as  my  initial  need  to  conduct  this 
research.  Since  understanding  the  outside  world  and  our  knowledge  about  it  requires 
introspection  and  an  attempt  to  get  in  touch  with,  even  reveal,  our  doxa and  self 
knowledge, then a doctoral dissertation, before anything else, is of personal significance. 
It acquires larger implications when the personal sphere, comprising individual knowledge 
and drives, intersects with the personal sphere of other persons and the common space 
between these persons becomes public. It  is through this common/private space that the 
analysis of the children's books that had an important impact on me personally becomes a 
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study of the importance of these books on children and people in general. Finally, since a 
scholar must master her field of study, it helps to be a “native” in the field – my “native” 
children’s literature with which I grew up. In this way, this dissertation is also a study of 
the self.
The question of the possibility of attaining pure objectivity and the extent of the 
importance of personal bias and circumstances in revealing universal truths has always 
occupied  a  central  place  in  scientific  research and  writing.  However,  where  the  hard 
scientists have a more difficult time acknowledging the role of the person and the social 
context  in the production of hard-scientific  knowledge, the social sciences,  particularly 
anthropology,  have accorded much attention to both the advantages and the pitfalls  of 
participant knowledge (Bernard, 1995; Wolcott, 1995; Grahame, 1998; Steinmetz, 2005; 
Creswell,  2009,  inter  alios).  Here,  the  main  objection  to  self-study7 stems  from the 
Cartesian  position  that  sees  the  personal  realm  as  incompatible  with  objectivity  and 
scientific observation on the grounds that “nativity” involves emotions that, together with 
the taken-for-granted values and knowledge, may veil other possibilities of interpretation. 
By the  same  token,  however,  native  values,  or  parochialism,  interfere  and  veil  other 
possibilities of interpretation regardless of whether one chooses to study new and foreign 
territory or the old and familiar. The advantages of doing “field-work at home” is that it  
brings  forth  the  urgency to  face  and  question  the  self  as  much  as  to  understand  the 
problem of  literary and  scientific  knowledge,  thereby once  again  bridging  that  space 
between the personal and the social as well as between the self and the “other”, regardless 
of whether this “other” is a stranger, a fellow being, or the unknown and the mysterious 
parts of the self. Because of this intertwining of the personal and the social, I begin this 
work  by  looking  at  the  reader-writer  relationship  and  then  proceed  to  presenting  the 
circumstances under which I have encountered the three books I chose to illustrate the 
three  paradigms  of socio-economic  relations  and  their  epistemologies,  ontologies,  and 
anthropological structures.
Children who read are either guided by curiosity (an inner desire to learn) or by 
nagging adults who obsess about literacy and their children's success in school. Adults, on 
7  What is referred to in anthropology as the “problems of doing field-work at home”.
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the other hand, can be driven by different motivations: pursuit of entertainment, a quest for 
a challenge to see new aspects of the world, the need for confirming one’s own knowledge 
and position, seeking practical information, advice, increasing symbolic and social capital, 
etc.. The pursued end, thus,  ultimately taints the reader's relationship with the text and 
defines the meaning of the reading process and the definitions that may arise in the course 
of that relationship. In this respect, the extreme end of the reader-response theory – such 
as Barthes’ Death of the Author (1977) – provides a particularly narrow angle for defining 
reading, a view that ascribes to the reader more autonomy and voluntarism than is possible 
in real life. For, even though this view, to an extent, reflects reality, it  is  not concerned 
with dialogue or an exchange of knowledge and experience. More accurately, the idea that 
the author ceases to exist as the text is appropriated by the reader reflects the reality of 
“ignorance”,  where often the legitimated  discourse  from the top down overwrites  the 
intended meaning of the author and in this sense the author ceases to exist. By the same 
token, however, the text too ceases to exist, since the voice of authority is not concerned 
with a  dialogue  or  the reality  of experience,  but  rather  with the hierarchical order  of 
voices, values, and opinions. In this regard, in addition to the reader's doxa that interferes 
with both the authorised narrative, the author's intentions, and the text itself,  the reader 
may be trapped in  the tunnel of reality that  prevents people to hear their  interlocutors 
because they are stuck projecting their own limitations and deafness on the other8.
Alexei  Ukhtomsky  (in  Nikitina,  1998),  drawing  on Petr  Kropotkin's  anarchist 
theory on evolution and physiology, calls this syndrome of “reality tunnel” the problem of 
the double, whereby an interlocutor instead of listening to the other replaces the speaker 
with the image of herself and understands only what she wants to hear while ignoring and 
dismissing  everything  else.  Ukhtomsky  attributes  much  of  the  cruelty,  alienation, 
8 The American psychologist, Timothy Leary, proposed that most people's understanding of the world and of 
others is limited by the tunnel of concepts, experiences, and understanding of reality acquired through life 
mainly through language but also by means of other indoctrinating experiences (education, family, socio-
economic reality,  etc.),  which  create  a  firm barrier  of  belief  systems  that  curb both  understanding and 
imagination:  “imprinting of models accidentally present in the environment at critical periods determines 
the  tunnel  realities  in  which  humans live (Leary,  1987:  chapter  1).  This  is  related  to the  problem  of 
understanding through empathy in that if a person bases her choices and actions on belief system, especially 
acquired through imposed education that is based on texts, stories, and authority (the pedagogy of: “z is so 
because x wrote this, now learn this by heart”) rather than interacting with the real body and mind of humans 
and non-humans as real life experiencing happiness and pain, then apathy and cruelty become the praxis of 
that  habitus and easy to engineer  new reality through the manipulation of educated yet alienated human 
resources.
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suffering,  and war  to  this loss of the ability of civilised people to hear  the other and 
empathise with her pain. When the reader approaches the text with the intention to hear 
the other so as to be able to expand the realm of one's experience and knowledge, there 
becomes an urgency to suspend one's judgements  and to allow the personal meaning to 
evolve in the context of the author's meaning. If the reader then accepts to enter into a 
reading  relationship  with  the  author,  then  more  concomitant  levels  have  to  be 
acknowledged in that interaction.
In Death of the Author (1977), Barthes takes Balzac's  Sarrasine as an illustration 
that it is futile even to attempt to trace or understand whose voice and intention depicts the 
castrato's femininity and pronounces the knowledge of what a “real” woman  is. Barthes 
asks: was it  the author's voice? The narrator's? Has the author spoken on behalf of the 
reader? Is this a voice of a character? Is this the voice of universal wisdom? His response 
is that it is impossible to know and that therefore the author is dead and writing becomes 
the “neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all 
identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing” (Barthes, 1977).
 Reading and writing, however, are not neutral activities. By choosing to read one 
book and not another, for instance, Sarrasine and not Order and Chaos, the reader chooses 
the world of Balzac over that of Hakim Bey. The reader decides to invest time, effort, and 
money in acquainting herself with the author because of the relevance that the reader saw 
in  how  the  reading  was  presented  (i.e., advertised)  or  for  personal  reasons  (such  as 
rebellion against the status quo). The background of the author, whether highlighted in the 
foreground or lurking in the backdrop, is part of the symbolic capital vested in ideas and 
meaning and is part of the process in the reader's making a decision about the literature of 
choice, whatever “misunderstanding”, “appropriation of the meaning” or other issues that 
may arise in how we view that reader/writer relationship. In this sense, authorship in itself 
becomes critical in  the choice of “reading”, and the act  of reading acquires symbolic, 
economic, and political aspects. 
Yet, in spite of the context of publication that creates the author's public image for 
marketing purposes, the person who chooses to write has specific intentions in writing the 
text. As in  any communication between interlocutors,  it  is  important  to understand the 
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author's meaning and intentions before proceeding with its “appropriation” or dismissal of 
the  work  (Arshavky,  1992).  In  the  words  of  Snufkin,  the  eternal  wanderer  of  the 
Moominvalley, the crux of the matter is “how to find that tune”, defined by its purpose and 
varying according to who chants it.  In this study, I  am concerned with the “tune” that 
inspires  children’s  literature,  writing,  reading,  and  research.  Finally,  I  am striving  to 
capture the “tune” of the narrative and therefore I proceed to a short elaboration on the 
meaning of three children's books that spoke to me in childhood and with whom I continue 
my dialogue today in an attempt to receive and not appropriate their meaning.
   1.2. Meeting Dunno and Friends
Nikolai Nosov was the first  author to have inspired me  to connect  the Russian 
letters, then mystical to me, as I was sitting under the three palm trees trifurcating from a 
corner of our garden on the bank of the Blue Nile. I was five years old and it happened at 
one particular moment, when suddenly everything fell into place and made sense. I had 
not even noticed that the desert moon had replaced the merciless sun and was only roused 
by the worried voice of my mother calling me in for supper. That day opened to me the 
world of reading and marked my Russification beyond repair.
We had just moved to Khartoum from Moscow and my mother was concerned that 
I  first  learn to read and write  Arabic  and English,  before my native Russian,  so  as to 
“succeed”  in  school.  Ironically,  my  mother  at  the  time  already had  become a  Soviet 
philologist and a professor of Russian and my father, although Sudanese, found it easier to 
speak  Russian to  his  children,  even  to  those  who  were  later  born in  Sudan.  I  either 
inherited their passion for the Russian language and thought or developed my own due to 
the injustice I felt,  which I experienced as violence, at having being ruptured from my 
motherland. In any case, at four and half years of age, I vowed to keep in touch with my 
beloved grandparents, cousins and friends and promised them and myself to learn how to 
read and write in Russian. 
Hence,  Nosov’s presence in  my life  is  connected to motivations,  passions,  and 
desires larger and deeper than “literacy” concerns and/or “entertainment” by “stories for 
children”. His stories were not only my vehicle to literacy but also a bridge to a world, 
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which I felt was snatched away from me without my consent and which made cultural and 
political warfare between ideologies an integral part of my experience of this complex and 
violent world. His books proved to be a cornerstone not only in my “virtual” connection to 
that  world,  secluded  behind  the Iron Curtain  and  the  Cold  War,  but  also  to  a  whole 
generation of people exposed to this talented writer whose work was a crucial vehicle in 
transmitting notions of justice and social harmony through the lens of anarcho-socialism.
I have revisited Nosov throughout my youth. Upon my return to Russia in May 
1998 after years of wandering around the globe (at the time, planning on my return to be 
permanent), I reread the third part of the trilogy,  Dunno9 on the Moon, and laughed and 
wept even more then at the recognition of the Moonly world around me. As an adult, I 
appreciated the genius and the importance of this writer and documentary film-maker even 
more and it was this revelation that prompted me to return to him with all due seriousness 
in my doctoral research.
   1.3. Into the Moomin Valley
Tove Jansson has marked another critical stage in my becoming. I discovered her at 
about seven years old through Finnish picture books while visiting Finno-Sudanese family 
friends.  We lived on the bank of the Blue Nile  in an English colonial house with high 
ceilings built of stone. My parents' friends Mari and Hassan explained to my parents that 
they wanted their children to grow up in a Sudanese environment, among the peasants and 
working class, in a house of local architecture made of mud. Visits to their house was a 
feast  to  me as my friends,  Sami and Ali,  took me  around a totally different  world of 
Sudanese farmlands, a local market, and the neighbourhood that seemed to be on the other 
side of the desert. As we played and climbed trees in the garden, I could see Mari going 
about her chores and always ready to respond when we needed her. Mari's image was thus 
imprinted  in  my  memory  as  a  picture  of  Moominmamma’s  eternal  serenity  and 
unconditional love. I later rediscovered the Moomins in Sweden where we sojourned for a 
year till I turned eight and half years old. And later, as an adult, I read them in Russian 
with  my daughter  whose comments  and  reactions  brought  back  my  own feelings  and 
9  The Russian title was Незнайка на Луне (Neznajka na Lune). Margaret Wetlin translates Незнайка (the 
one who doesn't know anything) as Dunno.
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thoughts of long ago.
During my childhood, these books stirred in me the deep longing for the undefined 
cosmic harmony I had felt in my pre-language years. They reinforced my wildness and 
opened  a window to the landscape  of solitude  and  liberation from closed  systems,  a 
freedom I grew to love.  Of course,  at the time I did not conceptualise my emotions in 
these terms and probably the language itself sheds its own nuances on the original picture. 
Yet, the feeling and the realisation or visualisation of what it means to be “out there” was 
as  clear  then as  it  is  now.  It  could  be  that  these  concepts  were  palpable  due to  my 
childhood  experience  of having  lived  with  my grandparents in  a  tiny Russian  village 
surrounded by forest and wilderness, where winter months hid the houses under a thick 
blanket  of  snow  cutting  us  off  from the  rest  of  the  world  just  as  in  Midwinter in 
Moominland. Later, at the age of five and half, this doxa was reinforced by a six months 
sojourn in a geological camp with my parents in the Sudanese savannah of the Darfur 
region,  living in  tents under  the abysmal African sky,  where stars,  humans and beasts 
comprised one song, one melody containing in it everything: fear, grief, mystery, harmony, 
peace, knowledge and the unknowable.  My meaning of freedom was defined then and 
there.
Regardless of these experiences, I believe that the Moomins are capable of opening 
this window of possibility to any child or adult, even to those who were not exposed to 
such  experiences  as  mine,  because  the  depth  of  the  related  atmosphere  of  tranquil 
beatitude in these books is enough to make this other possibility of experience not only 
possible but real and tangible. If all else fails, at least they are capable of offering a dream; 
and where there is a dream, there is a way to realise it.
In  effect,  in  1978 in  the Soviet  Union,  Altaev wrote the  script  and  Zjablikova 
directed  a  puppet  animation film in  three  parts  presenting  many of the  characters  of 
Moominvalley and the events of the  Comet Comes to Moominvalley. The films capture 
accurately  the  atmosphere  of  the  books,  which  indicates  that  people  from  different 
experiences are capable of understanding, feeling, and dreaming the possibility of letting 
go of social constraints so as to dive fearlessly into the mystery of chaos.
This mystery is that singular spot for true freedom where each of us searches in 
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solitude,  a  fact  accepted  by  moominparents  when their  child  undertakes  a  dangerous 
journey to  the  observatory on a  high  mountain at  a  time  when  the  world  was  being 
threatened by a cosmic invader – a comet. Jansson put it this way: “Every children's book 
should have a path in it where the writer stops and the child goes on. A threat or a delight  
that can never be explained. A face never completely revealed” (Kivi, 1998). Jansson thus 
expresses  the  necessity  of mutual  respect  for  knowledge  between  the  author  and  the 
reader. Having understood the author,  the reader accepts the invitation to enter into an 
epistemological dialogue filling in the gaps with one’s own knowledge of the world,  a 
knowledge that comes from personal introspection and a daring to move beyond the social 
barricades of order out into the wilderness of chaos. This realisation has prompted me to 
analyse the Moominworld in relation to the Dunno trilogy.
   1.4. Winnie-ther-Pooh as Other
The third pick for my comparison was tougher to make. Having grown up between 
at  least  five  worlds  (the  Soviet,  the  Swedish,  the  Northern  Sudanese,  the  Western 
Sudanese, and colonial British school run by the Vatican clergy), I felt that a third element 
for contrast was important and it had to be something with which I have been familiar as a 
child and that presented a real alternative to the ontologies of Jansson and Nosov. Unlike 
other foreign authors, I never mistook Alan Alexandre Milne for a Russian when I was 
growing up.  The works of Alexandre Dumas, Frank Baum,  or other translated foreign 
authors, all seemed Russian to me, except for Winnie-the-Pooh. As a child, I thought that 
Alan Alexandre Milne was German (in the communal Russian memory Germany was still 
the enemy at the time even though the war supposedly had ended). As I was going through 
what “foreign” book to pick, Terry Cochran, my advisor, advised “why not Winnie?”.
Rereading the original (and it’s been quite some time now that I have “discovered” 
that  it  was English)  I  was  surprised to  find  that  it  was  different  from the image  and 
understanding I had of this work earlier; that is, the definitions that guided me then gave 
me a different meaning of what Winnie seemed to mean to me now in my North American 
context. There is more to the story, though. The three – now classic – Soviet animation 
films (1969, 1971 and 1972) with which every Soviet citizen has grown up – even though 
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very close to the original text – omit Christopher Robin altogether and hence erase the 
hierarchical element of the original book.
Even though there existed two translations of  Winnie-the-Pooh into Russian,  the 
Soviet  animation film has overwritten them both.  Hence my “adult”  re-reading  of the 
original  book  came  as  a  “surprise”,  revealing  elements  in  conflict  with  the  more 
“egalitarian” Russian animation version of the 100 Aker Wood. In addition to the Russian 
changes,  Winnie-the-Pooh underwent  a  transformation  in  the Disney  adaptations  that 
missed  the possibilities  of irony presented  by the  original  intentions  of the  author  in 
addressing these books to an adult audience (Milne, 1974). Winnie-the-Pooh thus proved 
to be an interesting and sensible pick for contrast and comparison to the other two worlds 
and in the manner in which these books have worked their way into my being, shifting 
meaning and definitions of what we know about order and chaos.
   1.5. Brief Sketches about the Authors
1.5.i. Tove Jansson (1914-2001) was born in Helsinki. At the time, Finland was part of 
Russia and has throughout the civilised history of Europe remained in the midst of the 
strife between Swedish and Russian imperial interests.  Jansson's parents were Swedish-
minority  artists.  Her  mother  was  a  painter/illustrator  and  her  father  a  sculptor.  Two 
important factors in her life  were: the old sculptor's studio with the old wood-stove in 
which she grew up and the summer house on a solitary island in the Finnish archipelago 
where the family spent their summers. European (e.g. British10) biographers place her in 
upper middle class, bohemian milieu, while American biographers highlight the financial 
“poverty” of her artistic parents and the lack of space. 
Jansson wrote the first Moomin book, The Little Trolls and the Great Flood (1945), 
during the war but dates the first drawing of a moomin to her childhood: 
In our house hidden away in the Finnish archipelago we used to write things upon the 
walls. One summer a lengthy discussion developed along the walls. It all started when 
my brother, Per Olov, jotted down a quasi-philosophical statement and I tried to refute 
it, and our dispute continued daily. Finally, Per Olov quoted Kant, and the controversy 
came to an immediate end as this was irrefutable. In annoyance, I drew something that 
was intended to be extremely ugly, something that resembled a Moomin. So, in a way, 
10 “Modest as her backgorund might have been, the home was middle class...”  (Jones, 1984: 4)
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Immanuel Kant inspired the first Moomin (Fliescher in Jones, 1984: 10).
Although Jansson denied “philosophical” content in her moominbooks, the first moomin 
conception was born in a philosophical debate and, in any event, denial of philosophy in 
itself constitutes philosophy, even if only to provide comic elements such as found in the 
nihilist  philosopher  Muscrat  in  the Moomin  stories.  The  books appeared  in  published 
versions  between  1945  and  1970,  after  which  Jansson  wrote  for   adults11.  The 
moominbooks consist of nine novels, a series of picture books, and comics on which she 
collaborated with her brother, Lars Jansson, leaving the comics to him to him after 1974. 
The first  book provides the genesis of the Moomin Valley,  where,  because of a 
great  flood and  people  switching  to  electric  stoves  and general  civilisation,  the  small 
moomintrolls,  prior  to  that  dwelling behind old stoves and under wooden floors,  were 
forced to migrate to a new land. Moominpappa had taken off earlier with the strange dumb 
and numb mass-wanderers, the Hattifatteners, and Moominmamma decides to venture on 
a long journey to find him. The family reunites after undergoing various adventures, such 
as being chased by a Serpent who dropped into the mud of the marshes after staring at a 
glowing flower-girl, or such as getting lost in a strange under-world made of sweets and 
artificial lighting  – a  predecessor  of Roald Dahl’s  Charlie  and the Chocolate Factory 
(1968). Unlike Dahl’s sugary empire of colonialism and slavery, where the accumulation 
of wealth is presented as the desired end, the moomins renounce the sugary, artificial bliss 
that  gives them the stomach runs and depression.  They find  their way out  after going 
through dangerous adventures in the tumultuous sea, a terrifying trip with the hattifattners, 
the ferocious  paws of an ant-lion,  a  great  flood, and more.  Finally,  crossing  different 
geophysical settings, a Marabou bird carries them away from an African landscape atop an 
enormous tree where they find Moominpappa who had already built them their Home in 
the shape of an old wood stove. This house becomes the home of many creatures,  for 
whoever wishes to join the family is adopted.
The rest of the books recount various moments in the lives and adventures of these 
creatures. W. Glyn Jones interprets the later books as particularly philosophical. “As the 
11 I would argue, however, that the borders between her children's and adult literature are hazy, at best. Her 
adult books often figure children and the children's books take on serious topics whose ruminations are 
interesting and appropriate for all ages.
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series  progresses,  philosophical  and  psychological  questions  ...  become  increasingly 
important until, in  Moominpappa at Sea and  Moominvalley in November, they form the 
very essence of the work” (Jones, 1984: 4), in which the novels evoke particularly in a 
post-Foucauldian reader questions of madness and normalcy, presence and absence. More 
important,  however,  is  the underlying  basis  of Jansson's  doxa and ideology,  no  doubt 
nurtured  by  her  singular  childhood,  facing  storms  in  the  open  sea,  living  in  an  old 
sculptor's studio with a wood stove, or exploring deserted islands months on end. In effect, 
the moominhouse is  depicted in  the image of the stove and the moominbooks' ending 
evokes images  and  experiences  from her  life:  travel,  movement,  cosmic  togetherness, 
longing,  love,  and home are not  only compatible  elements,  but  constitute the essential 
components of a thriving universe that engender a real life.
The last book, Moominvalley in November (1971) takes up where Moominpappa at  
Sea (1966) leaves off, namely, the family members sail in a boat into the open sea and find 
a solitary island that they decide to explore indefinitely. In the last book, the reader learns 
that, even in their absence, their house in Moominvalley remains alive. Various characters 
move there,  they have their fears,  their hopes,  their  relationships.  The moominfamily's 
absence  itself  in  this  book becomes  a  character,  even a protagonist,  in  its  own right. 
Without notice or technologically facilitated communication at the end, everyone knows 
when the family decides to return and, without speaking to each other, they know what to 
do.
Toft  wasn't  surprised  when  he  saw  that  the  tent  had  gone.  Perhaps  Snufkin  had 
understood  that  Toft  was  the  only one  who  should  meet  the  family when they got 
home. . . . His dream meeting the family again had become so enormous that it made 
him feel tired. Every time he thought about Moominmamma he got a headache. She had 
grown so perfect and gentle and consoling that it was unbearable (172). . . . 
Toft walked on through the forest, stooping under the branches, creeping and crawling, 
and thinking of nothing at all, and became as empty as the crystal ball. This is where 
Moominmamma had walked when she was tired and cross and disappointed and wanted 
to be on her own, wandering aimlessly in the endless forest. . . . Toft saw an entirely 
new Moominmamma and she seemed natural to him. He suddenly wondered why she 
had been unhappy and whether there was anything one could do about it . . . .
The forest began to thin out and huge grey mountains lay in front of him. [When he 
climbed the mountain], [t]he whole sea spread out in front of him, grey and streaked 
with even white waves right out to the horizon. Toft turned his face into the wind and sat 
down to wait (174). . . . 
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Just before the sun went down it  threw a shaft of  light through the clouds, cold and 
wintry-yellow, making the whole world look very desolate. 
And then Toft saw the storm-lantern Moominpappa had hung up at the top of the mast. 
It threw a gentle, warm light and burnt steadily. The boat was a very long way away. 
Toft had plenty of time to go down through the forest and long the beach to the jetty, and 
be just in time to catch the line and tie up the boat12 (Jansson, 1971: 175).
1.5.ii. Nikolai Nosov (1908-1976) was born in Kiev, Ukraine.  He graduated from the 
Moscow Institute of Cinematography in 1932 and fought during World War II (1941-45). 
Between 1932 and 1951 he worked as a film-maker, mostly in educational and scientific 
documentaries.  The  Grand  Soviet  Encyclopedia (Prokhorov,  1969-1978)  [Большая 
Советская Энциклопедия] dates his literary debut at  1938. Among Nosov's numerous 
and varied interests were “music, singing, amateur theatre, writing for the journal X, as 
well as chemistry, chess, radio, electronics, photography. Nosov sold newspapers, worked 
as  an  ordinary worker,  an  excavator,  a  grass-cutter,  transporter  of  felled-wood,  etc.” 
(Arzamastseva, et al. 1997: 312). The first book in the Dunno trilogy, The Adventures of  
Dunno and his Friends13,  was published in  1953. The second,  Dunno in Sunny City14, 
came out in 1958, and the last book in the trilogy, Dunno on the Moon15, in 1964. Only the 
first of the books has been translated into English by Margaret Wetlin16 who immigrated to 
12 Homsan blev inte förvånad över att tältplatsen var övergiven. Kanske Snusmumriken hade förstått att det 
inte fick vara någon annan än Toft som tog emot familjen när den kom hem. . . . Hans dröm om mötet 
med familjen hade blivit så stor att den gjorde honom tröt. Varje gång han tänkte på mamman fick han 
ont i huvudet. Hon hade vuxit sig så fullkomlig och mild och tröstande att det var olidligt (158). . . . 
Homsan  Toft  gick  vidare genom skogen,  hukade under  grenarna, kravlade och  kröp,  han tänkte på 
ingeting alls och  var  lika tom som glaskulan. Här hade mamman gått när  hon var  trött och arg och 
besviken och ville var ifred, planlöst vandrande i den ständiga skuggan, djupt inne i sitt missmod . . . 
Homsan Toft såg en alldeles ny mamma och hon föreföll honom naturlig. Han undrade plötsligt varför 
hon hade varit ledsen och vad man kunde göra åt saken. . . .
Nu glesnade skogen och stora gråa berg kom emot honom. . . . Hela havet låg utbrett framför honom, 
grått och strimmat av jämna vita vågor ända ut till horisonten. Toft vände nosen mot vinden, han satte sig 
ner för att vänta (160).
Just innan solen gick ner slog hon en rämna av ljus i molnbanken, kall och vintergul, den gjorde hela 
världen mycket ödslig.
Och nu såg homsan Toft stormlyktan som pappan hade hängt i masttoppen. Den hade en mild varm färg 
och den brann stadigt. Båten var mycket långt borta. Homsan Toft hade god tid på sig att gå ner genom 
skogen och följa stranden till båtbryggan, precis lagom för att ta emot fånglinan (Sent i November 1970: 
161).
13 Original title: Приключения Незнайки и его друзей.
14 Original title: Незнайка в Солнечном Городе.
15 Original title: Незнайка на Луне.
16 Margaret Wetlin translated only the first part of the trilogy.  She did an excellent job in rendering the 
liveliness of the characters and most important their names. It is a pity that she did not undertake to translate 
the two subsequent volumes. I spoke to her son in Philadelphia, but he did not know why she didn’t continue 
the project; “perhaps she wasn’t sponsored,” he suggested.
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the Soviet Union for ideological reasons in the 1930s.
The first book depicts an idyllic mite utopia. The social organisation is anarchistic 
despite mention of authority, which is mainly expressed in the mites' desire to trust and 
listen  to  Doono's17 advice  since  Doono  is  the  embodiment  of knowledge.  Albeit,  the 
society functions  perfectly  well  without  authority and  in  the  absence of laws,  police, 
schools,  or farming since the strongest  drive of the mites is  harmony and cooperation. 
Conflicts happen, but the author demonstrates that the little humans are perfectly capable 
of solving these themselves. In contrast with The Sunny City where police interfere with 
“order”, the anarchist mites solve their conflicts more effectively than in the presence of 
the police. More important than Doono, however, is Dunno, the 'anti-knowledge' who is 
the protagonist  of the trilogy.  In  the first  book, among other  issues,  Nosov raises  the 
“problem”  of  gender.  Gender  segregation,  the  book  demonstrates,  is  the  result  of 
ignorance and competition. The Mites travel to the Green Town the equivalent of La Cité 
des Dames18, learn from the wise girl-mites and by getting to know one another they learn 
to  appreciate  each  other's  insights  and  help,  which  brings  a  reconciliation  between 
genders. 
In the second book, Dunno meets a magician who rewards his concern for animals 
and people by giving him a magic wand that can make any wish come true. Together with 
his now best friend, a girl mite by the name of Buttonette, and another friend, a boy mite 
called Smudges Bright19, Dunno wishes to travel. A car appears and they visit a high-tech 
megapolis  with  complex  technological  agriculture,  futuristic  architecture,  a  complex 
system  of  transportation,  and  an  inefficient  panopticon  run  by  police  (but  without 
politicians or leaders) in a communist social structure: The Sunny City.
Several of the chapters are dedicated to problematising and raising questions about 
the function of the police and the problems of policed society.  A significant part of the 
book is dedicated to the question of good and bad deeds, conscience, empathy, knowledge, 
and  self-governance.  Although  the  problem of  police,  crime,  and  punishment  gets  a 
17 Margaret Wetlin translates Знайка (the one who knows everthing) as Doono.
18 Just like Dunno in Sunny City is reminiscent of Campanella's dictatorial utopia City of the Sun, the Green 
Town is a women's liberation zone based on the same principles as Christine de Pizan's  La Cité des 
Dames.
19 Кнопочка and Пачкуля Пёстренький in the original (translation mine).
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separate treatment in the capitalist distopia depicted in the third book on the Moon, Nosov 
makes  a  point  to  raise  the  question of police,  freedom,  and prison in  the communist 
society of The Sunny City. This is particularly interesting in the context that the author's 
father  had  been censored for  his  performance  of “songs  of  jail  and  freedom” (songs 
usually sung in Russian and Soviet jails that form a particular folk genre) after which his 
father spent his life working as a janitor and cashier. To be denied the fulfilment of one's 
dream, of one's calling, is a great personal tragedy and these questions must have struck a 
chord.
The  final  book  takes  Dunno  to  the  moon  where  he  discovers  the  horrendous 
suffering of exploited mites in conditions of dire capitalism. Dunno learns the problems of 
economics and politics and becomes involved in the struggle for liberation of the moon 
mites,  but  this time,  through agriculture and the rights of peasants to  own their  crops. 
Nosov thus  depicts  large  societies  as  complicated,  raising  many social  and  economic 
problems that  are  solved  by agriculture.  However,  the  mites  return to  their  anarchist, 
gatherer utopia at the end of the trilogy, and a tear-wrenching scene depicts, not only that 
home is best, but that without home there is no life.
Even though the themes of the books risk being didactic, the books are written with 
great humour. Hilarious and expressed with great imagination and mastery, the text also 
offers abundant scientific descriptions of inventions which gloss over the ideology as well 
as an inconspicuous critique of the Soviet state. Not surprising, interpretations of Dunno 
abound – each more startling than the other20.
1.5.iii. Alan Alexandre Milne (1882-1956) was of Scottish ancestry born in Hampstead 
and raised in London. His father was a schoolmaster, and H.G. Wells was his teacher and 
mentor  (Milne,  1974).  He  received  his  education  at  Westminster  School  and  Trinity 
College,  Cambridge.  From his  24th  birthday until  World  War  I,  he  published  in  and 
worked as assistant editor at Punch – a humour magazine. He fought during the war and 
20  Some authors have attempted to follow up the various options provided, particularly, by the crossroads 
in the Sunny City where Dunno and friends chose the direction. For example, a former police officer, 
Vladislav Yurjevich Shebashov (pseudonym: Boris Karlov) explores the possibilities of Dunno choosing 
a different direction  on  the cross-roads, such as the Stone City.  Nosov's son,  Igor  Petrovich  Nosov, 
fought for  copyright ownership and forced the Shebashov to withdraw his books,  which  he rewrote 
renaming the characters. Igor P. Nosov now writes his own sequels (Chuprinina, 2003).
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then  continued  to  write  after  he  returned,  exploiting  most  literary  genres:  poetry, 
dramaturgy,  stories and novels.  He considered himself an adult  author,  writing  for  the 
“child within us” (ibid). The author's real-life son, Christopher Robin Milne, wrote to their 
friend and favourite  author,  P.  G.  Wodehouse: “My father did  not  write  the books for 
children. He didn't write for any specific market; he knew nothing about marketing. He 
knew about me, he knew about himself, he knew about the Garrick Club – he was ignorant 
about anything else. Except, perhaps, about life”21. 
The first Pooh story appeared on 24th of December 1925 and was broadcast on 
Christmas Day by Donald Calthrop. That was the first chapter of the first book of Winnie-
the-Pooh. The second book, The House at Pooh Corner, appeared in 1928. The imagined 
realm of the 100 Aker Wood has a real-world reference: the author's house, his son and his 
son's toys. The hierarchy is set right from the start: the main character is a boy and he 
reigns over a world of toys, whose reality is contingent on his will,  agency, and power. 
Winnie-the-Pooh, the bear of small brains, is his favourite, and Owl, the most literate and 
therefore brainy,  is  the most  important.  Both represent  Christopher  Robin's  needs and 
decisions for order. For instance, when the immigrants appear, Pooh first verifies that they 
are legal (that  Christopher  Robin is  aware of and approves of their  appearance in  the 
Wood), and then, he conducts the placement interview. The rest of the characters exist to 
simply satisfy the child's need for play and imagination. There is  an absence of female 
characters, with the exception of a later appearance of Kanga, Roo's mother. Christopher 
Robin's mother is  present in the dedication that acknowledges her role in inspiring the 
Pooh stories.  The Russian version turned Owl into a woman, but in Milne's original, the 
remaining  characters  are  male:  Piglet  the  tiny  pocket  friend,  Rabbit  the  xenophobic 
aristocrat, Eeyore the melancholic donkey, and Tigger the newly arrived immigrant who 
moves with Kanga and Roo to form a one-house-ghetto. The xenophobic, aristocratically, 
hypocritically polite Rabbit mobilises an anti-immigrant act when Kanga and Roo arrive 
and another one when Tigger appears.  In the end, however, everyone is accepted and the 
reader watches life in the 100 Aker Wood unfold with its daily little adventures.
The underlying ontological premises of the narrative reveal a sterile world that has 
21 http://www.poohcorner.com/Bios/
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no possibility of regenerating or thriving and in effect ceases to be active when the real 
boy leaves for boarding school.  What  is  most  interesting and relevant  for  my study is 
Milne's play with language that has the potential to challenge the doxa through unexpected 
associations  revealing  the  arbitrariness  of  meaning.  For  instance,  the  mock  scientific 
expedition to discover the North Pole was about heading north, finding a pole, sticking it 
in the ground and then celebrating the discovery with a naming ceremony “North Pole”. 
Albeit Milne does not use language to reveal its absurdity, arbitrariness and unreliability in 
the  manner  of  Lewis  Carroll,  for  instance.  He  penetrates  its  “un-logic”  through  the 
freedom of childhood, a revolutionary potential unleashed by the child's  uncrystallised 
relationship to social norms and language. Unlike the Moominbooks where there is  no 
need for revolution since it is already an integral part of chaos and movement, and unlike 
Dunno's adventures where members of an anarcho-primitivist society bring liberation to 
the exploitative  capitalist  Moon,  in  spite  of its  potential,  the 100 Aker  Wood remains 
static, locked in the oppressive concept of civilised permanence and therefore ceases to 
move, live, and finally to exist. The last chapter of the book, titled: “Chapter X. In which 
Christopher  Robin  and  Pooh come to  an enchanted  place,  and  we  leave  them there” 
conveys a sense of doom and hopelessness as the characters know of an imminent end:
Christopher Robin was going away. Nobody knew why he was going; nobody knew 
where he was going; indeed, nobody even knew why he knew that Christopher Robin 
was  going  away.  But  somehow  or  other  everybody  in  the  Forest  felt  that  it  was 
happening at last. Even Smallest-of-all, a friend-and-relation of Rabbit's who thought he 
had once seen Christopher Robin's foot, but couldn't be quite sure because perhaps it 
was something else, even S. of A. told himself that Things were going to be Different; 
and Late  and Early,  two other  friends-and-relations,  said,  “Well,  Early?” and “Well, 
Late?” to each other in such a hopeless sort of way that it really didn't seem any good 
waiting for the answer (Milne, 1992 [1956]: 162).
   1.6. A Note on Illustrations
Tove  Jansson  was  a  painter  and  illustrator  as  well  as  writer  and  she  mostly 
illustrated her own books. As mentioned earlier, the first Moomin drawing appeared as a 
cartoon illustration in response to a philosophical debate on Kant with the author's brother. 
She illustrated her novels in black and white as well as in colour and with her brother, 
Lars,  developed the strip comics.  Her life-companion, a Finnish illustrator and painter, 
Tuulikki Pietilä made some Moomin illustrations as well and together they have created 
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moomin puppets.
Nosov  and  Milne's  books  are  also  illustrated,  however,  different  artists  have 
depicted them at various times either in colour or black and white which renders them 
different  from Jansson's,  since in her  case illustrations come as hints and nuances that 
support the text, whereas in the case of Nosov and Milne, the illustrations are “readers'” 
interpretations. All three authors have been adapted to animation, theatre and other cultural 
media.
Chapter 2: I Read Therefore I am: A Sociological Perspective
This work is not only about stories. It is about the larger meaning of stories that  
have been written in the context of civilisation. More accurately, it is about the premises 
that  inform the  social  construct  of  knowledge  inscribed  into  our  flesh  that  we  then 
articulate in (his)stories. Having become an integral part of our genes and memes, these 
precepts and their stories interfere with our choices, feelings, and thoughts and impel us to 
act on behalf of certain interests that often conflict with our own. These stories articulate 
our suffering, confusion, and hopes and help camouflage our real drives. Together, these 
stories flow into one narrative that structures our understanding and misunderstanding and 
knowledge and unknowledge.
Therefore, this work is also about narratives – those complex sets of stories of our 
civilisation that lull us to surrender to its order. Narratives domesticate chaos and claim to 
know what things came first, what followed, what we should be, how we should live and 
where we should end. They contain in them stories of creation, morals of success, warning 
tales of hardcore punishment, death, and coveted rewards. Sometimes they admonish with 
cautionary tales of where not to stray with our desires and dreams; at other times,  they 
offer imaginary scenarios of alternative possibilities, cosmic trajectories, and the promise 
of rebellion in an attempt to regain wildness.
Unni Wikan and Cheryl Mattingly (in Mattingly and Garro, 2000) challenge the 
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idea that narratives offer a coherent, chronological and even logical order to experience. 
Nevertheless, they do not distinguish between the civilised and non-civilised narratives. 
Neither do they specify the narrative level; for instance, there is a larger framework within 
which the varying multiplicity of narratives are inscribed that structures one version of the 
history of humanity  and the world.  In  Lyotard's  terms,  these  narratives  constitute  the 
metadiscourse and the metanarrative that are ultimately informed by Bourdieu's concepts 
of doxa,  habitus, and ideology.  Wikan writes that because in her native Norwegian (as 
well  as  in  Arabic  and  several  other  languages)  there  is  only  one  word  “story”  or 
“storytelling”,  it  is  difficult  for  her  to  grasp the nuances and  the differences between 
“narrative” and “story” or “narration” and “storytelling”.
In  my  own  native  Russian  language,  however,  there  are  differences  between 
история,  рассказ,  рассказывание,  повесть,  повествование,  излагать,  поведать22. 
История [istorija]  means “story”,  both,  as in  “a story” and “history” (like the French 
“histoire” can be “une histoire” [a story] or “l'histoire” [history]) and “event”. This word, 
therefore,  contains the nuances of something  that  could  have truly happened.  Рассказ 
[rasskaz] means story,  which can be fiction or a personal testimony of an event. Even 
though рассказ and  история are  synonymous,  there  are  situations  when  one  cannot 
replace  another;  for  example  “вот какая  история  [istorija]  приключилась  со  мной” 
(Voilà the “adventure” or “story” that has befallen me), but it would be wrong to use the 
synonym: рассказ [rasskaz] or story in this context. 
Рассказывание [rasskazyvanije] means to tell something that really happened or to 
recount a fictive tale.  Повесть [povest'] is a novel,  a long story, or a narrative since it 
assumes a complexity of stories and time frames. Повествование [povestvovanije] is to 
narrate a complexity of ideas or stories that has a ring of orally transmitted truth but can 
also be used in narrating legends and fiction (in subsequent parts of my work, I challenge 
the civilised distinctions between fiction and reality,  but for the time being I leave it  at 
that).  Излагать [izlagat']  means  to  recount  through  attentive  description,  stating  and 
listing  meticulously  the  various  points  of  one's  argument  in  the  story  or  narrative. 
22 Complexity and nuances are further complicated by the different forms of the same verbs that signal one 
time, specific events or regularly recurring, time unlimited events. In other words, the forms of Russian 
verbs signal timely and ordered structures of narrative and the admission of an unbridled chaos.
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Furthermore, this grammatical form of the verb has no time structure or limitations since it 
conveys  a  ceaseless recurrence,  even an eternity,  whereas  изложить [izlozhit']  is  the 
finite form of the verb: give all the details and facts and make one's case once and for all.  
Finally,  there is another word,  поведать  [povedovat'], which means to impart or reveal 
one's story or secret.
English words for  tell also carry specific,  English connotations.  For example,  to 
relate something means “to tell”, but the word shares the root with  relate to or  connect  
with and  make  one  a  relative  of sorts.  Relay carries  the  connotations  of  convey and 
exchange, and narrate has a more complex and formal ring to it, while recount shares its 
root with account and resonates with the Russian izlagat'.
Even Swedish, in spite of the fact that it lacks the range of vocabulary for “telling” 
that Russian has, nevertheless, has two words:  historia for “story” and berättelse, which 
can be used for “narrative” or “discourse” and for narration, or narrat for “narratee”. The 
same applies to the two terms for “tell” and “narrate”: förtälja  and berätta,  the latter is 
more common and has a nuance of sharing, which the Russian peredavat' carries, as well 
as to tell,  to relate and to narrate. Then there is  relatera, which means relate or recount 
and återberätta, which means to retell and transmits a sense of quotative evidentiality that 
is  an obligatory marker in languages like Turkish or many aboriginal languages in the 
Americas and Australia, as well as in other parts of the world. In cases where the language 
imposes quotative evidentials, the speaker is obliged to pick specific words to signal the 
level of reliability of the information relayed, such as whether an account was retold and 
not witnessed personally or whether it  was based on first-hand experience through the 
teller's  senses23.  In  Russian,  the  equivalent  is  пересказывать [pereskazyvat'].  Finally, 
Swedish has adopted the same French word as did Russian, and whose English equivalent 
shares the root with history in other Indo-European languages as well: historia or English 
story or Russian история [istorija].
In other words, Wikan's discomfort with the word narrative, which to her sounds 
“foreign”  and  elitist,  is  another  reminder  of  the  existence  of  a  connection  between 
language  and  experience  and  the  ways  in  which  we  communicate  and  structure  that 
23 For more on the interrelationship between language and cognition see Palmer (1986), Papafragou et al. 
(2007), Boroditsky (2009), and Casasanto et al. (2010).
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experience – an endeavour  that  influences our bodies,  space and world,  for  her  essay 
specifically tackles – not the unNorwegian narratives, she stresses, but – stories of illness, 
relationships,  and language (Wikan in  Mattingly & Garro,  2000).   Evidently,  language 
provides  important  metaphors  and  taints  the  perspectives  on  experience  and  reality 
through  nuances  and  various  associations.  Nevertheless,  the  theory  of  linguistic 
determinism warrants caution, because the effects of coercion through social expectations, 
punishments and rewards at the basis of the methods of education and domestication are 
the primary factors responsible for forcing people to comply with the defining power of 
language and narrative structures.
Contrary to Wikan, for instance, my own consciousness has been formed in a wide 
spectrum for ways to tell and narrate, that is, in Russian language and culture. I hence find 
myself being sensitive to the different concepts that the two words,  story and narrative,  
convey.  Albeit,  these differences and nuances in  themselves,  I  argue,  are not  the most 
important aspects of knowledge, because, when one reads Tove Jansson's Moomintrolls in 
Swedish, one gets overwhelmed with the expanses of freedom and wilderness, in which 
language is played and tampered with, burnt (the interdiction signs that form the grammar 
of  the  Hemulens'  worldview),  and  used  to  communicate  and  transmit  personal  and 
communal  healing  (The  Exploits  of  Moominpappa  [later  edited  into Moominpappa's  
Memoirs] 1950) and nurture life. Narrative in Jansson's case, thus, loses its chronological 
structure and becomes a series of moments caught – like the tune that Snufkin chases, 
captures, loses, then captures again – for sharing communally in a chaotic and always new 
and unpredictable way. The characters do not evolve, but are themselves full of chaos and 
their experience is always diverse, just as the world they inhabit. In this light, I attribute 
the  most  important  difference  to  the  perspectives  that  underlie  the  drives  behind  the 
different versions and modes of these expressions and not to the forms and mechanisms of 
communicating  events,  experiences,  and  desires.  It  is  these ontological perspectives,  I 
argue, that shape desires and mould the details of our lives; they can help us find our way 
back to wilderness or, to borrow John Zerzan's (1994) phrase, lead us into our “Future 
Primitive”.
Because stories are not neutral, recent trends in social and anthropological research 
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(Jameson [2002], Mattingly and Garro [2000], Landau [1991], Martin [1987], inter alios) 
have turned their attention to examining the various forms of human endeavour through 
narrative structures, plot and literary theory: narratives in medical anthropology, narratives 
of law, narratives of childhood, narratives of scientific interpretation of “real” phenomena, 
and so forth.
In spite of the ability of habitus and doxa to proliferate through time in a fixed and 
rigid form, oral tradition is by nature an interactive process of communication that entails 
exchange in knowledge. It would not be a tradition if each individual were to have an oral 
interaction with herself. That would be introspection. To borrow from the premises of the 
reader-response or reception theory, the act of reading is similar to hearing a story since 
the space of reception becomes the locus of contested desires, interests and meaning, a 
relationship that conflates dimensions of time and space, where act and process that we 
conceive  as  occurring  through time  also  form an integral  component  of the space  of 
mental, emotional, historical and future negotiations.
Literature,  both oral and written,  hence,  opens a  window for understanding the 
interaction of personal and social spheres and the negotiation of personal and institutional 
interests,  since  authors  imbue  their  texts  with  their  habitus,  doxa,  and  knowledge  or 
ideology and the readers understand them in their own manner. Numerous thinkers have 
tackled the problem that  the genesis itself of literacy has not  been a neutral event  but 
rather a logical development  of the technology of domination. Acknowledging this fact 
raises important questions on both the nature and the purpose of all literature, including 
children's.
First,  as  Jack Goody (1963, 1968 and 1977)  and Walter  Ong  (1982 and 1986) 
observe, literacy is a corollary of civilisation and therefore necessarily implicates relations 
of power that are intentionally engineered and that are proliferated through unintentional 
mechanisms  such  as  language,  narratives,  and  literature.  In  the  following  chapter,  I 
explore these connections through the theory of narrative, anthropological field study, and 
examine its articulation in children's books.
56
Chapter 3: Language as Root of Violence and Grammar of Ordered  
Reality
 The  pivotal  aspect  of  the  mechanism  responsible  for  the  proliferation  of 
institutions is  language. Language is both a semiotic system and a system of laws, or a 
grammar, that structures and regulates the exchange of symbolic capital and the economy 
of effort. Grammar provides concrete rules and formulae which by its nature is designed to 
contain meaning, predict interactive responses thereby preventing the unforeseeable and 
curbing  improvisation  and  chaos.  In  other  words,  grammar imposes  uniformity  or 
standards of assigned meanings and concepts to our understanding and thereby controls 
interactions between humans and their world. Even pictures and illustrations in children's 
books  require  and/or  “train”  a  fluency in  semiological  systems;  i.e.  they constitute  a 
language that collaborates with the verbal aspect of the books.
While  the  meta-linguistic  and  epistemological  studies  of  literature  point  to 
increasing possibilities in interpretation that  are capable of conveying various levels of 
complexity in the narrative, these complexities could be the result of unresolved tensions 
and  conflicts  characteristic  of  stratified  societies24 due  to  the  pressure  applied  by  an 
attempt  to  standardise  and impose  a  uniformity that  limits the expression of personal 
experience and observations.  Learnt  through ritual and repetition, grammar becomes an 
integral part of habitus and doxa, and language itself becomes a crucial aspect of the brain, 
perspectives on the world, and dispositions. Nonetheless, there is room for chaos even in 
language,  since  meaning  fluctuates  based  on  personal  history,  associations,  the 
physiological  memory of  emotions,  posture,  dispositions,  experiences,  and  knowledge 
which constitute the body hexis—an aspect of communication that  implicates the role of 
biography in forging specific perspectives underlying the premises and conclusions of all 
endeavours of social significance, whether scientific or creative25.
24 Frederic Jameson (2002) and Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963) make an important point about the complexity 
of art: when a society, such as the Caduveo, chooses to organise itself hierarchically, they fail to resolve 
the  contradictions  and  conflicts  arising  from  inequality  and  subjugation.  These  conflicts  are  then 
expressed in the complexity of lines and details in their paintings.
25 Scientific and artistic categories are as artificial  as any other. For example, to learn anatomy,  or  to 
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Even  though  some  linguists  believe  language  to  be  a  natural  or  evolutionary 
characteristic of human beings, the nature of language or the ability of other species to 
have grammatical systems for arranging signifiers and meaning indicates that language is 
neither a “natural” nor unique aspect of humanity. Rather, it is one of the tools, probably 
the most archaic of human tools, that helped organise abstract thought within a system, i.e. 
provided a grammar for symbolic representation and with it the possibility to replace the 
real experience by the symbolic. As I discuss in part three, this ability for language and 
civilisation are not exclusive to human animals,  however, very few species choose that 
path of cultural transmission and interaction since it  appears that language, among other 
things, provides a vehicle of submission to social and cultural norms that impose a sense 
of relating oneself not to a first hand experience, but first of all to language itself and to its 
system of arbitrary rules, restrictions, definitions and values – a grammar that is imposed 
on a person through the methods of education and domestication from early childhood and 
which requires a certain mode of relating oneself to the rest of the world. Research in the 
field  of  language  and  cognition reveals  this  relationship  of language,  knowledge  and 
domestication. 
In Metaphors We Live By, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (2003) examine this 
connection  between  understanding,  experience,  and  observation  from a  deterministic 
perspective on the metaphors used for scientific exploration. Their analysis demonstrates 
the role of metaphors and linguistic turns in shaping what we observe, how we interpret 
and feel about our observations, and ultimately how the language itself then shapes values, 
metaphors,  language,  experience,  “facts”,  and  their  interpretation.  Other  deterministic 
studies in sociolinguistics have been vital for an attempt to understand and address the 
problems of social injustice and stratification. For instance, the work of William Labov 
(1972)  on Black  English,  Lesley Milroy (1987)  on language,  stratification,  and social 
networking, Deborah Cameron (1995 and 2009) on language, gender, and class, among 
others demonstrate how accents,  terms, and body postures can be used to keep wealth 
distribution  out  of  reach  for  certain  groups  based  on  ethnicity,  gender,  or  other 
practice architecture one needs to be able to “see” and to “draw” in addition to the learning and analytic 
skills needed to perform any task. This is valid also for art, where one needs to learn about what one sees 
from other “scientific” aspects (anatomy, physics, etc.).  For a deeper discussion, refer to chapter 4 on 
Knowledge.
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discriminatory markers that  are connected with linguistic  expression,  essentialism,  and 
socio-economic status. Others have elaborated on the relationship between language and 
class, and by extension on language, disempowerment and access to resources and capital. 
Basil Bernstein (1971), Karen Foss and Stephen Littlejohn (2010), James Atherton (2011), 
inter alios, also offer invaluable insight into the mechanisms behind in-group participation 
and out-group discrimination. While these theories offer important contributions regarding 
the use of language for the purposes of discrimination, domination, and ostracising from 
economic networks, they do not address the question of the genesis and nature of language 
itself.
The  standard,  underlying  premise  in  most  of these  approaches  to  language  is 
defined by the civilised perspective that still continues to see language as a potential of 
“progress”, presumably an improvement over the dark animal a-linguistic ignorance to the 
elevated,  even  if  incomprehensible  for  most,  language  of  abstract  poetry  and  artistic 
representation. Furthermore, this perspective presents language as a natural characteristic 
of  humanity.  Noam Chomsky  (1957  and  1972),  for  instance,  argues  that  exclusively 
human children's  brains are hardwired specifically  to  learn language by a certain  age, 
which  appears  to  be  lost  (atrophied)  after  puberty  and  is  not  related  to  intelligence. 
Psycholinguistic research of feral and deaf children appears to confirm this observation. 
However, researchers studying the cases of “feral” children have focused on grammar and 
syntax rather than on the ontological premises in the notions conveyed by language.
Now considered a classic study in language acquisition and childhood, the case of 
Genie is an extreme scenario of this narrative of incarceration, dependence, and isolation. 
Because of this, it  reveals the mechanisms of domestication and its effect on wilderness 
which under the conquest of civilisation becomes a desertified landscape of loneliness. 
Having been severely abused by her parents until the age of thirteen, Genie grew up in 
complete isolation from her family, strapped to a chair in a room, occasionally being fed 
by  her  parents  who  did  not  communicate  with  her  with  the  exception  of her  father 
growling at her to show his anger when he brought her food. Otherwise, Genie was left in 
isolation from the rest  of the family,  whose other  children received normal treatment. 
Social workers discovered Genie  in  November 1970 at  the age of almost thirteen and 
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placed  her  in  the  care  of  psychologists  who  turned  Genie  into  dissertation  material 
observing her abilities to learn speech and adaptation to life in “society”. Genie eventually 
learnt  how to communicate,  but  had difficulty with standard grammar and concepts of 
politeness, such as “hello” and “thank you” (Rymer, 1993).
However, the concept “thank you” is not simply a matter of semantics and forms of 
polite socialisation. It contains the ontological premise that people have been created as 
self-centred,  selfish,  and  cruel;  that  what  they  snatch  from the  world  becomes  their 
property and right; and that they do not have to share or be kind to others. Therefore, when 
they decide to show concern for someone else, even in a seemingly simple greeting such 
as: “good morning, how are you?”, the response should acknowledge the fact of asking 
and not answer the question, because the inquirer does not care to find out how the other 
really feels. It would therefore be inappropriate to provide a description of one's real state 
of mind, heart, or life, because the answer should signal the appreciation for the question 
itself and so a “very well, thank you, and how are you?” is  then also met with a “very 
well, thank you; what a lovely day” even if the day is dark and the person is hungry and 
has no means of procuring food.
Alice Parman observes that the “thank you” issue and praise for food were the first  
aspects  of  her  upbringing  in  the  United  States  that  stood  in  stark  contrast  with  the 
interactions she witnessed in the home of her Indian hosts in a place in India where she 
has not seen a foreigner for kilometres (Anarchy Radio 15th December 200926). “Thank 
you for the meal, it  is very good,” is the American way of expressing that everything is 
appreciated and comme-il-faut, she says. “Why, the food wasn't good last time?” the hosts 
asked half-jokingly.  Family members, Parman observes, are expected to share and help 
each other out. They do not need to say thank you, because they will share and help out 
too when need arises. Such observations on the ridiculous aspect of thanking someone for 
food have been made in other non-domesticated societies. For example a Danish traveller, 
Peter Freuchen, who had married an Inuit woman and lived with the Inuit in Greenland, 
observes that the Inuit see mutual aid and reciprocity as the nature of human relations and 
one does not  thank for what constitutes the foundation of community,  members of that 
26 http://www.archive.org/details/AnarchyRadioTv12-15-09
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community explained to him (Freuchen, 1961).
There are good arguments for  both the “thank you” or the “thankless” way of 
relating to members of one's community, so it would be difficult to say definitively which 
might  be  the  more  optimal  modality  for  expressing  communal  relationships  while 
concurrently respecting personal space and effort, which the “thank you” acknowledges. 
Returning  to  Genie,  however,  having  been abused as  a  child  and  having  known only 
selfish cruelty, this concept must have appeared foreign to her. 
In this way, Genie's case reveals that these ontological differences at the root of the 
distinction between wildness and domestication are responsible for the extent of the effect 
of our interiorisastion of domestication, abstraction, and language and its expression in the 
characteristics  that  make  up  our  physiological,  cultural,  political,  and  environmental 
specifics and differences. The most tragic and most revealing aspect of her case, though, is 
that  her  extreme  domestication  through  abuse,  left  her  with  neither  wilderness  nor 
civilisation and therefore an inability to submit to relations articulated through symbolic 
and abstract sounds that  reconfirm through a ritual exchange of politeness that acts of 
kindness are the exception, while acts of cruelty, exploitation, incarceration, and abuse are 
the norm.
In other words, language is the sum of narratives and rules devised to instruct how 
to live in the world, how to relate to it, and how to interact with it. Chomsky's observation, 
that the ability to learn “language” is lost by a certain age thus makes sense if we define 
this phenomenon as the loss of the ability to develop alienation through symbolic thought. 
There is, perhaps, a stage at which a human or animal person grows into the world as a 
wild  being  and  becomes  less  prone  to  domestication,  with  its  promise  of  deferred 
gratification that  informs  the  basis  of contemporary symbolic  salary-culture  in  which 
symbols are given in  exchange for extorted labour or the promise of “good jobs” and 
“good living” in  exchange for  complying  with the board of education agenda or with 
teachers' demands. Language could have been that mutation that allowed us to develop the 
possibility to symbolise, separate, and harm the world and to encode these dispositions 
into the semantics and the grammar that structure and solidify domestication. On the basis 
of this grammar and structure, civilisation has developed effective pedagogical methods of 
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domestication that  realises  itself  through language.  Since  language is  the grammar  of 
symbolism  per se,  it  can serve as an effective tool of alienation, one that  defines and 
orders social and personal space as well as the experiences that are fitted to constitute a 
civilised self27.
There  is  significant  evidence  that  all  human  and  non-human  animals  have 
language28,  although  it  appears  that  only  some  human  languages  have  developed  a 
consistent (almost bullet-proof) system of violence. Here, I have in mind John Zerzan's 
1994 and 1997 essays on the social construction of time and language in  Running on 
Emptiness: The Pathology of Civilization (2002), in which he argues that the first tool of 
domestication was symbolic thought channelled by language:
Symbolizing is linear,  successive,  substitutive; it  cannot be open to its  whole object 
simultaneously.  Its  instrumental  reason  is  just  that:  manipulative  and  seeking 
dominance. Its approach is “let a stand for b” instead of “let a be b.” Language has its 
basis in the effort to conceptualize and equalize the unequal, thus bypassing the essence 
and diversity of a varied, variable richness (Zerzan, 2002: 2).
In  contrast  to  the  proposition propounded  by Jack  Goody and  Ian Watt's  (1963)  that 
literacy and alphabetisation is  what developed the human brain and made it  capable of 
abstraction, Zerzan identifies the invention of language itself as the cause of our rupture 
from  real  experience  and  our  world,  because  language  has  provided  the  means  to 
substitute the symbol for the real, denoting it in flat dimensions and experiencing it as a 
linear and organised order thereby homogenising diversity, simplifying the complexities 
by overlapping symbols.
Since civilisation is  marked by intense violence,  war,  and stratification with its 
totalitarian imposition of obligatory schooling and literacy, Zerzan's question regarding the 
link  between  language  and  violence  deserves  serious  examination.  In  the  context  of 
children's literature, I argue that this violence is transmitted through narrative structure. In 
other words, the interaction of the various parts of that narrative structure becomes the 
language (i.e. the grammar and the semiotics) of civilisation. Hence, a harmless looking 
27 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, many sociolinguists and anthropologists of language have discussed 
the connections between language and its relations to economic disparities and psychological identity 
based on gender, race, class, and I would add species to the list. The classic pioneers in this field are 
Lesley Milroy (1987), William Labov (1972), Deborah Cameron (1995 and 2009), inter alios.
28 Apart from the famous studies on the language of bees, dolphins, and primates, Con Slobodchikoff of 
Northern Arizona University researches the transmission of semantic information by prairie dogs.
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book, such as A.A. Milne's  Winnie-the-Pooh, may appear at first glance to be funny and 
cute because no  overt  aggression is  ever  depicted,  yet  the  ontological premises of its 
civilised space nonetheless transmit  a violent  order of power, cruelty,  and abuse that is 
kept at bay as long as both the victims and their master play their roles and claim their 
relations to be the expression of love and joy. The important question that  arises from 
Zerzan's critique is whether a different ontological premise transmitted through language 
is capable of circumventing the violent outcome that symbolic systems, as Zerzan argues, 
ultimately convey. In other words, can a book, for instance a moominbook, still be able to 
transmit  love,  life,  and  peace  if  it  is  based  on  the  ontological  premise  of  wildness, 
movement, and chaos even when the transmission occurs through language, moreover, 
through written language? It is an important aspect to investigate separately, particularly in 
comparison with the languages of other species, namely, whether the ontological premise 
can circumvent  the impetus towards separation and alienation that appears to inhere in 
civilising tools and systems such as language.
On a different level, Zerzan notes that, in Latin, the word “define” originally meant 
“to limit  or bring to an end. Language seems often to close an experience,  not to help 
ourselves  be  open to  experience.  When  we  dream,  what  happens  is  not  expressed  in 
words,  just  as  those  in  love  communicate  most  deeply  without  verbal  symbolizing” 
(Zerzan, 2002: 2).  In this sense, then, definition, limitation, order and domestication are in 
the very nature and purpose of language – a system that shapes the knowledge which it  
orders, denotes, symbolises and transmits. That is why language, Zerzan observes, has not 
always evoked the optimistic cheer that the civilised, such as Eli Sagan, have expressed:
Eli Sagan (1985) spoke for countless others in declaring that the need to symbolize and 
live in a symbolic world is, like aggression, a human need so basic that “it can be denied 
only at the cost of severe psychic disorder.” The need for symbols – and violence – did 
not  always  obtain,  however.  Rather,  they  have  their  origins  in  the  thwarting  and 
fragmenting  of  an  earlier  wholeness,  in  the  process  of  domestication  from  which 
civilization issued. Apparently driven forward by a gradually quickening growth in the 
division of labor that began to take hold in the Upper Paleolithic, culture emerged as 
time, language, art, number, and then agriculture (ibid).
The breadth of research from which Zerzan draws this connection between violence and 
language is compelling and highly relevant to any attempt at furthering the understanding 
of human knowledge particularly as it  is  expressed through and encoded in  language, 
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since, unless one thinks a critique for herself under her breath and exclusively in her own 
mind,  any  cultural  or  social  attempt  to  understand  and  challenge  its  curtailing  and 
deadening power in itself takes place in and through language.
Wikan's problem discussed above thus becomes even more pronounced when one 
approaches it  from the angle of Zerzan's critique of symbolic thought, language, and the 
social construction of time. Namely, Wikan's difficulty with the vocabulary responsible for 
structuring experience and knowledge through stories (simpler elements of narratives) and 
narratives  (more  complex  and  larger  forms  of  communicated  experience)  becomes 
understandable and reveals the value of – even the urgency for – a comparative analysis of 
fictional stories with socio-cultural narratives in Swedish, Russian, and English which I 
undertake here.
Chapter 4: Literacy as Tool of Domestication and Oppression
The concept of domestication entails not only the conceptualisation of the “other” 
as “own”, but also of convincing the “other” that she is  “other” and “owned”. In other 
words, the alignment of the other's will with one's needs requires a narrative that structures 
obedience, contentment, a conception of “natural rights”, desires, and other symptoms of 
life.
In  civilisation,  just  as  in  wilderness,  desires,  personal  and  social  “history”, 
dependencies  and  interactions  are  inscribed  within  the  larger  system of  relationships. 
Unlike in wilderness, however, which contains in it a multiplicity of narratives expressing 
different interests, in civilisation, one dominant version speaks with authority on behalf of 
specific  interests  and  inscribes  all  other  interests,  including  those  in  conflict  with the 
dominant  version,  into  an official narrative with its  sense of direction and chronology. 
Narratives order events into a plot that betrays a certain foundation of values providing a 
scale  for  measuring  a person's  worth and  instilling  a  sense  of norms  and  ideals.  The 
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mechanism for  constricting  a person's  movement  and presenting  a plot  through which 
literary  characters,  both  fictional  and  ethnographic,  submit  to  a  system of  rewards, 
punishment,  direction,  and  plot  forges  specific  fears,  desires  and  aspirations  in  the 
audience who identifies with these literary characters that symbolise the audience's own 
dreams even as  the audience  has been alienated from reality  and  own inner  wildness 
through domestication and its methods of education and manipulation.
The question that arises from these observations becomes: can we ever – whether 
we are cultural producers or cultural consumers – detach ourselves completely from our 
world,  experience  and  concerns—i.e.  from anthropocentrism?  For,  if  we  depend  on a 
specific  paradigm for  the  organisation of livelihoods,  in  the context  where  space and 
resources have been privatised, then access to one's livelihood depends on the networks 
through which we acquire access to food and to symbolic and material capital. In such a 
context our imagination, no matter how uncurbed and wild, would still derive its life-force 
and  form  (language)  from  our  experience  within  pre-set,  previously  accumulated 
categories  of  knowledge  and  perspectives,  an  imagination  that  renders  this 
experience/knowledge  pre-ordered,  pre-categorised,  and  handed  down  as  part  of  the 
symbolic heritage in terms of meaning, networks, institutions, knowledge, identity, pass-
time,  history,  future,  and  so  forth.  For  instance,  science fiction and  fantasy,  the most 
fictional  and  imaginary  of  literary  genres,  whether  written  for  old  or  young  adults, 
illustrate  the  point  that  civilised  literature,  stories,  and  narratives  are in  themselves 
narcissistic endeavours always concerned with the human, the nature of the human, the 
interests of the human, the nature of human relationships with themselves and with the 
world, et al. 
This obsession with humanity and humanism moulds the rules of credibility for 
works  of  fiction:  if  humans  cannot  relate  to  the  depicted  world,  then  it  is  deemed 
nonsensical or utopian (incredible, improbable,  alien). Regardless of the author's intent, 
books offer specific sets of rules, which in the case of imaginary worlds can “convince” 
the reader  to  believe  in  that  world  and identify  with  its  characters.  Credibility,  rules, 
representation – even in the case of the fantastic – thus depend on the “knowledge” about 
the “real” world that the author and the reader hold, interact with, or challenge.
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The question of credibility touches upon several aspects of literary works.  First, 
trust  and belief  are linked with the issue of authority:  the authority of the author,  the 
authority of the genre,  the authority of the work itself,  including the debate of literacy 
versus illiteracy. In the contemporary global technocratic system, literacy is  valued and 
written texts  have  weight,  voice  and  authority  that  are denied  to  oral traditions.  This 
renders  authored,  written,  and  published  sources  of  information  credible  and  the 
unpublished sources not; a published author here is seen as authority, but an unpublished 
author is not; elite knowledge is credible because the elite have access to the process of 
producing and publishing texts as well as the final products, while popular knowledge is 
not because, as Bourdieu (1979) observes in Distinction, it constantly undergoes inflation; 
and so forth. The knowledge that the literate classes, and specifically the groups in control 
of the production of literacy, produce about the popular classes too constitutes the voice of 
authority that is internalised by the popular classes or resources, who are thereby silenced 
and objectified as they are “studied”, “known”, and told who they “are”.
Domestication thus entails  teaching a person knowledge that is  not available in 
wilderness. If the case were otherwise, there would have been no need for the principle 
itself  of  pedagogy,  i.e.  the  notion  that  someone  must  teach  others  a  standardised 
curriculum or the “uneducated” will perish,  because the assumption is that they are not 
capable  of learning  these  principles  on  their  own.  In  the  wild,  a  person  living  in  a 
community of human and non-human people and plants from childhood learns how to 
guard the balance and diversity of that community so as to ensure that life continues and 
thereby learns to respect seasons: today I eat, tomorrow it  is  the raven's turn,  then the 
hare's,  and then the wolf's.  In civilisation,  only those who  have  power and ownership 
“rights” over “real” estate and living and non-living resources are the ones who eat. In 
other words, there are those who consume and control the symbolic capital, and there are 
those who are “legally” denied access to basic necessities, i.e. the majority of human and 
non-human “resources” who are excluded from this system of distribution of symbolic and 
material capital and resources because they themselves constitute the resources that are 
known to exist to be consumed. Hence, the cows, chicken, and pigs are incarcerated in 
concentration  camps,  locked  in  stalls  for  slaughter;  human  resources  are  used  and 
discarded; soldiers are shipped off to kill and be killed; and the share-holders hold shares 
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of people, modes of production, products, markets, governments and their representatives, 
just to cite a few examples. 
In order to domesticate a human or non-human person, that person needs to be 
taught  that  she will  die  if  she  does  not  please  the  one who  has  succeeded in  killing 
competition – both the competing enterprises, the individuals that comprise them, and the 
human and animal persons who compete – and has appropriated food and other necessities 
for one's livelihood. Resources have to be taught that they are resources on a daily basis, 
for in the wild they would not learn how to fear, suffer, and toil; and when not reminded 
they easily turn feral.
Historical,  anthropological,  linguistic,  philosophical,  and  other  studies  all  agree 
that there is an interconnection between literacy, social and political domination of minds 
and bodies, the emergence of the capitalist mode of thinking human relations in terms of 
both  product  yield  and  social  relations,  and  the  environment  which  in  civilisation  is 
necessarily agricultural and domesticated. The technologies of writing, the body itself of 
the text,  and  the technologies  of dissemination or,  as  in  the case  of elite  knowledge, 
technologies for the monopoly of texts and valued information, work together to seal off 
access to agency and to impose the domesticated narrative as the legitimate and “natural” 
interpretation  of  any  ontological,  anthropological,  or  epistemological  explorations  in 
creative and scientific literature.
In The Domestication of the Savage Mind (1977) and later in The Logic of Writing 
and the Organisation of Society (1986), Jack Goody observes that, in the written records 
that  have  survived  from ancient  times,  it  is  the  financial  and  administrative  lists  that 
predominate and not  the literary or other creative texts,  which indicates that the initial 
intent in literacy was to establish “relationships of dependence”.  Technically,  literacy is 
different  from oral societies,  where individuals memorise  their  personal,  political,  and 
economic transactions in  a context  of relationships “perhaps with the aid of witnesses, 
where  the  transfer  establishes  a  specific  relationship  of  credit  or  debt  rather  than  a 
generalized  one  of  dependence”  (Goody,  1986:104).  The  lists  that  Goody  cites  deal 
specifically with the administration of financial debts, prices, yield, etc. and have emerged 
in hierarchical societies where the majority was managed to produce for the profit of the 
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owners  (at  different  epochs,  “owners”  went  by  different  terms:  lords,  merchants, 
aristocracy, courtly administrators, etc.).
While it is not self-evident whether literacy came in response to the mutation in the 
human brain that suddenly shifted from the wildness mode to that of domestication and 
ownership or whether it caused the shift, Goody formulates writing as the “technology of 
the  intellect” responsible  for  the  crystallisation of civilisation in  its  current  form.  He 
explains that
by discussing mechanisms as well as differences, I have tried to map out an approach to 
the problem of cognitive processes, the ‘nature of human thought’,  l’esprit humain (to 
use the formulae of Chomsky and Lévi-Strauss respectively),  which attempts to take 
into account of the effects of differences in the mode of communication between and 
within human beings (Goody, 1977: 160).  
This technology of the intellect, Goody argues, is what differentiates literate cultures from 
oral  but  he  does  not  see  the  hierarchical  and  alienating  potential  of  technology  as 
necessarily  threatening.  As  his  frequent  collaborator,  Walter  Ong  says,  “[w]riting” 
heightens consciousness. Alienation from a natural milieu can be good for us and indeed is 
in many ways essential for human life. To live and to understand fully, we need not only 
proximity but also distance. This writing provides for consciousness as nothing else does” 
(Ong, 1982: 81). 
Here, Goody and Ong articulate the civilised position, which inadvertently justifies 
violence, particularly since alienation entails the infliction of pain on those from whose 
experience the domesticator chooses to distance himself and to silence its expression by 
misnaming it. Pain that would have resonated sharp and loud through empathy, not only 
becomes blunt, it disappears from the radar of the domesticator's knowledge because it is 
(re)presented as something else—joy for  instance.  In other words,  the civilised person 
tunes to the legitimate discourse on experience instead of tuning in to the experience itself. 
The price of this alienation is change in the very nature of civilised beings. As the civilised 
began to  alienate themselves from themselves and their  world,  they began to  undergo 
physiological,  ontological,  and epistemological mutation which was aided by language 
(Chomsky, 1957 and 1972) and literacy (Goody and Ong) thereby inducing physiological 
changes in the brain, which constitutes both a vital organ of agency and a space for doxa 
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and habitus. This organ as space and motor drives a person to interact with and act upon 
the environment  in  specific  ways.  In more than abstract  or symbolic  manner  we now 
express our domestication through our flesh, and, in this light, Goody and Ong's research 
confirms Bourdieu's processes of the embodiment of elite perspectives, knowledge, and 
values. Accordingly, literacy became the DNA of oppressive and concurrently oppressed 
brains,  which effectuated a significant  shift in the nature of intelligence  per se causing 
serious deterioration in understanding, intelligence, knowledge, and relationships. 
These observations and connections between literacy and oppression have been 
made by scholars from a variety of disciplines: anthropology, pedagogy, literary studies, 
history, among others. The principal point of these disputes circles around “the chicken or 
the egg” question:  namely,  when we accept  the association between the emergence of 
literacy  and  the  fundamental  changes  in  human  nature  and  society,  which  of  these 
elements is the factor and which is the consequence? Was literacy responsible for these 
changes, was it  a corollary, or did it appear in response to specific needs and perhaps to 
the changes themselves? In the end, what does this tell us about the general trajectory and 
experience of human and non-human beings, their knowledge and, by implication, about 
the culture of childhood?
Many scholars see these changes either as inevitable or, like Walter Ong, even as 
positive. In Imagined Communities, the historian Benedict Anderson (1992), for instance, 
argues  that  in  post-industrial  societies,  literacy  played  a  central  role  in  making 
“knowledge”, which has been invented and constructed as symbolic  currency,  standard 
and accessible for the “public” even while he acknowledges the intentional manipulation 
of  invented  traditions  (Hobsbawm  and  Ranger,  1983).  Just  as  writing  provided  the 
technological means for solidifying new ways of relating (or rather of not relating but 
alienating, as Ong puts its) to the world in a hierarchical and utilitarian manner, so has 
print  culture,  according  to  Anderson,  provided  the  technologies  for  nationalising 
knowledge and  information,  inscribing it  into  the structure of power,  exploitation and 
stratification,  thereby  altering  the  lives  of  domesticated  people  who  began  to  view 
themselves  differently  in  relationship  to  the  imagined  communities  and  to  the  now 
abstracted members of their group. In other words, the formation of modern consciousness 
69
itself owes its existence to literacy and, in more recent developments, to print and world 
web cultures.
In contrast to Goody and Ong, some theoreticians of literacy and capitalism saw 
these changes in  the nature of knowledge and human experience as menacing.  In The 
Postmodern  Condition,  for  instance,   Jean-François  Lyotard  (1984)  observes  that  the 
“grand narratives of legitimation” have lost their  credibility and power of authority.  In 
other  words,  he  assumes  that  the  various  stories  about  the  history  of  the  whole  of 
humanity, such as the Enlightenment story about progress, Hegel's dialectic of Spirit, or 
Marx's utopia of the impeding crumbling of capitalist autocracy and the dissolution of the 
state had, prior to postmodernism, provided a convincing narrative that legitimated them; 
but  since,  according to  his  version of the story,  postmodernism has  splintered stories, 
narratives, nonnarratives, ahistoric epistemologies and moral theories, people lost faith in 
the ability of the metadiscourse to contain the narratives and hence to provide the meta 
level necessary for their legitimation. Having lost  its  power,  knowledge has become a 
commodity that can be easily bought or sold and thus has altered the nature of knowledge 
itself. Most important, he observes that knowledge is no longer based on “facts”, rather is 
a  product  of social relations  (Lyotard,  1984),  and,  in  the context  of civilisation,  these 
relations are based on closed group networking, hierarchy, and limitations. In other words, 
like  Goody  and  Ong,  Lyotard  identifies  the  importance  of  (meta)narratives  in  the 
development  of  civilised  hegemony.  However,  by  characterising  the  “modernist”, 
“narrative”,  “metannarative”,  and  the  “metadiscursive”  as  ineffective  technologies  of 
legitimation of knowledge and power, he nonetheless conceives the possibility of rescuing 
the postmodern project by incorporating the splintered stories into practice. Practitioners 
thence legitimate their practice within a “justice of multiplicities” (Lyotard, 1984). Fraser 
and Nicholson offer a critique of Lyotard's oversight in his piece on postomodernism:
A major  problem  with  Lyotard's  “justice  of  multiplicities  conception  [is  that  it] 
precludes one familiar, and arguably essential, genre of political theory: identification 
and critique of macrostructures of inequality and injustice that cut across the boundaries 
separating relatively discrete practices and institutions.  There is no place in Lyotard's 
universe  for  critique  of  pervasive axes  of  stratification,  for  critique  of  broad-based 
relations  of  dominance  and  subordination  along  lines  like  gender,  race,  and  class” 
(Fraser and Nicholson, 1989: 88). 
Fraser and Nicholson point to an important deficiency in Lyotard's critique, which, even 
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though  he  acknowledges  the  “evolution”  of  systems  of  relations  of  knowledge(s), 
nevertheless, like Ong and Goody, does not pay enough attention to the “direction” of this 
“evolution” and its  effects on living experience of anthropogenic devastation on earth. 
Fraser and Nicholson's own oversight, however, is as serious since in their discussion of 
relations  of  dominance  and  subordination  they  include  only  those  species  who  are 
categorised as human and in this sense, like Lyotard, they leave in tact the metanarrative 
of  domestication,  dominance,  and  subordination.  In  this  way,  Lyotard  and  his  critics 
actually  salvage  the  legitimacy  of  “(meta)narratives”  as  abstracted  from  individual 
experience  of  pain  that  is  inflicted  by  the  “meta-narrative”  of  civilisation  and  the 
technologies of biological modification. On the other hand, Lyotard's idea of the practice 
of “justice of multiplicities”, a conception that legitimates itself  through praxis, allows for 
oral traditions and non-civilised narratives to legitimate themselves as well. In this respect 
Lyotard reopens the door for a possibility of liberation from the technologies of literacy, 
something that Nosov succeeds to envision in his ideal Flower Town.
From  a  different  perspective,  approaching  the  problems  of  literacy  and 
technologies of texts and knowledge, technocratic  views of literacy have been strongly 
contested. For instance, Michel Foucault (1970), Jacques Derrida (1978 and 1997), Roland 
Barthes (1989), among others, pay attention to the dichotomies inherent to the oral/literate 
debate. Their discourse echoes the Marxist approach adopted by Bourdieu in that it views 
concepts of consciousness and knowledge as historically contingent upon the (civilised) 
narratives  that  correspond  to  economic,  political,  and  technological  conditions  of 
possibility. In this regard, they do not question the oral/literate dichotomy per se as much 
as they shift  the focus from the linear, closed space of literacy to the non-linear, open-
ended space of electronic literacy. 
For Bourdieu (1979), symbolic value is independent of truth value and that makes 
it possible to concoct “knowledge” and cultural representation whose mere “prestige” and 
high price  render  it  “credible”  regardless  of whether  the  “information”  it  purports  to 
present  is  true  or  false,  thereby  comprising  the  main  leverage  in  the  underlying 
mythologies  of civilisation.  Limiting  accessibility  to  these  objects  of symbolic  capital 
increases the value and the desire to possess them. Yet, popularisation of elitist knowledge 
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does nothing to distribute power or to confront inequality. On the contrary, as Bourdieu 
illustrates with popular and elitist art and literature, popularising an elitist article decreases 
its symbolic  and “material” value whereby the elite immediately come up with another 
mystical  artefact  to  stand  as  a  symbol  of currency that  is  turned  into  an “organ”  of 
knowledge  inaccessible  for  the  masses.  Devaluation  of  academic  degrees  is  another 
example that undergoes a similar process of inflation, Bourdieu argues. For, the higher the 
rank, the more exclusive the knowledge and the degree and the more authority it earns its 
holder. However, as more and more people strive to advance their chances of climbing up 
the social ladder,  the less  valuable  these degrees become.  Today two postdocs are the 
equivalent  of  a  B.A.  or  a  Masters  degree  half  a  century  ago.  This  inflation  of 
“certification”  that  the  institutions  of “knowledge”  sell  reveals  another  mechanism of 
exclusion and ostracism since the grading and the elimination process ultimately sieves 
out more people than it retains by requiring them to know the “exclusive” elitist cultural 
symbols which ultimately allows them to compete (and mostly lose) in the hierarchical 
system of exploitation. In this vein, making literacy available to the masses in itself will 
not make the masses better off, rather will devalue the currency of the symbolic capital 
that a given literate piece conveys.
Still, many, particularly socialist and other leftist-anarchist thinkers, such as Noam 
Chomsky (in Achbar and Wintonick, 1992), argue that literacy is an important tool that 
ultimately allows the masses to access the information circulating among the elites and 
whose  popularisation  makes  accessible  cultural  work  and  knowledge,  which  under 
capitalism constitute elitist currency. Making these works available to the masses devalues 
their  symbolic  and  real  price.  However,  in  contrast  to  Bourdieu's  understanding,  this 
devaluation, they argue, disarms their elitist power. According to Andrew O'Malley (2003) 
and Gillian Avery (1975),  this has been the tactic with children's  books in England for 
centuries. Avery and O'Malley's historical research illustrates that the elites have always 
managed  to  regroup and  thus  salvage their  new symbolic  and literary capital keeping 
stratification in place.
The  doxa poses the principal challenge to the dream of liberation by means of 
popularisation and technologies, since it is the upper class knowledge, values, and desires 
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that  provide the axis for  habitus. Because the elites assign and control symbolic  value 
thereby generating the criteria for the production of symbolic culture, then it is the upper 
stratum of society that sets the tone and defines what is important, legitimate and to be 
desired,  regardless  of the degree of success  in  popularising these works  and  “assets”. 
Desires are manipulated successfully, even when the social roles and aspirations assigned 
to  individuals  from the  lower  classes  are  expressly  framed  as  antagonistic  to  those 
assigned to upper cliques.  Again,  Avery (1975) and O'Malley (2003) present  numerous 
examples  of  how values  and  characteristics  project  specific  roles  for  identification  in 
children's  literature  in  Great  Britain,  books  in  which  the  rich  are  lauded  for  their 
sneakiness, exploitation, control, ownership, spontaneity, and a sense of personal freedom, 
while the poor are depicted as striving to be dependable, hard-working, self-sacrificing, 
and content with the little joys of their poor lives.
The first  impediment  on  the  way  of  liberation  via  technology,  hence,  is  the 
question of the “real” production and exploitation of labour.  For,  if  everyone becomes 
“free”,  then who will mine? Who will design? Who will work in the plastic factories? 
Who will assemble computers? Who will make clothes, cook, and clean, when the free are 
enjoying  technology?  And,  if  all  goes  well,  who  will  produce  the  texts  and  the 
information? How and why would they do it, and why would anyone be interested in it? 
This critique of technology and the exploitation it requires inheres in various disciplines 
including children's literature which channels these assumptions, hopes, and critiques, to 
which I will return further on in my work.
Second, in the context of the totalitarian capitalism, where land, resources, food, 
space,  and  time  are  all  expropriated,  struggle  itself  entails  tremendous  sacrifices  and 
demands an immense effort that most people simply cannot afford since the majority of 
global population is preoccupied simply with day to day survival. Hence, even when re-
appropriation  by  human  masses  takes  place  (for  instance  as  in  the  French,  Russian, 
Chinese, African revolutions), the enjoyment of access to symbolic culture requires time 
and the social roles themselves become part of the mechanism that keeps the hierarchical 
status quo of knowledge and symbolic culture in place. Once again, all of these abstract  
entities that have concrete capitalist value are in the possession of a small group of people 
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while the majority of the dispossessed, apart from surviving, is preoccupied with caring 
for the needs of the owners of time, symbolic capital, human and non-human resources, 
and material wealth. The dispossessed thus attend to the owners' needs for cleaning, child-
rearing, feeding, entertaining, building, servicing the elites' leisure, doing their work for 
them, accumulating their wealth for them and (ac)counting that wealth, ad infinitum.  In 
other words,  possessions do not only make up the non-material or social and symbolic 
capital  such  as  education,  taste,  and  knowledge,  time  itself  becomes  the  locus  in 
constructing  the  civilised  narrative  as  well  as  an  object  of  possession  and  a  tool  of 
domination from which the “masses” are alienated, but which constitute their doxa as well 
as their innermost dreams and desires.
Legitimate manners owe their value to the fact that they manifest the rarest conditions of 
acquisition, that is, a social power over time which is tacitly recognized as the supreme 
excellence:  to  possess  things  from  the  past,  i.e.  accumulated,  crystallized  history, 
aristocratic  names  and  titles,  chateaux or  ’stately homes’,  paintings  and  collections, 
vintage wines and antique furniture, is to master time, through all those things whose 
common feature is that they can only be acquired in the course of time, by means of 
time, against time, that is, by inheritance or through dispositions which, like the taste for 
old things, are likewise only acquired with time and applied by those who can take their 
time (Bourdieu, 1979: 71).
Finally,  having spent their time on the classes who have appropriated everyone's 
time29, as well as the labour that feeds, clothes and otherwise nurtures the people with 
ownership and the whole world, the majority of the dispossessed people is unable to enjoy 
the “democratisation” of the internet space or other popularised aspects of formerly elite 
culture because value  and legitimation of these pieces of knowledge comply with  the 
hierarchical standards, and, as Bourdieu observes, even when they do manage to “steal” a 
bit of time, the masses cannot do much with the knowledge that has lost its value and 
legitimacy. Namely, the valued and legitimated books, photocopies, computers, printers, 
intellectual resources,  transportation, social networking, and the general conditions that 
induce reflection and concentration, such as the availability of time, health, quiet working 
space, a satisfied stomach that does not distract with dizziness or sucking and gurgling, 
etc.:  all  of  these  material  and  symbolic  aspects  of  living  in  a  world  colonised  by 
civilisation have a bearing both on the amount and quality of time a person has to reflect 
29 For instance, a recent study conducted by sociologists in the United States confirms that the time 
available for personal health related activities and family togetherness is contingent on income (Gupta, 
Sayer and Cohen, 2009).
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on, acquire, synthesise, and produce knowledge, as well as on the nature and “quality” of 
work a person yields. But, if the insights and results are dismissed as illegitimate and as 
bearing  no  value  for  the  body  of  knowledge,  then  the  endeavour,  along  with  the 
articulation of the experience and suffering of the persons in the dispossessed category 
becomes wasted and silenced. This wasting and silencing constitute an intimate part of 
civilised violence.
Hence, Foucault’s and Derrida’s optimism regarding the possibility of using textual 
technologies, such as the internet to disseminate ideas and information is valid in as much 
as the anarchical dissemination of knowledge devalues and hence undermines the currency 
of oppression; yet it remains ineffective if the fundamental perspective of civilisation and 
domestication remains  unchallenged,  because  ultimately  the  living  “resources”  cannot 
undo the structural limitation of class access to non-living “resources” and legitimate their 
value  and  use.  Most  important,  they  cannot  benefit  from  symbolic  capital  if  they 
themselves constitute an important portion of that capital and are themselves someone's 
“resources”. In other words, if the desire to achieve social justice among human and non-
human  people  is  sincere,  beings  must  first  be  freed  from the  categories  of  civilised 
knowledge that confine them to the epistemological cages that define them as “resources”. 
Hence,  liberation is  possible  only through the revolution of basic  precepts,  where the 
underlying premises of civilisation must be guillotined in the name of wilderness.
Narrative is thus intricately connected to the methods of proliferation of knowledge 
as hegemony, legitimation of power and oppression, with literacy acting as a useful tool in 
cementing the hierarchical structure of oppressive relationships within the physiology of 
living beings. To this extent, the act of narrating per se and the larger discourse into which 
our propensity for improvisation inscribes it allows for both the method and its technology 
to become the content. The method becomes knowledge since it  is  the routine, and the 
way in which the person learns, including the emotional and environmental contexts, that 
becomes inscribed as habitus in the flesh. The method – not the form or even the content – 
of communicating this knowledge, which is at once knowledge and its method, comes as a 
response to the type of the knowledge being communicated: if  it  is  about  life,  then it  
inscribes itself into the memory of each living member of the tradition; if it places material 
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commitment in the foreground, then, as paradoxical as it may appear, the method's end is 
not to inscribe the content as an integral part of memory, instead it produces the fixed lists 
of accounting, debt, and dependence that ultimately cause amnesia, devour and kill.
The stress on repetition and on inhabiting the narrative or allowing for the meaning 
to become part of one's  habitus collude to bridge the gap between the application and 
internalisation of “texts” (as method, written work, psalm, or poem). Both the method of 
learning something by heart and writing and reading it are effective in invading personal 
space and as a  tool of domestication if  the narrative  is  hierarchical  and linear  with a 
driving premise stemming from civilisation. Yet, the crucial difference between the oral 
and the literate modes of cultural (re)production and transmission lies in the basic premise: 
one stresses relationships with biodiversity and, hence, with life, while the other strives for 
relationships of dependence, control, consumption and death.
In  much  of  the  scientific  and  theoretical  literature,  theoreticians  agree  about 
distinctions between oral and literate technologies of transmission of ideology, habitus and 
doxa, and the role that literacy plays in framing the discourse of permanence, death, and 
stratification as well as fixing it as a solid structure or a perpetual machine. This is not to 
say that oral traditions cannot transmit a civilised epistemology. They can, but when they 
do, literacy becomes an important step in fixing the plot and normalising the individual 
and social bodies within its logic,  whereas wild  epistemologies do not need a plot and 
therefore do not care for a technology to standardise and to embody the chrono-logical 
narrative with its sense of time and meaning. At this juncture, Michel Foucault's (1961; 
1963)  work  on medical  discourse  and  power  over  bodies  and  “sanity”  has  inspired a 
plethora of anthropological research on the nature of discourse, narratives, and the body-
social politic connection. As my analysis of Dunno as precursor of Foucault and Rosenhan 
shows,  these  problems,  concepts,  and  connections,  including  the  role  of  medical 
“normalisation”,  overseeing,  and  incarceration  in  constructing  illness,  health  and 
normalcy,  have  all  been  raised  in  Nosov's  trilogy.  Echoing  Peter  Kropotkin's  (2002) 
critique of prisons and mental asylums, the trilogy explores the potential for abuse that 
medical  power  yields  projecting  this  power  as  even more  dangerous than that  of the 
police, because it is less visible and identifiable with higher potential of being internalised 
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by the subjects/objects.
To situate this critique within the space of contemporary medical anthropology, 
approaching the nexus of the construction of illness and health, sanity and reason, power 
and  disempowerment,  through  the  lens  of  psychiatry,  Lawrence  Kirmayer  makes  an 
interesting contribution to this line of thought: the poetics of medical narrative constructed 
and negotiated in the context of mental health care is pivotal to the emerging “truth” or 
“knowledge” about self,  illness, health and social relations (Kirmayer in Mattingly and 
Garro,  2000).  He observes  that  in  the context  of literate  science,  the oral and  poetic 
practice is unavoidable if integration of experiences and healing is to be achieved. Hence, 
even  though  contemporary  science  claims  to  be  a  “scientific”30 and  literate  body of 
knowledge,  branches  such as  psychiatry are  necessarily  practised  orally,  exposing  the 
reality of the scientific narrative's dependence on poetic expressions to negotiate meaning 
and  experience  in  a  dynamic  relationship  between  the  personal  and  the  public, 
“knowledge” and meaning. 
Psychodynamic theory argues that gaps in narrative may mask or hide a deeper narrative 
that is repressed or denied because of its painful substance. But the fractures of narrative 
may  also  reflect  the  inchoate  nature  of  illness  represented  as  islands  of  reason, 
fragmentary stories, narrative strands, and, above all, poetic evocation through bursts of 
figural  language.  This  emphasis  on  figures  and  fragments  rather  than  on  extended 
narratives reflects a basic view of everyday thinking as rooted in poetic refigurations of 
the world. Research on the central role of metaphor in language and thought supports 
this view of the quotidian mind as poetic (Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff, 1993; Turner, 1996 as 
summarised by Kirmayer in Mattingly and Garro, 2000: 171).
This citation offers an excellent  transition to the debate of knowledge in oral traditions 
versus domesticated literacy and to the question of the role of poetic and, to an extent,  
chaotic re-comprehension of the world and of one's own place and role in it; i.e., Kirmayer 
offers a new way to understand the power of poetry to cure the depression and alienation 
that civilisation generates and which malaise thrives by silencing the doxa of violence and 
repressing the need to express this pain. The anarchic potential of poetry, especially its 
illiterate potential, has in fact always been feared and repressed by persons with power and 
authority. In this battle between the chaos of poetry and the order of civilised literacy, the 
role of medical panopticon becomes particularly clear as revealed in my anthropological 
30 This claim to objectivity and “dry” facts of science has been debunked by Lakoff and Johnson (2003) in 
Metaphors We Live By and other studies.
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research on medical practitioners and social workers and their attempt to domesticate the 
Somali culture, which I discuss after my examination of The Adventures of Dunno and His  
Friends. Echoing the questions raised by Peter Kropotkin in the second half of the 19 th 
century, Nosov explores these issues in his trilogy for young readers (first published in 
1953) years before this discourse was brought to the fore by Michel Foucault's work on 
mental asylums and madness (1961), the origins of the clinic (1963), or on questions of 
discipline and punishment (1979)31, as well as before David Rosenhan's 1973 experiment 
titled “On Being Sane in Insane Places”.
Chapter 5: First there was Dunno, then there were Rosenhan and  
Foucault
The anti-hegemonic and anti-authoritarian premise of Dunno's trilogy permeates all 
the spheres and levels of social relationships in that world: knowledge, learning, economy, 
health care, and all. Notwithstanding the fact that literacy has a place in Dunno's world, it  
is  never imposed; there are no schools and no peer pressure; and everyone is perfectly 
capable of learning on her own and at her own pace. Hence,
Dunno never could do anything right. He never got beyond reading in syllables, and he 
could only write printed letters. Some people said his head was empty, but that was not 
true, because he could not have thought at all if it had been empty. To be sure, he did 
not think much, but he put his boots on his feet and not on his head, and it takes some 
thinking to do even that32 (Nosov, 1980: 16).
In other words, literacy is important, but knowing how to live comes first on the priority 
list.  Literacy does not replace worldly intelligence,  the savoir vivre,  and can be easily 
acquired by anyone once the need to read and write arises. To know how to live entails 
31 Madness and Civilization; The Birth of the Clinic; and Discipline and Punish respectively.
32 Если Незнайка брался за какое-нибудь дело, то делал его не так, как надо, и всё у него получалось 
шиворот-навыворот.  Читать  он  выучился  только  по  складам,  а  писать  умел  только  печатными 
буквами. Многие говорили, будто у Незнайки совсем пустая голова, но это не правда, потому что как 
бы он мог тогда сооброжать? Конечно, он соображал плохо, но ботинки одевал на ноги а не на голову,
—на это ведь тоже соображение надо (Носов, Н. Глава второя: Как Незнайка был Музыкантом, стр. 
232).
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making  one's  own  decisions  and  even  mistakes,  which  ultimately  means  coming  in 
conflict  with authority whose goal is  to  maximise one's  yield  and minimise costs and 
errors. Reflecting this dynamic, the trilogy is replete with episodes of the problems caused 
by  doctors  and  police  whose  roles  often  intertwine  and,  often,  even  become 
interchangeable  as  they try to  affirm a specific  order  and narrative.  As  an attempt  to 
neutralise the hierarchy of characters, Nosov projects as one of the protagonists Dunno's 
whole community consisting of sixteen boy-mites who live in a house on Blue-bell Street 
in Flower Town.
Dunno's is an unschooled33 world where mites learn when they are interested and 
become professionals by practising their chosen avocations. Just like in Lyotard's (1984) 
theory,  here  becoming  an  expert  requires  no  legitimating  process,  since  practice  and 
knowledge by themselves evoke the respect  of others.  In Dunno's world expertise that 
comes as a result of passion is always needed by the community and receives admiration. 
Hence, a poet, a madman, a traveller, a doctor, an astronomer, a cook, and even a thief, all 
have  a  place  in  this  society.  At  the  same  time,  school,  teachers,  academia,  or  other 
institutions of teaching and the production of legitimate knowledge have no place here 
with the exception of conference debates that are open to anyone. One such conference 
appears in the third book,  Dunno on the Moon, in which Doono, Professor Starson, and 
astronomer  McGlass34 have  a  debate  on  the  genesis  and  nature  of  the  moon.  The 
conference takes place at the academy of sciences in which the general public votes for the 
theory that is most likely to be closer to truth.  In other words, it is not the academy that 
legitimates knowledge and discoveries,  rather  it  is  the general public.  The academy is 
physically situated in the communist Sunny City, and its function is to offer a place for 
debates  between  anyone  wishing  to  present  a  theory,  a  published  book,  or  research 
regardless of whether they are citizens or not (Doono is not a resident, for instance). The 
academy functions in the manner of the French conception of a “free school”,  such as 
33 The term comes from Teach Your Own, a theory developed by John Holt (Holt and Farenga, 2003) based 
on  his  experience  of  and  reflections  on  schooling  methods  that  worked  to  suppress  the  creative 
expressions of a child's self and to oppress her will. Unschooling is a term that is designed to incorporate 
all forms of child-led education that entails focusing on the child's learning needs for self-learning and 
not teaching. I use the term “unschoolling” for lack of a better  term to describe empathic, attachment 
parenting, and child-led learning and living activities, where a child is not taught but allowed to learn 
organically through interest and interaction with the world.
34 In the original: профессор Звёздочкин and Стекляшкин.
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Collège de France or the participating institutions whose research and lectures have been 
historically accessible for the public for free and without the need for registration or other 
forms  of  legitimated  usage  (unlike  other  institutions,  particularly  North  American 
universities, where attendance and usage of libraries and other resources is monitored and 
available only through admissions and tuition fees)35.
In order to  participate in  these  events or academies,  one simply needs to learn 
autonomously the subject of one's passion. Hence,  Doono becomes a scientist by simply 
doing science and elaborating his method. Blobs is a painter because he paints. Doctor 
Pillman  is  a  doctor  because  he  heals  and  learns  his  métier by  experimenting  with 
medicinal plants and discussing the ethics and other aspects of the profession with other 
health practitioners, such as Doctor Honeysuckle in Greenville Town36. Separate chapters 
of  The  Adventures of  Dunno and his Friends (1980 [1953])  are dedicated to  Dunno's 
attempts  to  learn how to play music,  paint,  or  become a poet  by asking questions  or 
borrowing tips and instruments from the musician Trills, artist Blobs, and poet Turnips37. 
The pedagogical principle underlying the narrative amounts to: if someone wants to learn 
how to play music, one tries different instruments and experiments with the possibilities. 
When a person is guided by passion hard work becomes a pleasure and leads to expertise. 
The “master of the art” can share the musical instruments and respond to the needs of the 
learner and the questions the learner raises along the way of exploration. But it is vital to 
leave the learner to experiment, formulate questions, and discover what she needs or likes. 
This applies to everything: music, writing, and reading, which Dunno learns by himself 
when the need arises (such as in writing letters to his friends). This conception of learning 
constitutes the core of the unschooling approach to “pedagogy”, which holds that there is 
no standard age for starting reading and writing,  some learn them at four and others at 
thirteen,  but  they always learn and when they do,  even the children who  started later 
surpass the average “fluency” of school children within a year (Suggate, 2009)38.
35 This has changed in France and other places in Europe during the last decade.
36 Медуница and Зелёный Город in the original.
37 In the original, the characters' names are: музыкант Гусля, художник Тюбик, поэт Цветик.
38 In 2006, Sebastian Suggate defended a doctoral dissertation on the benefits of delayed literacy skills in 
children. His methods were based in psychology at Otago University and dissertation was listed among 
its exceptional theses for 2009, titled:  The role of age-related development in literacy acquisition and  
response to reading instruction. (Suggate, 2009). My own experience confirms this. My parents, in fact, 
hindered me from learning to read and write in Russian and I simply made the effort to learn it by the age 
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The  fundamental  premises  underlying  the  personal,  social,  and  environmental 
relationships in  mite-land stem from the understanding that  people mean well,  that  all 
idiosyncrasies are valuable and that conflict can be resolved by respecting personal quirks 
and by working on understanding the motivations that drive individuals in their actions. 
Here, valuable contribution to society is possible only when individuals are driven by their 
passions to choose their avocations. It  is  this passion that makes useful and significant  
discoveries  possible.  Hence,  Dr.  Pillman  heals  and  helps  his  fellow-mites,  Doono’s 
knowledge and science serves his community: he invents the air-balloon, studies the stars 
and conceives inter-planetary travel,  etc., Bendum and Twistum, the mechanics,  design 
cars  and  various  forms  of  mechanization,  among  many  other  examples.  In  fact,  the 
characters' names point  to their passions,  which become their specialisations and, thus, 
their spheres of knowledge. 
Yet, these skills, professionalism and knowledge also have the potential to confine 
as disciplines do by their very nature: they “discipline”, punish, and circumvent both the 
bodies of knowledge and the bodies that know. The only two characters that break out of 
such confinement or discipline are Doono – who knows everything – and Dunno, the hero 
– who does not know anything; in short, the multi- or ultra- disciplinarian and the anti-
disciplinarian.
Dunno is complex: he does not possess institutionalised knowledge, yet even if the 
author introduces Dunno as “not knowing anything at all”, a few paragraphs later he says 
about him that he did just fine in life and learnt all that was needed at his own pace.  In 
fact, Dunno is a free thinker, a traveller, the “village fool”, the philosopher, and his type of 
“knowledge”  can  be  said  to  be  the  link  that  allows  Doono  to  make  his  scientific 
discoveries.  Doono is a tacit  model of authority for those with specialised,  i.e. limited, 
spheres of knowledge. Some critics,  such as Boris Kuprianov and Lev Pirogov (2004) 
defined Doono’s knowledge as potentially totalitarian. This totalitarianism is juxtaposed to 
and threatened by the anti-authoritarian, the anti-totalitarian, the anti-disciplinarian Dunno 
who, with his inspiration and imagination, constantly challenges this authority and puts 
of five. My brother learnt by following the bed-time reading pages that our mother read to him at the age 
of four. My daughter learnt how to read in Russian at six years and learnt how to read English before she 
could even speak it at the age of eight.
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this  knowledge  to  the test.  In other  words,  more than anyone else  in  the mite-world, 
Dunno  disrupts  Doono's  attempt  to  order  this  particular  society's  knowledge  and  to 
structure experience into a (meta)narrative.
Doono  is  not  the  only one,  however,  whose  knowledge  and  endeavour  Dunno 
challenges. “In this same house lived Dr. Pillman, who looked after the Mites when they 
fell ill” (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 11). The true nature of the controlling and oppressive role of 
the doctor is revealed in his encounters with Dunno and finally clearly articulated in a 
debate with Honeysuckle, a girl-mite doctor from Greenville Town. These encounters (the 
book was published in 1954) spell out Kropotkin's thesis that “[t]he chains disappeared, 
but asylums – another name for prisons – remained, and within their walls a system as bad 
as that  of the chains grew up by-and-by”  (Kropotkin,  2002: 369).  In other words,  the 
methods of disciplining the body by physical means have been replaced by “curing” the 
mind through panoptical gaze and the ordering of space,  bodies,  desires, and thoughts, 
which were the exact same topics that  Michel Foucault's  explored in  The Birth of  the 
Clinic (1963),  The History of Madness (1961), Discipline and Punish (1975) among his 
other works.
The first  encounter between Dunno and Pillman appears in chapter three, titled: 
“How Dunno Became an Artist”. Dunno decides to learn how to paint. He goes to Blobs 
who lends him his materials and leaves to work. Dunno approaches drawing creatively 
and produces fifteen social caricatures of his house-mates. Such fellow dwellers in the life 
of  a  real  child  comprise  the  members  of  the  first  community  in  which  the  child  is 
socialised and, according to Freudian psychology (Freud, 1933), whose members become 
the first figures for the child's identification. It is the agency with which they act on behalf 
of the child that provokes the child's need for rebellion and self-assertion. In contemporary 
society, this tension is even more pronounced in the relationship of “citizens” with their 
general physician or paediatrician,  since the parents renounce their authority over their 
own body and health as well as over their children's in favour of the family doctor. Here, 
Nosov depicts this position of the doctor and his (Dr. Pillman's) role as a disciplining body 
that integrates the child into society by suppressing the child's wildness and the possibility 
to rebel against this centralising medical force.
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The first to wake up was Dr. Pillman. As soon as he saw the paintings he began to laugh. 
He liked them so much that he put on his spectacles to get a better look at them. He 
examined each picture in turn, laughing very hard.
“Good for Dunno!” he said. “I never had such a good laugh in my life!”
At last he came to his own picture.
“Who is this?” he asked in a stern voice. “Me? It couldn't be me. No likeness at all. Take 
it down.”
“Why?” asked Dunno. “Let it hang there with the others.”
“You must be mad, Dunno!” said Dr. Pillman angrily. “Or, perhaps, there's something 
wrong with your eyes. What makes you think I have a thermometer instead of a nose? 
I'll have to give you a big dose of castor oil tonight when you go to bed.”
Dunno disliked castor oil very much.
“Please don't,” he whimpered. “I can see for myself that the picture isn't like you.”
And he took it down and tore it up (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 22-23).
Even though all of the mites enjoyed the caricatures of their friends and disliked the ones 
that made fun of them, they used negotiating tactics to coerce Dunno into pulling down 
their picture.  Dr. Pillman is the only one to use his authority in  giving leverage to his 
demands and force compliance by, first, diagnosing Dunno as “mad” or “ill”: “You must 
be mad.... Or, perhaps, there's something wrong with your eyes” (ibid) and, second, by 
threatening to administer medication: “I'll have to give you a big dose of castor oil” (ibid). 
Thus,  his  medical knowledge is  not  reserved exclusively for  the purpose of curing his 
fellow-mites' health afflictions, but also used to advance his own interests that drive him to 
apply all forms of social or political intimidation, including punishment and blackmail, in 
order to suppress social commentary and artistic expression. Doctor Pillman does the same 
thing in chapter four, where Dunno became a poet and declared that: “I've written a poem 
about Dr. Pillman too”. Pillman's response was:
“We've got to put a stop to this, friends,” … “Are we to stand calmly by and let him go 
on telling fibs about us?”
“No, we aren't!” agreed everybody (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 28).
Whereas the other characters simply express their dissatisfaction and attempt to negotiate 
their position with the artist, in this instance just as elsewhere in the book, Dr. Pillman 
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dictates the tone of the public opinion and initiates the repression of art. Steering the social 
consensus towards his own ends, and with the help of the “public”, Dr. Pillman succeeds 
in suppressing Dunno yet again, just as he did in other instances where he mobilised the 
mob to rally against Dunno's musical and painting endeavours. 
These episodes reveal the tension between public appreciation, mainstream art, and 
artistic  critique  of  society  that  is  highlighted  in  later  discussions  with  the  artists  in 
Greenville Town. Most important, however, these scenes question the nature and the role 
of art by juxtaposing “realist” and symphonic depiction of an idealised reality versus the 
need to bring out the critical and cacophonic potential of social experience—a conflict  
exposed by the encounter between the rebellious artist and medical authority. Not only do 
Dunno's encounters with the doctor challenge the purpose and the oppressive nature of this 
authority, they question its very claim to truth. After all,  the civilised, authoritarian and 
authorised  narrative  derives  its  power  and  legitimacy  by  presenting  its  knowledge  as 
truthful,  reflecting  the “real”  nature of beings  and  their  “real”  needs.  This  encounter, 
however, not only reveals the problems of reality and representation, but also the question 
of truth as Dunno exposes Dr. Pillman as a liar.
In the chapter on “How Dunno Took a Ride in a Soda-Water Car”, Dunno drives 
Bendum  and  Twistum's  soda-water  and  syrup  car  into  a  ditch  and,  having  lost 
consciousness, is taken to Dr. Pillman's clinic. At first, the doctor expresses surprise at the 
fact, almost lamenting it, that Dunno is not in a worse state than he would have expected 
him to be: “Strange as it may seem not a bone is broken” (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 35). Then, 
each time Dr. Pillman plans to perform a procedure, such as take out splinters or apply 
iodine,  he lies that  it  is  not going to hurt,  and each time he hurts Dunno. Finally,  Dr. 
Pillman announces that he needs to take Dunno's temperature. 
“Oh, don't! Please don't!” [cried Dunno]
“Why not?”
“It'll hurt.”
“It doesn't hurt to have your temperature taken.”
“You always say it doesn't hurt, but it always does.”
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... “Silly! ... Well, now you'll see it really doesn't hurt,” said the doctor and he went to 
get the thermometer.
As soon as he was gone Dunno jumped out of bed, leaped through the window, and ran 
off to Gunky's. When Dr. Pillman came back with the thermometer, Dunno was gone.
“A fine patient!” muttered the doctor. “Here I am doing my best to make him well and 
instead of thanking me, he jumps out of the window and runs away! He ought to be 
ashamed of himself!” (ibid: 36).
Michel  Foucault's  remark  that  “Power  is  tolerable  only  on condition  that  it  mask  a 
substantial  part  of  itself.  Its  success  is  proportional  to  its  ability  to  hide  its  own 
mechanisms”  (Foucault,  1978:  86)  applies  perfectly  to  the  analysis  of  Dr.  Pillman's 
treatment of his patient. In other words, it  is necessary for authority to conceal its truth, 
which is what Pillman does, because, as we learn later, he inflicts pain on purpose, yet lies 
that it  is not going to hurt masquerading his real intentions under the guise of “curing”. 
However successful Dr.  Pillman may be with the other mites (the masses),  the author 
shows that he fails to trick Dunno, the illiterate, traveller, anarchist. Evidently, the comic 
aspect  of  this  scene  works  better  with  a  reader  who  has  prior  acquaintance  with 
vaccinations and other medical procedures. But regardless of the extent of the audience's 
personal  contact  with  doctors,  this  scene  raises  three  critical  points  that  have  drawn 
extensive attention across a range of disciplines, particularly in medical anthropology. 
First,  there  is  the  problem of  overmedicalisation  and  incorrect  diagnosis.  The 
World  Health  Organization (WHO)  reports that  33%  of diseases  today are caused  by 
medical treatment or doctors' intervention. According to Barbara Starfield, “doctors are the 
third leading cause of death in the US after heart disease and cancer causing an estimated 
250,000 deaths each year” (Starfield, 2000). In Europe and Japan, Associated Press reports 
the high use of medications in rape and violence. For instance, in Sweden, the
demand for flunitrazepam — a sedative sold as Rohypnol and widely known as a “date 
rape drug” — increasingly is being met by unauthorized production, and North America, 
where widespread abuse of  prescription drugs,  including the narcotic fentanyl — 80 
times as potent as heroin — has been blamed for a spike in deaths.
The very high potency of some of the synthetic narcotic drugs available as prescription 
drugs  presents,  in fact,  a  higher  overdose risk than the  abuse of  illicit  drugs,”  said 
Narcotics Control Board President Philip O. Emafo (Associated Press, 2007).
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Of course, most “real” and fictional doctors do not use or prescribe such medications with 
the intent  for them to be used in  rape and other  acts of violence.  However,  the larger 
narrative that structures this parasitic relationship between the rapists, the doctors, and the 
raped is based on the  doxa that the well-being and prosperity of the doctors depends on 
there being enough patients incapable of taking care of themselves and hence in need of 
medical  expertise  and  drugs.  In  other  words,  the  doctors'  expertise,  legitimacy,  and 
authority  is  a  monopoly,  which  is  more  than  a  metaphor  of  rape,  derived  from the 
dispossession of such knowledge and blocking the patients' independent access to cures. 
The war on herbal self-healing is a continuation of the medieval war on witches whose 
victory brought about the new age of the panopticon overseen by the doctor (Ussher, 1991; 
Foucault, 1963). 
In an anthropological study of illness and health,  Stuart  McClean discusses the 
importance of narrative, knowledge, and personal approach to healing. A “healing method 
or practice is deemed acceptable ‘if it works for you’” (McClean, 2005: 629-30). McClean 
cites research on chronic illness among Canadians that confirms a general preference for 
the  Complementary  and  Alternative  Medicine because  “…participants  perceived 
themselves as healing the parts of their lives over which they had some inherent control” 
(Thorne et al. in McClean, 2005: 637). Personalising the narrative of illness is a “form of 
knowledge [that] is fundamentally different from scientific knowledge”, giving the CAM 
or the “witch medicine”  an advantage over  the biomedical  approach (ibid:  637).  This 
oppressive nature of narratives and language that renders individuals impotent in the face 
of their personal struggles with health is further accentuated by the fact that
…military metaphors have more and more come to infuse all aspects of the description 
of the medical situation. Disease is seen as an invasion of alien organisms, to which the 
body responds by its own military operations, such as the mobilising of immunological 
‘defences’, and medicine is ‘aggressive,’ as in the language of most chemo-therapies 
(Sontag in McClean, 2005: 640).
It  is  common knowledge that freedom, access to space, clean wilderness,  and food are 
necessary  for  health,  while  exploitation,  expropriated  resources,  and  a  domesticated 
(raped) world with all the devastating pollution and organised violence are responsible for 
the  malnutrition,  contagious  diseases,  and  high  early  mortality  rates.  Yet,  instead  of 
solving the health problem by looking into  its  roots in  poverty,  people are required to 
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depend on doctors and medication for functioning at work as resources in the same system 
that  abuses  them and in  spite of the extensive  research that  demonstrates that  holistic 
approaches and egalitarian relations are better for health, longevity, and happiness of all.  
Nonetheless, despite the availability of this knowledge, civilised human decisions, fears, 
and choices manage each time to inscribe themselves within the civilised narrative that 
imposes literacy and yet misleads in the meaning of life; it  demands activity, yet denies 
agency by putting the birth, life and death of the domesticated masses in the hands of the 
physician. In Nosov's trilogy, however, Dunno jumps out of this narrative and takes off to 
live,  learn,  and  have  joy  with  no  punitive  consequences  whatsoever,  thereby 
demonstrating the premise that, regardless of the motive, the doctor lies about pain and 
about the fearsome consequences of disobedience.
Dunno  thus  reveals  the dishonest  nature of the doctor-patient  relationship.  The 
most problematic aspect of this relationship in human civilisation resides, not only in the 
parasitic  nature of the ontological foundation of confiscated expertise and monopolised 
specialisation,  the  problem is  also  a  practical one  that  stems  from the overt  financial 
dependence  of  doctors  on  the  lucrative  pharmaceutical  business.  Since  the  capitalist 
economy  undergoes  constant  devaluation,  under  the  stress  of  competition  the 
entrepreneurs  experience  a  constant  pressure  to  increase  profit  and  exceed  previous 
figures.  Doctors  depend  on  pharmaceutical  companies  and  governments  and  their 
demands for increase in profit  and consumption as well as clients' compliance with the 
government's need for panoptical control and therefore the clients' dependence on doctors 
and medication. The underlying basis for the doctor-patient relationship, hence, relies on 
the proliferation of illness and the impotence of patients to take care of themselves. The 
more  people  take  medicine,  the  better  it  is  for  the  medical  and  pharmaceutical 
establishment  as well as for the people in charge of administrating the whole scenario 
(government). According to Herper and Kang (2006),  “global spending on prescription 
drugs has topped $600 billion.... Sales of prescription medicines worldwide rose 7% to 
$602 billion.... [The] emerging markets such as China, Russia, South Korea and Mexico 
outpaced those [American] markets, growing a whopping 81%”.
The  US Pharmaceutical Industry Report  (2008-2009)  (which,  incidentally,  costs 
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US$999.00) states that in 2007, the medication revenue in the United States amounted to 
US$ 315 billion. “Since the year of 2000, the pharmaceutical R&D expenditure has been 
maintaining  an  increase,  even  in  2008,  impacted  by  the  global  financial  crisis,  the 
pharmaceutical R & D expenditure totaled at  US $65.2 billion,  up 3.16% of last  year. 
There are 2,900 drugs currently in research in US” (US Pharmaceutical Industry Report, 
2008-2009).
Furthermore, domestication entails coercion of free persons into compliance with 
the civilised narrative and in this scenario, the administration of pain and suffering – the 
very  same  elements  that  drive  a  person  to  seek  help  –  constitute  effective  tools  of 
pedagogy.  This  practice  permeates  civilised  culture  and  finds  expression  in  mundane 
negotiations,  through  a  wide  range  of  pedagogical  methods,  and  in  the  legalised 
punishment  of  acts  challenging  the  concept  of  private  property  as  well  as  other 
transgressions of civilised laws.
Throughout the trilogy, Nosov returns to the problem of control, healing, and social 
order  approaching these  questions  from several angles.  For instance  in  Sunny  City he 
highlights the critical role of conscience and compassion in social harmony and depicts the 
role  of the police  with  its  methods  of social coercion and  punishment  as  ineffective. 
Edifying  for  this  discussion of the role  of the medical narrative  in  domesticating and 
normalising pedagogies is a debate that transpires during a ballroom dance between Dr. 
Pillman of Flower Town and Dr. Honeysuckle of Greenville Town as they argue about the 
role of the doctor in society as a deterrent of deviance and whether the administration of 
pain is an effective method of education, personality adjustment, and socialisation:
“You must admit our methods of treatment are better than yours,” she whispered into his 
ear. “Honey is the thing to treat all scratches, bruises, wounds, boils, and even abscesses 
with. Honey is a strong disinfectant and keeps things from festering.”
“I must disagree with you,” said Dr. Pillman. “All wounds, scratches and boils must be 
treated with iodine. Iodine, too, is a strong disinfectant and keeps things from festering.”
“But  you can't  deny that  your  iodine  burns the  skin,  while  our  honey is  absolutely 
painless.”
“I can't deny that your honey may do for treating girl-Mites, but it can't possibly be used 
on boy-Mites.”
88
“Why is that?” asked Honeysuckle.
“You yourself have said that treatment with honey is painless.”
“And do you think treatment ought to be painful?”
“I do,” said Dr. Pillman firmly. “If a boy-Mite climbs a fence and scratches his leg, the 
leg must be painted with iodine so that the patient will know it is dangerous to climb 
fences and will not do it again.”
“He'll just climb roofs instead and fall down and hurt his head,” said Honeysuckle.
“Then we'll paint his head with iodine so that he'll know it's dangerous to climb roofs 
too. Iodine has great educational significance.”
“A doctor should be more concerned with relieving suffering than with education,” said 
Honeysuckle. “Your iodine only increases suffering.”
“A doctor  must  think of  everything,”  said Dr.  Pillman.  “Of course,  if  you're always 
treating girls there's nothing to think of, but if you're treating boys ——”
“Let's change the subject,” said Honeysuckle. “It's impossible to dance with you.”
“It's you it's impossible to dance with.”
“You might be more civil.”
“It's hard to be civil when I meet with such ignorance.”
“It's you who are ignorant. You're not a doctor at all, you're just a quack!”
“And you're a ... you're a ...”
Dr. Pillman was too furious to speak (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 172-174).
The fact that Honeysuckle's definition remains the last word - “you're just a quack” - while 
Dr. Pillman remains speechless signals Honeysuckle's victory in this debate39. The earlier 
scene  in  which  Dunno  escapes  from  Dr.  Pillman  substantiates  this  interpretation. 
Furthermore, it is in Greenville Town that Dunno realises his faults and is “rehabilitated” 
with the gentle methods of the girl-mites who treat him with compassion, understanding 
and forgiveness, once again proving Dr. Pillman wrong. By ridiculing gender stereotyping, 
Nosov reveals his personal preferences in  healing methods.  Moreover, the fact that the 
“escape the doctor” scene takes place at  the beginning of the book while  this episode 
39 For  further  discussion  on  the  relationship  between  definitions,  dialogue,  language  and  control  in 
children's literature see Knowles and Malmkjaer (1996).
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occurs towards the end demonstrates that this is  a  well thought  out  thread intended to 
develop a cogent and thorough critique. 
His critique of the social significance of the doctor in domestication does not stop 
at this40, for in the middle of the book, Nosov raises another critical aspect, mentioned by 
Kropotkin (2002) in “Are Prisons Necessary?” written in 1887, a theme that was explored 
in-depth twenty years after  Dunno's trilogy was published by Michel Foucault  (1963), 
namely,  the  role  of  the  psychiatric  hospital  as  a  place  of  confinement  for  deviants, 
vagrants,  and  the  insane,  i.e.  those  who  threaten  the  civilised  order  with  their  free 
movement, whose unreason disregards civilised “reason”41 and purpose as the deviants, 
the vagrants, and the insane disorder uniformity and challenge the concept of sedentarism 
at the very basis of the logic of incarceration and pedagogy.
As  the  dialogue  between  Pillman  and  Honeysuckle  reveals,  if  Pillman  uses 
corporal punishment (iodine inflicts pain), methods that Kropotkin and Foucault attribute 
to the earlier, feudal methods of coercion and control, then Honeysuckle, according to this 
thesis,  is  a modern overseer of public  order:  she not  only cures but  also  confines  the 
deviants and the vagrants.
When Doono invents the air balloon, all sixteen boys who share his household in 
Flower Town decide to travel. At a certain point in the journey, the balloon begins to loose 
hot air and descend. Having prepared for this eventuality, Doono instructs everyone to put 
on a parachute and evacuate and, in order to lead by example, jumps out first. But as soon 
as Doono is gone, Dunno notices that the balloon gets lighter and picks up some altitude 
and speed. So, he tells everyone not to follow the “cowardly” scientist and they remain in 
the balloon until it crashes on the outskirts of Greenville Town, La Cité des Dames. Dunno 
bounces away from the group and gets picked up by two girls by the name of Cornflower 
and Snowdrop42. When the other girl mites discover the rest of the boys they take them to 
the hospital (in Flower Town there are no hospitals, only the stern doctor Pillman). Since 
Greenville  is  a  girls  only town,  the boys  become social  deviants  here.  They are  also 
travellers, i.e. vagrants, a status debated and contested in Greenville Town, and, according 
40 The theme of the doctor and hospitals appears in the other two books as well, but, unfortunately, there is 
no space to develop the analysis here.
41 Reason stands for both: the reason for something occurring or being and “sanity”.
42 Синеглазка and Снежинка in the original.
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to Foucault's research, vagrants were the first to be incarcerated in the special hospitals 
(quarantines)  during  the  Rennaissance  (Foucault  1961).  Doctor  Honeysuckle  runs  the 
hospital and states clearly that because boys are dangerous, they need to be confined and 
that refusal to obey is defiance of her order:
“What's that on your forehead, Cornflower — a plaster? Clever girl! I warned you it 
would come to that. Nobody knows better than I do how dangerous those boys are....”
“Hm, I told that young fellow to stay in bed, and here he is, up and about in defiance of 
doctor's orders and picking a fight with everybody” (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 96).
First, this scene depicts how the doctor monopolises the narrative of illness and health and 
imposes it on the patient regardless of how the patient feels. This comes up several times 
in the book. For instance,  when Dunno wants to get up and explore after the accident, 
Cornflower tells him that he cannot know whether he is ill or well, only Dr. Honeysuckle 
can. Second, the hospital is not only a place that confines but also acts as a quarantine that 
isolates  the  persons  who  pose  “danger”  for  social  “health”  and  economic  order.  For 
instance, in Fit to Be Citizens, Natalia Molina (2006) presents a pertinent analysis of how 
this  transpires  in  real  life  demonstrating  how  quarantine,  social  policy,  and  health 
constructed  race,  ownership,  and  stratification  in  California  from 1879  to  1939  and 
informed Planned  Parenthood practice  of control of reproduction by sterilising certain 
races and persons scoring low on intelligence tests. In other words, the medical institution 
observes and controls bodies and persons on an individual level as well as it isolates them, 
confines them to specific space and time, controls their reproduction (breeding was the 
first  domesticating practice),  encloses space and prevents access to the participation in 
social, material, and symbolic resources and questions of land and business ownership.
In this respect, when Dunno's request to see his friends is met with a categorical 
refusal,  Honeysuckle exercises her control by quarantining the “deviants” of Greenville 
Town indefinitely and diagnosing them regardless of whether they have “symptoms” or 
whether the “symptoms” warrant the diagnosis and confinement. As soon as Honeysuckle 
has left the room with Cornflower to remove her plaster and treat the sore spot,
Dunno caught sight of a white smock and cap hanging on a hook. He instantly put them 
on, and he also put on a pair of spectacles Honeysuckle had left lying on the desk. Then 
he picked up her wooden trumpet and went out of the room. Snowdrop stood watching 
him in awe and admiration.
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He went down the corridor and opened the door of the ward in which his friends lay. In 
the first bed he found Grumps who was looking more surly and sullen than ever.
“How are you feeling, my friend?” said Dunno, changing his voice.
“Wonderful!” said Grumps, making a face as if he were to die.
“Sit up, if you please,” said Dunno.
Grumps  sat  up with a great  effort  and stared dully in front  of  him.  Dunno put  the 
wooden trumpet to his chest.
Breathe deeply, if you please,” he said.
“Can't you give a man any peace?” grumbled Grumps. “ 'Sit up!' 'Lie down!' 'Breathe 
deeply!' 'Stop breathing!'”
Dunno gave him a little whack on the head with the trumpet.
“You haven't changed in the least, Grumps,” he said.
“Dunno!” he said, amazed at seeing him.... “Listen, Dunno, help me get out of here,” 
whispered Grumps. “I'm perfectly well, honestly I am. I just gave my knee a little bump. 
It doesn't even hurt any more, but they won't give me my clothes. I'll go mad here. I 
want to get up and go out.”
Grumps  seized  Dunno  by the  sleeve and wouldn't  let  go.  “I'll  do  something,”  said 
Dunno. “Just be patient a little longer. Promise to do as I say, and if anybody asks you 
who made the balloon, tell them it was me, will you?”
“I'll say anything you like if you just get me out of here,” said Grumps (Nosov, 1980 
[1954]: 97-98).
Confinement, whether for medical reasons or punishment, grants power to anyone who 
can enter into a relationship with the confined regardless of their previous contact or rank 
in  the  power  hierarchy.  Hence,  even when in  Flower  Town Dunno  and  Grumps were 
equal,  in  Greenville  Town,  by masquerading  as a  doctor and agreeing  to  enter  into  a 
relationship between Dr. Honeysuckle and her victims as negotiator, Dunno immediately 
acquires power to manipulate his friends.
Perhaps it is not so ironic, then, that it  is Dunno – the subversive anti-knowledge 
element, the anti-disciplinarian – whom Honeysuckle discovers dressed up as a doctor in a 
white smock and cap conducting a mock “medical examination” of his friends the patients.
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Just then Honeysuckle and Cornflower came back.
“Who told you you could put on that smock?” said Honeysuckle angrily. “I never saw 
such disobedience!”
“I wasn't disobedient,” said Dunno. “I just went to see how my friends were.”
“And how did you find them?” asked Honeysuckle mockingly.
“I found that all but one of them were well and could leave the hospital.”
“What?” said Honeysuckle in fright. “Can you imagine what would happen if we let out 
fourteen boys all at once? They would turn the town upside down! Not a house would 
have a whole window left in it, and all of us would be covered with bumps and bruises. 
The boys must be kept in hospital to prevent an epidemic of bumps and bruises” (Nosov, 
1980 [1954]: 100).
In Nosov's narrative,  disobedience is  empowering because,  first  of all,  it  is  not simply 
driven by the need to disobey, but by a genuine desire for symbiosis and care: Dunno says 
that he was not disobedient, he simply wanted to see his friends and find out how they 
were doing, and he would not have succeeded had he followed the doctor's orders. Second, 
as later episodes with the police in Sunny City demonstrate, authority, laws, and control do 
not bring harmony to a society, only conscience can regulate one's behaviour and control 
any impulses for “hooliganism”. Authority is  impotent in the realms of conscience and 
actually causes more harm than good. Hence, having disobeyed both Dr. Pillman in the 
earlier episode and Dr. Honeysuckle here, the anarchist succeeds in convincing the doctor 
to free the hostages.  This carnavalesque  overturning of the roles  contradicts Bakhtin's 
conception of  the  carnival  as  reconfirming  the  status  quo,  because  in  this  encounter 
between  authority  and  anti-authority,  anti-authority  triumphs.  Honeysuckle  agrees  to 
follow Dunno's proposed list of which two mites to free each day and confesses that the 
boys have been healthy all along, never needing any treatment at all.  The quarantine, it  
turns out, was a preventative social measure:
Once more Honeysuckle examined the list. “It's too soon to let Shot out,” she said. “His 
ankle's still swollen. He's my only real patient, you know.”
“What about Grumps?” said Cornflower.
“Never! I wouldn't let him out for anything!” cried Honeysuckle. “He's such a nasty 
chap! Always grumbling ... gets on everybody's nerves. Let him stay where he is for 
being such a grumbler. Of course, I'd be only too glad to get rid of him, and of that 
insufferable Pillman, too, who calls himself a doctor and is always trying to prove my 
methods wrong.”
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“Let them both out if they're such a nuisance,” said Cornflower. “Not for the world! Do 
you know what that horrid Pillman said to me today? He said I made people sick instead 
of well! … You can be sure I'll keep him here just as long as I can. And Grumps too” 
(Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 140).
Thus, in  spite  of the contrast  between the vengeful,  authoritarian male doctor and the 
good-willed,  motherly and gentle female doctor, the mites' encounters with the medical 
professionals reveal the inherent perils, not of the personal traits of the doctors, but of the 
medical  métier itself:  after  all,  the mites’ imprisonment  in  Greenville  Town’s  hospital 
underscores  the  possibility  of  the  hospital  becoming  a  prison,  a  quarantine,  or  a 
disciplining and rehabilitating institution regardless of whether Dr. Pillman is in charge of 
it  or  whether  it  is  Dr.  Honeysuckle.  In  addition,  Dunno's  trilogy  questions  the  very 
knowledge of wellness and illness and of who is authorised to know, how we know, how 
we  conceptualise  this  information/experience/knowledge,  and  how  we  experience  it: 
through cognition or through something else? In short what is it that we know and how do 
we know “it”?
Thus, in a humorous and lively manner, Nosov links knowledge, medicine, social 
order and control, thereby revealing the threats that the relationship between knowledge 
and discipline, knowledge and punishment, medicine and discipline (even incarceration) 
pose to anarchy, chaos, and cosmic harmony. In this sense, Dunno's trilogy offers a satire 
of diagnostic methods at the basis of the medical narrative and raises the question of truth 
and lie in the civilised knowledge of illness, healing, and health preceding by almost two 
decades one of the most important and creative experiments in the history of psychiatry.
In 1973 David Rosenhan conducted an experiment titled “On Being Sane in Insane 
Places” (Rosenhan, 1973). His question was the following:
If sanity and insanity exist, how shall we know them? ...At its heart, the question of 
whether  the sane can be distinguished from the insane...  is  a simple  matter:  Do the 
salient characteristics that lead to diagnoses reside in the patients themselves or in the 
environments  and  contexts  in  which  observers  find  them?  From  Bleuler,  through 
Kretchmer,  through the formulators of the recently revised Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of the American Psychiatric Association, the belief has been strong that patients 
present symptoms, that those symptoms can be categorized, and, implicitly, that the sane 
are distinguishable from the insane (ibid).
The results of the experiment demonstrated that the circumstances under which a patient is 
admitted (for instance, “credible” family members complained about a disruptive relative) 
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and the fact of admission already prove in the mind of the diagnostician a preconceived 
diagnosis. In other words, the “literacy” or fluency in the narrative of psychiatry and the 
authority  that  the practice bestows can frame  normal  behaviour  as  illness  if  a  person 
socially and personally fits the label “ill”.
To  find  how diagnostics  work,  eight  sane  people  agreed  to  seek  admission to 
various mental institutions and “gained secret  admission to twelve different  hospitals”, 
some  of them deemed  the best  in  the United States.  Among  the  patients “were three 
psychologists, a pediatrician, a psychiatrist, a painter, and a housewife”. Only once during 
the interview for admission did the pseudopatients lie that they sometimes heard same-sex 
voices  that  sounded  “”empty,”  “hollow,”  and  “thud””  (ibid).  Otherwise,  during  the 
interview and after admission they provided truthful information about  their characters 
and  lives  and  acted  sanely  as  they  normally  would  in  daily  lives:  they  engaged  in 
conversation with staff and other patients, readily accepted medication (which they did not 
actually take) and took notes for their research. Yet, the staff never detected their infiltrator 
status.  Moreover, they attributed normal behaviour to compulsive traits of their mental 
illness – schizophrenia – and interpreted the behaviour as “too talkative”, “compulsive 
writer”, etc. even while the medical staff themselves engaged in these same practices of 
talking, asking questions and taking notes. Most important, however, the labels given were 
irrevocable even after discharge. Once a person was “known” to be a schizophrenic, that 
person was “always” a schizophrenic—for life.
Admitted, except in one case, with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, each was discharged 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia “in remission.” [The pseudopatient who was admitted 
to a private hospital was the only one diagnosed with a milder  form of the disease, 
indicating the relation between social status and diagnostics (from footnote)]. The label 
“in remission” should in no way be dismissed as a formality, for at no time during any 
hospitalization had any question been raised about any pseudopatient’s simulation. Nor 
are there  any  indications  in the  hospital  records  that  the  pseudopatient’s  status  was 
suspect.  Rather,  the  evidence  is  strong  that,  once  labeled  schizophrenic,  the 
pseudopatient was stuck with that label. If the pseudopatient was to be discharged, he 
must naturally be “in remission”; but he was not sane, nor, in the institution’s view, had 
he ever been sane (ibid).
Rosenhan  states  that  the  hospital  staff  had  enough  time  to  observe  and  detect  the 
pseudopatients' sanity (seven to fifty two days). Yet, they were not carefully observed and 
“this  failure  speaks  more  to  traditions  within  psychiatric  hospitals  than  to  lack  of 
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opportunity”  (ibid).  Most  interesting,  however,  is  the  fact  that  while  the staff applied 
rigidly  the  label  of  mental  illness  that  was  to  last  permanently  (in  one  case,  the 
experimenters had an extremely difficult time releasing one of the pseudopatients from the 
hospital because the staff refused to believe that the patient was sane), the other patients in 
the hospitals were able to detect the pseudopatient’s sanity.
During the first three hospitalizations, when accurate counts were kept, 35 of a total of 
118 patients on the admissions ward voiced their suspicions, some vigorously. “You’re 
not crazy. You’re a journalist,  or  a professor  (referring to the continual note-taking). 
You’re checking up on the hospital.” While most of the patients were reassured by the 
pseudopatient’s insistence that he had been sick before he came in but was fine now, 
some  continued  to  believe  that  the  pseudopatient  was  sane  throughout  his 
hospitalization. The fact that the patients often recognized normality when staff did not 
raises important questions (Rosenhan, 1973).
This is exactly what happens with Dunno in Greenville Town. Honeysuckle attempts to 
construct him as a patient and confine him to bed, and it is the patient who reveals the 
good health of the other “patients” who, all along, knew that they were healthy. Just like 
Dunno's trilogy,  Rosenhan's research,  “On Being Sane in  Insane Places” raises critical 
questions  on the  truth value  of medical  knowledge and  narrative  and  the  relationship 
between narrative, normalisation, and oppression.
How many people, one wonders, are sane but not recognized as such in our psychiatric 
institutions?  How  many  have  been  needlessly  stripped  of  their  privileges  of 
citizenship...?  How  many  have  feigned  insanity  in  order  to  avoid  the  criminal 
consequences of their behavior, and, conversely, how many would rather stand trial than 
live interminably in a psychiatric hospital – but are wrongly thought to be mentally ill? 
How  many  have  been  stigmatized  by  well-intentioned,  but  nevertheless  erroneous, 
diagnoses? [And] psychiatric diagnoses are rarely found to be in error. The label sticks, 
a mark of inadequacy forever. 
Finally, how many patients might be “sane” outside the psychiatric hospital but seem 
insane in it – not because craziness resides in them, as it were,  but because they are 
responding to a bizarre setting,  one that may be unique to institutions which harbor 
nether  people?  Goffman  calls  the  process  of  socialization  to  such  institutions 
“mortification” – an apt metaphor that includes the processes of depersonalization that 
have been described here (Rosenhan, 1973).
First, this is exactly the experience of the fictional character Grumps in Greenville Town's 
hospital:  “I'm perfectly well, honestly I am. I just gave my knee a little bump. It doesn't 
even hurt any more, but they won't give me my clothes. I'll go mad here. I want to get up 
and go out” he tells Dunno (Nosov 1980 [1954]: 97-98). Second, in real life, Rosenhan's 
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experiment demonstrates that regardless of the multiplicity of voices and the contradicting 
information  conveyed  by  real  acts,  diagnoses  silence  these  voices  and  reality  gets 
interpreted, “diagnosed”, and labelled according to the predetermined narrative or script 
whose goal is to organise and then maintain its order within a specific economic structure 
and which ends up confirming itself regardless of whether the facts are relevant or even 
true.
For  an  exploration  of  the  narratives  of  wildness  and  domestication,  Michel 
Foucault, David Rosenhan, and Nikolai Nosov offer invaluable connections to the debate 
on the nature of knowledge in civilised structures of oppression – a body of knowledge 
that  becomes  ingrained  in  the  doxa which  is  the  taken  for  granted  and  silenced 
understanding of how things (people, animals, nature) “really” work. Silencing occurs on 
more  than  one  level  as  individuals  are  forced  into  categories  of  domestication, 
exploitation, and control and these oppressive structures, as discussed by Goody and Ong, 
become part of the physiological make-up of the human brain inadvertently squeezing all 
practices and relations,  even the ones that  contradict  the “ideology” of a  given socio-
cultural model, into the metadiscourse or metanarrative.
These structures, however, have not come to exist on their own or due to random 
factors. Perhaps their initial sprouting has been due to random responses to various events 
and conditions. However, to be able to globalise a single structure for intra- and inter-
species  relations,  there  had  to  be  a  uniformalising  effort,  a  logic,  a  rationale,  and  a 
narrative. The resulting imbalance in biodiversity is devastating and any such imbalance in 
“nature”, when not taken care of promptly, becomes a fatal disease. Overpopulation of one 
form of life leads to one species of microbes or viruses taking over the biosystem, killing 
the  world  in  which  it  arises.  And  so  it  is  with  civilisation.  Uniformalising  through 
civilisation,  the  culture  of  human  and  non-human  animals  around  the  globe  follows 
exactly the same logic of the spread of disease, and it is a conscious effort on the part of 
the persons in  the upper strata of government  who constantly invest  time, energy,  and 
resources to keep reconfirming and reconfiguring the elements that ensure the solidity of 
the structure and its status quo. Yet, even if the details comprising this civilised structure 
appear to be fluid and in a permanent mode of reshuffling and renegotiation, the structure 
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itself not only remains solid and static, but it  proliferates and, like a malignant tumour, 
colonises more and more topoi, minds, bodies, and space.
These agents of civilisation work relentlessly on elaborating the mechanisms of 
domestication and apply consciously the potential of stories, narratives,  and literature – 
and hence literacy – to disable children's wildness,  prevent  any potential rebellion and 
integrate them into the system of resources. Jack Zipes' (1983) work, particularly on the 
German project  for  nationalisation for  children through fairy  tales  during the  Weimar 
Republic but also his later research on the reconfiguration of consumerist and capitalist 
culture in America through children's literature and culture, reveals the political potential 
of  literacy  and  supports  the  debates  on  the  implications  of  children's  narratives  for 
cementing structural inequalities and injustice such as expressed in sexist, racist, or other 
“otherist” relations. 
Zipes'  prolific  research on European collectors  of folk  tales  –  for  instance the 
Brothers Grimm or Alexandre Afanasiev – and on the stylisation of the oral tale by authors 
like  Charles  Perrault,  who  aligned  his  narratives  with  the  French  civilising  process, 
demonstrates that the act of transcription and embellishment of the live oral tales by the 
domesticating agents climbing the social ladder striving to please no lesser than the king 
(1997;  1994;  1983; or 1979)  mortifies these stories by disciplining their content and the 
bodies and minds of the domesticated readers. Literacy, hence, imbues these texts with the 
power that contests and overwrites individual agency, encasing it within the structural and 
paradigmatic  limitations  imposed  by  the  Institution  of  civilisation,  and  provides  an 
improved  tool  for  domestication.  My  anthropological  research,  titled  The  Encounter 
(Mötet) between Somali immigrants in Sweden and the Swedish medical sector and social 
workers,  demonstrates that  the same mechanism operates  in  any domesticated context 
regardless of the details that supposedly differentiate one totalitarian system from another 
and which could go by a different name – such as a capitalist democracy or even socialist  
democracy,  for  instance  –  regardless  of  whether  we  are  talking  about  the  Greek 
civilisation, the Arab, the Weimar Republic, or contemporary Sweden.
In other words, the Encounter in present day Sweden illustrates Zipes' research on 
the history and evolution of the role of narrative and children's literature in gender and 
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economic  class  divisions.  It  reveals  the  awareness  with  which  state  “representatives” 
(beneficiaries) understand the crucial role that literacy and medical observation play in 
economic relations (i.e., exploitation of people and nature). These agents of the state act 
concurrently on behalf of their  own interests and on behalf of those of the institution 
through which they live, even while they may be honest when they state their belief that 
they are driven by the most  sincere desire  to  “help” and “care for” their  “clients”.  In 
contrast to the case of the  “resources” where the personal and institutional interests are 
often in conflict, in the case of governmental representatives and other people with social 
capital and in positions of authority, the personal and institutional interests are intertwined. 
This discrepancy in the response of the institution to personal needs depending on the 
class of its subjects has been thoroughly examined by Karl Marx himself and the plethora 
of Marxist  literature.  However,  this conflict  of interests and of bodies,  knowledge and 
narratives  comes  to  the  foreground  when  people  refuse  to  comply  with  the  imposed 
ideology whether for cultural reasons or for reasons of “mental health” as demonstrated by 
David Rosenhan, so vividly depicted by Nikolai Nosov, and so aptly articulated by Irma, 
the social worker in Eskilstuna.
Chapter 6: Wild Somalis and Civilised Swedes as Fiction and Reality  
of Winnie-the-Pooh's Immigration Policies
Trahison
Ce coeur obsédant, qui ne correspond
Pas à mon langage ou à mes costumes
Et sur lequel mordent, comme un crampon,
Des sentiments d’emprunt et des coutumes
D’Europe, sentez-vous cette souffrance
Et ce désespoir à nul autre égal
D’apprivoiser, avec des mots de France,
Ce coeur qui m’est venu du Sénégal?43--Léon Laleau
43 Betrayal
This implacable heart, which matches
neither my tongue [n]or my clothes,
after which bites, like the hinges of a trap
the borrowed sentiments and customs
of Europe—do you sense this suffering,
this despair, which is like nothing else,
breaking in with words from France
this heart, of mine, come from Senegal?
—-by Léon Laleau, translation Michelle Cahill
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In spring 1996, the Centre for Studies of Immigration and Ethnic Relations (Ceifo) 
at Stockholm University invited me to conduct an anthropological study commissioned by 
the Swedish Board for Health and Social Work (Socialstyrelsen44), the principal ministry 
of Sweden. The individuals acting on behalf of the Board were concerned that the Somali 
refugees  had  a  “difficult  time  integrating  into  the  job  market;  did  not  trust  Swedish 
doctors; and refused to take their children to the state run clinics for regular observation”. 
The research,  titled  The  Encounter,  was  conducted  mainly  in  Stockholm with  a  few 
interviews and visits to Eskilstuna from 1996 to 1998 where the other part of the project, 
conducted  by  Marie  Louise  Seeberg,  was  concerned  with  the  investigation  of  the 
successful integration of Vietnamese refugees. In my part of the research, Socialstyrelsen's 
aim was to understand the differences between Swedish and Somali attitudes towards the 
centralised Swedish health system and economy, revealing that the members of the board 
drew clear  links  between:  (1)  the cultural  conception of health,  literacy and  the  “job 
market” and (2) children’s literature and access to the “job market”45 – in other words, the 
framing of literacy and children’s literature as an organisational modus operandi in the 
economic sphere of worker/owner relations.
The following excerpt from my field notes depicting the interaction between Irma, 
the Swedish social worker in Eskilstuna, and Aisha, a Somali woman who had immigrated 
to  Sweden five  years  earlier  illustrates  these  concerns.  Since  there is  no  immigration 
policy in Sweden with the exception of political refugee status, Aisha had spent two years 
in a Swedish refugee camp before receiving her refugee residence status. I met Irma at her 
office and after our discussion, Irma accompanied me to visit Aisha at her home.
Irma greeted me with exuberance stating immediately her appreciation of the Somalis 
who were “so beautiful, with such smooth and deep dark skin. They have such suave 
manners and look at you with this dark, languorous gaze. These men are just so gentle 
and plain beautiful. I love the Somalis”--thus setting off an alarm in my head: what does 
44 Literally,  styrelsen is  management  and board,  hence the major  ministry of  Sweden is that  of  social 
management.
45  The Swedes concerned in this project were not talking about ministerial or elitist jobs for the Somalis. 
The commissioners from  Socialstyrelsen  and the various social workers complained that  the Somali 
women wore the scarf and therefore could get only background jobs (dishwasher at a fast food shop), 
because the stores could not hire them for positions where they would be visible, such as a waitress or a 
cashier. The scarf issue appeared to be the main concern of the project commissioners. The Somali men’s 
jobs mentioned included cleaning, cashier and taxi-driving.
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she mean by “Somalis” and what do I expect next? I did not have to wait long, for she 
swiftly proceeded to complain that “there [was] a lot of trouble with them. Because they 
are  illiterate.  Papers  don’t  mean  anything  to  them.  They  just  don’t  understand  the 
importance of  paying bills.  They simply throw away the bills.  Can you imagine? A 
Swede would never dream of doing such a thing. Throwing away the bills! And then this 
Aisha. She’s a nice woman. Always smiling and so personable when I come to see her 
[at  her  home].  Never  objects  to  anything  I  say  but  then  just  ignores  my 
recommendations. Plain simple ignores me”.
“Are your recommendations a must to follow?” I ask.
“Of course I can’t force her. But if she doesn’t comply with what I recommend in her 
children’s best interests, then she can’t provide a good environment for them. A good 
future. And if there’s trouble, then the social office can intervene… As it is, they [the 
Somalis] already have problems getting jobs,” explains Irma.
“I see. So what kind of things do you recommend?” I inquire.
“Well, one problem is that she refuses to read to her children. I brought her all these nice 
books to read [to them]. She thanks me every time – all smiling. Never refuses them. 
Always polite. And then just ignores them. She has not read a single book to them,” says 
Irma.
Later we go to visit Aisha. Aisha, true, was smiling. She offered us Turkish coffee and 
Supermarket biscuits.  Her  unread-to children,  aged 7,  5 and 2½ years,  were playing 
quietly, occasionally stealing in to beam at us, then scattering away in giggles. 
Knowing that Somalis value highly their rich oral tradition in which every Somali can 
be compared to a walking encyclopaedia  of poetic,  historic and religious  heritage,  I 
asked Aisha what it was that she liked to do with her children. It turned out that the kids 
already knew bits from the Qur’an and some of Somali poetry by heart. “You mean, you 
do NOT prefer  Cinderella  and the  Ugly Duckling?” Aisha smiled and took a sip of 
coffee46.
Several issues become apparent in this encounter. First, it  reveals a strong link between 
hierarchical  economic  interests,  literacy,  children's  books,  medical knowledge,  control, 
and government. Second, what transpires during this interaction illustrates Jack Goody's 
point that, at its very inception, literacy was a tool of oppression: the written word fixes 
the relationships of dependence and overwrites the living with their drive to chaos and 
meaningful relationships that require presence and memory. Third, the social worker is an 
individual who acts on behalf of the socialising project  following and imposing on her 
“clients” the agenda of those who “lead” and “manage”. While Irma may be driven by the 
best of intentions and a desire to facilitate the integration of the people she said she loved 
46  From field-notes for The Encounter (Mötet), Socialstyrelsen September 1996 to December 1997.
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into her society, one that she obviously loved too, this “love” expressed in the context of 
civilisation becomes one of hierarchical value and stems from the position that Somalis 
are doing poorly because they have not learnt how to be “Swedes”. 
Furthermore,  in  this  interaction  between  the  “state”  and  the  “citizen”,  the 
connection between children's books and bills (domestication through lists of debts) comes 
to the foreground and is a conscious effort of concern on the part of the state. Fourth, Irma 
acts, not only from the position: “in Rome do as the Romans do”, but from her doxa that 
accepts the hierarchy of cultures in favour of her own: reading from a Swedish book is 
more  valuable  than  spending  time  together,  reciting  poetry  or  creating  new  poems, 
particularly  when  those  poems are  “Somali”  or  the  “threatening”  Qur'an.  Irma's  doxa 
dismisses the value of Aisha spending time with her children, because in the “feminist” 
and “socialist” ideology in civilisation, just as in capitalism, Aisha's value is based on her 
fulfilling her role as a resource. One of the completely serious suggestions discussed at the 
meetings with Socialstyrelsen, for instance, was that “if the Somalis are so wild and un-
integratable into  the Swedish economy, but  love and are good with camels,  how about 
helping them start camel farming in Sweden? Give them something to do, and raise the 
Swedish economy by introducing a new variety of meat. This way it  will be good for 
everyone [except the camels, of course]”47.
Being responsible for both “health” and “social order”, Socialstyrelsen is a perfect 
illustration  of how,  in  a  civilised  hierarchy,  these  two  concepts  are  intertwined  with 
literacy and education on more than one level: (1) an individual's health is measured by 
the extent  of her  functionality as a physiological worker  which is  related to a healthy 
“education” and means that the individual agrees to fulfil,  and even be happy with, the 
role that years of schooling, evaluation, along with the starting symbolic and other capital, 
have prepared her for. (2) The health of a society is measured by how stable the system of 
exploitation  is,  regardless  of  the  statistics  that  reveal  the  extent  of  poverty  and 
unhappiness  of  the  population  –  for  instance,  regardless  of  the  number  of  persons 
47 I met again with one of the administrators of the project, Pär Skoglund, August 2010 in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, where he is launching a follow-up comparative project, because in Minneapolis the Somalis 
as a group, are doing extremely well economically and in Sweden, still,  twelve years after the initial 
research,  they are secluded as  a  group and the essentialist  knowledge about  them constructed  by a 
frustrated “state” persists.
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medicated for chronic depression, insomnia, and other indicators of despair48. As observed 
in  various  psychological  and  anthropological studies  (e.g.  Rosenhan,  1973  or  Molina, 
2006), both professionals in the health industry and lay people's understanding of what 
constitutes health and illness depends on the social status of the person being diagnosed. 
Poverty and immigration often constitute illness that strips the poor or migrant worker of 
the status  of  “agent”,  “citizen”,  “legitimate”  or  “credible”   voice.  Civilised  children's 
literature also taps into these distinctions in diagnoses of illness and health.
For example, Frances Hodgson-Burnett's (1996) The Secret Garden , considered an 
important classic, is often used as a metaphor itself for the sequestered world of children's 
literature. The story projects the integrated process of healing through the relationship of 
three protagonists in a secret garden, namely, Mary, Martha, and Colin. Even though their 
relationships are structured by the economic disparities that divide them across the lines of 
class,  race, illness,  and health and which encompass the larger conception of justice as 
based on rightful ownership and stratification. These categories constitute the main forces 
that shape them as characters and as a society. Here, the bad temper of the wealthy but  
orphaned girl, Mary, who is used to being served by “blacks” of India appears has to learn 
that “white” servants in England are different in order to “integrate” into this environment 
in  a  functioning  and  socially  healthy way.  Colin  is  the  wealthy but  a  sick  boy in  a 
wheelchair. The healthy peasant girl, Martha, here is depicted as always ready to give of 
herself and as happy to remain poor and hard-working. It is not only her moral duty, but 
part of her nature to want to integrate Mary in this class structure and to return Colin to 
life,  a  healing  that  enables him to  reign over  the land and its  human and non-human 
resources, i.e. including her kin, the peasants. The book presents “her” role in life as being 
a poor but  happy peasant  servant  who is eager to serve those who own her land. The 
48 For instance, the U.S. enjoys the status of successful and stable government and styrelsen system, yet, in 
2006,  70  million  Americans  of  all  ages  were  reported  to  have  suffered  from  sleep  disorders: 
“Prescriptions for sleeping medications topped 56 million in 2008 -- a record, according to the research 
firm IMS Health, up 54% from 2004” says Denise Gellene in her March 2009 article on the economy of 
sleeping pills  (Gellene,  2009).  As  for  the  link between  poverty,  gender  and race,  U.S.  Government 
statistics on life expectancy by race, scores significantly lower for  Black Americans as compared to 
white: thus, in the first year of life 75.7 white males on average are expect to live and only 69.7 of black 
males have the same chances. As for mortality rates, these are even more heart-breaking: for every 1000 
lives, 6.12 white male babies and 5.01 white female babies are expected to die before the age of one year 
as compared to 14.48 deaths of black male babies and 12.23 black female babies– in other words, more 
than twice by race alone. Mortality figures are consistently higher for  black people throughout every 
single age category and also differentiate lower income whites and other populations of colour.
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recovery of the boy means that the boy returns to his status and rules over his domain with 
“love”.  In  civilised  society  this  “love”  means  that  the  landlord  (or  any other  owner) 
exploits the peasants' (workers' or employees')  health “kindly” and ensures that nothing 
changes: the peasants remain the property of the rich and the rich boy does not share his 
wealth,  thereby ensuring  the  “health” and  stability of that  social  system and  its  class 
relations.
The narrative  could  have  constructed  the  boy's  health  as  contingent  on  the 
restoration of economic and gender equality between the characters, particularly as the 
author makes an attempt to critically raise the issues of racism. Yet, the problematic of 
exploitative relations disappears as the narrative domesticates both girls and elevates the 
boy to a state of health as he inherits his father’s regime. The author fails to examine the 
conception of the laws as the vehicle that structures the wider framework for social illness 
and health. Instead, the text romanticises poverty and ignores the voice of the oppressed. 
This injustice becomes particularly clear in the scene where the boy's father “repays” the 
Martha's months of care by giving her siblings a golden sovereign. “If you divide that into 
eight  parts there will be half a crown for each of you,” he said.  Then amid grins and 
chuckles and bobbing of curtsies he drove away, leaving ecstasy and nudging elbows and 
little  jumps  of joy behind”  (Hodgson Burnett  1996:  297).  The book tells  us that  this 
sovereign was an act of charity and even as miserly as it is, the sovereign was still more 
than the peasants ever expected to receive. Apparently, they would have done just as well 
without it, but Colin and his kin, for some reason, cannot do without their wealth, their 
land, their peasants, and their servants. This caricature of the “nature” and “culture” of the 
rich and poor however is never once questioned in the book.
Another example is  The Chronicles of Narnia where C.S. Lewis (1950) depicts 
Edmund's temporary illness caused by his “bad” choice of the “wrong” political camp as 
curable because Edmund is destined to be king of Narnia, whereas all the little creatures 
who are at the bottom of the social hierarchy and make the same “bad” choice must be 
exterminated, hence the endless wars of Narnia. In other words, by following the White 
Witch and  her  food,  Edmund  almost  dies,  and  the  narrative  thus  illustrates  the  same 
principle of capital punishment that compels individuals to work for the civilised system. 
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When Edmund chooses the right side, that of the Lion King, he heals and re-integrates into 
the structure that punishes by death those who refuse to play the roles of resources that 
their superiors had prescribed to them.
Winnie-the-Pooh provides  an  even  more  illustrative  example  from  children's 
literature  depicting  vividly  Socialstyrelsen's concern  with  the  “healthy”  integration  of 
immigrants in Sweden as well as the immigration policies of such countries as Canada, 
France, the U.S., inter alia, that demand an expensive and thorough medical examination 
and literacy skills upon immigration. In the first book, one day,
NOBODY seemed to know where they came from, but there they were in the Forest: 
Kanga  and  Baby  Roo.  When Pooh  asked  Christopher  Robin,  “How did  they  come 
here?” Christopher Robin said, “In the Usual Way, if you know what I mean, Pooh,” and 
Pooh, who didn't, said “Oh!” ...Then he went to call upon his friend Piglet to see what 
he thought about it. And at Piglet's house he found Rabbit. So they all talked about it 
together.
“What I don't  like  about it is  this,”  said Rabbit.  “Here are we--you, Pooh, and you, 
Piglet, and Me --and suddenly... Here –we—are,” said Rabbit very slowly and carefully, 
“all—of—us, and then, suddenly, we wake up one morning, and what do we find? We 
find a Strange Animal among us. An animal of whom we had never even heard before! 
An animal who carries her family about with her in her pocket! Suppose I carried my 
family about with me in my pocket, how many pockets should I want?” (Milne, 1992 
[54]: 90-92 – italics original, underlining mine).
Evidently,  this  is  one of the passages addressed to  multiple  audiences  and  is  a  direct 
statement  on immigration from places where child  rearing practices are different  from 
those of the civilised English.  Rabbit, here, represents the hypocritical upper class snob 
with good manners and yet, concurrently,  exhibiting xenophobic and other classist  and 
sexist attitudes. For instance, during this conversation, he kept forgetting to include Eyore 
and Owl in  the “us”.  The appearance of the immigrants in the first  book leads to  the 
Rabbit  mobilising  an anti-immigrant  act  in  the Wood to  get  rid  of the  strangers.  Yet, 
everything gets resolved, and the immigrants stay in the 100 Aker Wood since Christopher 
Robin, the human being, authorised their stay.
In the second chapter of the second book, another immigrant arrives and this time 
the author depicts the immigration placement procedure, very similar to the ones I have 
observed during my anthropological research in France in 1993-94, in Sweden during The 
Encounter, and one that I personally experienced upon immigration to Quebec.
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“Oh, there you are!” said Pooh. “Hallo!”
“Hallo!” said  the  Strange Animal, wondering how long this was going on. 
Pooh was  just  going  to say  “Hallo!”  for  the  fourth time  when  he  thought  that  he 
wouldn't, so  he  said: “Who  is  it?” instead.
“Me,” said a voice.
“Oh!” said Pooh. “Well, come here.”
So Whatever-it-was came here, and in the light of the candle he and Pooh looked at each 
other.
“I'm Pooh,” said Pooh.
“I'm Tigger,” said Tigger.
“Oh!” said Pooh, for he had never seen an animal like this before. “Does Christopher 
Robin know about you?”
“Of course he does,” said Tigger.
As soon as Tigger's legal status is established: Christopher Robin knows and approves of 
his presence; then, in order to place him, it is necessary to determine his class (category) 
according to what he eats.  It  turns out that Tigger does not eat the food of the Wood's 
“natives”, he eats (only) Roo's strengthening medicine. Thus, Tigger is placed with Kanga 
and Roo (the  other  immigrants),  and  the three  form a “neighbourhood” or a  “ghetto” 
particularly  visible  since  all  the  other  “natives”  live  in  houses  by  themselves.  The 
aristocratic Rabbit later organises another anti-immigrant demonstration in an attempt to 
drive  the  stranger out  of  the  Wood.  In  this  respect,  Milne  links  medication   with 
consumption and the control of space, residents, and “resources” and the book reflects the 
temporary status of childhood that is seen as something that is to be cured and the children 
to be strengthened, managed, and curtailed according to the “instructions from above”.
Even if Milne has the multiple layers in his text by virtue of it being intended for  
various  audiences,  much  of  children's  books  are  written  with  the  assumption  that 
childhood is a temporary period of ignorance and deviance that will be remedied. Jack 
Zipes (2009) makes  an important  critique when he observes that  the plethora of texts 
written for children address the “future” adult instead of conveying to children – who are 
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already  people  there  and  then  –  the  magic  and  magnificence  of  childhood  with  its 
uncurbed by adult  – I  would highlight: civilised – categories,  experience,  politics,  and 
limitations. The temporary and disposable quality of these texts becomes an integral part  
of marketing structures in  which children are “known” to be the objects of marketing 
strategies whose goal is  to turn them into manipulated consumers.  Zipes observes that 
children  contest  these  messages  and  yet,  judging  by  these  texts'  omnipresence  and 
resilience –  according  to  O'Malley (2003) and Avery (1975),  propagandistic  children's 
books have abounded in the English-speaking world for more than two centuries – this 
literature is economically successful and hence effective, since in a capitalist structure the 
“product” must  yield profit  to the owner as well as be able to finance the apparatus of 
exploitation, coercion, surveillance, and oppression. The Barbie Book series alone provide 
an ocean to drown a person of any age in the problems of fashion, jewellery, manners, ad 
infinitum. The Disney series, e.g.:  Barbie Loves Ballet and Fashion Show Fun (2009) or 
books by individual authors, such as Barbie and the Diamond Castle by Depken (2008) 
overwhelm with their endless demands for paraphernalia to be purchased in order for the 
children and their parents to feel “normal” citizens of the consumer society. Their success 
owes largely to the generally accepted claim that consumerism is empowering and allows 
a person – in this case it is a child –  to feel herself as agent of her life, with a voice and 
will49, when in reality she is being sold a prefabricated, temporary, contingent, and inferior 
49 The majority of papers given at the Childhoods 2005 Oslo conference in the section on “Children, 
Consumer Culture and Social Change: Globalisation and Social Change (12.01)” either attempted to find 
a compromise position between the “consumerism is good” and “consumerism is bad” positions, or 
argued that consumerism was the path to full agency over one's life and invited children to be full 
participants in buying and consuming. For instance, in “Rituals in Children’s Consumer Cultures: An 
ethnographic Study”, Erika Hayfield (Napier University), John Davis (University of Edinburgh) and 
David Marsden (Napier University) (2005), focused on the positive aspects of consumerism that forges 
“identity” and allows for social participation in public space (school). In “The Child as Portal Between 
Family and Market”, Daniel Cook (2005) said that active participation in consumption empowered 
children. In “Selling Childhood? Children and Consumer Culture”, David Buckingham (2005) argued 
that children needed to be empowered in their consumption choices. In “Teenagers as Consumers and 
Patriots in 1950s Indianapolis”, Alexander Urbiel (2005) demonstrated that school became the locus in 
the 1950s for the expression of patriotic feelings through consumerism. In “Gender differences in the 
consumption of children and young people in Finland”, Wilska, Terhi-Anna (2005) demonstrated that 
consumption is also gender specific with boys offered 20% more earnings than girls, yet because they are 
socialised to want more expensive brands, they buy less than girls. In another paper, “How Do Race and 
Class Shape Childhood Consumption Inequality? A Quantile Regression Analysis”, Hao and Yeung 
(2005) touched on important problems of economic marginalisation and consumption. Yet another paper 
“The role of children in the household economy” given by a group of Danish researchers, Flemming 
Hansen, Jens Carsten Nielsen and Pernille Christiansen (2005), offered a survey of the hidden and overt 
consumption as well as of conscious and unconscious participation of children in buying services, such 
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quality  humanity,  just  like  the  rest  of  the  disempowered,  oral,  “uneducated”  or  dis-
authorised adults, whose voices do not constitute “legal” voices of authority.
It is in this sense that the above mentioned chapter from Winnie-the-Pooh reveals 
the interconnectedness of medicine and knowledge as tools of control and the distribution 
of space or, in this case,  the designation of a  literary immigrant  ghetto.  As mentioned 
earlier, the concept itself of the ability to cure another presumes a sense of normalcy and 
temporariness; namely, something that fails to function can be re-adjusted to re-function 
after a period of rehabilitation. Perhaps, by giving Roo and Tigger strengthening medicine, 
Milne  intended  to  present  a  possibility  of  overcoming  the  temporary  attributes  of 
childhood, such as frailty and irrationality. However, on another level, this chapter draws 
on the civilised  premise  that  migration is  illness  (here  come  to  mind  Kroptokin  and 
Foucault's  hospitals  for  vagrants  and  the  mentally  ill  and  Molina's  study  of  medical 
knowledge and the policies for land ownership in California), and hence “illness” – in the 
case of Tigger and Roo – is also a permanent category of otherness: they eat, not food, but 
medication  and  they  are  strangers who,  among  other  things,  raise  their  children 
differently.
In my discussion of the mythology at the basis of the civilised narrative, I explore 
in greater depth the causal relationship between civilisation and epidemics. At this point, 
however, it is important to reiterate the “feudal” aspect that is revealed by the encounter of 
the Somali  immigrants with  the concerns  of the Swedish state  and its  representatives. 
Namely, the control of movement and the construction of the norms for “health” that are 
directly linked to land and ownership reflecting the feudal practice of holding peasants 
tied to the land and the lord who owned the land, the peasants, and the fruit of their labour. 
Even though the work and production aspect is absent in  Winnie-the-Pooh, nevertheless, 
the book reveals that the same structures govern the children's literary representations of 
social relations of the domestication of residents as well as the immigrants “who carry 
their children in their pockets” – and in the case of the Somalis – refuse to read. 
as heating and other amenities, and concrete items, such as toys, sweets, clothes, or food (full citations 
available in bibliography under Conference Talks in the Childhoods 2005 Oslo section). However, such 
focus on “consumption” without questioning the capitalist and civilised aspects of domination, 
expropriation, and exploitation is a problem in itself as the term obscures the larger problem of 
“ownership” which causes deprivation in the first place.
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Medication  in  the  book  and  the  doctors  and  social  workers  in  the  case  of 
Socialstyrelsen reflect the guiding principle of colonisation of space through bodies and 
minds and the forcible displacement of human and non-human animals who move and 
leave their homeland not because movement is life, but because they have been forced out 
by the (post)colonialist interests of the countries to which they flee. In other words, the 
knowledge of the coloniser first  cripples and then diagnoses the colonised as crippled. 
Since, in civilisation, the difference between the illness of the economically powerful and 
the illness of the disempowered is  understood within the framework of how much the 
resources  yield  for  those  who  own  the  results  of  their  labour  and  who  control  the 
production  of  knowledge  and  the  legitimation  of  those  authorised  to  diagnose,  then 
productivity determines the diagnosis and becomes a class issue since the illness of the 
wealthy does not warrant the same social stigma and judgement (Rosenhan, 1973) as the 
illness  of  the  “human  resources”  whose  lack  of  health  leads  to  “invalidity”  or 
“nonvalidity” as a resource because it renders the person unable to work. The probability 
of  succumbing  to  illness  by  persons  who  are  overworked,  overstressed,  and 
undernourished  increases.  Life  expectancy  itself  is  contingent  on  these  relations  of 
inequality50. Citing Oxfam statistics, Sumlennyj and Koksharov (2010) find that a child 
born in an economically deprived neighbourhood of Glasgow, for instance, can expect to 
live  on  average  almost  thirty  years  less  than  a  compatriot  born  in  a  well-to-do 
neighbourhood of the same city.  In a society where food and the means of livelihood 
(including time and space) are limited to when a person is  usable,  the repercussions of 
illness are severe for the economically disenfranchised. In this respect, individual health is 
directly related to the role prescribed to a person's “class” or “category”, and the way in 
which these roles and categories are constructed indicates active and conscious choices on 
the  part  of  those  who  have  the  power  to  impose  their  definitions,  as  the  case  of 
Socialstyrelsen illustrates.
50 Demographic studies demonstrate that lifetime gets cut in half for the economically marginalised in the 
same city and the same ethnic background and this translates into marginalisation from symbolic capital 
as well, such as cultural participation, education, etc. See Philip N. Cohen and Danielle MacCartney (in 
Scott et al., 2004), Bianchi et al. (2004), Philip N. Cohen (2006), among others.
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_21.pdf
or
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0105.pdf
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Finally, Irma says that she only offers Aisha recommendations, and yet she expects 
obedience from her. Until my remarks, she did not respect the way in which Aisha spent 
time with her children and did not value the content of what she was transmitting to them 
in lieu of the  Ugly Duckling. Reading in itself seems to be so important to Irma that it 
overwrites every other aspect of family relations and pedagogy. It overwrites the fact that 
Aisha does indeed transmit a literary tradition, only one in a different “alphabet” from the 
written tradition. 
The myth that the earlier a child acquires literacy the better are the chances for the 
future  adult's  success  has  been  challenged  extensively.  Numerous  anthropologists, 
pedagogues, historians and theorists have pointed out the dangers of (early) literacy from 
various angles, including questioning its very value for individuals, social groups, and the 
environment. For instance, Lena Nikitina (1998) focuses on pedagogical theory from the 
perspective of socialist-anarchist physiology (Arshavsky and Ukhtomsky) and the role of 
schools in suppressing children's instincts for learning with which they are born. David 
Nasaw (1979) examines the history of schooling and arrives at the same conclusions as 
Nikitina; particularly, he argues, that the intention behind the founding of public schooling 
from its inception has been a project of domestication, exploitation, and the ordering of 
the poor. The theory of practice in pedagogy also yields important critiques; for instance, 
John  Taylor  Gatto  (1992  and  2003)  and  John  Holt  (1969,  1982,  and  1983)  have 
documented the harm of teaching as seen from the teachers' perspective. Gatto specifically 
highlights the fact  that  the very idea of contemporary compulsory schooling  from the 
militarisation  and  nationalisation  project  of  Bismarck  and  Fichte  in  Germany  (Gatto, 
2003). 
In  2006,  Sebastian Suggate conducted  a  doctoral  dissertation in  psychology at  
Otago University in New Zealand, listed among its exceptional theses for 2009, entitled: 
The  role  of  age-related  development  in  literacy  acquisition  and  response  to  reading  
instruction (Suggate, 2009), in which he demonstrates that the stress on early literacy in 
public  school yields problematic  results.  It  follows that later literacy, when a child  has 
already formed her anthropological foundation, allows for more effective interaction with 
the text. In this light, Aisha's lack of subordination to literacy requirements in themselves 
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are not the factors in the children's possible (probable) lack of integration into the Swedish 
economic order in the future. It is the doxa of the racialised dispositions of the wealthy 
groups  and  their  representatives with  regard  to  the  markers  of  “otherness”  and 
insubordination to the literacy imposed by the medical panopticon that would hold the 
upper hand in  their  discrimination.  The Somalis  who have immigrated within the last 
twenty years to Minneapolis, Minnesota, for instance, have a completely different social 
and  economic  trajectory.  Incidentally,  many  of  them  have  landed  there  by  route  of 
Sweden, leaving their compatriots in Sweden still marginalised while they have flourished 
economically in this particular city in the United States51.
…Omar, a Somali doctor in Stockholm, who spoke fluently Russian, English, Swedish, 
Arabic and Somali explained to me that for an average Somali person a piece of paper 
does not signify a commitment. “If a Somali does not give his word of honour face to 
face, then he does not see the point of being obligated to someone who does not have 
the courage to look him in the eye. …Somalis respect living memory. A person who 
cannot remember things without making a note in his agenda is a dead person. What can 
such a person know? How can he ensure the living memory of his ancestors if he can 
not remember his own commitments? A person who does not remember his people’s 
history is handicapped, invalid, dead…. Every Somali is a poet and remembers by heart 
all the important poets of his people. This is the history that makes him a Somali”52.
The relationship of literacy to death and the nature of the written word, of which doctor 
Omar speaks, has occupied many minds, including the monotheistic tradition itself starting 
with  the Old  Testament.  In spite  of,  and  contrary to,  the common  belief  that  writing 
preserves memory, this theory holds that abstraction leads to amnesia. It burries the living 
beneath the word and, particularly through symbolism, subtracts from or kills  the real, 
imposing  the  simulacrum  in  its  stead.  This  subtraction  from  reality  also  erases  the 
boundaries  of  truth  and  hence  makes  it  easy  and  probable  to  intentionally  and 
unintentionally  convey false information, an issue on which Dunno's trilogy elaborates 
and the awareness of which many cultures signal by the language itself. Languages that 
have evidentiality markers oblige the speaker or writer to choose between two different 
words that indicate whether the person speaks as a witness of a situation or has received 
the  information  second  hand.  Evidentiality  markers  thus  help  these  languages  and 
51 From my interview with Pär Skoglund, August 2010, Minneapolis, Minnesota. For more on the subject, 
see report by Skoglund (2010).
52 From  field-notes  for  The  Encounter (Mötet),  Socialstyrelsen  September  1996  to  December  1997. 
Furthermore, various books on Somali history and poetry illustrate this argument, for instance, Samatar 
(1982), I.M. Lewis (1993; 1994; and 2008), or Bernhard Helander (1988).
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traditions  to  maintain  an emphasis  on presence,  memory,  reliability,  and  trust  that  are 
characteristic of relationships in oral cultures. Obliging the speaker to highlight presence 
and  absence  exerts  certain  demands  on  the  speaker  who  is  held  responsible  for  the 
reliability  of  the  information  conveyed,  which  in  turn  plays  an  important  role  in 
negotiating relationships. Stemming from a position of wildness, these demands render the 
culture qualitatively different  from one where the emphasis is  on “education” and the 
“domestication” of people into relationships based on symbolism and abstraction. Because 
the emphasis  in  the civilised cultures is  not  on truthfulness,  but  on legitimacy,  whose 
purpose it is to subjugate those who are not in positions of “authority” and hence stratify, 
then submission and dependence are inscribed in the very plot of that narrative and are 
imposed by the technologies of language and literacy themselves.
Peter  Roberts,  writing  on the  history  and  philosophy  of  education,  offers  the 
following observation:
In many societies, the value of literacy is frequently taken for granted.  The ability to 
read and write is often regarded as an indispensable prerequisite for active participation 
in the contemporary world. It is sometimes helpful to remember, however, that human 
beings survived without literacy for hundreds of thousands of years. Harvey Graff notes 
that while the species homo sapiens is roughly 1,000,000 years old,  writing did not 
emerge until  approximately 5,000 years ago. Western literacy (based upon the Greek 
alphabet) has been with us about 2,600 years, and printing is just 430 years old (Graff, 
1987: 26). Literacy, then, as it has typically been defined, has been a feature of everyday 
life for  but a fraction of the total period of human existence.  All basic human needs 
(including food, clothing,  shelter,  and social contact)  can be met without literacy.  In 
addition,  humans  can  communicate  with  one  another  without  reading  and  writing 
(through the spoken word, through pictures and other forms of visual representation, via 
gestures and sign language, and so on). Why, then, do we invariably take it for granted 
that people ought to become literate? (Roberts, 1997).
As  the  resume  of  the  whole  of  humanity  demonstrates,  the  curriculum vitae  of  the 
alinguistic, the illiterate and oral traditions boasts a much longer and wealthier record than 
the  literate  period,  which  is  tightly  linked  to  the  spread  of  civilisation.  Bourdieu's 
explanation of the mechanism through which cultures, ideas, experience, and ideologies 
proliferate  through  the  bodies  and  minds  of  living  human  beings  also  supports  the 
interpretation  that  without  narrative  individuals  and  groups  have  better  chances  of 
remaining alive and proliferating as they pursue chaos and enjoy the cacophony of the 
multiplicity  of voices,  poems,  and  dreams.  In  Somali  society, “poetry is  the medium 
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whereby an individual or a group can present a case most persuasively. The pastoral poet 
is,  to  borrow a phrase,  the public  relations man of the clan,  and through his  craft  he 
exercises a powerful influence on clan affairs” (Samatar, 1982: 3). In light of Kirmayer's 
study mentioned earlier,  poetry can be  seen as  “science”  or  at  least  as  a  “scientific” 
method of reasoning and communicating knowledge and experience with the public. It is 
this tradition that Aisha was transmitting to her children, which the Swedish social worker 
dismissed because it  is not designed for children, is not literate, and is not perceived as 
compatible with the civilised Swedish narrative and economic needs.
It  is  true  that  Aisha  transmits  to  her  children  “adult”  culture,  while  in  the 
contemporary North-  or Western society children are allotted a  specifically  designated 
body of knowledge, culture, and literature53 which are still created, marketed, and chosen 
for the most part by adults with a specific ontological and anthropological understanding 
of what childhood is supposed to be: a domesticating period of intense dumbing down that 
prepares children for life as resources (AbdelRahim, 2009b). This happens in spite of the 
fact that the books that have survived epochs are the ones that have crossed borders and 
been able to reach the reader regardless of whether she is a child or adult. Nonetheless, the 
majority of the books that  are on the market  continue to  comply with the notion that  
children need simpler and more linear narratives than “real” literature. 
This dumbing down element becomes apparent when one looks at the majority of 
what is considered as “standard” children's books and the children's writers' manuals that 
praise the “accessible” (simple) language, “accessible”  (simplistic)  narrative,  and large 
bright pictures “suitable” for the specific “age”. This constitutes the rationale for much of 
the “translations” for children by Disney of stories and books, or as Jack Zipes observes, 
the goal of Disney is not to bring viewers together “for the development of community but 
to be diverted in  the French sense of  divertissement and American sense of diversion. 
[This diversion] is geared toward nonreflective viewing, everything is on the surface, one-
dimensional” (Zipes, 1994: 95). In their original form, these stories appeal to audiences of 
various ages,  including adults; e.g. the stories of Hans Christian Anderson or the three 
authors I am concerned with in this research.
53 Evidently, regardless of whether Aisha read Swedish books to her children at home or not, they would 
have been exposed to them in school and would have acquired two distinct cultures in place of one.
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The notion of simplicity is linked with the civilised conception of childhood as a 
temporary period whose logic is: “why invest into something that will pass away anyway, 
will be broken, or quickly forgotten” and hence “why invest in quality?” Because of this 
doxa of temporality, children’s merchandise is often of inferior quality: children will grow 
out of the pants fast; they will break the object easily; they will lose the pages of the book; 
they won't appreciate the story when they're seven; and so on. Apart from the constraints 
imposed by stratification and the fact that things and services in a capitalist system are 
priced  according  to  demand  and  profit  rather  than  with  respect  to  the  principles  of 
exchange and the cost of labour – prices that render most parents unable to afford quality 
things  and  time  for  their  children  –  this  rationale  ignores  the  fact  that  if  a  child's 
experiences are simplified, if she is  overwhelmed with temporary and disposable things 
instead  of  lasting  and  durable  relationships,  this  experience  of temporariness  and  the 
dispositions it instils are inscribed into the permanency of the person's habitus and remain 
with the person throughout her life in her body hexis, doxa, ideology and, most important, 
in her emotional dispositions. Notwithstanding, in the civilised narrative, the construct of 
childhood remains linked tightly with the concept of temporality – a fundamental liaison 
in the promulgation of the grammar of stratification and abuse because it is based on the 
concept  that  children,  poverty,  and “crime” are corrigible  and curable even though the 
seventeen thousand of years of civilisation have demonstrated that the more civilised the 
globe becomes, the more there is poverty, extermination of species and human groups, and 
general, overall escalating violence. Still, the civilised narrative tells us that if people are 
educated even further, domesticated even deeper, and punished even more, then happiness 
shall come.
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Chapter 7: Whose Narratives? Whose Children?—the Foundation of  
Crime and Punishment
In  civilisation,  the  concept  of  temporality  is  assigned  to  both  the  nature  of 
childhood and to that of oral culture. For example, the status of children as “illegal” and 
“deviant” subjects (rather objects) is at the basis of the rationale for corporal punishment, 
a practice that is still legal in most countries around the world. Recent debates regarding 
the  Canadian  Criminal  Code  illustrate  the  conception  of  childhood  as  linked  to  the 
concepts of temporality and corrigibility. In 2004, the Code has reiterated that a child is 
“allowed  to  receive”  corporal  punishment  from  the  age  of  two  to  twelve  years 
administered by an adult in charge of the child. Commonly referred to as the “spanking 
law”, section 43 of the Canadian Criminal Code (1) reads as follows:
Every schoolteacher, parent or  person standing in the place of a parent is justified in 
using force by way of correction toward a pupil or child, as the case may be, who is 
under his care, if the force does not exceed what is reasonable under the circumstances.
The  formulation of the punitive  paradigm itself  assumes  that  the  adult  knows correct 
behaviour  and  has  the  right  to  define  it,  while  the  child's  knowledge,  and  therefore 
humanity,  in  this  relationship  is  suspended  until  finally  corrected.  Here,  the  category 
“human” is  provisional and conditional.  People are not born “human”; they have to be 
forced, “corrected” and bullied into becoming human. Ontologically, this leaves room for 
the understanding that without coercion and violence we are not human, which means two 
things:  (1)  that  without  legalised,  premeditated violence  we  are  animals,  and  (2)  that 
animals do not coerce or use violence as an educational method, only those destined to 
become  human  do  so.  In  other  words,  violence  is  a  strictly  human  property.  This 
understanding leaves us either with fear and despair or hope and rebellion; for, either we 
agree to submit to the whipping hand of domestication or insist on dreaming savagely of 
the vast  possibilities of wilderness  and strive  incessantly towards a  return to  our  true 
animal essence. 
Broken down to its basic components, the position for punishment postulates: (1) 
that children learn through conditioning and hence the intentional infliction of pain and 
rewards can act as pedagogical stimuli; (2) that children have an innate side to their nature 
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that, if left unconditioned and allowed to act according to its wishes, will ultimately wish 
“evil”,  while  the right  type of conditioning can reform the wicked streak; (3)  that  the 
wrong-doer is responsible for wrong-done acts and when exposed to pain, the decision to 
do wrong becomes a conscious choice, since punishment is supposed to teach and imprint 
on the memory that such and such act is  wrong because it  causes pain to the doer (the 
question of sentience and empathy towards the victim comes secondary in this rationale), 
etc.;  and  (4)  that  people  should  believe  in  the  justice  of the authority  who  has  been 
designated to inflict pain as punishment and hence the question of credibility, definitions, 
and authority are always present in this continually contested territory.
The opposite stance holding that children do not need punishment stems from the 
position (1) that children and humans strive for harmony and goodness, that they are good 
deep inside and do not wish to harm, especially not consciously; (2) that the intentional 
infliction of pain teaches by example how to intentionally inflict pain and hence alienates 
people from each other and is destructive for relationships and community building54; (3) 
that punishment teaches a person to surrender to the dictates of the authority figures who 
inflict  pain (hierarchical subordination)  and whose interests become the guidelines  for 
“right” and “wrong” instead of conscience that atrophies in these conditions; (4) finally, 
that  children  are  hard-wired  to  learn what  is  necessary for  their  well-being—if  other 
animals can, why would human animals be unable to?
The concept of punishment thus presupposes specific notions about the nature of 
the human animal, the nature of the child, and the nature of the perceived act of deviance, 
in  addition to  a  conception of the nature and intentions  of the perpetrator  and of the 
inflicter of punishment. These basic premises in the  rationale of punishment inhere in a 
variety of contexts and  practices that  determine the nature of the relationship,  usually 
between unequals: between adults from unequal socio-economic groups, between adults 
and the elderly, between humans and animals, or between adults and children. Moreover, a 
relationship  can be  punishing  even in  the  absence of corporal pain.  Gregory Bateson 
(2000), for instance, in his anthropology of psychiatric institutions discusses the damage 
54 Animal psychology studies demonstrate that rats and other animals are kind, responsive, empathic, and 
willing to help others when they themselves  have experienced kindness and love. For instance,  see: 
Church (1959); Kraus et al. (2010); Bekoff and Pierce (2009).
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inflicted  on  mental  and  emotional  health  by  the  morally  and  emotionally  punishing 
attitudes of parents and the conflicting messages that they relay leading to schizophrenic 
condition in children.
The rationale of punishment holds that just as children are punishable because they 
are  constructed  as  temporary  deviants,  i.e.  their  deviance  is  reformable,  so  are  oral 
traditions constructed as temporary, “unreliable”,  “forgettable” and therefore in need of 
remedy. This explains why Irma perceives  Aisha's  illiteracy as deviance and acting as 
authority, Irma knows that if, at any point, this deviance poses any serious threat to her  
order (both Irma's order and the social order on whose behalf she acts) then Irma and her 
order have the right  and the power to intervene and take the necessary steps to correct 
Aisha’s  lack  of cooperation,  if  necessary,  by means  of legalised  violence  (police  and 
laws)55. In other words, legitimated by the fact that it  is backed by police and laws, the 
authority dictates to people what form, methods,  and syllabi their children's upbringing 
should adopt. The underlying premise of this relationship is that people are  not free to 
choose how to raise their children and children as well as adults should not be trusted to 
choose what to do with their learning, because if left alone, they will not comply with the 
economic mandates of business owners and “styrelsen” or management.
The critical issue with children's  literature,  hence,  is  the political application of 
literacy itself to control and domesticate children's wilderness by imposing a narrative and 
a method that  in  itself is  inculcated as  habitus and  doxa;  these latter foster a civilised 
(hierarchical)   relationship to knowledge about the world and the place of humans in it, 
thereby failing to forge a real relationship to the world. According to Socialstyrelsen, the 
social workers,  and medical personnel,  Somalis and Gypsies are considered to be two 
troublesome groups,  because they are illiterate and refuse to be monitored via  regular 
medical check-ups and hence are difficult to instruct and forced to comply – the term is 
“integrate”. This illiteracy, however, does not mean that the Gypsies and Somalis do not 
know how to read and write  or refuse totally  to  read and  write.  It  is  simply that  the 
preferred mode for memory and social interactions is based on oral traditions and face to 
55 The various legal cases of homeschoolers in Europe, illustrate this point, particularly the case of seven 
year  old Domenic Johansson  who was  abducted  on  25th June 2008 by the  state for  homeschooling 
reasons. The parents had already boarded the plane on their from the plane heading to India, his mother's 
native land, where they decided to move permanently (Sundberg, 2009; Lundström, 2010).
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face  presence  rather  than  through  lists  of  economic  relationships  of dependence  and 
replacement.  The  “illiterate”  have  not  accepted  the  literate  method,  because  the 
relationships that oral culture fostered forged a particular ontological position vis-à-vis life 
and society that differed radically from that of the civilised Swedes. 
My  Somali  interlocutors  in  this  project  have  helped  me  see  a  critical  nuance 
usually  glossed over  in  the literacy versus oral tradition dichotomy,  namely,  that  they 
reject  literacy as a method of formulating human relationships,  but  they do not  refuse 
literature per se, i.e.  they do not  reject  cultural articulation in  a literary – even if  not 
literate – form56. This means that an oral tradition, such as the rich tradition of Somali 
poetry, which contains the whole history of Somali clans, has room for narrative(s), even a 
civilised one if domestication enters their ontological conceptions. This is precisely what 
happened with the spread of Islam that appears to have reached Somalia in the seventh 
century AD. It was easily incorporated even while the clans remained mostly nomadic and 
pastoral57.
Like children's literature, which during the early stages of childhood the child can 
access through caretakers by means of repetitive reading aloud and memorisation, and like 
the tradition of bed-time reading or story telling, both of which practices bridge the gap 
between  the  ontological  meaning  of  the  traditional  story-teller  and  a  written  down 
narrative,  so  is  the  Qur'an  a  text  that  lives  through  memorisation,  repetition,  and 
vocalisation. Like all poetic traditions58, it  is daily revived by the ability of Muslims to 
recite from memory, sometimes in solitude and other times with other people in communal 
prayer. Here, both the oral and literary modes have the potential to serve as a tool for the 
transmission of the ideology of domination through doxa and habitus, even if both offer a 
compromise between literacy and oral culture.
56  It is almost ironic to write about what is required to be unwritten, but there are numerous books on the 
oral  tradition  of  the  Somalis.  For  more  discussion,  see:  Samatar  (1982)  cited  above,  I.M.  Lewis 
Understanding  Somalia (1993  and  2008),  or  Blood  and  Bone (1994),  or  Bernhard  Helander  The 
Slaughtered Camel (1988).
57 The exact  date has been  contested,  but  according to I.M.  Lewis (1993 and 2008) the Somalis have 
participated in the wars of jihad and appear to have been among the earlier converts to Islam in Africa.
58  Poetic traditions not only in oral cultures, but also in literate traditions where children learn poetry from 
written sources by heart. This ensures a living memory, a live-relationship and at the same time a “dead” 
text that was brought back to life by the required presence of a living recital. Theatre is another surviving 
form of this compromise, where active presence is required in reliving and relieving the written legacy of 
the playwright.
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In addition to the practice of bed-time reading in  literate societies,  children use 
books  similarly  to  how  holy  books  are  employed,  for  they  too  practice  repetition, 
rereading, and memorisation of beloved texts regardless of whether this takes place in the 
company of siblings, adults, or by themselves. In this way, children, holy books devotees, 
as well as theatre goers and lovers of poetry thereby negotiate a compromise between the 
written word and  live  presence.  What  determines  the outcome  in  reading  then is  the 
ontological basis of the text: is the basic premise civilised or is it  wild? Does it  prompt 
death or inspire life? Does it follow rigid rules and is squeezed into an unyielding structure 
or is it flexible, malleable, and unpredictable even when reread for the hundredth time?
Following  this  line  of  reasoning,  fiction  provides  an  excellent  genre  with  a 
potential to substitute reality with falsehood and to reconfirm the civilised narrative even 
while  presenting  a  multiplicity  of  threads.  It  is  a  powerful  tool of  reconfirmation of 
personal  and  social  knowledge,  because  the  elements  that  contradict  desires  and 
perspectives can be dismissed as “imaginary” and the elements that  can help build  an 
“argument”  or  justifications  can  then  be  used  to  reconfirm  the  categories  of  reality 
funnelling  conclusions  into  a  predetermined,  domesticated  direction  thus  creating  the 
illusion that the text is fluid and ambiguous, while in reality, it turns out to be specific and 
practical. The Swedish social worker's (in this case it was Irma) ideology and doxa stems 
from this knowledge of the power of children's  (and other) literature to re-inscribe the 
rebellious  or  otherwise  dysfunctional  (ill,  criminal,  immigrant,  or  otherwise  deviant) 
individuals within the system of resources.
It is the civilised definition of resources as yielding profit and labour that defines 
membership  in  a  civilised  society  or  marginalisation.  Some  groups  are  permanently 
labelled, e.g. schizophrenics (Rosenhan, 1973); others, such as children, are constructed as 
temporarily deviant (from the productive norm) who with the right methodology can be 
“healed”  and  may  “graduate”  at  eighteen  (or  whatever  the  specific  “legal”  age  of 
adulthood may be in  any given society),  thereby becoming legal participants as either 
owned resources or owners. 
In this regard, a simple book, take for instance a Caillou story on diapers, may at 
first  glance appear  as having  nothing  to  do  with the civilised  narrative  of illness and 
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health, like the one explicitly articulated in  The Secret Garden or in  The Chronicles of  
Narnia.  Yet,  it  does  the  same  job  as  the  one  carried  out  by  the  psychotherapists  in 
Kirmayer's study (in Mattingly and Garro, 2000), whose aim is to re-integrate and recycle 
the “in-valid” persons into society. In other words, Caillou's authors strive to integrate the 
wild  child  into  the civilised order.  Having been created for the very young by various 
contributors, the Caillou series (first published in Quebec in 1987) depicts “problematic” 
situations that, in a civilised society, would threaten the child by withdrawing acceptance 
and love. The authors offer solutions for the child to become integrated and ways to win 
that acceptance by pointing out that these are common problems so that the child identifies 
herself with Caillou and the “normal”  standards outside of her,  regardless of her  own 
needs or self-knowledge. The aim of such books is to offer a narrative that demands that 
the child  trust that, by following the recipe,  integration shall come and happiness shall 
follow. 
For  instance,  Caillou:  Potty  Time (Sanschagrin,  2005)  presents  the  problem of 
Caillou not understanding where to poop. Parents buy him a potty as a gift and when he 
goes to the kindergarten, he learns that it is socially unacceptable to either wear a diaper or 
to poop around; people laugh at you and turn away. In order to integrate, Caillou chooses 
to poop in a pot and is rewarded by social acceptance. In contrast, a society such as the 
Semai in Malaysia, does not impose restrictions or any form of psychological, moral, or 
physical punishment on children and lets the child learn these things simply by living and 
enjoying the safety of the unconditional love that the community provides (Dentan, 1968). 
In these societies, as soon as they begin to crawl, children learn where to go to the toilet 
without books, narratives, or the threat of abandonment. 
Healing,  correcting,  and  educating  people  is  therefore  a  thread  that  tightly 
interweaves all the institutions of civilisation, such as the departments concerned with the 
concepts and methods of regulating illness and health,  policing and military59, law and 
justice,  education,  among  others.  Moreover,  these  concepts  underlie  all  of  literature. 
Scientific texts attempt to explain phenomena that are then used to control inner and outer 
59 The functions of both the military and the police are the same, except that the military is created to 
control and conquer foreign populations, while the function of the police is to do the same with the 
human resources at “home”.
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nature,  but  also  to  question  the  anthropogenic  realities.  Fiction  too  plays  a  role  in 
cementing  the  dispositions  and  structural  knowledge but  also  project  possibilities  that 
challenge the  status quo of power.  In this cacophony of possibilities of submission and 
rebellion,  children's  literature,  too,  has room for  the negotiation of resolutions and the 
steering of minds, emotions,  and behaviour and offers a place for the unfolding of the 
conflict  between the personal or voluntaristic impulses and the deterministic social and 
historical  constructs  of  knowledge,  the  agents  of  the  state,  and  the  language  of 
domestication.
Chapter  8:  Taming  Children's  Inner  Landscape  and  Other  Wild  
Things
In a domesticated culture, narrative channels the idea that, from the perspective of 
linear evolution of events, becomes the  doxic climax of the plot while its chronological 
structure allows us to develop the plot  to its logical end. In this sense,  a domesticated 
narrative appears as an ordered, linear, and temporal framework for the chaotic details of 
life thereby marking the critical distinction between the various ways in which culture and 
socio-economic paradigms are materialised. Since the seed of violence has been planted at 
the inception of language, it inheres in the very reason for its being. The main difference 
in the extent to which this violence manifests itself resides in the ontological positions at 
the  basis  of  the  premises  used  to  construct  those  systems  which  are  then  articulated 
through language and defined by the needs fostered by the ontological premises. 
In contrast to the civilised story that is required to be limiting and defining because 
it  is always expected to make or prove a point, since the premises of wildness offer no 
grammar  for  narratology,  then  wild  stories  are  not  defined  by  social  construct  of 
permanence  or  logic.  Where  the  wild  narrative  is  free  to  wander,  the  civilised  story 
projects an expectation of a climax through a “dynamic” and “evolving” plot which thus 
seizes time and assumes it to be a natural structure bound to the concept of a finite frame. 
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Thereby the civilised story constricts experience and directs the object of domestication, 
through  the  promise  of  punishment  and  reward  (i.e.  threats),  to  a  world  of  civilised 
obedience. The events that make up the civilised story can be imagined, invented, or lived. 
They can question time as in time-travelling science fiction stories. Nonetheless, the plot 
directs us to a specific point of domestication through punishment and reward, failure and 
success and the ultimate resolution in favour of the hierarchical system of resources. If it  
refuses  to  deliver,  then,  “what  is  the point  of that  film?”  – audiences  ask,  baffled by 
underground cinema; or “what is the point of your story?” – creative writing professors 
demand  of  their  students;  “what  is  the  point  of  your  essay?”  professors  ask  of 
insubordinate students, etc. Civilised stories make their points regardless of the medium in 
which they are told: a live storytelling in a public reading session, an actor interpreting the 
role of a character in a story or a play on stage or through a technological medium such as 
TV or film. In other words, be it through live interaction, oral or audio-visual performance 
mediated through technology, whether recorded on tape, transmitted on screen, or written 
on paper – each story becomes an integral part of the larger narrative, the civilised story. 
In  this  chapter,  I  compare  two  examples  of civilised  children's  narratives:  one 
obvious and the other much less overt. The first illustration of a civilised narrative comes 
from the celebrated 1963 picture book by Maurice Sendak,  Where the Wild Things Are. 
Here, wilderness is presented as a place to which a child withdraws as a consequence of 
punishment,  because wilderness is  assumed to be undesirable and abnormal,  something 
that  is  dangerous  and  which  can  therefore  be  used  to  scare  and  inflict  emotional, 
psychological  or  physical  pain  in  order  to  modify  the  child's  behaviour.  The  second 
example draws from A.A. Milne's Winnie the Pooh.
The events in Sendak's book transpire as follows: Max, the protagonist, wants to 
play a beast, perhaps be one in the family space – a place of domestication. He wears fur 
and acts “naughty”. His parents banish him to his room depriving him of supper. He is 
depicted then as going to a “dark”, “scary”, “wild” place and we are told that he conquers 
it  and its inhabitants by staring into their eyes,  just  as John Berger (1972),  in  Ways of 
Seeing (1972), describes the gaze of science and art that tames, objectifies, and renders 
pornographic the women turned into observed, gazed at commodities of knowledge and 
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marketing strategies. 
The  narrative  follows  a  linear  development  from wildness  to  taming,  thereby 
depicting the evolution of a little boy shaped by punishment. Punishment is a method of 
modification of non-human and human animals' behaviour by appealing to their fears of 
pain and death and threatening their well-being and life itself. In other words, to civilise a 
person, the pedagogue needs to create the logic of endangerment on purpose, a purpose 
that  is  absent  in  the  wild,  because  even  though  beings  learn  from experience,  that 
experience is never static and one needs to constantly improvise in the complexity and 
unpredictability of chaos where applying a standard rule cut to fit  only static, inorganic, 
simplified programmes can prove fatal.
The crux of Max's lesson consists in learning that rebellion against his civilised 
masters,  the  ones  who  possess  food,  threatens  him.  It  is  not  wilderness  per  se that 
endangers  him;  rather,  it  is  his  parents  who  demand  that  wilderness  be  banished, 
conquered, and destroyed. By threatening his wilderness, his parents instil in him a fear of 
it, because through their punishment  he learns that in order to be safe in the colonised 
space of “home” and its relations, he must colonise the wilderness around him and inside 
of him so as to be able to return to the conditional love in the world of rationed food.  
Compliance with the hierarchical roles and the norms of behaviour set in this colonised 
world demands of him expansionism in which he,  himself,  provides the terrain for the 
colonisation of new spaces. Success in this colonisation brings Max to food and teaches 
him to do to the wild “things” (they are not “beings” according to the text) exactly what 
his parents do to him: they conquer his will by inflicting emotional pain and by frightening 
him by withdrawing unconditional love and – the most important tool of domestication – 
food. Having tamed that place of wilderness, the boy returns to the world of confiscated 
food and rewards through food – a world we call civilisation. The first thing that happens 
upon his return, he smells food and through that knows that he is “loved” as long as he 
obeys those who control his livelihood. Like the dogs stripped of independence and will 
by Pavlov's methods of dressage, Max cues in and does what his parents demand of him: 
stop craving wildness,  renounce chaos,  enter  the domesticated space and submit  to its 
order. On a deeper level, Max also learns that there is an emotional-psychological reward 
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in this system: as the owners of food exert control over his will, he too can domesticate 
those rendered weaker than him. In this respect, domestication allows each member in its 
hierarchy to feel himself to be concurrently a victim and a tyrant and thus submit to its 
ontological definitions through personal, even if miserly, stakes.
Punishment  by  means  of  withholding  food  has  been  an  effective  method  of 
modifying behaviour for thousands of years.  It  has become one of the most  important 
aspects of the language of civilisation and is at the root of the methods of education, which 
is a system of modifying children's behaviour intended to render them civilised, i.e. docile, 
useful and serviceable60. Its grammar signals to the domesticated subject that they must 
obey and respect the one who is stronger, who possesses the key to the locked away food 
and to power in the system of hierarchical cruelty. Most important, it confounds concepts 
and jumbles up its own language, just like picture books do when they depict one thing in 
the text and a contradictory action in the accompanying picture,  making children learn 
how to instinctively, on the level of habitus and body hexis, tune into the politics of power. 
Children copy this culture and re-enact this system of social relations especially in school 
where the structure is already set hierarchically: grades, teachers, promotion of leadership, 
and the establishment of the leaders and working class as well as of winners and losers. 
The  constant  threats  by  stronger  children in  the  schoolyard  force  weaker  children  to 
submit and the effect this has on the threatened children is the experience of constant fear; 
when not sanctioned by the school, it is referred to as “bullying”61. However, the structure 
informed by these relationships of unequal distribution of power maintained by the doxic 
or  unspoken  of  real,  physical  threat  is  cemented  in  the  grammar  and  language  of 
civilisation.  Children's  books  written  from  this  perspective  and  in  this  language, 
inadvertently, articulate these precepts. 
For instance, a popular book such as Where the Wild Things Are refers to civilised 
bullying as benign order and defines wilderness as a dangerous zone of anarchy and chaos. 
Destroying that chaos and killing the wild is a requirement for the survival of civilised 
ontology,  for  it  depends  on victims  (resources,  workers,  slaves),  and,  if  there  are  no 
60 For the history of education, see David Nasaw (1979) or Jonathan Kozol (2000).
61 In the same vein, people who kill for the military and who obey the higher orders of persons who are 
well paid for their orders to kill and who enjoy legitimate authority are called “soldiers”; the people who 
do the same thing for a competing or non-sanctioned group are called “terrorists”. 
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victims (i.e. everyone is wild), it will have no order, no language, and no anthropological 
expression. It thus becomes vital to suppress, criminalise and eradicate any possibility of 
rebellion against this colonising and murdering culture. Hence, teaching the cues so as to 
enable the child to decipher who is a legal bully and who is illegal constitutes one of the 
main points of pedagogical culture.
Chapter 9: The Metanarrative of Literacy and Crime in 100 Aker  
Wood
My second example of a civilised tale, Winnie the Pooh, holds no claim to being a 
pedagogical handbook; bien au contraire, its value lies in the perception of it  being anti-
pedagogical.  Notwithstanding,  the  same  civilised  precepts  form the  very basis  of  the 
relationships in  the 100 Aker  Wood. First,  Christopher  Robin's  imaginary world opens 
with  school  and  ends  with  him  leaving  for  boarding  school.  Literacy and  authorised 
knowledge, therefore, define the stagnation of this locked space which nobody, with the 
exception of the human boy, can leave. Second, it is a hierarchical world and its chain of 
command  is  evident  in  who  names,  controls  writing,  issues  signs,  possesses  human 
attributes or personhood, who is the overlord and who is the overlord's favourite, etc.. For 
instance,
“A lick of honey,” murmured Bear to himself, “or—or not, as the case may be.” And he 
gave a deep sigh, and tried very hard to listen to what Owl was saying.
But Owl went on and on, using longer and longer words, until at last he came back to where he 
started, and he explained that the person to write out this notice was Christopher Robin.
“It was he who wrote the ones on my front door for me. Did you see them, Pooh?” (Milne, 
1992 [1954]: 51).
This book is about literacy and control even if the above scene between Winnie-the-Pooh 
and Owl depicts  language as  inadequate in  communication.  Miscommunication recurs 
throughout  the  books  as  characters  talk  past  each  other,  yet  underlying  this  lack  of 
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communication  lies  the  drive  for  greed  and  unvoiced  desires  for  consumption  that 
manoeuvres the characters' interactions. Hence, even when outwardly they may appear to 
be indulging in polite conversation about pleasant things,  inwardly they are calculating 
how to trick each other out of another pot of honey: 
. . . Rabbit said, “Honey or condensed milk with your bread?” [Pooh] was so excited 
that he said, “Both,” and then, so as not to seem greedy, he added, “but don't bother 
about the bread, please . . . .” And for a long time after that he said nothing . . . until at 
last, humming to himself in a rather sticky voice, he got up, shook Rabbit lovingly by 
the paw, and said that he must be going on.
“Must you?” said Rabbit politely.
“Well,” said Pooh, “I could stay a little longer if it—if you——” and he tried very hard 
to look in the direction of the larder.
“As a matter  of  fact,”  said Rabbit,  “I was going  out  myself  directly”  (Milne,  1992 
[1954]: 26).
This  stereotypically  English  scene  of  polite  hypocrisy  spells  out  that  there  are  no 
misunderstandings about who wants what: at first, when Pooh knocks on the door, Rabbit 
pretends that he is not home. Then, he lies that it is someone else who is home; and finally 
does his best to get rid of the avaricious guest, who “so as not to seem greedy”, eats the 
“cream” and leaves the bread. The reason why the two have to dance around the bush is 
the symbolic economy of manners which flow into the established hierarchy: Rabbit is a 
xenophobic aristocrat and has to be reckoned with, regardless of whether he is  right or 
wrong  as  the  scenes  where  the  characters  side  with  his  attempts  to  get  rid  of  the 
immigrants demonstrate; Owl is the literate intellectual with long words and here, as in the 
civilised “real world”, accuracy is not an issue; Winnie is the favourite nobleman with no 
brains; and so forth. In all of this, the one who controls literacy, language, and knowledge 
is the one who controls time and space and everything and everyone who dwells in these 
dimensions—namely,  the  monarch  is  Christopher  Robin,  the only one  who  holds  the 
empowering title “human” and ruler.
In this respect, the world of 100 Aker Wood mirrors Jack Goody and Walter Ong's 
correlation between literacy and the more effective means of controlling the lives and the 
labour of “resources”. One of the ways in which private property, names, and written signs 
are interlinked is  the fact that the characters in 100 Aker Wood dwell under signs with 
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written names that enunciate ownership and the concept of trespassing:
Winnie-the-Pooh lived in a forest all by himself under the name of Sanders.
(“What does 'under the name' mean?” asked Christopher Robin. “It means he had the 
name over the door in gold letters, and lived under it”) (Milne, 1992 [1954]: 4).
Or, here is another example:
Next to [Piglet's] house was a piece of broken board which had: “TRESPASSERS W” 
on it (ibid: 34).
And,
...Winnie-the-Pooh went  round to  his  friend Christopher  Robin,  who lived behind a 
green door in another part of the forest (ibid: 11).
Literacy in 100 Aker Wood thus plays a crucial part in the mechanism of colonisation of 
space encircling it within walls, locking “resources” behind doors, and constitutes a grave, 
invisible and symbolic, yet real barrier to freedom. It provides its holder with agency over 
others, but it does not allow the agent to be free of domination or subordination—after all,  
Christopher Robin moves out to school where he is going to be domesticated himself, he 
is not moving out to do as he pleases. Literacy permanently confines the characters to the 
circumscribed and domesticated space of the Wood, and the only ticket out of that world is 
belonging to the category of “humanity” and  the possession of “literacy”. Again, falling 
in the trap of a vicious circle, the human agent can leave that world to go away to school 
only to be taught, domesticated, and civilised, which brings an end to his own agency over 
his imaginary world. In this respect, Christopher Robin's agency and control of literacy 
(i.e.  grammar  as  rules  and  laws)  are  directly  related  to  the  control  of  space  and  his 
subjects, and this power over their very existence—they are, after all, figments of his will 
and imagination—and over his dominion is  the great impediment to the self-realisation 
and free movement of the rest of the inhabitants of the Wood, a world that is destined to 
end as he grows out of this “temporary” phase, known as childhood, and enters the real 
world of domestication.
The  hierarchical,  Christian  and  monarchist  structure  of  the  100  Aker  Wood  is 
further  inscribed  into  the metanarrative by the  omniscient  narrator  –  the literary and 
concomitantly  real-life  father  of  the  human  son  who  reigns  in  this  kingdom. 
127
Notwithstanding the fact that Milne challenges the confines of adult language by playing 
with concepts and turning their meaning upside-down, the larger civilised metadiscourse 
remains intact:  the academy headed by Christopher  Robin still  seals  the final,  even if 
random, meaning of names, places, and “facts”.
For instance, the residents of the Wood value “knowledge” and “studiousness”, yet 
the “expotition” to find the “North Pole” in  chapter VIII of the first book exposes the 
vulnerability of terms and the rules that structure the meaning of referents and references. 
Christopher Robin and his “scientific crew” embark on a scientific journey to discover the 
North Pole. Winnie-the-Pooh, the scientist in this case, finds a pole; Christopher Robin, 
the authority,  the “academy”, sticks it  into a spot in the ground, marks the stick as the 
“North Pole”, and finally holds a ceremony to honour Winnie. Thus, the team succeeds in 
making  a  “scientific  discovery”.  Their  scientific  proceeding  follows  the  logical 
prescriptions, the methodology, and the authorisation process used in “real” science, even 
though we might laugh or shake our heads in disbelief, because we “all” “already” “know” 
that this “North Pole” is not the “scientific” referent on the map and that the classification, 
categorisation, usage and the referents are different from “real science”. 
Nonetheless, we know that the rules, meaning, and terms of “real science”, too, are 
arbitrary and that the process by which knowledge is constructed, authority identified, and 
deviance  and  conformity  structured,  is  an  exercise  in  the  ordering  of  chaos  through 
specific domesticated logic that curbs imagination and controls the analysis of the “data” 
at the basis of arguments, imperatives, contentions, demonstrations, et al. The grammar of 
the scientific language hinges on the logical links such as hence, therefore, because, thus, 
etc.  since they contain  the premise of permanent,  natural laws.  A random example of 
social fears of the past: “if a boy wears frills as a child, he will grow up liking dresses as a 
man”.  This  sentence  contains  a  generalised  assumption,  a  direction  and  a  recipe  for 
control: “if something comes from that source, it turns into that and if you want to avoid it, 
you should refrain from doing so”.  Needless to say,  in  both the fictional world of the 
Wood and our “real” world, science is an exercise in power, and this power names, orders, 
commissions  its  “scientific  discoveries”  as  well  as  bestows  awards,  condones,  and 
punishes and imposes logical links.
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In  a  civilised  system where  domestication is  the  end,  the  concept  of  rewards 
depends on an existent system of punishment. This system demonstrates that when one is 
chosen for an award, it  is because others have not received such acknowledgement. The 
very nature of a pyramidal hierarchy dictates that few people receive awards and hence 
more people get punished rather than rewarded. This contrast between winners and losers 
is a necessary part of punitive logic that implies that if the winner deserves the rewards 
because she has done well, then the loser must have not done as well and deserves to be 
left  with  nothing.  The system of awards  breeds envy and  competition – precisely  the 
behaviour of the dwellers of the 100 Aker Wood who constantly check themselves against 
each other and compare who has more or less brains,  longer words,  more information, 
better food.
For instance, in chapter X “In which Christopher Robin Gives Pooh a Party, and 
We Say Good-bye”, Christopher Robin calls  for “a special sort of party” (Milne,  1992 
[1954]: 149). When “they had all nearly eaten enough, Christopher Robin banged on the 
table with his spoon and everybody stopped talking and was very silent... 'This party,' said 
Christopher Robin, 'is a party because of what someone did, and we all know who it was, 
and it's his party, because of what he did, and I've got a present for him and here it  is'” 
(ibid, 155). Everyone is supposed to “know” the meaning of Christopher Robin’s words. 
Indeed,  almost  everyone  does,  except  for  usually  melancholy  Eeyore,  who  for  once 
exhibits optimism and confidence, because he thinks that the speech is meant for him and 
that at last he is receiving recognition. He even gives a speech of “modesty”, “gratitude” 
and “acceptance” only to be ridiculed and brushed aside “because it's  because of what 
Pooh did when he did what he did to save Piglet from the flood” (ibid, 149).
In this scene, Christopher Robin summons, announces and rewards in the best of 
authoritarian  traditions.  He  rewards  the  one  he deems  deserving  and  deprives  the 
undeserving,  regardless  of  whether  the  “undeserving”  Eeyore  believes  himself  to  be 
deserving or not. Other characters support Christopher Robin's preference for Pooh over 
Eeyore thereby confirming his power and authority and supporting the social order and 
“knowledge” of what is appropriate, good, and rewardable behaviour, of which character 
deserves distinction and who merits disdain – i.e., enacting the definitions and knowledge 
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of  what  is  categorised  as  normal  and  acceptable  and  what  is  delineated  as  deviant, 
abnormal, and unacceptable. 
Legal terminology defines crime  as “any act that is “legally” designated as such 
and  is  prohibited  by  law”  (in  Pozdnjakov,  2001:  33,  translation  mine).  However,  as 
Pozdnjakov  and  others  have  noted,  the  philosophical  considerations  of  crime  cannot 
ignore the social context and the hierarchical imposition of the criteria that would define 
one act as deviant and another similar act as not. As Pozdnjakov puts it: “crime has been 
born with the social human being and is characteristic only of the  social human being” 
(ibid: 11, italics and translation mine). He connects the concept of crime to civilisation and 
states  that  correction  and,  inadvertently,  punishment  constitute  some  of  the  most 
fundamental civilised features. In a similar vein,  The dictionary of philosophy edited by 
Flew defines “punishment” as follows:
The word in its full and central sense may be defined as the intentional infliction by 
some authority upon an offender, of some penalty intended to be disagreeable, for 
some offence against rules authorized by that authority. The references to intention 
and to an authority are both essential.
...What  is  philosophically  controversial  is  not  so  much  the  definition  of  the  word 
'punishment' but the justification of the institution. Should it be in terms of deterrence, 
retribution, reparation, or reform? (Flew, 1984: 293).
Even  if  Flew  does  not  question  the  definition  of  punishment  and  believes  that  the 
institution,  whose  justification  he  admits  to  be  controversial,  is  related  neither  to  the 
definition nor to the authority which is “essential”, in his words, he nevertheless identifies 
the ontological problem of the institution itself: what is the foundation of its existence? 
What is the knowledge that it  takes for granted about permanence and temporariness of 
acts, motivations, desires? How do we identify the authority in this system of relations and 
why is this authority above the “normal” and the “deviant”? Finally,  Flew identifies the 
link  between  the  goal  to  “reform”  individuals  according  to  the  definitions  of  this 
“authority” by means of pain.
In this light,  depriving Eyore of the award implies punishment:  the decision is  
made by an authority, Christopher Robin himself, and it works as a deterrent of undesired 
behaviour (nagging, pessimism, slowness of thought and action, lack of participation in 
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“discovering the North pole”,  etc.) as well as it  is intended to foster desired behaviour 
(activity,  satisfaction,  and support  of Christopher  Robin's  initiatives)  in  Eyore and the 
society at large. Eyore’s expression of pain and discomfort is blamed on his nature. In the 
psychiatric terminology of our “real” world, he would have been diagnosed with “manic 
depression”,  “dyslexia”,  “serotonin  imbalance”,  et  al.,  and  would  be  medicated,  even 
hospitalised and controlled.
As discussed earlier in Foucault's study of the birth of the clinic and in Nosov's 
depiction of the gendered and vagrant marginals in Greenville Town, marginalisation is a 
construct  with  far  reaching  social  repercussions,  and,  in  the  100  Aker  Wood,  Eeyore 
personifies that marginal.  He lives on the outskirts, feels lonely among the self-centred 
inhabitants  of  the  Wood,  and  is  depressed  in  the  hopelessness  of  that  sterile  and 
claustrophobic world. Laughing at Eeyore inscribes this marginalisation and even bullying 
(picking on and laughing at him) within the system of civilised knowledge that outlaws 
courtyard bullying at school, while legitimising it in institutions through grades and other 
policing tactics. Here, bullying relationships form the foundation of civilised institutions 
and are permissible as long as bullying is practised within the framework of the institution 
and its hierarchy. What defines acts as deviant or normal, hence, is not whether they cause 
pain or harm but whether the one who commits them is denied the “right” to hurt or is 
authorised by the institution to intentionally inflict pain, even if “only” the emotional pain 
of disappointment.
Furthermore, the order of 100 Aker Wood reflects the author's cultural context. The 
British  Common Law has  provided  the  model  for  the  laws  of Commonwealth62,  e.g. 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, including the U.S. This law is based on the “rule of 
precedent”,  which  institutes  the  historically  established  authority  as  rule  and  justice 
thereby revealing the historicist nature of its law. This “method” of writing the law creates 
a  “body”  of  “knowledge”  or  “information”  that  contains  and  in  itself  depends  on 
historicity and on the already established solutions worked out through the struggle for 
62 This  also  applies  to  some  extent  to  the  African  countries  who,  after  de-colonisation  have adopted 
European political, economic, and legal structures, for example, Kenya. However, like Canada, they have 
parallel systems of legislatures. In Quebec, for  instance, the major  referent is the Civil code of Quebec, 
based on the French legal system, while the Common Law of Canada is secondary.
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power and control over definitions: namely, the outcome that has been decided once and 
accepted by authority becomes the rule  and the law that defines subsequent  behaviour 
thereby guaranteeing the  status quo of civilised resolution of conflict. It is  this lack of 
flexibility  of  the  legal  structure  that  renders civilised  spaces  sterile  and  asphyxiating. 
Eyore's  depression,  therefore,  reflects  the  reaction of the  millions  of people,  whether 
medicated  or  not,  who  suffer  from such  a  feeling  of  entrapment  in  civilised  social 
structures.
Outside of civilisation, however, definitions are neither universal nor static. On the 
one hand, definitions and categorisation depend on one's personal life-stance; on the other, 
in  a  civilised context,  they are a  key to  the struggle  of power.  Being  battled  for  and 
battling,  they are imposed by those who have the authority to inflict  their  interests on 
others.  What  ultimately determines meaning then is  the view of human nature and the 
reasons for the existence of the world. This knowledge then informs the choices that any 
given society makes with regard to whether it  institutionalises education and punishment 
or whether it trusts its members' nature and simply lets them be.
In literature, just as in life, the way characters deal with deviance, then, stems from 
the  narratives  that  structure  civilised  ontologies  into  their  epistemological  and 
anthropological conception of their own nature and the nature of their world and their 
relationships: They might be selective in their reaction to it, as is Piglet when scorning 
Eyore's deviance (melancholia and social awkwardness) yet ignoring Winnie the Pooh's 
earnest and honest avarice. Or, they might choose either to punish it or to work together to 
awaken the “conscience” of Dunno as the girl-mites do in Greenville Town; or yet they 
might disregard difference and just live as do the blithe dwellers of the Moomin Valley.
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Chapter  10:  The  Semi-Wild,  Semi-Civilised  Justice  of  Mites: 
Kropotkin as Predecessor of Foucault
In  contrast  to  the  civilised  and  Commonwealth  definition  of  crime,  Errico 
Malatesta, the Italian anarchist thinker, proposes an alternative definition:
Naturally the crimes we are talking about are anti-social acts. That is those which offend 
human feelings and which infringe the right of others to equality in freedom, and not the 
many actions which the penal code punishes simply because they offend against the 
privileges of the dominant classes. 
Crime,  in  our  opinion,  is  any  action  which  tends  to  consciously  increase  human 
suffering,  it  is  the  violation of  the  right  of  all  to equal  freedom and to the  greatest 
possible enjoyment of material and moral well-being (Malatesta, 1984).
Malatesta's definition of crime identifies the well-being of each and every creature as the 
centre  of  focus  in  conceptualising  justice,  society,  nature  and  the  world.  From this 
perspective, the intentional infliction of pain by Christopher Robin or by a judge issuing 
the verdict “guilty” – for instance, such as in the classical example immortalised by Victor 
Hugo in Les Miserables, where a man gets punished for stealing bread to feed his family – 
both verdicts of “guilty” equally constitute crime and, from Malatesta's perspective, the 
authority required by Flew and exercised by Christopher Robin is criminal.
Nosov's  trilogy,  for  instance,  delineates  crime  and  punishment  as  complex 
phenomena that transpire on both the vast social and the deep personal levels. In Dunno's 
universe, crime can occur only in a social context since it  involves hurting someone else 
and punishment is a product of hierarchical relations of power with others. Learning and 
correction of acts that may have caused pain to others are deeply personal events that can 
take place only in the depth of one’s conscience. Help from outsiders, including those who 
are  hurt  by the  “crime”,  can be  effective  only through empathy and  kindness,  never 
through pain inflicted for  the purpose of punishment  or revenge.  This position further 
reflects Nosov's creative projection of Kropotkin's work on Russian and French prisons 
(2002), in which Kropotkin calls for reforming – not the conditions of the prisons – but  
eradicating the root causes that create the need to steal from others and the “curing” of 
greed. In other words, individuals possessing or craving power and symbolic and material 
wealth must be cured from these afflictions in contrast to the reverse capitalist stance that 
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holds that it is the poor and disenfranchised who must be medicated or even hospitalised 
or otherwise incarcerated and improved.
In the second book, Dunno travels to the Sunny City, where mites have discovered 
the bliss of industry and technology and which, at first glance, appears to be a utopia come 
true. On a closer look, however, no matter how well intentioned the inhabitants of Sunny 
City's may be, their society is ordered by police who have prisons and therefore crime, the 
two concomitants of complex, hierarchical city structures. Along with the title’s reference 
to Campanella’s totalitarian utopia The City of the Sun, the extensive space allotted to the 
discussion of crime and punishment  renders Nosov’s trilogy a sophisticated critique of 
both communist and capitalist systems.
When Dunno finds himself detained in Sunny City's police cell, his response to this 
aspect of civilisation is to destroy the prison with his magic wand: “I want the police walls 
to collapse, and that I get unharmed to freedom63” (Nosov, 1984: 122). Dunno knows that 
he can wish for anything and his wand will make it come true, hence, the formulation of 
his wish is significant. He could have simply asked to be taken out of jail, to open the 
window, or whatever else. Yet, he wishes for the prison to collapse. Many revolutionaries 
(remember those who stormed the Bastille), including Peter Kropotkin, have called for the 
abolition of prisons:
The  prison  does  not  prevent  anti-social  acts  from  taking  place.  It  increases  their 
numbers. It does not improve those who enter its walls. However it is reformed it will 
always remain a place of restraint, an artificial environment,  like a monastery,  which 
will make the prisoner less and less fit for life in the community. It does not achieve its 
end. It  degrades society.  It  must disappear.  It  is  a survival of  barbarism mixed with 
Jesuitical philanthropy.
The first duty of the revolution will be to abolish prisons,--those monuments of human 
hypocrisy and cowardice (Kropotkin, 2002: 235).
In this book, Nosov dedicates a whole chapter to Dunno's discovery of conscience and 
then several subsequent chapters to his debates with her64 and then several more to her 
growth and development as her voice becomes stronger, louder, and more confident. There 
are also several chapters depicting Dunno's encounters with the local police, who punish 
63 “Хочу, чтоб стены милиции рухнули и я невредимый выбрался на свободу!” (Носов, 1984: 122).
64 In Russian, conscience is feminine gender, which adds depth to the nuances in his debates with the 
deepest, feminine side of himself.
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him in an attempt to correct, ironically, not his real wrong but what they deemed as wrong; 
while the real wrong, which is  what has caused the suffering of another mite and three 
donkeys, can be “punished” only by Dunno's conscience, since, after all, no-one even sees 
his naughty trick with the magic wand that turns a boy into an ass and the three donkeys 
into boys. In this trilogy, discipline and punishment, whether carried out in the hospital or 
in prison, are presented as useless and even harmful. In the words of Kropotkin:
It is not insane asylums that must be built instead of prisons. Such an execrable idea is 
far from my mind. The insane asylum is always a prison. Far from my mind also is the 
idea,  launched from time to time by the philanthropists,  that the  prison be kept  but 
entrusted to physicians and teachers. What prisoners have not found today in society is a 
helping hand, simple and friendly, which would aid them from childhood to develop the 
higher faculties of their minds and souls... (Kropotkin, 2002: 233).
Once again,  the anarcho-communist  position of Nosov, Kropotkin,  and Malatesta is  an 
attempt to negotiate a middle ground between the paradigm of civilisation – with its drive 
for colonisation, education, ignorance, apathy, and with its systemic infliction of pain – 
and the total freedom of wilderness – with its trust, multiplicity, and chaos. Seen from the 
position of this middle ground, literacy, when not imposed, can inscribe itself into chaos. 
Learning and other matters of social life that raise the questions of justice and harmony are 
also approached here from the position of empathy and wildness. Albeit, one issue remains 
unresolved, which I tackle in the third part of this work, namely, the unquestioned ethic of 
work and the nature of technology. In the meantime, for contrast, I turn to how Jansson 
treats these questions in her Moominworld.
Chapter  11:   Wild  Stories,  Wild  Justices—Anarcho-Primitivism in  
Moominland
Domesticated narratives organise the schemes for crime and deviance by means of 
“logical” or “rational” linkages. For, in order to “correct” or “punish” certain behaviour, it  
first  needs  to  be  denominated,  circumscribed,  defined,  and  then  disciplined.  The 
knowledge derived through such disciplines then establishes logical sequences between 
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acts and results,  such as: between the correctional methods, the acts of deviance,  their 
results  and  finally,  the  results  of  the  correction  itself.  Reflecting  the  premises  and 
observations in Peter Kropotkin's studies on prisons,  evolution, wilderness, cooperation, 
and civilisation, Nikolai Nosov has envisioned alternatives to civilised and capitalist ways 
of relating to the world. A.A. Milne's work stands in stark contrast to Nosov's as it projects 
a sterile  world locked in  domesticated logic,  a world that  is  “logical” and linear in  its 
“graduation” from childhood to adulthood, from agency to education, and from freedom to 
responsibilities. Conversely, stories told from a non-domesticated perspective may or may 
not have a point, a chronological order, or even a “main” character or “hero”. Namely, 
someone's  desire  to  tell  a  story or  notion that  some  event  was  interesting  constitutes 
enough reason to  tell  the  story.  Truth value,  morals,  or  chronology do  not  occupy a 
prominent place here.
Hence,  some  oral  tales  may  propose  patterns  of  punishment  and  reward  (the 
example of the abused step-daughter getting rewards and the pampered daughter getting 
punished)65 while  other tales such as the north Russian tale about a woman wanting to 
taste a female bear's foot does not seem to have any “logic” except for the narration of a 
series of events that have no “direction” or “aim” or “purpose”. There is no “why”, no 
“because”, no “therefore”, no punishment and no reward in that type of tale. Here is an 
example of a Russian folk tale from the north:
A man was walking to Njonosku, on the bridge... he saw a she-devil rambling: “Dress to 
impress  I  had;  everything  was  taken  away;  but  today,  into  the  water  I  probe  in  a 
fashionable German robe, all bright, and with a haircut short and never will I emerge 
again, and never will show my voice”66.
The above is  a  story.  It  is  not  a  narrative.  But,  the cacophony of tales comprising the 
volumes  of this  collection by Onchukov  point  to  the  folk  narratives  of  the  Northern 
peoples  of  Russia.  In  other  words,  the  wild  narrative  contains  stories,  points, 
contradictions, aimlessness, logic and lack of it, among endless possibilities, all of which 
fuse into the larger picture of the multiplicity of meaning.
65  These tales abound throughout the world. For samples and a discussion of punishment/reward tales see 
the chapter by Rina Drory (1977): “Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves: An Attempt at a Model  for  the 
Narrative Structure of the Reward-and-Punishment Fairy Tale”.
66 Translation  mine;  for  more  examples,  see  the  complete  collection  of  Russian  Northern  Tales  by 
Onchukov (1998).
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Moominbooks too provide pieces for the larger narratives of wilderness. In this 
world,  language  can  happen,  but  then  an  event  or  a  series  of  scenes  can show that  
communication  is  more  effective  without  it.  For  instance,  in  the  eighth  book, 
Moominpappa at Sea, the family spends days on end on a solitary island without speaking 
with each other. Because they spend most of their time in silence and each with his or her 
own self, they explore their own souls, discover their own secrets, and we learn about their 
lives through their  thoughts,  experiences,  and actions.  In the moominworld,  literacy is 
present, but no-one cares about it. When someone decides she needs it, she learns it. For 
instance,  Moominpappa  who  grew  up  in  an  orphanage  learnt  how  to  write  books, 
memoirs, and rhymed tragedies all by himself by simply doing it. Presence can happen in 
absence and vice versa. Schools and prisons, Snufkin shows us, must be brought down, 
burnt and abolished. In other words, there is no linear plot, no dependence on systems or 
signs and no promises of predictability and order.
A scene  from the  first  moominbook  illustrates  how Jansson  uses  language  to 
project  a  non-linear  narrative.  Here,  a  great  marsh  serpent  pursues  Moominmamma, 
Moomintroll and Sniff. A tiny girl dwelt in the flower that Moominmamma was carrying 
to light the way through the dark forest. As the Serpent was nearing, she suddenly lit up. 
Blinded, the Serpent falls into the marshes and the moomins are saved. In describing this 
scene, Jansson omits causal conjugations and thus presents the serpent's cessation of the 
pursuit and their saving as a singular event.
Something very remarkable had happened. Their tulip was glowing again; it had opened 
all its petals and in the midst of them stood a girl with bright blue hair that reached all 
the way down to her feet.
Brighter  and brighter  glowed the  tulip.  The Serpent began to blink,  and suddenly it 
turned right round with an angry hissing and slid down into the mud (Jansson, 1946: 3).
By means of a sequence of images, Jansson offers a path to harmony through randomness. 
Yet, this harmony is not the “logical” predictability of a controlled reality and time, for 
logical and causal conjugations are absent  in  the descriptions which would have been 
needed to draw a rule that could have been applied to other situations. In this story we 
simply learn that things happen and creatures make sense of them as they come along. 
Since  manifestations  are  never  the  same,  categorisation,  although helpful  at  times,  is 
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questionable and does not allow us to draw the conclusion that “if this time it worked to 
have a glowing tulip girl to stop the serpent, it should also work in the future”, since the 
future will consist of another set of unique circumstances and variables of chaos that will 
probably require new solutions as the participants tune into its melody. We may, therefore, 
assume that the Serpent has stopped following the Moomintrolls  because the girl in the 
tulip blinded it  but we cannot do so with certainty since the author does not provide us 
with  the  logical  link  that  excludes  other  possibilities  in  interpreting  the  causal 
relationships  in  this  scene,  such  as:  because a  girl  glowed  brightly,  the  serpent  was 
blinded; and when serpents are blinded, they stop their pursuit; hence, if we want to end a 
serpent’s or some other dangerous pursuit, then we should get a glowing girl. By omitting 
these logical links, Jansson does not allow us to make rules, since the absence of 'because' 
leaves space for  other  possible  factors in  the serpent's  ceasing the chase  –  such as it 
rationally or irrationally changed its mind, got tired, distracted, got overcome by magic, or 
whatever else.  The author describes only what happened  then and  there,  which may or 
may not work again.
Yet, even if we can not draw a rule out of the events, the moments described in the 
moominbooks usually work out smoothly revealing the author's trust in the harmony of 
universal chaos in which our world is but a speck among milliards of other specks.  As 
Comet  in  Moominland tells  us,  some  stars  are harmonious,  some  threaten the cosmic 
order, but still in the end, everything works out in favour of life.  And, most  important, 
everyone, including human animals, is also a star.
“Stars!” [Snufkin] exclaimed. “... Stars are my favourite things. I always like and look at 
them before I go to sleep, and wonder who is on them and how one could get there. The 
sky looks so friendly with all those little eyes twinkling in it.”
“The  star  we're  looking  for  isn't  so  very  friendly,”  said  Moomintroll.  “Quite  the 
contrary, in fact.”
“... And then I asked pappa if comets were dangerous,” he went on, “and pappa said that 
they were. That they rushed about like mad things in the black empty space beyond the 
sky trailing a flaming tail behind them. All the other stars keep to their courses, and go 
along just like trains on their rails, but comets can go absolutely anywhere; they pop up 
here and there wherever you least expect them.”
“Like me,” said Snufkin, laughing. “They must be sky-tramps!” (Jansson, 1959: 56-57).
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The inability to establish causal relationships in the first example expresses the cosmic 
principle of surprise also  present  in  the tales of the gatherer nomads that  often depict  
encounters between predators and prey67, all of whom exist for their own purpose. These 
encounters are singular, and each time they must negotiate anew the terms of co-existence, 
cooperation, strife, empathy, threat, and love in an unpredictable harmony of the balance 
of life. 
Jansson's treatment of literacy, schooling, prison, and justice is consistent with the 
anarchist  perspective.  For  instance,  Mymble's  daughter  explains  about  monarchy, 
citizenship, meaning, writing and words:
“Tell me,” said the Joxter, “why are all these walls here? Are you shutting people in or 
out?”
“Oh, they have no special meaning,” answered the Mymble’s daughter. “The subjects 
think it’s fun to build them, because then you can take your food along with you and 
have a picnic. My maternal uncle has built ten miles of them! You’d be surprised at my 
uncle,” she continued happily. “He studies letters and words from all sides and likes to 
walk around them until he’s quite sure of them. It takes him hours and hours to do the 
longest words!”
“Like ‘otolaryngologist,’” said the Joxter.
“Or ‘kalospinterochromatokrene,’” I said68 (Jansson, 1994: 86-87).
What triggers the discussion is Joxter's question: walls are built to either shut someone in 
or out; and where there are walls, there are monarchs; and where there are monarchs there 
is  discrimination  (shutting  some  people  out),  incarceration  (shutting  others  in),  and 
hierarchy.  The  deeply  insightful  Mymble's  daughter,  despite  being  an  untrustworthy 
source on the truth of things with her rich, playful imagination, explains that walls and 
words have no special meaning unless one decides to heed their power and the authority of 
those who impose their  meaning (such as a king).  Obedience and belief can prevent  a 
67 I analyse the Inuit tales more thoroughly in the second part of this research, where humans do not always 
appear to be winners and the outcome of negotiations with both prey and predators is never certain.
68 Hördu, sade Joxaren. Varför har ni byggt de här murarna. Stänger ni in nån eller blir man utestängd?
Äsch, inte är det nån mening med dem, svarade Mymlans dotter. Undersåtarna tycker det 
är roligt att bygga murar för då kan man ta maten med sig och göra en utfärd… Min morbror har byggt  
sjutton kilometer! Ni skulle bli förvånade over min morbror, fortsatte hon glatt. Han studerar alla bokstäver 
och alla ord framifrån och bakifrån och går runt omkring dem tills han är alldeles säker på var han har dem. 
Om de är mycket långa och krångliga kan det ta timmar för honom!
Till exempel gargolozymdontolog, föreslog Joxaren.
Eller antifilifrenskonsumtion, sade jag (Jansson,  1968b: 94).
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person from movement, entropy and play,  but reality dwells in the joy of transcending 
these barriers and not  in  obeying  their  laws and random meaning,  Mymble's  daughter 
explains, and then takes the Joxter and his companions to the great feast of the greatest 
joker:  the  King.  Furthermore,  the  moominnarrative  reflects  Pozdnjakov's  definition of 
crime  as  social  construct,  namely,  in  the  absence  of  oppressive  structures,  including 
money, there can be no crime and hence no one can be locked in and nothing can be stolen 
if it is there for all who need it. Diversity of desires ensures that not everyone will need the 
same thing and of course, if one really needs something, one can make it.
Jansson’s anti-capitalist  position eliminates the notions of crime and punishment 
on all levels, including the parental: for example, the author repeats throughout the books 
that Moominmamma never punishes her children – the underlying assumption being that 
all creatures yearn for harmony and do not need the fear of punishment for guidance. On 
an economic  level,  the following  scene  depicting  a “commercial”  interaction between 
Moomintroll and friends with a tiny old lady, owner of a store from her second book, 
Comet  in  Moominland illustrates  the  underlying  premises  of  exchange  in  social 
relationships in Moominvalley as based on need and not on price and profit.
In  the  store,  Moomintroll  and  Snork  Maiden  exchanged  gifts,  Sniff  drank 
lemonade and Snork got a notebook to make notes for the group, while Snufkin tried on 
some trousers but declined to take them because they were too new. Finally, the moment 
has come to pay.
None of them even had pockets except for Snufkin, and his were always empty. ... Not 
one of them had a single penny!
“That'll be 40 pence for the exercise book, and 34 pence for the lemonade,” said the old 
lady. “The star is 3 marks and the looking-glass 5 because it has real rubies on the back. 
That will be 8 marks and 74 pence altogether”. Nobody said anything [they began to put 
back the things on the counter, except for Sniff who had vomited his lemonade].
The old lady gave a little cough.
“Well, now, my children,” she said. “There are the old trousers that Snufkin didn't want; 
they are exactly 8 marks, so you see one cancels out the other, and you don't really owe 
me anything at all.” (Jansson, 1959: 122).
After debating among themselves whether that was correct, the old lady realized that she 
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“still owed” them 74 pence and gave them lollipops. 
The “commercial” exchange that takes place here is not one of “accumulation” or 
of  pre-set  and  fixed  prices,  rather  it  transpires  according  to  the  anarchist-communist 
slogan of “each according to her needs”: Moomintroll and Snork Maiden needed to give 
each other gifts (in this case valuables, such as rubies, are precious because they are gifts 
and  the  old-shop-owner  gives  them  away  to  facilitate  the  relationship  of  mutuality 
between Moomintroll and Snork Maiden), Sniff needed to drink, Snork needed a notebook 
to  record  tactics  to  avoid  the  impeding  disaster,  and  Snufkin  did  not  need  anything 
because, as he often says, “possessions are dangerous”. 
Here, ideal, material and other possessions are relative concepts that are exchanged 
outside the symbolic and monetary dimensions: Snork’s material notebook is important for 
jotting down ideas of how to evade the comet and, even if the others do not share his 
belief, no one argues with him and they let him have his notebook. The shop owner even 
sacrifices one from her store, although, it is obvious that it is not Snork’s notes, i.e. not his 
“ideal  production”,  that  is  going  to  save  them,  but  some  miracle  beyond  their 
comprehension or control.  Yet,  in  some mysterious way,  this notebook with the jotted 
down ideas do help Snork himself, perhaps by making him at peace with himself and his 
surroundings thus inscribing him into the general harmony.  Snork needs literacy and it 
helps him. But it is not indispensable for the rest of the group and in this way, Snork can 
neither become the sole monopolist of the “right” knowledge or ideas; nor can he become 
an entrepreneur, who possesses the rights and the means to the production of ideal capital 
by  hindering  the  access  of  others;  rather,  he  facilitates  it.  In  the  non-capitalist 
moominworld,  even Snork is  forced to share his list  of ideas,  which have no power to 
force relationships of dependence upon the group. Most important, despite  the relative 
value of the products themselves,  the effort, role and the existence of each character is 
esteemed.  Even the annoying and pestering  hemulens are not  only dealt  with but  also 
aided and adopted. In moominworld, therefore, there can be no crime, no theft because the 
notion itself of property and monetary exchange has been eliminated from the very basis 
of its life-stance. Only the hemulens69 are capable of coming up with such an absurdity as 
69 Hemulen is also a derogatory slang word for authority in Swedish (Bertills, 2003).
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a prison. In the  Moominsummer Madness (Farlig Midsommar), since the hemulens run 
both  facilities,  Jansson  establishes  a  connection  between  kindergartens  as  children’s 
institutions  and  imprisonment,  just  as  Nosov  links  the  medical  establishment  with 
incarceration.
Snufkin has several run-ins with police and the hemulens' law prior to this book. 
However, here, the wandering anarchist returns on purpose in order to liberate the children 
kept in a park run by two hemulens and destroy the walls and the forbidding signs. He 
announces his intentions in a song that he plays on his harmonica, while Little My, whom 
he finds in Moominmamma's work basket in the reeds after she has been carried away by 
the waves – just like baby Moses, sings the words: 
All small beasts should have bows in their tails 
Because now the Hemulens are closing the jails 
Whomper'll dance to the moon and rejoice (Jansson, 1955: 79).
After the song, Snufkin announces that he is here to “settle an old account I have with a 
villain!” (ibid: 80). When they arrive at the school fence (all establishments of control, 
exploitation, and incarceration have fences and walls), they find it “was hung with notices 
at  regular  intervals:  ABSOLUTELY  NO  ADMITTANCE”  (ibid:  80)  and  other 
interdictions, such as, “NO SMOKING”, “LAUGHING AND WHISTLING STRICTLY 
PROHIBITED”,  “NO  HOP,  NO  SKIP,  AND  DEFINITELY NO  JUMP ALLOWED 
HERE”, etc. Basically, all normal children's activities, fun and play have been outlawed on 
these grounds, and, as the twenty four woody children sat in the sand-box and stared in 
silence,  Snufkin  enjoyed  tearing  down and  burning  the  signs.  “Little  by little  it  was 
dawning on them that he had come to their rescue. They left the sand-box and gathered 
around him” (ibid: 86).
Snufkin is compared to Moses on several occasions in moominbooks. In this scene, 
the parallel is  even stronger,  for,  just  as the  people  have  gathered around Moses,  the 
criminal and fugitive by Egyptian laws who had killed one of the enslavers and then led 
the Israelites to freedom from the oppression of Egypt, so did the little woody children 
gather around Snufkin,  the outlaw, the criminal by hemulens' laws and standards, who 
tramples their  fences,  burns down their written words of interdiction, and liberates the 
woodies by leading them to the promised land of Moominvalley.
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One day, when Moses had grown up, he went out to his people and looked on their 
burdens; and he saw an Egyptian beating a Hebrew, one of his people. He looked this 
way and that, and seeing no one he killed the Egyptian and hid him in the sand... When 
Pharaoh heard of it, he sought to kill Moses. But Moses fled from Pharaoh, and stayed 
in the land of Mid'ian (Exodus 2:11-15). 
Sunfkin  and  Moses'  rebellious  actions  acquire  different  meaning  depending  on  the 
perspective  with  which  one  approaches  their  interpretation.  From the  perspective  of 
domestication, in a scenario in which both the Israelites and the Egyptians agree that there 
should be a social order, with management of resources, it is normal that there should be 
some individuals designated to control the productivity of others. The question here would 
be  who  should  constitute  the category of the  resources and  who  would  make  up the 
management  and administration. This paradigm would not  work if  everyone wanted to 
become the  boss  or  if  everyone  were  to  constitute  the resources.  If  both groups,  the 
management and the resources, believe that this order is natural, then in this scenario, the 
Israelites would believe that it should be them controlling the order, whereas the Egyptians 
believe  that  it  should be the Egyptians.  Hence,  from the perspective of the Israelites, 
Moses was right to break the Egyptian law and lead them to a land where they could eat  
for free. But from the perspective of the Egyptians, Moses was a criminal who broke the 
law of their civilised society, a law that was there to protect the social order. From the 
perspective of any civilised nation state, the one in a position of power is authorised and 
legitimated by that  same power  and is  therefore the law and  in  the right.  Hence,  the 
Egyptians were legitimated by the authority of their abuse and Moses, the outlaw, should 
have been hunted down, sent to Guantanamo or some other prison or labour facility or 
even worse, like some 21st century examples from Iraq demonstrate, executed.
From the perspective of wilderness, on the other hand, Moses is a righteous and 
courageous rebel, fighting against injustice and domestication, because no one – neither 
the Israelites, nor the Egyptians, nor the horses, nor anyone else – should be exploited and 
oppressed. He is a hero who leads the people from slavery and injustice to a land with no 
civilisation, exploitation, borders, categories of discrimination, or control. Still, in order to 
domesticate this figure, Moses is inscribed in the hierarchy as obeying a higher order than 
the  Egyptian,  namely,  the  divine  order,  whereas  Snufkin  remains  completely 
undomesticated and free.  Both,  however,  can be seen as elements of chaos heeding  a 
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cosmic voice, for Moses the divine will and for Snufkin the divine song.
According to biblical scholar, Christine Hayes, the story of Moses is part of a well-
established literary convention that has already existed, since at least 2300 BCE, in the 
parallel birth story of King Sargon of Akkad. As a baby, his mother places him in a basket 
lined with tar and sets him afloat on the river. Hayes thus places the Exodus story in the 
literary narrative genre (Hayes, 2006) and by drawing a parallel with Moses' birth story, 
Jansson too inscribes her narrative into that tradition. Yet, even though Snufkin leads the 
woodies to the promised moominland, he himself remains  forever a  nomad,  without  a 
father, a home or a land. No one knows how he grew up except that he has always been 
welcome at the moominhome. In this he differs from the biblical narrative which tells that 
“fortune” had decreed that Moses be raised by his own mother even after she abandons 
him, even though, as Hayes points out, the biblical account, too, remains vague about the 
details  of Moses' childhood and  growing up revealing  only that  he  had  developed an 
Israelite identity70 in spite of having grown up in the Pharaoh's court.
Jansson  presents  slightly  more  information  about  Snufkin's  childhood  and 
genealogical narratives that connect creatures, even when casting them asunder and even 
while  Snufkin remains homeless, without any group identity. Like the Bible, particularly 
important are Moominpappa's Memoirs, the healing book that Moominpappa has written 
during  his  illness  and  that  presents  a  genealogical  narrative  for  Snufkin  and  other 
characters,  thereby  healing  Moominpappa  himself  and  the  spirit  of  continuity  and 
community. The  scene  of  the  woodies  surrounding  Snufkin  who  heeds  their  plight 
conjures the image of the prophet gathering his people around him:
Snufkin looked at the silently admiring group that had flocked around his legs.
“As if one weren't enough,” he said. “Well. Come along, then. But don't blame me if 
everything goes wrong!”
And with twenty-four serious little children at his heels Snufkin wandered off over the 
meadows, bleakly wondering what he would do when they got hungry, had wet feet, or a 
stomach-ache (Jansson, 1955: 87).
The responsibility that befalls Snufkin is great and like a father to his people he faces it  
70 Hayes  and  my point  on  identity as  a  necessary tool  for  separating  and  alienating  from  the  group 
constructed to dominate is discussed in the second part of this research.
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stoically and with responsibility. He leads them even if, like Moses and his people, he does 
not know what they will eat. Yet, like Moses, he feeds them as chaos leads them to the 
Fillijonk's house awaiting them with the feast that she had prepared for her uncle who 
never visits anyway.
As Snufkin takes the woodies to freedom after having attacked the institution of 
confinement, the hemulens must punish someone for this crime, and mirroring the events 
in Nosov's  Sunny City, detain the innocent, namely, Moomintroll, Snork Maiden and the 
Fillyjonk who had prepared the feast. A subsequent chapter titled “About tricking jailers” 
is  supported by a later  scene in  the book depicting Snufkin helping them successfully 
escape the pursuit by police, particularly significant since Snufkin has previous experience 
with  escaping  from prisons.  These  scenes  reveal  the  author's  intention  to  depict  the 
arbitrariness  of punishment  and  jail  sentencing.  Evading  incarceration  in  these  books 
offers a possibility for liberation for all from any type of oppression, not intended in the 
classist sense such as projected in the civilised narrative of The Wind in the Willows, where 
only the rich enjoy the luxury and impunity of tricking jailers. In this respect, Nosov's and 
Jansson's positions vis-à-vis the civilised constructs of crime, punishment, and justice are 
almost identical and diagonally opposite to those of Milne.
Jansson's critique of the system of justice and incarceration is not limited to acts of 
rebellion  however.  In  Finn  Family  Moomintroll (1958)  (Trollkarlens  hatt 1948  rev. 
1968c),  the author envisions the possibility for  a court trial transpiring in  an anarcho-
primitivist setting. This is a particularly interesting book in terms of Jansson's treatment of 
the  problem  of  language,  foreigners,  property,  theft,  and  a  judicial  process  and 
demonstrates the extent of her questioning the basic premises of ownership,  crime, and 
justice.
One day, two tiny foreigners with an enormous suitcase appear in Moominvalley. 
Thingumy and Bob speak an incomprehensible language in which the first letters of the 
words are switched. No one can understand these “foreigners”,  the residents complain, 
except for the Hemulen who becomes their interpretor liaison. The Moominfamily extend 
their  usual  hospitality  as  they  do  with  everyone  else  and,  as  always,  respect  the 
newcomers' idiosyncrasies and secrets. One day, for instance, Moominmamma's handbag 
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disappears. It is later discovered serving as a bed to the little funny duo, but they are so 
lovable  and  the  moominfamily  so  forgiving  that,  instead  of  punishing  the  thieves, 
everything ends with the family offering a feast in their honour. However, not everything 
is  rosy and cosy in Moominvalley.  Two frightful characters inhabit that world: the ever 
cold and freezing Groke and the ever tragic and stern Hobgoblin, both of whom are drawn 
to the valley by Thingumy and Bob's mysterious and enormous suitcase. The Groke claims 
that  Thingumy and Bob are thieves and wants her  possession back.  And even though 
nobody knows what the suitcase holds, at first, everyone sides with Thingumy and Bob 
because they are small and cute and the Groke is big and scary. The situation, however, 
turns out to be much more complex than what the characters had initially thought.
“I've  been  talking  to  Thingumy  and  Bob....  It's  their  suitcase  the  Groke  wants,” 
explained the Hemulen.
“What a monster!” burst out Moominmamma. “To steal their small possessions from 
them!”
“Yes, I know,” said the Hemulen, “but there is something that makes the whole thing 
complicated. It seems to be the Groke's suitcase.”
“Hm,”  agreed  Moominmamma.  “That  certainly  makes  the  situation  more  difficult” 
(Jansson, 1958: 132-133).
Snork then decides to hold an improvisational court trial appointing himself as the judge. 
The  nihilist  philosopher  Muskrat  serves  as  the  Prosecutor  for  the  Groke,  but  sleeps 
through the trial as do many famous judges and lawyers around the world, who in many 
cases hand death sentences when they wake up at the end of the trial (recent trial cases 
from Australia  and  the United States have  become particularly notorious according  to 
Asimow and Mader, 2007; Clear et al., 2006; Banner, 2002; inter alios). Sniff “who hadn't 
forgotten that they had called him a silly old mouse” (Jansson, 1958: 133) volunteered to 
be their Prosecutor. The Hemulen chose to be the Counsel for their Defence; the Snork 
Maiden agreed to be the Moomin Family's witness; Snufkin was to take notes concerning 
the proceedings of the Court; and the rest of the residents were the public whose opinions 
and proposed solutions highly mattered.
“Why doesn't the Groke have a Councel for the Defence?” asked Sniff.
“That isn't necessary,” replied the Snork,  “because the Groke is in the right...” (ibid: 
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In other words, the Groke is in the right, but this does not automatically render Thingumy 
and Bob in the wrong, hence the need to establish how to rule or divide the “possession”. 
To complicate things further, it turns out that only the Contents of the suitcase belong to 
the Groke while the suitcase itself belongs to Thingumy and Bob.
“Ha!” said Sniff. “I can well believe that. Now everything is perfectly clear. The Groke 
gets her Contents back and the herring-faces keep their old suitcase.”
It's not clear at all!” cried the Hemulen boldly. “The question is not who is the owner of 
Contents, but who has the greatest  right to the Contents.  The right thing in the right 
place. You saw the Groke, everybody? Now, I ask you, did she look as if she has a right 
to the Contents?” (ibid: 135).
In other words, justice is not about ownership, Jansson's wild narrative tells us, but about 
rights.  However,  how does one know who is  in  the right  and who has the right? The 
Hemulen, being prone to order and stereotyping, evokes the concept of “credibility”: the 
Groke  is  not  likeable  and  hence  cannot  be  credible,  thereby reflecting  the  numerous 
anthropological  studies  and  books  on law that  demonstrate  that  the  economically  and 
socially impoverished African Americans, for instance, are the ones most prone to receive 
the death penalty and other serious sentencing in the United States even when their crimes 
are  less  grave  and  sometimes  they become innocent  victims  of  wrongful  convictions 
(Forer,  1994; Bedeau, 1997; Sarat,  1999; Sarat and Boulanger,  2005;  inter alios).  The 
moominbook characters continue to debate these problems of trust, authority, and rights as 
the trial progresses.  To counterfeit  the Hemulen's  argument  of credibility,  Sniff evokes 
compassion:
“That's true enough,” said Sniff in surprise. “Clever of you, Hemul. But, on the other 
hand, think how lonely the Groke is because nobody likes her, and she hates everybody. 
The Contents is perhaps the only thing she has. Would you now take that away from her 
too—lonely and rejected in the night?” Sniff became more and more affected and his 
voice trembled. “Cheated out of her only possession by Thingumy and Bob” (ibid: 135-
136).
This argument of compassion and extenuating circumstances is  not exclusive to fiction. 
Professor of Law, Peter Fitzpatrick, for instance, makes a similar call in his essay on “how 
law is  decomposed and made inadequate by the death penalty” (in  Sarat,  1999:  131). 
Because the death penalty is final,  it  can not be corrected and the statistics continue to 
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demonstrate that black defendants receive harsher sentences and are discriminated against 
on various levels. Death is not adjustable and “responsive possibility can hardly be made 
available in capital cases. If the evidence were to be allowed cogency in such cases, then 
the black defendant should never be executed. Comparable evidence would serve also to 
exempt people denied equal protection for other reasons,  such as poverty. The outcome 
would be that only people not so discriminated against could be executed” (ibid: 131). In 
other words, this leads to the conclusion that, if there must be a death penalty, then only 
the wealthy should be executed, while the oppressed need understanding and compassion.
Sniff reflects Fitzpatrick's reasoning and argues that compassion should extend to 
all,  particularly to someone who hates everyone and is  not  liked by others.  Seventeen 
years later, in  Moominpappa at Sea, Jansson returns to this theme of the Groke needing 
compassion to heal, which I discuss in the second part of my research, and, once again, in 
this, the moomintrolls reflect the position of Dunno correcting himself because the girls 
embraced him with forgiveness and understanding. In addition, Jansson raises the question 
of  bias,  as  the  Moomin  Family's  witness,  the  Snork  Maiden,  states  that  “We  like 
Thingumy and Bob very much” and “We disapproved of the Groke from the beginning. 
It's a pity if she must have her Contents back” (ibid: 136). Yet, they agree that they must 
overcome their biases and solve the problem for the satisfaction of all. At this point, in 
order to understand who needs the Contents the most, they ask Thingumy and Bob to 
reveal what is in the suitcase.
Thingumy and Bob whispered something again. The Hemulen nodded. “It's a secret,” he 
said. “Thingumy and Bob think the Contents is the most beautiful thing in the world, but 
the Groke just thinks it's the most expensive.”
The Snork nodded many times and wrinkled his forehead. “This is a difficult case,” he 
said. “Thingumy and Bob have reasoned correctly, but they have acted wrongly. Right is 
right. I must think” (ibid: 136-137).
As Snork and the others reflect on the problem of the contradictions between reasoning 
and acting and on whether it is the emotional value that gives the right to hold a thing or 
whether it is the “market” value, the Groke appears and Snork decides to solve the matter 
in favour of both needs: the Groke's for price and Thingumy and Bob's for attachment.
“Stop, Groke!”  said the Snork....  “Will you agree to Thingumy and Bob buying the 
Contents of the suitcase? And if so what is your price?”
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“High,” said the Groke in an icy voice (ibid: 137).
But because this is  a non-capitalist,  and non-commercial world, rather a community of 
mutual aid and cooperation, then the Groke is allowed to decide what is satisfactory for 
her in this exchange, with everyone entering into negotiations with her and offering to 
chip  in  for  Thingumy and  Bob.  The  trial  here  is  not  about  finding  one  wrong  and 
correcting it through punishment while absolving the other. Jansson's notion of justice is 
that conflict can only be resolved with all parties satisfying their needs, which are different 
and must – and can – be all reckoned with. Only when everyone responds can there be 
justice.
“Would my gold mountain on the Hattifatteners' Island be enough?” asked the Snork.
“No,” answered the Groke as icily as before....
“Here is the most valuable thing in the whole of Moomin Valley, Groke! Do you know 
what has grown out of this hat? Raspberry juice and fruit trees, and the most beautiful 
little self-propelling clouds: the only Hobgoblin's Hat in the world!”
“Show!” said the Groke scornfully.
Then Moominmamma laid a few cherries in the hat... When the Groke looked into the 
hat a handful of red rubies lay there....
The Groke looked at the hat. Then she looked at Thingumy and Bob. Then she looked at 
the hat again. You could see that she was thinking with all her might. Then suddenly she 
snatched the hat and, without a word, slithered like an icy grey shadow into the forest 
(ibid: 138-139).
In  this  way,  throughout  the  nine  moominnovels,  Jansson  tackles  the  interconnections 
between desires,  which motivate actions, language, literacy, borders and walls,  and the 
questions of freedom and oppression. Here,  freedom entails  liberating individuals from 
dogma,  sterility  and  the  calculated  predictability  of  the  mundane  personified  by  the 
nagging  hemulens,  those  pedantic  bureaucrats  obsessed  with  order:  they run schools, 
prisons, orphanages, and other institutions of oppression. Still, regardless of the hemulens' 
compulsive  need for  order,  they are capable  of tuning into  the moomin chaos and the 
moomins are friendly towards them even when they are most annoying and adopt them 
when they need a home, kindness, or a breeze of unreason (such as depicted in the last 
book). The hemulens come to them even as they suffer from all the explosive creativity 
149
and diversity,  for, like everyone else, they need this love,  openness, and sharing which 
brings them solace and healing. 
Therefore, Moominvalley has no place for hospitals or doctors. If anyone feels ill,  
Moominmamma  helps  heal  by  offering  acceptance,  care  and  warm  onion  soup. 
Moominpappa cures  himself  by writing  memoirs  that  provide  a  narrative of strength, 
continuation through genealogy, and community. The invisible child, Ninny, for instance, 
“who has faded away from sight because she had been 'frightened the wrong way by a 
lady who had taken care of her without really liking her,' the icily ironical kind” [sic] who 
ridiculed instead of scolded” (Huse in Milner and Milner, 1987: 137-8). Moominmamma 
refuses to take her to the doctor, instead, cures Ninny's invisibility by offering her own 
presence, love and acceptance. Healthcare in Jansson's world is not about professionalism, 
which  is  depicted  as  failure,  and  all  the  institutions  of  “care”  for  children,  such  as 
orphanages, kindergartens and schools, generate unhappiness and the desire to either rebel 
or escape.
In this respect, two main forces underlie Moominvalley's  wilderness: that of the 
generative power of Moominmamma's love and that of Snufkin's music and chaos. Like a 
prophet, Snufkin opens his friends' eyes and soul to the generosity and splendour of the 
universe and embodying that ultimate sense of freedom that no walls,  whether those of 
home, prison, orphanage, school, or any other institution, can contain or domesticate, he 
brings to them divine song.
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Chapter  12:  From  Epistemology  to  the  Ontological  Roots  of  
Knowledge
In pursuing my analysis of what  defines the epistemological basis  of children's 
literature, I have examined the roots of the knowledge that informs our imaginary and real 
worlds. Since our imagination is constrained by two factors – experience and motivations 
– any such analysis is inevitably bound to stumble upon the nature of this knowledge and 
its expression, which I argue stem from either the position of wildness or domestication. 
These  positions  inform  our  ideology,  doxa,  and  language,  and  have  far-reaching 
repercussions on the ways we choose to interact with each other and with our world. The 
perspective  of  domestication  entails  violence  and  the  root  of  its  genesis  resides  in 
symbolic  thought  and  language  itself.  If  these  two  characteristics  supposedly  mark 
humans as different  from other animals,  then language, symbolic  thought  and violence 
could be the human genesis itself in its new form of an all-devouring tumour of the planet. 
This link between language and our genesis is also articulated in the civilised monotheistic 
topos of the creation of the word and the world the way we know them. 
The  three  children's  authors  deal  with  these  premises  of  domestication  and 
wildness in  three ways.  A.A. Milne presents humanism and the sterility it  sows as an 
ineluctable fate, dreaming of the wilderness of yore as a nostalgia for an impossible state 
of being. For Nikolai Nosov, civilisation is part of an evolutionary tempo which can be 
manoeuvred by cooperative effort  to avoid totalitarian exploitation, domestication,  and 
control. Whereas Tove Jansson dreams of a world with no borders, where sorrow can be 
healed by the joy of togetherness, through eternal movement and Moominmamma's love, 
with  Snufkin's  song  destroying  the  incarcerating  power  of literacy and  language  and 
reinstating a most authentic communication and understanding with his harmonica. In the 
following section, I turn to the conceptions of genesis in civilised and wild narratives and 
examine how they inform the ontologies at the basis of children's books.
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II
Genealogical Narratives of Wilderness and Domestication: 
Identifying the Ontologies of Genesis and Genetics in Children’s 
Literature
The  first  part  of  my  inquiry  examines  the  epistemological  basis  of  children's 
literature focusing on the linguistic/symbolic problems of written literature and their role 
in the construction and representation of the pedagogical cultures as expressed in the three 
social paradigms. These underlying premises in Jansson's moominbooks, Nosov's trilogy 
on the mites of Flower Town, and Milne's 100 Aker Wood manifest themselves through 
distinct pedagogical, medical and criminological cultures depending on whether they stand 
on the ontological position of civilisation or wildness.
This part of my research focuses on how the ontological premises of wilderness 
and civilisation shape the underlying perspectives of the narratives of creation, which in 
turn inform our kinship systems – i.e., our relationships with the world – that have an 
anthropogenic effect on reality and, consequently, on the possible anthropologies.
Because of the relative geographic proximity of the three authors (all wrote in a 
European space), the collage of peoples who have migrated through and populated these 
areas  has  given  a  distinctive  flavour  to  the  fundamental  topoi  and  metaphors  that 
unconsciously guide human play with literary forms and myths. One of the most notable 
of such invasions of Europe, which took place long before Christianity came along with its 
patriarchal and hierarchical culture to colonise the European and Scandinavian world, was 
that of the Vikings, who settled the British Isles and marked the Slavs through constant 
raids and invasions. 
H.R.  Ellis  Davidson  invites  us  to  consider  particularly  the  legacy  of  the 
Scandinavian worldview in Northern Europe whose conceptions about the world branched 
out and intersected with the geographical areas of the three children's books chosen for 
this study – an imaginary that informs the authors' cultures and knowledge in the most 
fundamental way.
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Animist  conceptions of the forces behind our universe blend into  the chorus of 
scientific  and  Judaeo-Christian perspectives,  which form the fabric  of East  and  North 
European epistemologies underlying the literary creations for children by Nikolai Nosov, 
living in Slavic-Soviet space, by Tove Jansson emerging as a writer in the cold winter of 
World War II in Finland, and by Alan Alexandre Milne conceiving the world of one lord 
and his vassals of small brains in the epoch of British imperialist supremacy.
The  prevalent  topos  in  animist  cosmogonies,  which  had  a  lasting  impact  on 
monotheistic genesis and on science, is that of the life-giving and world-forming tree that 
permeates  the imaginary of folklore.  Along  with  stories  of floods,  of battles  between 
cosmic forces of good and evil, which often have been depicted as the battle between the 
Bird of the Sky and the female Serpent of the Land, or stories of various creatures from 
different worlds,  inter alia, these images and forces provide the topoi that have come to 
occupy a central place in literary, scientific, and spiritual knowledge of who or what we 
are and how all of us living have come about. These topoi form the foundation of human 
ontologies.
 The explanations of genesis that these motifs offer function as justifications for our 
actions and pave the way for our mutual interactions and culture – also known as socio-
economic and political systems. They also provide the language pregnant with metaphors 
for the formulation of religious and scientific principles that conceptualise our existence71. 
This cultural and scientific heritage serves as the foundation for the imaginary worlds of 
literary creations, including those with which this study is concerned, namely civilised and 
wild narratives in children's literature. In order to examine thoroughly the foundation of 
these narratives, this study pulls together an amalgam of disciplines that explore the topoi 
of origins and examine how characters' actions respond to explanations of genesis and the 
understanding of our relatedness – or its lack – to other living beings as well as to non-
living matter. Consistently, the topoi of transformation reflect the underlying concepts of 
relatedness that stem from the two conflicting perspectives of wilderness and civilisation 
and reveal how the concepts of genesis  drive the anthropological manifestation of the 
71 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson  (2003) explore in-depth the metaphoric nature of language, while John 
Zerzan (2002) in Running on Emptiness provides an important critique that links language to symbolic 
thought and alienation.
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ontological relationships  that  the civilised and  wild  narratives inform.  These wild  and 
civilised  perspectives,  hence,  also  permeate  the  interdisciplinary  examination  of  the 
question of “nature” and “identity”, of “what” we are and “what” our world is as presented 
in children's books. 
The premises underlying the three literary worlds become apparent right from the 
opening paragraphs of the first books with the sequels building upon the postulates in the 
first scenes: Jansson  opens The Little Trolls and the Great Flood  with Moominmamma 
and Moomintroll crossing the deep, dark forest; Milne begins  Winnie-the-Pooh with the 
assumption  that  the  reader  knows that  this  is  a  continuation of a  supposedly already 
existent story of possession and the power to name, when in fact, this one is the first, and 
to indulge in sado-masochistic and pornographic relationships that are called love; while 
Nosov's book opens with a depiction of mites (general, not the specific “protagonists”) 
living in a town of flowers surrounded by wilderness and the community they forge. In all 
three  books,  there  are  spaces  called  forests  and  rivers,  but  they  are  characterised 
differently as the characters live with them, live by them, or domesticate them.
Chapter  1:  Tiptoe  Lightly  Among  the  Trees:  Rebirth  into  the  
Wilderness of Moominforest
It must have been late in the afternoon one day at the end of August when Moomintroll 
and his mother arrived at the deepest part of the great forest. It was completely quiet, 
and so dim between the trees that it was as though twilight had already fallen. Here and 
there  giant  flowers  grew,  glowing  with  a  peculiar  light  like  flickering  lamps,  and 
furthest in among the shadows small, cold green points moved.
'Glow-worms,' said Moominmamma, but they had no time to stop and take a closer look 
at them. They were searching for a nice, warm place where they could build a house to 
crawl into when winter came.
. . .So they walked on, further and further into the silence and the darkness. Little by 
little, Moomintroll began to feel anxious, and he asked his mother if she thought there 
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were any dangerous creatures in there. 'Hardly,' she said, 'though we'd perhaps better go 
a little faster, anyway. But I hope we're so small that we won't be noticed if something 
dangerous should come along.' (Jansson, 1945 [translated '96]: 1)72.
The very first characters we meet when we open the first moominbook, The Little  
Trolls and the Great Flood, are a child and his mother. We see them in the depth of a great,  
dark forest and we realise that a whole universe already exists as we plunge into the lavish 
world of trees  –  a  timeless  place beyond any physical or  geographic location.  At  the 
moment of the narrative's birth, mother and child are in movement; they are coming from 
a different place travelling to a new home. In order to get there, they must learn how to 
tiptoe lightly past the trees and the beings, without touching or disturbing them because 
everything exists for itself, for its own purpose, and, in this world of trees, Moomintroll 
and Moominmamma must find their own wilderness.
The motif of the world as having been founded on trees,  or the tree that holds 
existence, permeates all the disciplines of knowledge around the world. We have met it as 
the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge and as the forest trees in the Garden of Eden; 
it reappears throughout folk wisdom the world over as well as in science inspired by Jean-
Baptiste Lamarck's (1809) tree of life in Philosophie zoologique or by Edward Hitchcock's 
(1840) application of the metaphor to geological forms in the late 18th and beginning of the 
19th century; Ernst Haeckel (1883) proposed several trees of life for the pedigree of homo 
sapiens sapiens in the 19th century; and numerous others have relied on this metaphor to 
map an interpretation of the familial relations of humans in and to their world. 
Finally, its most famous incarnation appeared in Darwin's Tree of Life, which he 
placed at the heart of his theory of evolution “by natural selection or the preservation of 
72 Det måste ha varit fram på eftermiddagen någon gång i slutet av augusti som Mumintrollet och hans 
mamma kom in i storskogens djupaste del. Där var alldeles tyst och så skumt mellan träden som om 
skymningen redan fallit på. Här och där växte jätteblommor som lyste med ett eget ljus likt flämtande 
lampor, och längst in bland skuggorna rörde sig små kallgröna punkter.
   “Lysmaskar”, sa mumintrollets mamma, men de hade inte tid att stanna för att titta närmare på 
dem. De var nämligen ute och letade efter en trevlig och varm plats där man kunde bygga ett hus att krypa in 
I innan vintern kom. Mumintroll tål inte alls vid köld, så huset måste vara färligt senast i oktober.
   Så vandrade de vidare, längre och längre in i tystnaden och mörkret. Småningom kände sig 
mumintrollet ängsligt och frågade viskande sin mamma om hon trodde det fanns några farliga djur därinne. 
“Knappast”, sa hon, fast det är kanske bäst att vi går lite fortare i alla fall. Men jag hoppas att vi är så små att 
vi inte märks ifall det skulle komma något farligt.” (Småtrollen och den stora översvämningen, Jansson, 
1945: 11-12).
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favoured races in the struggle for life”73. In this respect, the motif of the Tree of Life, even 
after all the adaptations in the scientific, theological, and mythological theorising before, 
during, and after Darwin's era, has remained a major element throughout the trajectory of 
the myth: it is literally a topos and has always mapped genealogical connections. In Norse 
mythology, for instance, it links the different worlds and the creatures dwelling in them; in 
evolutionary thought, it maps the relationship between life and and non-life connecting the 
homo sapiens sapiens to the animal kingdom and to all that has lived and died before 
(Stearns  and  Hoekstra,  2005);  in  religious  imaginary,  the  family  tree  connects  the 
bloodlines and, through genealogy, explains the history and fate of the world. 
This archetypal tree is  also common throughout Scandinavian mythology and is  
directly  relevant  to  Moominland.  For  instance,  the  Edda  of  Norse  mythology74 is 
constructed around the World Tree with a sacred spring at its foot. This tree is believed to 
have given life, provided food and drink for the gods, and tied their domains to the worlds 
of humans, giants, the living, and the dead75. In the words of a Scandinavian mythology 
scholar: “The tree marked the centre of the universe, and united the cosmic regions. Some 
Finno-Ugric tribes believed that the gods feasted upon its fruits, and that souls were born 
among its  branches.  It  was characteristic  of this  World  Tree that  its  life  was renewed 
continually : thus it  became a symbol of the constant regeneration of the universe,  and 
offered to men the means of attaining immortality” (Davidson, 1964: 192).
 However, the dangerous journey not only leads the moomins to discover life in the 
forest,  but  also maps their  trajectory through the domains of life  and death.  They face 
monsters,  descend  into  the  centre  of  a  mountain  and,  finally,  in  the  manner  of  the 
archetypal floods recounted in Edda or in the Middle Eastern mythological and biblical 
texts, overcome the rushing waters of the Great Flood and, in the Great Tree, reunite with 
Moominpappa. This itinerary reflects the mythical odysseys for immortality, which, in a 
metaphorical  sense,  they attain  in  the  eternally  peaceful  Moominvalley  even  as  their 
presence and absence flicker from book to book.
The quest “for a nice,  warm place where they could build a house to crawl into 
73 Part of the original title of Darwin's book (Darwin, 2008b).
74 Sturluson, Snorri (translated  from Icelandic by Jean I. Young) (1954) interwove the various heathen and 
monotheistic mythologies to offer a tale of genesis, apocalypse and redemption.
75 Davidson notes that this idea probably came from the Near East in the first place (Davidson, 1964: 191).
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when winter came” (Jansson, 1945: 1) thus sets them off on “a long and perilous journey 
from one world to another over mountains and desolate wastes of cold and darkness, or of 
a  tedious  and  fearsome  road down to  the  abode of the dead.  Long  before  astronomy 
revealed to men the terrifying extent of the great starry paces, the idea of fastness and of 
distances  to  tantalize  the  mind  was  already  present  in  heathen  thought.  In  Norse 
mythology also,  as in  that of many other peoples further east,  we find the image of a 
bridge that links the worlds” (Davidson, 1964: 193).
The moomin books contain so many of the elements of Scandinavian mythology 
that one can easily replace a synopsis of the moominbooks with Davidson's text on the 
poems  and  prose  of  Edda,  as  the  above  exercise  demonstrates,  revealing  the  rich 
mythological fabric of the Moominworld. For example, a bridge over the river is the first 
thing  that  Moominpappa  builds  when  they  find  the  house  he  had  built  sometime, 
someplace else. Movement is  presented as the nature of being. And it is that enormous 
river, grown pregnant with life during the flood that carries it  Home to Moominvalley – 
their paradise found. Jansson's choice to open the first moominbook onto the majestic and 
intricate world of trees and the diverse forms of life that it  sustains, while telling a story 
about a Great Flood and Small Trolls, ties the narrative not only to the archetypal tree, but  
also  to the motif of water as possessing both life-giving and destructive powers:  great 
bodies of salt and fresh water is a recurrent theme in pre-domesticated creation stories as 
well as in the domesticated narratives. 
These  archetypal  forces  of  water  also  warn  of divine  wrath summoning  great 
destructive  floods,  such  as  depicted  in  The  Epics  of  Gilgamesh, Ziusudra,  Atrahasis, 
Utnapishtim, Enûma Eliš,  and  of  course  in  the  biblical  tradition,  either  as  a  general 
expression of cosmic anger or elements specifically delivered to punish the people gone 
astray. Moreover, in all of these motifs, water pre-dates the genesis of the world, where by 
divine will life springs out of chaos from pre-existing realms, usually,  water. Scientific 
narratives, too, propose that life came out of water and that the various historical floods 
shaped the fauna of today. Even in the biblical tradition, it  appears that water pre-dates 
creation and God finds it already present as he roams over the deep:
In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form and 
void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the Spirit of God was moving 
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over the face of the waters (Genesis 1:1-2).
Or, also,  God creates darkness and light  and orders “a firmament  in  the midst  of the 
waters” (ibid: 1:6).
Floods  and  storms  appear  throughout  these  children's  books  in  a  variety  of 
colourful contexts. As discussed earlier, at one point, Snufkin is compared to Moses, even 
though Jansson plays with her reader, and, later, in  Midsummer Madness, the scene with 
Little My depicts a much closer parallel with Moses, who was found in a basket among 
the reeds just as Snufkin finds the tiniest of Mymble's daughters, Little My, sleeping in 
Moominmamma's  work-basket  in  the  reeds  after  having  been  carried  away by  water 
during  yet  another  great  flood  (Jansson,  1954  [translated  1955])76.  In  the  Comet  in  
Moominland,  when Moomintroll  and  Sniff  first  meet  Snufkin,  the question about  the 
absence of Snufkin's mother leads them to comparing him with Moses:
“Haven't you got a mother?” asked Moomintroll, looking very sorry for him.
“I don't know,” said Snufkin. “They tell me I was found in a basket.”
“Like Moses,” said Sniff (Jansson, 1959: 114).
Jansson achieves several things by linking Snufkin to Moses. First, she draws a parallel 
between Snufkin as a  criminal  and fugitive  in  a  land  of property and exploitation,  as 
discussed earlier:  Moses killed an Egyptian who  was abusing an Israelite  and Snufkin 
repeatedly  breaks  the  hemulens'  laws.  Second,  Jansson  presents  the  very  concept  of 
genesis as inextricable from motherhood, sacrifice and love: Moses' mother abandoned 
him so that  he could live and be taken care of,  thereby tricking the strict  confines of 
kinship. The adoption principles of many of the Somali clans, such as the Hubeer, despite 
their  seemingly  rigid  agnatic  patrilineality  principles77,  provide  an  anthropological 
example of a dynamic and flexible kinship system analogous to the moomins'. Because 
Jansson's conception of kinship is horizontal and limitless, the moominbooks also blend 
the topos of genesis with chaos theory and the anarcho-primitivist perspective resulting in 
76 Moses' story of being abandoned by his mother in a basket and the questions of slavery, liberation, and 
growing up parentless appears to constitute an important motif that runs throughout the moominbooks. 
For example, Moominpappa is abandoned by mother wrapped in newspapers at the orphanage run by 
Hemuls and he wishes she would have placed him in a basket on the moss (1952: 9; 1968: 3).
77  Helander, Bernhard: The Slaughtered Camel: Coping with Fictitious descent among the Hubeer of  
Southern Somalia. 1988.
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a rich text where trees, water, a living and throbbing universe, and constant movement are 
all  understood to  be  integral elements of being  and invite  the reader  on a journey of 
exploration of childhood, motherhood, and belonging – such as expressed in friendships 
and kinship with the world – and of the various dimensions of life, including the forces 
that threaten it.
Chapter 2: On Monsters, Wilderness, and Love
Perhaps the most potent aspect of the opening scene is that it presents the forces of 
life  as contingent  on mother's  love,  which allows her child  to build  knowledge of the 
actual world as together they search and face difficulties. The viability of that knowledge, 
of that child, of that mother, and of the whole Moominworld depends on the existence of 
the forest and on knowing how to go through it and, in it, find life.
Jansson wrote this story during the harshest winter of WWII and, whether intended 
or not,  Moominpappa's  taking  off with the hattifatteners  who  live  permanently  on the 
move, as a mob with no individual thought, in search of what they do not even yearn for, 
could serve as an allegory for the fathers leaving for the war. As Moominmamma walks 
with Moomintroll and the newly adopted “small creature” into life, she is mostly greeted 
by a generous and kind universe with only occasional danger. This danger can spring out 
of the depths of a dark forest marsh in the form of a giant serpent (another archetype) or 
descend out of nowhere,  on a quiet  sunny day on the beach, in the form of a tiny but 
territorial and vicious ant-lion. But regardless of whether the enemy is stronger or weaker 
than her, Moominmamma refuses to engage in violence, not even for self-defence or to 
dispute claims and property rights. She chooses to flee (Jansson, 1945['96]: 2 & 9). 
Her  statement  to  Moomintroll  in  the  opening  scene  that  smallness  and 
inconspicuousness  make  for  effective  self-defence  strategies  in  the  face  of danger  is 
Jansson's  implicit  response  to  war,  for,  as  Nietzsche  (1989:  89)  puts it  in  one  of his 
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aphorisms, “Whoever fights monsters,  should see to it  that  in  the process he does not 
become a monster. And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you”. 
The  moomins  refuse  to  be  monsters  and,  here  again,  Jansson  plays  with  tropes  and 
challenges our preconceptions.
Jansson depicts trolls – traditionally feared creatures – as small, cute, and loving, 
and thus subverts their image in Scandinavian folklore as dangerous tricksters. Presenting 
them as harmless,  even as fair  and respectful (no one,  especially the children,  is  ever 
forced to do anything against her will), Jansson invites the reader to question the premises 
of  an  ontology  that  portrays  the  world  as  populated  by  dangerous  creatures  and  to 
challenge its implicit logic of war: dangerous creatures must be fought back and killed, a 
logic that, by extension, teaches to beware of the yellow peril, get the red scare, fear the 
blacks  (anarchists  or   people  of  colour),  annihilate  the  terrorists  (Arabs/Muslims 
interchangeably), just to cite a few examples from history.
At  the  same  time,  the  books  elaborate  that  Moominmamma's  calm,  accepting, 
generous,  and forgiving  demeanour  is  not  an essential quality,  but  rather  a  process of 
search  and  learning.  For,  even she  can be  sad  and  angry.  What  makes  her  different, 
however, is that she can get in touch with that anger or pain in solitude in the forest and 
that there are friends who are capable of understanding her and her feelings and willing to 
ask themselves what they could do to help.
Toft walked on through the forest, stooping under the branches, creeping and crawling, 
and thinking of nothing at all, and became as empty as the crystal ball. This is where 
Moominmamma had walked when she was tired and cross and disappointed and wanted 
to be on her own, wandering aimlessly in the endless forest. . . . Toft saw an entirely 
new Moominmamma and she seemed natural to him. He suddenly wondered why she 
had been unhappy and whether there was anything one could do about it78 (Jansson: 
Moominvalley in November 1971: 174).
Jansson develops the thread of this ability to understand the feelings and experiences of 
the  other  throughout  the  books.  The  relationship  between  the  Groke,  the  world,  and 
Moomintroll demonstrates ever more clearly how the ability to empathise is a skill that 
78  Homsan Toft gick vidare genom skogen, hukade under grenarna, kravlade och kröp, han tänkte på 
ingeting alls och var lika tom som glaskulan. Här hade mamman gått när hon var trött och arg och 
besviken och ville var ifred, planlöst vandrande i den ständiga skuggan, djupt inne i sitt missmod . . . 
Homsan Toft såg en alldeles ny mamma och hon föreföll honom naturlig. Han undrade plötsligt varför 
hon hade varit ledsen och vad man kunde göra åt saken (Sent i November 1970: 160).
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requires effort,  time,  patience,  introspection and the desire to look into the soul of the 
other,  thereby echoing Nietzsche's  aphorism, for,  by looking into  the Groke's eyes,  the 
abysmal loneliness of her soul gapes back at Moomintroll and awakens his understanding.
The Groke appears as absolute terror in the third book, Finn Family Moomintroll 
(Trollkarlens Hatt), and reappears throughout the four subsequent books. Whenever she 
approaches,  the world freezes around her  and everything dies.  However,  in  the eighth 
book, Moominpappa at Sea, Moomintroll discovers that the Groke is that way because of 
the unbearable emptiness that comes with everyone fearing and avoiding her. The more 
that everything she touches dies, the colder she becomes. Still, his empathy leads him to 
reach out to the Groke and befriend her, a gesture of understanding and care that needs no 
words and which causes her  to thaw. Moominmamma explains in  chapter one: “we're 
afraid of the Groke because she's just cold all over. And because she doesn't like anybody. 
But  she's  never  done any harm” (Jansson, 1966: 15).  In other words,  Moominmamma 
believes that the Groke has a right to not like others and in no way should we be afraid or 
intolerant of her even if she dislikes us. After all, it is the deeds that count, not knowledge 
or lack of it.
“The Groke. Did somebody do something to her to make her so awful?”
“No one  knows,”  said  Moominmamma..  .  .  “It  was  probably  because  nobody  did 
anything at all.  Nobody bothered about her,  I  mean. I  don't  suppose she remembers 
anyway, and I don't suppose she goes around thinking about it either. She's like the rain 
or the darkness, or a stone you have to walk round if you want to get past” (ibid: 27-28).
Indifference and apathy, the narrative tells  us,  breed monsters.  In this respect,  Jansson 
takes a  step further  than Alice Miller's  ([1969]  1977)  thesis  in  “black”  or “poisonous 
pedagogy”, namely that abuse and neglect in childhood infuses adult life with horror. For 
Jansson,  ignoring and  dismissing a  person is  tantamount  to  abuse.  What  the Groke is 
looking for, without even knowing it herself, is the warmth of light. However, every time 
she approaches it,  she extinguishes it  with her freezing loneliness. “The light from the 
lamp shone on the grass and on the lilac bush. But where it crept in among the shadows, 
where the Groke sat all on her own, it was much weaker” (ibid: 12). Moomintroll “knew 
that if she sat on the same spot for more than an hour, nothing would ever grow there 
again. The ground just died of fright... She couldn't help it, she had to come as close as 
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possible, and everything died” (ibid: 17-18). “She came over the water in her cloud of cold 
like somebody's bad conscience” (ibid: 116).
Despite the terror that the Groke instils, Moomintroll seeks her out and, throughout 
the  book,  she,  too,  keeps  returning  to  the  spot  of  their  tacitly  agreed  upon  nightly 
rendezvous to stare at the light he brings with him. “She stared at the lamp, following a 
ritual of her own....  The Groke was dancing! She was quite obviously very pleased, and 
somehow this  absurd  ritual  became  very important  to  Moomintroll.  He  could  see  no 
reason why it  should stop at all,  whether the island wanted it to or not” (ibid: 147). In 
other words,  Moomintroll learns how to respond to this  terror and to take the time to 
explore her need by imagining what it  would be like to be the other; thus, “Moomintroll 
imagined he was the Groke” (ibid: 18). Moomintroll's empathy warms up the Groke and 
she begins to look forward to his company every night. At first she fears that he might not 
show up, and when he appears she greets him with song and dance. Little by little, the 
Groke realises that she no longer needs the lamp, because the light is in the warmth of 
Moomintroll's commitment, and he goes to a great length not to disappoint her. While the 
Groke learns how to trust, the island learns how to live with her. Moomintroll
could hear  the beating of  the  island's  heart....  Suddenly the Groke started to sing.... 
There was no doubt about it: the Groke was pleased to see him. She didn't mind about 
the  hurricane lamp.  She was  delighted  that  he  had  come  to  meet  her”  (ibid:  212). 
“Somehow he knew that she wasn't afraid of being disappointed any longer (ibid: 222).
Jansson's response to the feared requires trust, which can not be fostered unless the basic 
premise of our ontology allows us to know the world as mostly harmonious, albeit without 
falling into the trap of idealising it as being completely safe. Rather, like Petr Kropotkin's 
(2006)79 thesis on evolution by means of cooperation and mutual aid and not through the 
struggle  of  competition,  yet  without  dismissing  the  occasional  horror,  again  like 
Kropotkin,  she chooses to focus on the prevailing goodness and the striving of beings 
towards the balance of life, who in the face of threatening forces, meet the challenge with 
dignity, understanding, and love. For the moomins, the knowledge of how to live can be 
79 Petr Kropotkin was a late 19th century Russian naturalist and anarchist political theorist, who presented 
extensive research to challenge Darwin's theory of evolution by means of natural selection. He argued that 
the world is bountiful, even in the Tundra, where he observed the principles of cooperation and mutual aid 
between animals during several winters in Siberia. Competition, violence and war, he concludes in his 
research, is characteristic of civilised human culture not of wild life.
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acquired, transmitted, and safeguarded by entering the world of trees and going through it  
with confidence and humility (i.e. smallness) – all of which is provided by Mother's love 
and her trust in the child's ability to take care of himself and do things right in a benign,  
even  though constantly  moving  and  changing,  universe.  Moominland  thus  echoes  the 
basic principles of chaos theory which depicts the universe, in spite of the regularity of the 
constants and the particles'  responsiveness to the observer,  as also unpredictable,  and, 
therefore, as ultimately unknowable, yet, harmonious and self organising (Davies, 1977; 
Hawking, 1993; Jantsche, 1980).
The narrative echoes a number of other ontological disciplines about the place of 
humans in the world. This place varies, as my discussion on domestication reveals, and 
depends on whether we approach it  from the perspective of wildness or domestication. 
Hence, all the domains of knowledge – science, folklore and religion – may either depict 
the  human  as  all  powerful  and  most  sophisticated  ruler  of  the  world,  or  they  may 
characterise the human as small, fragile and dependent on the community of life, in spite 
of claims by the civilised to have killed God and despite the arrogant attempt of science to 
conquer nature; for, even with a few centuries of “development” behind it, civilisation still 
fails to conquer the nature of our dependence on forests and wild spaces, and, therefore the 
question of our own wilderness remains vital to our understanding of the world and of 
ourselves.  Just  as Jansson's  trolls,  throughout  the scientific  and literary narratives,  we 
appear  as  specks  in  an unknown,  immense,  probably  endless,  universe –  or  as  some 
quantum physicists argue, possibly in simultaneous multiverses80 – where,  still, our very 
survival  depends  on whether  we  succeed  in  leaving  no mark  behind  and  not getting 
noticed81. 
Civilised societies value grandeur, monumental exaggeration in architectural and 
other  endeavours,  and  history,  dismissing  and  denigrating  the  wild  understanding  that 
smallness and inconspicuousness is what can save us from harm. Endless World Wars are 
80 For further discussions on chaos theory, universe, and multiverses see Brian Greene (1999), ed. Michel 
Cazenave (2005), Stephen W. Hawking (1988),inter alios.
81 Many aboriginal peoples stress the importance of leaving the world unchanged and unmarked, just as we 
found it, for example, the Ainu of Japan. In an interview published on BBC and in Time (Sunday, 25 April 
2010), the astrophysicist, Stephen Hawking, said that it was best NASA did not send out signals to “alien” 
forms of life as it would be best not to get noticed as the result may be as devastating as the Europeans 
noticing Africa, Australia, Asia, and the Americas (basically, the whole world).
163
a testimony to that, in fact the moominbooks are born during one such war. Defying these 
civilised values,  tiny Moominmamma treads confidently with her child and an adopted 
foundling through silence and darkness amidst tremendous trees, armed with her trust in 
the kindness of wilderness, holding in her hand a glowing flower inhabited by a girl with 
sparkling blue hair. At the end of their odyssey, a bird brings them to Moominpappa atop 
an enormous tree, a moment of rebirth that brings them home, to movement and chaos, 
which is harmony and which is life.
Chapter 3: Questions of Choice: Discerning the Truth
Jansson  integrates  and  re-imagines  the  mechanisms  of  the  world  as  told  in 
traditional and scientific  narratives and points to the forest  and water,  not  only as the 
moment of our birth, but also as the place of our liberation from history. More precisely, 
since she depicts place and characters in movement, she points to a path of salvation from 
a world of war and civilisation back to paradise: Moomintroll and Moominmamma flee to 
that world of trees, transcend the underworld with its false seductions, elude giants, meet 
magical creatures, survive the great flood and, having interacted with everyone they meet 
in  a  spirit  of serenity,  acceptance,  mutual trust  and aid82,  escape violence and,  finally, 
regain the paradise lost.
These steps from civilisation to the forest are traced in the first four pages in which 
Moominmamma and Moomintroll adopt another member of the family, the small creature 
who goes by the name Sniff in the rest of the books,83 and Tulippa, the dweller of the 
glowing flower,  joins them on their journey after having saved them from the serpent. 
Moominmamma explains to them what brought them to the forest.
82  It is not a coincidence that the author chooses to depict the scene in which Moominfamily helps the stork-
bird find glasses and the stork-bird helps them find them Moominpappa on the great tree, a reunion that 
leads them back to life in Moominvalley.
83 In contrast to Winnie-the-Pooh, which starts with the act of naming, particularly in the first Moominbook, 
Jansson makes a point of refusing to name. 
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“You  see,  we're  looking  for  a  nice,  sunny  place  to  build  a  house  in...  (2). 
...Moominmamma told them stories. She told them about what it was like when she was 
young, when moomintrolls did not need to travel through fearsome forests and marshes 
in order to find a place to live in.
In those days they lived together with the house-trolls in the houses of human beings, 
mostly behind their stoves. 'Some of us still live there now,' said Moominmamma. 'But 
only where people still have stoves. We don't like central heating.'
'Did the people know we were there?' asked Moomintroll.
'Some of them did,' said his mother. 'They felt us mostly as a cold draught in the backs 
of their necks sometimes – when they were alone.'” (Jansson, 1945[96]: 4).
By explaining  the reasons for  Moominmamma and Moomintroll's  journey right  in  the 
beginning,  Jansson weaves into  the story a  critique  of technological development: the 
moomins  have been ousted by civilisation and its  accomplishments in  sealing  cracks, 
constructing reliable doors, and switching to electric heating – basically, driven by human 
selfishness to keep things to themselves.
These cracks are the gateways between dimensions and, having thoroughly sealed 
them,  humans  have  shut  themselves  off  from possibilities  and  interactions  with  life. 
Development and technological efficiency thus lead humans to ignorance, since the selfish 
urge to shut doors to protect possessions (including heat and warmth) keeps the civilised 
humans out of touch with reality and ignorant of the existence of the moomins dwelling in 
those cracks behind the wooden stoves and whose presence people previously had felt as a 
soft breeze.  Civilised,  sedentary house-building practices thus displace the non-humans 
and alienate and segregate the humans from a mysterious, wild, and intricate world.
In some  ways,  this  story of exile  is  reminiscent  of the many variations on the 
theme, not least, the exile from the Garden of Eden, where civilisation was meted out as 
punishment on disobedient, greedy and impatient humans:
And to Adam [God] said, “Because you have listened to your wife, and have eaten of 
the  tree  of  which I  commanded you,  'You shall  not  eat of  it,'  cursed is the  ground 
because of you; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it 
shall bring forth to you; and you shall eat the plants of the field. In the sweat of your 
face you shall eat bread till you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; you 
are dust, and to dust you shall return” (Genesis 3:17-19).
In the Old Testament, civilisation is an affliction brought about by human disobedience of 
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the laws of life; yet, the civilised have mostly interpreted this tragedy as a permanent and 
ineluctable fate and embraced it as a triumph84.
Jansson refuses this fatalistic view and projects a world in which it  is within the 
characters'  power to change the actions that  have brought  about  the wrath of life  and 
points to  the possibility of transcending our fears,  greed, and limitations by venturing 
through  the  land  of  trees  back  into  the  garden  of  wilderness.  In  other  words,  she 
challenges the civilised  narrative that  sees punishment  as  an inevitable part  of human 
experience, since Moominmamma's position assumes that there is no permanence in what 
we do. We can always change our actions and interactions and can find new paths back to 
what we are, which is the only constant, whereas the condition of punishment can become 
an inevitable constant only when civilised humans have no intention to change their way 
of life. Seeing their sin as a permanence, as an unchangeable part of who they are, there 
can be no forgiveness, only eternal guilt.  Ultimately,  this raises the question of choice, 
albeit  not  from the  predetermining  position  –  not  a  choice  of  right  or  wrong  with 
consequences, but the choice to correct the wrong when one discerns the truth. Because 
one never knows where some choices lead, Moominmamma leaves it up to the individual 
– be it a child or an adult, from her own species or from another – to make her decisions. 
Hence,  throughout  the book,  Moominmamma states  explicitly  that  everyone  is 
invited to join her and her child on their journey or they are welcome to stay where they 
are or go somewhere else where they are happier.  There are no consequences and no 
strings attached, because the assumption is  that  none of the creatures is  endowed with 
powers over others or possesses information that is not accessible to others. How can she 
know more about what's good for the “small creature” than the “small creature” himself, 
for instance. Moreover, she reassures the children that they can always change their minds 
and come and live with them later.
The small creature therefore has the choice to accompany them or stay behind. He 
chooses to come. Tulippa chooses to go with them too, but when she finds the tower with 
84 Several biblical scholars have pointed to the different voices in the Old and the New Testaments. My play 
Red Delicious (2003) explores the implications of wilderness and vegan gathering in the Bible. Moreover, in 
his Ishmael trilogy, Daniel Quinn (1993, 1997 and 1998) also argues that the original story of the fall has 
been told from the perspective of non-domesticated society and has subsequently been adopted and adapted 
by civilisation.
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the sunlit  boy,  she decides to  settle  in  that  lagoon and they bid one another  farewell.  
Snufkin and other  characters  move  in  and  out  as  they please.  And while  voicing  her 
reservations to the old gentleman about  liking it  inside the mountain,  Moominmamma 
nevertheless specifies that all can stay as long as they wish and may eat as much as they 
desire, even though they are looking for the real sun and sea and it is porridge and “real” 
food that is good for children.
In the image of a forgiving God, a loving parent in Jansson's universe cannot be 
punishing, and forgiveness becomes the natural state of a world founded on the premise 
that all creatures are fundamentally good because they crave harmony and the balance of 
life.  Lack of experience may lead one astray on account  of the not  perfected skills  of 
discernment, but this is precisely the reason for reaching out to the child, or anyone else 
for  that  matter,  so  that  she  may  hone  those  skills  by  diving  into  a  world  of  life, 
understanding, and acceptance. It is in this spirit that one learns how to discern truth from 
falsehood and real from fake.
Jansson  builds  this  argument  by  integrating  the  various  archetypal  topoi  of 
punishment  and  reward,  abundance  and  misery,  authenticity  and  falsehood  and,  once 
again,  exploring new ways of understanding them through the perspective of wildness. 
She imbues her characters with the ability to see through as well as the strength to refuse 
the deceptive promises of satiation and comfort  as promised by civilisation in  general, 
and, in particular, by the old gentleman who invites them to live with him under a fake 
sun, known as electric light, and behind shut doors inside the mountain where he has built  
a world of simulated rivers and trees made of sweet food. This is the only instance in the 
moominbooks when someone shuts the door in order to leave “danger” out, since in the 
land of falsehood, distrust is the basis of relationships. Sniff interprets this act as a sign 
that perhaps the gentleman himself is not to be trusted, that the kindly, frail, old man is 
perhaps more dangerous than the serpent, and in his offer of limitless engorgement lies the 
real danger, the Satan of false hope and deception:
Then [the old gentleman] closed the door very carefully, so that nothing harmful could 
sneak inside....  'Are  you  sure  this  gentleman  is  to  be  trusted?'  whispered  the  small 
creature.... Then a bright light shone towards them, and the moving staircase took them 
straight into a wonderful landscape.  The trees sparkled with colour  and were full  of 
fruits and flowers they had never seen before, and below them in the grass lay gleaming 
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white patches of snow. 'Hurrah!' cried Moomintroll, and ran out to make a snowball. 'Be 
careful, it's cold!'  called his mother. But when he ran his hands through the snow he 
noticed that it was not snow at all, but ice-cream. And the green grass that gave way 
under his feet was made of fine-spun sugar. Criss-cross over the meadows ran brooks of 
every colour, foaming and bubbling over the golden sand. 'Green lemonade!' cried the 
small creature,  who had stooped down to drink.  'It's not  water at all,  it's  lemonade!' 
Moominmamma went straight over to a brook that was completely white, since she had 
always  been very  fond of  milk....  Tulippa  ran from tree  to  tree  picking armfuls  of 
chocolate creams and candies, and as soon as she had plucked one of the glowing fruits, 
another  grew at once.  They forgot  their  sorrows and ran further and further  into the 
enchanted garden. The old gentleman slowly followed them and seemed very pleased by 
their amazement and admiration. 'I made all this myself,' he said. 'The sun, too.' And 
when they looked at the sun, they noticed that it really was not the real sun but a big 
lamp with fringes of gold paper. 'I see,' said the small creature, and was disappointed. 'I 
thought it was the real sun. Now I can see that it has a slightly peculiar light.' 
'Well, that was the best I could do,' said the old gentleman, offended. 'But you like the 
garden, don't you?' 
'Oh yes,' said Moomintroll....
 'If you would like to stay here, I will build you a cake-house to live in,' said the old 
gentleman....
'That would be very nice,' said Moominmamma, 'but ... we must be on our  way. We 
were actually thinking of building a house in the real sunshine'  (Jansson, 1945[96]: 
5).
The old gentleman's  garden,  modelled after  the real garden,  remains  only a  replica,  a 
falsehood and a substitute for the authentic, which, for Moominmamma, can never replace 
the real sun, the real sea, or the real trees. 
Once again,  the wildness of Moominmamma's philosophy is confirmed with her 
refusal  to  punish  and  in  her  lack  of  expectations  of  obedience.  Moominmamma  is 
concerned  only with the children’s  well-being,  safety,  and happiness;  the minute their 
tummies  get  upset  from the  feasting  on fake,  sugary food,  she  rushes  to  help  them, 
because  she  trusts  them  even  when  they  have  erred.  The  children  prove  right 
Moominmamma's fundamental premise that loved and happy creatures turn out to be good 
and  kind  beings,  and  they eagerly  leave  as  soon as  they realise  the  falseness  of  the 
experience and the impossibility of the truly Original Affluent Society existing trapped 
behind  shut  doors  with  fake  substitutes.  Together,  they turn  down  the  invitation and 
choose the real world with open doors.
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When she woke up again she heard a fearful moaning, and realized at once that it was 
her Moomintroll, who had a sore stomach... Beside him sat the small creature, who had 
got toothache from all the sweets, and was moaning even worse. Moominmamma did 
not scold, but took two powders from her handbag and gave them each one, and then 
she asked the old gentleman if he had a bowl of nice, hot porridge. 
'No, I'm afraid not,' he said. 'But there's a bowl of whipped cream, and another one of 
jam.' 
'Hm,' said Moominmamma. 'Porridge is good for them, you see: hot food is what they 
need. Where's Tulippa?' 
'She  says  she  can't  get  to  sleep  because  the  sun  never  goes  down,'  said  the  old 
gentleman, looking unhappy. 'I'm truly sorry that you don't like it here.' 
... 'But now I think I must see to it that we get out in the fresh air again.' And then she 
took  Moomintroll  by one  hand,  and the small creature by the  other,  and called for 
Tulippa. 'You'll do best to take the switch-back railway,' said the old gentleman politely. 
'It goes right through the mountain and comes out in the middle of the sunshine.' 
'Thank  you,'  said  Moominmamma.  'Goodbye  then.'  'Goodbye  then,'  said  Tulippa. 
(Moomintroll  and the  small  creature  were  not  able  to say  anything,  as they  felt  so 
horribly sick.)....
When they came out on the other side they were quite giddy and sat on the ground for a 
long time, recovering. Then they looked around them. 
Before them lay the  sea,  glittering in the  sunshine.  'I want to go for  a bathe!'  cried 
Moomintroll, for now he felt all right again. 'Me too,' said the small creature, and then 
they ran right out into the sun's beam on the water (Jansson, 1945[96]: 6).
It is interesting that when moominbooks begin with this choice of the real, Nosov chooses 
to end Dunno's trilogy with a similar image. After his adventures inside the moon, Dunno 
gets seriously homesick and almost dies in capitalism and without the real sun, the blue 
skies, and the soft and fragrant grass. The only way to save him is for the mites to rush 
him home to earth. 
Dunno took a few faltering steps,  but  immediately collapsed to his  knees  and then 
falling face down, began to kiss the earth. His hat flew off his head. Tears rolled from 
his eyes. And he whispered:
-- My mother, my land! I will never forget you!
The red sun gently warmed him with its  rays,  the fresh breeze ruffled his hair as if 
caressing  his  head.  And  it  appeared  to  him as  if  some  incredible  huge feeling  has 
overwhelmed his heart. He did not know what to call this feeling, but knew that it was 
good and that nothing better existed in the whole world. He nestled his chest against the 
earth as though it was someone dear and close and felt the strength return to him and the 
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sickness leave all by itself.
Finally, he wept all the tears he had and got up from the ground and burst out in merry 
laughter when he saw his friend-mites joyfully greeting their native Land.
-- Well, brothers, that's it!-- he shouted cheerfully. --And now we can start off on another 
journey!
This is the kind of mite Dunno was (Nosov, 1985(b): 221-22 [translation mine])85.
For both Nosov and Jansson, reality, even with all its risks and uncertainties, is the only 
viable option and, hence, one author opts to end his narrative with the characters regaining 
the real world after a miserable experience in civilisation inside the moon and the other 
chooses to begin with this same question of reality versus civilisation. In both cases, this 
choice is a matter of life and death. 
Nosov's  mites  of  Flower  Town  also  share  Moominmamma's  position  on  the 
question of forgiveness and acceptance. Hence, Doono and his mates endlessly reach out 
to help Dunno after he had gotten himself and them in trouble – in the last book, they go 
to the moon to save him from his own folly,  even though he had stolen their rocket by 
mistake, which brought him to be stranded in the capitalist mite society dwelling inside 
the moon, getting harassed by their police and threatened by their laws. His friends still go 
out to help him, because the underlying premise guiding the relations in Flower Town, just 
as in Moominland, assumes that even when actions provoke undesirable consequences, the 
intentions behind them are nonetheless good, and hence the trust, support, and love of the 
community can provide the understanding and strength needed to change the wrong. 
Therefore, the minute Moominmamma and the children realise that the deception 
85 Незнайка сделал несколько неуверенных шагов, но туг же рухнул на колени и, упав лицом вниз, 
принялся целовать землю. Шляпа слетела с его головы. Из глаз покатились слезы. И он 
прошептал: 
-- Земля моя, матушка! Никогда не забуду тебя! 
Красное солнышко ласково пригревало его своими лучами, свежий ветерок шевелил его волосы, 
словно гладил его по головке. И Незнайке казалось, будто какое-то огромное-преогромное чувство 
переполняет его грудь. Он не знал, как называется это чувство, но знал, что оно хорошее и что 
лучше его на свете нет. Он прижимался грудью к земле, словно к родному, близкому существу, и 
чувствовал, как силы снова возвращаются к нему и болезнь его пропадает сама собой. 
Наконец он выплакал все слезы, которые у него были, и встал с земли. И весело засмеялся, увидев 
друзей-коротышек, которые радостно приветствовали родную Землю. 
-- Ну вот, братцы, и все! -- весело закричал он. -- А теперь можно снова отправляться куда-нибудь 
в путешествие! 
Вот какой коротышка был этот Незнайка. 
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of  the  sugary abundance  and  the  artificial  light  threatens  their  lives,  they  choose  to 
continue their search for the true and the real.  As they leave the dangerous illusion of 
safety in the centre of the mountain, they climb out into a sunny world full of life and 
trees, a world where they find their father in the tree of life. “There, on one of the highest 
branches of an enormous  tree sat  a  wet,  sad moomintroll,  staring  out  over  the water. 
Beside him he had tied a distress flag. He was so amazed and delighted when the marabou 
stork landed in the tree, and the whole of his family climbed down on to the branches, that 
he  could  not  say a  word”  (Jansson,  1945[96]:  16).  The following morning  they walk 
together into the valley where the flood current has planted the home that Moominpappa 
had built elsewhere. 
Jansson thus maps her conception of the nature of being as a trajectory from where 
we  are  to  what  we  are,  a  path that  is  revealed  to  us as  we  embrace  wilderness  and 
renounce domestication. This trajectory is expressed in the first question mark that appears 
in the book in the fifth paragraph: “What are you?” the small creature asked86 when he 
meets Moominmamma and Moomintroll — not “Who are you?”.
In other words, we are not dealing here with the problem of identity, but with the 
question of matter and nature. Proper names in Moominvalley are names of the types of 
creatures: the snorks, the moomins, the snufkins, etc. Yet, at the same time, each snufkin is  
Snufkin and each moomintroll is Moomintroll, with all the individual idiosyncrasies that 
make  them special  and  the commonalities  that  bind  them together  with  the  common 
denominator which is the experience of life with the underlying yearning for harmony and 
for the wild expanses of the multiverses – all of which make us an integral part of each 
others' lives, even with all our squabbles and territorial disputes, such as presented by the 
aggressive ant-lion who would not share the beach with Moominmamma and her children. 
Because the demarcation of space, time, and resources is never a constant, it is change and 
mobility that ensure a rotation of chances, and thus dominance can never be permanent or 
totalitarian.  In  other  words,  chaos,  not  order  and  identity,  is  what  ensures  egalitarian 
biodiversity and the stability of life.
86 “Vad är ni för ena?” frågade det lilla djuret (Jansson, 1945[96]: 13). There was an implicit question before 
this one regarding Moomintroll wondering whether there were dangerous creatures and Moominmamma 
responding “hardly”, which still ties in with the nature of the creatures of the world: what are they? Jansson's 
implicit response is: hardly dangerous, mostly minding their own business.
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In  itself,  the permanence promised  by the garden of infinite  food or the sugar 
paradise has provided a potent archetype in civilised ontology because it  constitutes an 
effective tool for domestication particularly in conjunction with imposed poverty. Pavlov 
illustrated this idea scientifically:  first, deny the victim of domestication access to food 
and then reward her when she does what you want; repeat it enough times for the victim to 
despair and lose hope for an exit from this situation of abuse. In Medieval Europe, with 
land expropriated and peasants starving, stories about the mythical Cockaigne circulated, 
where animals walked around and invited people to slice their  ribs and eat  them with 
people gorging themselves infinitely.  Islam and Christianity are the most  noted among 
holy traditions for their promise of rewards after death in terms of guaranteed abundance 
of food and, in some cases, sex. But they are not alone, for, Hinduism and Buddhism have 
evolved from the animist, spirit oriented faith practices that honoured wilderness and trees 
as sites of protection for all beings (Gottlieb, 2004) into the rewards by reincarnation into 
“higher”,  human-like  and  human,  as  well  as  wealthier  forms.  For  example,  the caste 
system of Hinduism structures this hierarchy through imposed borders between the classes 
or  castes  that  also  established  monopolies  over  knowledge  and  hence  the  notion  of 
sacrifice gets introduced and priests become important figures that represent and mediate 
for those who no longer can act on their own behalf (Hopkins, 1971). Like Judaism, the 
religious traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism are older than the more honed and fitted to 
“contemporary”  needs  the  traditions  of  Islam  and  Christianity,  and,  therefore,  it  is 
sometimes  difficult  to  detect  the  civilising  mechanism  that  drives  people  towards 
humanism, agriculture, and the values of avarice. We see the same theme of an artificial, 
never-ending world of sweets reappearing throughout children's culture as well, with its 
most notable incarnation rendered by Roald Dahl in  Charlie and the Chocolate Factory, 
published in 1964, almost two decades after The Little Trolls and the Great Flood87. 
Considered a classic, Dahl's story is one of the most widely read twentieth century 
children's books that have been written in English and has been adapted for television and 
the  big  screen numerous  times,  with  the  latest  film  by Tim Burton released  in  2005 
starring  Johnny  Depp.  Because  this  brutally  civilised  perspective  predominates  in 
87 AbdelRahim (2010).
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children's literature in spite of the strong criticisms, such as voiced by the NAACP88 or 
children's authors, like Eleanor Cameron, I allot considerable space to the discussion of 
Dahl's  book. Moreover,  it  is  reflected in  the ontology of Milne's  Winnie-the-Pooh and 
stands in stark contrast with the wild premises in Jansson and Nosov's works.
Chapter 4: Perils and Traps of Civilisation: Competing for Chocolate  
Slavery in the Unknowledge of Roald Dahl
To recapitulate, Moominland is a place where everyone, regardless of age or form, 
has a choice to either join or reject the artificial world of deception and where no tickets 
are ever  needed  to  partake  in  the  abundance  of the  earth  and  sea.  In  this  place,  the 
moomins' arms are always open for the world and so is the heart of the old gentleman, 
who upon hearing wails,  invites them all in and offers them anything they would like, 
even to build them a sweet, edible house, which they gently decline. 
In contrast, Charlie and the Chocolate Factory is built on civilised premises of an 
ontology of wealth and poverty, ownership and slavery, shut doors, deception and abuse, 
competition and  strict  criteria  for  selecting  members  of the  in-group  and  those  to  be 
excluded. The plot of Dahl's book centres around a lottery contest, slavery, the desire for 
control in general and particularly of the production of artificial food, and the generation 
of incessant  craving  for  it:  “[Charlie]  desperately  wanted  something  more  filling  and 
satisfying  than  cabbage  and  cabbage  soup.  The  one  thing  he  longed  for  more  than 
anything else was…CHOCOLATE” (Dahl, 1973: 8).
The  pyramidal  structure of the  social  relations  in  the  world  of the Chocolate 
Factory is framed right from the beginning with the announcement of a lottery: millions of 
chocolate bars are to be sold, but only a handful of tickets (ten in the first version of the 
book and five in the revised 1973 edition) are placed inside the wraps granting admission 
to the secretive chocolate factory whose doors have been shut to visitors for years. Out of 
88  National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
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these winners,  only one, the most  obedient  participant,  is  to  be named Willy Wonka's 
successor. This, of course, constitutes a well known and widely used marketing ruse that 
appeals to the sense of greed and nurtures it.
The goal of any contest is  for one, sometimes two or, perhaps, three persons or 
teams to win and many – all the other – people or teams to lose, i.e., the winner wins at the 
expense of the many who lose. First, on the psychological and emotive levels, giving a 
prize to one sends out the message to all the other participants that they are not quite “it”, 
i.e. they are inferior and this inferiority is a precondition for the superiority of the winner. 
Simply said,  without  losers,  there can be no winners. Second, the winner actually gets 
what everyone else loses: money, recognition, symbolic capital. There would be no point 
in  competing if  the  prizes  were to  be  distributed  equally  among  the  participants in  a 
contest,  lottery,  or  competition.  Contests  and  competitions  reconfirm  hierarchy  as 
“natural” and serve as rituals and useful reminders of the place of the many losers in the 
pyramidal hierarchy.  In this respect,  even if lottery and gambling  depend on luck and 
therefore are slightly less damaging for self-esteem than the contests and examinations 
that claim to evaluate intellectual prowess, a physical ability, or even degrees of beauty, 
the situation is nevertheless an artificial set up that reconfirms to the participants that, in 
this world, only a few will win, and the rest lose.
Dahl's Charlie and the Chocolate Factory reinstates this order with a sadistic zeal 
and translates this civilised hierarchy into a tale of adventure in which most readers, even 
though for the most part lose in the real world (pure probability), nevertheless cheer for 
the one winner to snatch it all. There are several steps in this seemingly self-contradictory 
indulgence. The first step is for the readers to be convinced by the justifications provided 
for  the reasons  why the main  character  deserves  to  win.  They find  them convincing, 
because  they  identify  themselves  with  the  traits  which,  in  the  spirit  of  the  civilised 
tradition of double-standards, are depicted as positive in favour of the winner while the 
same qualities become negative in the losers. Thus, even if everybody is greedy in Dahl's 
book – they all want to inherit Willy Wonka's chocolate factory – Charlie emerges as the 
only deserving character,  and he keeps the prize to himself,  that is,  he keeps it  in  the 
direct, blood-defined family and does not share it with “others”, or, does not “squander the 
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wealth”, while everyone else's greed earns them torture, even Veruca Salt who wants one 
single slave, a chocolate river, or just one hard-working squirrel. In short, since the readers 
see themselves as deserving the prize, they agree with the argument that the hero deserves 
to win. Yet, the way real-life competitions are set, the majority of the readers lose most of 
the time and so the next step for them is also to identify themselves with the losers in the 
book. 
The contradictions between the postulates, material goals, and idealised values of 
civilisation  fit  the  symptoms  of  schizophrenia,  which  amount  to  an  individual  being 
incapable  of  connecting  logical  dots  between  reality  and  the  imagined  or  desired 
understanding of reality89. In other words,  there are irresolvable contradictions between 
facts,  images,  desires,  and  words and,  hence,  paradoxically,  the  act  of witnessing  the 
elimination  of  the  losers  offers  comfort  within  a  system  whose  basic  premise  is 
dispossession and punishment, because it reconfirms to the witnesses that they are not the 
only ones to have been defeated, i.e., punished for their inferiority. Concomitantly,  they 
experience a certain sense of relief that,  even though they feel that they personally do 
deserve punishment, they nevertheless have managed to escape and someone else receives 
it instead. Most important, perhaps, is that the losers need a justification for the injustice, 
even though it  is not always a conscious affair; they need an explanation that there are 
good reasons why there (they) are losers, and it becomes an acceptable explanation that, 
“in any case, naturally, after all, only one is destined to snatch the wreath of glory”.
The incredible  popularity of the book also  demonstrates  that  readers (both the 
adults who choose the book for the children and the children who enjoy it) may find some 
masochistic comfort in watching the losers receive unimaginably sadistic punishments for 
wanting what everybody wants in a society that cuts off access to vital resources and locks 
them behind doors90. Even if children and adults know that the literary exaggerations are 
89 The term “schizophrenia” comes from Greek meaning “split mind” referring to the condition when a 
person is “split from reality”.
90 Children's literature historians, such as Avery (19750, Knowles and Malmkaejer (1996), or O'Malley 
(2003) have pointed to the prevalence of punishment and moralism in children's books. An excellent 
illustration of the naturalising of punishment is Maurice Sendak's (1963) Where the Wild Thigns Are  
discussed in part I. In this book, the boy is punished and sent to his room, he is at first upset, then travels to a 
dark wild place, tames the wilderness and having destroyed and subdued it, returns back to his room and 
sees the love in the punishing parents gestures. This is another book that promotes violence against the wild 
and the wilderness of the undomesticated self of the child and hailed as a work of genius by the civilised 
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not “real”,  in this joy and laughter that the depiction of cruelty evokes, there is  still an 
element of self-castigation for wanting that which they feel guilty to want.
This feeling of guilt is a product of civilisation, because its ontology naturalises 
violence, suffering, and pain, when deep inside the civilised know that this acceptance to 
suffer and to torture others is what has cost them their paradise and the love of the world. 
Guilt  is  a  concomitant  of civilisation,  because  both are  contingent  on the  premise  of 
permanence:  property  rights,  hereditary laws,  identity,  character,  genes,  the  desire  to 
achieve  immortality while  exterminating the rest  of the living world,  ad  infinitum.  In 
contrast,  if  people  saw  their  actions  as  changeable  and  corrigible  –  for  example, 
Moominmamma shows to her children that they are not obliged to stick with their choice, 
that they can still change their minds and the option to leave and heal is still available to 
them – there would be no syndrome of “guilt” as a constant. Impotence and identity crisis 
become a problem when people fail to see the possibility to change their actions and to 
redirect their desires.  Thus,  as guilt  becomes a socially constructed permanence, seeing 
someone  getting  punished  brings  relief,  because,  symbolically,  the  guilty  losers 
themselves  get  punished,  and  that  punishment,  in  their  civilised  logic,  sets  things 
temporarily right.  Yet,  evading that  punishment  personally  (since the scapegoat  or the 
symbol  receives  it  instead)  also  sets  things  wrong.  The  sacrifice  becomes  an integral 
aspect  of  institutional  symbolism  because  the  punishment  of  the  victim,  chosen  to 
represent  and symbolise everyone who deserves to  be punished, becomes the ritual of 
temporary relief constantly re-enacted in a culture of perpetual guilt but, at the same time, 
the symbolic yet real victim becomes the scapegoat who is the vital and ultimate loser. In 
the  end,  the  root  of the  problem lies  in  the  failure  of  the  civilised  to  connect  their 
obsessions with possessions and the feeling of guilt  with their conception of life  as an 
eternal competition for the survival of the fittest.
In  “The  Original  Affluent  Society”,  Marshall  Sahlins  (1972)  sees  the civilised 
conception  of  poverty  and  affluence  as  the  inversion  of  reality  that  stems  from the 
perspective its members hold on life. If a people constructs a cultural view of the world as 
generous and their needs as modest, the ideal of satisfaction becomes easy to attain and it  
book industry.
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becomes  pointless to  grab  and  obsess,  for  there  will  always  be  aplenty  tomorrow. 
Obsessions and avarice occur in the truly poor societies – the industrialised, developed, 
first world – where expectations are never realised, never meant to be realised, and this 
lack of realisation stimulates the perpetual greed, fear, and inequality.
One-third to one-half of humanity are said to go to bed hungry every night. In the Old 
Stone  Age  the  fraction  must  have  been  much  smaller.  This  is  the  era  of  hunger 
unprecedented.  Now,  in  the  time  of  the  greatest  technical  power,  starvation  is  an 
institution.  Reverse  another  venerable  formula:  the  amount  of  hunger  increases 
relatively and absolutely with the evolution of culture. 
This paradox is my whole point. Hunters and gatherers have by force of circumstances 
an objectively low standard of  living.  But  taken  as  their  objective,  and  given their 
adequate  means  of  production all  the  people's  material wants  usually can be easily 
satisfied....
The world's most primitive people have few possessions, but they are not poor. Poverty 
is not a certain small amount of goods, nor is it just a relation between means and ends; 
above all it is  a relation between people.  Poverty is a social status. As such it is  the 
invention  of  civilization.  It  has  grown  with  civilization,  at  once  as  an  invidious 
distinction between classes and more importantly as a tributary relation that can render 
agrarian peasants  more susceptible  to natural  catastrophes  than any winter  camp of 
Alaskan Eskimo (Sahlins, 1974: 36-38).
As Sahlins points out, in a consumer society, people see the world as miserly and life as a 
struggle – an outlook that justifies locked doors and private property and, in turn, causes 
the extensive deprivation and suffering. 
In such a world, it would be unthinkable to open the gates of the chocolate factory 
and to share the chocolate with all the human and animal children of the world. Instead 
there has to be a ceremony that reconfirms the naturalness of injustice: while legitimating 
greed in a few, it  chooses a handful of others for a public display of punishment, even 
cannibalism;  for  instance,  Augustus  becomes  chocolate  fudge  and  Violet  turns  into  a 
blueberry for wanting what Willy Wonka has and what Charlie gets, because those who 
have  lost  to  the  winners  in  this  ontology themselves  constitute  the  resources  for  the 
winner. Finally, the smooth operation of this system is secured when the losers express 
gladness and gratitude for getting consumed either as workforce, as the consumers who 
keep buying things91, or as ingredients in Charlie and Willy Wonka's profitable venture.
91 Cannibalism frequently appears in children's literature, perhaps precisely because the concept of 
consumers consuming each other, their children and themselves needs to be rendered normal and natural, 
and this expression of relations to get used to from early age. The film Cannibal Holocaust raises these 
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Dahl goes to great lengths to describe the horrifying and humiliating punishments 
of each eliminated contestant and justifies the mad cruelty by depicting the characters as 
disobedient to Willy Wonka's orders. 
There are thousands of clever men who would give anything for a chance to come in 
and take over from me, but I don’t want that sort of person. I don’t want a grown-up 
person at all. A grown-up won’t listen to me; he won’t learn. He will try to do things his 
own way and not mine. So I have to have a child. . . . I decided to invite five children to 
the factory, and the one I liked the best at the end of the day would be the winner! (Dahl, 
1973: 157).
The narrative, thus, also works as a training guide in domesticating children and, contrary 
to  Moominland in  which empathy and acceptance even of the  horrible  is  key to  life, 
Charlie and the Chocolate Factory's appeal stems from the reader's alienation from the 
suffering of the children who get beaten and consumed; for, only with effacement in the 
mind and the emotional sphere can anyone laugh at someone's suffering.
There are different methods of forcing the domestic/ated to comply with the will of 
the domesticator92. The withdrawal of approval and love is one tactic, the administration of 
pain and other emotional and physiological tortures is  another. Alternating hunger with 
promises of relief and then relieving it when the child or the animal conforms to the will 
of the trainer, then inducing it again, finally securing future cooperation with reminders of 
the threats and intimidation (bad grades, for example, play this role, their threats taking the 
form  of  “future”  withdrawal  of  food  and  other  necessities  through  poverty)  also 
constitutes some of the methods of torture93. Again, institutionalised abuse makes sense 
only on condition that exploitation itself has been institutionalised in a society. Otherwise, 
who cares if a child learns how to please persons with authority (e.g. teachers, adults, etc.) 
or if a horse understands “go”. 
Societies that  embrace wilderness do not have a purpose for changing someone 
else's behaviour because they have no ownership over the other's life, effort, or the fruits 
of her labour,  and hence they have no place for punishment  in their ontology; in fact, 
many such societies have lived for millions of years with no place allotted for punishment 
or any other form of institutional violence in their worldview. A contemporary example is 
questions clearly, if brutally.
92 Of course, Michel Foucault's studies on prisons and methods of punishment come to mind here.
93 Pavlov and his methods of degradation for dogs and horse trainers such as Paul Patton and Vicki Hearne.
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the Semai people of Malaya. The fact  that they still exist demonstrates that violence is 
neither indispensable for survival nor an intrinsic feature of life. The Semai lead vibrant  
lives without a structure of leaders or figures of authority at the top, with the “resources” 
at the bottom, and are most noted for the fact that they never punish their children. These 
children grow into responsible members of the world community precisely because their 
care-givers  follow the principles  that  ban all forms  of punishment  and cruelty against 
children as well as the animals they raise (Dentan, 1968). 
In this respect, even though the Moomin books are fictional, their ontology can be 
traced  in  ethnographic  reports  of  viable  communities  who  have  survived  despite  the 
globalised genocides of people, animals, and forests at the hands of the civilised. Contrary 
to the wilderness of Moominland, even the “tamed” and scaled down 1973 version of 
Charlie and the Chocolate Factory presents punishment, hierarchy, and discrimination as 
based on some presumed intrinsic and essential inferiority of the resources (such as slaves) 
and depicts abuse not only as natural, but also as coveted by the abusers and the abused 
themselves. As the reader is invited to join the tour of the mysterious factory through the 
experiences of the lottery winners, she learns the dark secret behind the factory doors that 
makes Willy Wonka's production the best and most famous in the world: slaves – animal 
slaves in  the persons of the squirrels and human slaves in  the persons of the Oompa-
Loompas. 
The text still favourably refers to slavery in the revised edition, even though the 
human slaves have changed from dark skinned pygmies in  the earlier  version to rosy-
white dwarfs in the revised book and are no longer from Africa but
“[i]mported direct from Loompaland,” said Mr. Wonka proudly (Dahl, 1973: 73). “...I 
shipped them all over here, every man, woman, and child in the Oompa-Loompa tribe. It 
was easy. I smuggled them over in large packing cases with holes in them.... They are 
wonderful workers. They all speak English now. They love dancing and music” (ibid: 
76). 
Positive descriptions of any form of slavery, human or animal, black or white in a book, 
especially in a children's book,  raises questions about the ethical principles in the book 
industry  as  well  as  about  the  ethical  stance  of its  readership.  It  becomes  even more 
puzzling, since having applied some cosmetic touches in the revision, Dahl left intact the 
179
Africa-specific fauna, descriptions, and raw material along with the favourable depiction 
of  slavery,  whereby  alluding  to  the  historical  interracial  relations  between 
capitalist/civilised  economies  and  exploited  colonies,  explicitly  chocolate  and  sugar 
plantations and, implicitly, everything else. 
The book tells us that these “primitive”, “miserable”, “wild” creatures cheer the 
colonial  master  because  they are  incapable  of making  anything  good  out  of  what  is 
available in their own Loompaland.
“And what  a  terrible  country  it  is!  Nothing but  thick jungles  infested  by the  most 
dangerous beasts in the entire world...  A whangdoodle would eat ten Oompa-Loompas 
for breakfast and come galloping back for a second helping. When I went out there, I 
found the little Oompa-Loompas living in tree-houses. They had to live in tree-houses to 
escape from the whangdoodles.... And they were practically starving to death. The were 
living  on  green  caterpillars,  and  the  caterpillars  tasted  revolting,  and  the  Oompa-
Loompas spent every moment of their days climbing through the treetops looking for 
other things to mash up with the caterpillars to make them taste better—red beetles, for 
instance, and eucalyptus leaves, and the bark of the bong-bong tree, all of them beastly, 
but not quite so beastly as the caterpillars. Poor little Oompa-Loompas! The one food 
that they longed for more than any other was the cacao bean. But they couldn’t get it. 
An Oompa-Loompa was lucky if he found three or four cacao beans a year. But oh, how 
they craved them. They used to dream about cacao beans all night and talk about them 
all day. You had only to mention the word ‘cacao’ to an Oompa-Loompa and he would 
start dribbling at the mouth. The cacao bean,” Mr. Wonka continued, “which grows on 
the cacao tree, happens to be the thing from which all chocolate is made.... I myself use 
billions of cacao beans every week in this factory. And so, my dear children, as soon as I 
discovered that the Oompa-Loompas were crazy for this particular food, I climbed up to 
their  tree-house  village  and  poked  my head in  through  the  door  of  the  tree  house 
belonging to the leader of the tribe. The poor little fellow, looking thin and starved, was 
sitting there trying to eat a bowl full of mashed-up green caterpillars without being sick. 
‘Look here,’ I said (speaking not in English, of course, but in Oompa-Loompish), ‘look 
here, if you and all your people will come back to my country and live in my factory, 
you  can  have  all the  cacao  beans  you  want!  I’ve  got  mountains  of  them  in  my 
storehouses! You can have cacao beans for every meal! ... I’ll even pay your wages in 
cacao beans if you wish!’
“’You really mean it?’ asked the Oompa-Loompa leader, leaping up from his chair.
“’Of course I mean it,’ I said. ‘And you can have chocolate as well. Chocolate tastes 
even better than cacao beans because it’s got milk and sugar added.’ 
“The little man gave a great whoop of joy and threw his bowl of mashed caterpillars 
right out of the tree-house window. ‘It’s a deal!’ he cried. ‘Come on! Let’s go!’
“So I shipped them all over here, every man, woman, and child in the Oompa-Loompa 
tribe. It was easy. I smuggled them over in large packing cases with holes in them, and 
they all got here safely. They are wonderful workers. They all speak English now. They 
love dancing and music.  They are always making up songs.  I expect you will hear a 
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good deal of singing today from time to time. I must warn you, though, that they are 
rather mischievous. They like jokes. They still wear the same kind of clothes they wore 
in the jungle. They insist upon that. The men, as you can see for yourselves across the 
river, wear only deerskins. The women wear leaves, and the children wear nothing at all. 
The women use fresh leaves every day….”
“Daddy!” shouted Veruca Salt. “Daddy! I want an Oompa-Loompa! I want an Oompa-
Loompa right away! I want to take  it home with me!”…  (Dahl, 1973: 73-77; italics 
mine).
As a thought experiment, imagine a best-selling children's book depicting an Arab sheikh 
poking his head into the window of an American, Canadian or European home. 
What he sees shocks him: miserable people and their children eating processed food, 
while there are pears growing all over the place and when it is pears they crave the most. 
“Oh, look at those poor, skinny fellows,” says the sheikh. “All those pears are growing 
around them and they can't even have them. I feel so sorry for you. If you come with me 
to Arabia and work for me in my factory making pear pies, you can have all the pears 
you want”.
When the tiny, skinny, and miserable American, Canadian, or European chief sees the 
sheikh's face and learns of his magnanimous intentions to save him from his misery, he 
welcomes the liberator and begs the sheikh to deliver all of the Americans, Canadians, 
or Europeans from their atrocious lot. Guided by the generosity of his heart, the sheikh 
grabs every child, woman, and man in the country, sticks them in a crate, pokes holes in 
it,  and smuggles them into Arabia where they live  happily ever  after  in his  factory, 
receive pears for wages, speak Arabic and sing and dance.
No  such  children's  book  exists,  undoubtedly  because  the  network  of  “international” 
academics,  literary critics and the publishing industry is not run by Arabs.  And even if 
such a book did manage to  come into existence,  the Eurocentric  and  North-American 
perspective would precipitate to denounce the message, point to the poor, propagandistic 
quality of such a text, and categorise it along with “enemy” (such as Al-Qaeda or Taliban)  
propaganda in which the sheikh would be labelled Hussein or Bin Laden – and we all 
know what happens to those kinds of people and their little helpers. 
In other words, this experimental version reflects exactly the same perspective as 
the ones informing Dahl's story, only here one ethnic group substitutes another: i.e. it  is 
based on exactly the same stereotypes, the same level of propaganda, and violence. Yet, it 
is not the denigration, objectification, and double-standards in this experimental variant 
that evokes the nervous laughter of surprise during most of my academic presentations on 
the subject, rather it is the Animal Farm outcome or the prospect of The Planet of the Apes 
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transpiring in this world accustomed to the current civilised order, a horrifying possibility 
where a persecuted (previously colonised) people might imagine doing to the oppressor 
what  the  oppressor  has  been  doing  to  them  all  along. It  is  this  tacit,  omnipresent 
knowledge and fear that drive the violent acts of racism. The people of power themselves 
have no need to panic or to commit the actual acts themselves, since holding the keys to 
oppression in  their  hands,  they can convince  easily  the  disempowered to  act  on their 
behalf for a  little  compensation.  The people of power,  actually,  refer to  themselves as 
“philanthropists”. The deprived then fill the ranks of armies, mercenaries, or commit racist 
and other phobic crimes. For instance,
Research examined the violent behaviour and the political consciousness of Canadian 
male  street  skinheads.  The  results  reveal  that  skinheads  are  drawn  from  homes 
characterized by extreme violence and oppression. These experiences leave these youths 
vulnerable  to  violent  behaviour.  These  tendencies  are  exacerbated  by  their  school 
experiences,  their  homelessness,  and  the  group  and  street  norms  that  support  and 
promote aggressive behaviour.  The political consciousness  of  skinheads is rooted in 
extreme violence and lacks coherence: this, combined with the structure of the groups 
and their histories of oppression, serves to inhibit long-term organized political activity 
(Baron, 1997).
Violence thus sets the tone for social relationships through a concrete socio-economic, 
political  and  educational  structure,  but  also  informs  some  of  the  most  favourite  of 
children's books.
Charlie and the Chocolate Factory  is today well known among the general and 
critical public. It has been translated into thirty two languages94 and awarded many prizes 
and nominations, even for the  first, overtly racist version. In 1972, it  received the New 
England Round Table of Children's Librarians Award in the U.S., and, in 1973, the same 
version received the Surrey School Award in the U.K.. The revised version received two 
more awards in U.K. In 2000: the Millennium Children's Book Award and the Blue Peter 
Book Award.  It  does  not  end  here,  however.  In  “Using  Roald  Dahl's  Charlie  and  the 
Chocolate  Factory  To  Teach  Different  Recruitment  and  Selection  Paradigms”,  Jon 
Billsberry and  Louise  H.  Gilbert  (2008)  have  elaborated  a  workshop  in  management 
education on how to apply both the 2005 film adaptation of Charlie and the Chocolate  
Factory and the book itself to teaching hiring strategies for a new management  and to 
elaborate the competitive process and its selection criteria, a system of “golden tickets” 
94  According to Billsberry and Gilbert (2008).
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and the marginalisation of large numbers of people that  has already been successfully 
applied  in  schools,  universities,  and their  funding programmes as well  as  in  the “real 
working world”. The authors praise the work in these words:
The  story  triumphs  the  ambition,  achievements,  and  values  (e.g.,  innovation  and 
honesty) of  the factory owner,Willy Wonka. Since its publication,  the name of Willy 
Wonka has become a byword for innovation, and the chocolate factory is the epitome of 
a successful but unconventional work environment and organizational culture,  as the 
following example illustrates. . . . In this way Wonka reveals the nature of his KSAs: He 
wants someone with particular terminal values (i.e., end states values), such as a belief 
that life should be fun and work should be “magic,” and instrumental values (i.e., ways 
of behaving), such as ingenuity, creativity, and common sense (Billsberry and Gilbert, 
2008).
In reality, what this ethic means is that workers should have the “right” attitude and enjoy 
working  for  the  owners,  even  when  overworking  for  minimum wage  at  Walmart  or 
cleaning public toilets. In contrast to Jansson, in both versions of his book Dahl depicts the 
forest as a deplorable place and the freedom to look for one's food as a detestable feat and 
presents slavery as a happy and desirable lot  for the Oompa-Loompas (though not for 
Charlie and Willy Wonka). The narrative tells us that it is “natural” for Oompa-Loompas 
to fail to access cacao beans – “an Oompa-Loompa was lucky if he found three or four 
beans a year” (Dahl, 1973: 73) – even though these plants and sugar are native to their  
land, but, despite being in a country where cacao beans do not grow, we are told that there 
is nothing strange or perverse about Willy Wonka's possession of unlimited supplies of the 
colonial products and nothing obscene in the power he enjoys in  offering the Oompa-
Loompas, in exchange for their lives, the beans that grow in their own homeland. In other 
words, Dahl's double standards are so fundamental and permeating his worldview that he 
fails to even see the irony95.
Furthermore, because they are so grateful, docile, and hard working, the cheerful 
and dim-witted Oompa-Loompas are in  high demand; yet  only the deserving have the 
right to possess them. Veruca Salt's demand to acquire an Oompa-Loompa, a chocolate 
river, and a squirrel sends her down the garbage chute, revealing the various niches in the 
hierarchy of slavery, ownership, and punishment – the “docile savage” gets to work, the 
“greedy competitor”  gets  eliminated,  etc.  Thus,  hierarchy and  injustice  are  explained, 
justified and reconfirmed, and the civilised reader finds satisfaction in the resolution and 
95 Even if he saw it, he failed to express it in the book.
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praises the book as one of the best exemplars of civilised children's literature.
Basically,  this  narrative  normalises  discrimination,  cruelty,  and  injustice,  and, 
within this logic, slavery (human and animal) emerges as a natural aspect of order. The 
forest, as a topos of civilised existence, becomes a dangerous place, even though in the 
real world it  allows wilderness to  prosper,  for,  together  with the sea,  the forest  is  the 
source  of  life  in  all  its  diversity  and  plenitude.  In  real  life,  the  forest  provides 
independence, since there is no reason for human and non-human animals to work for a 
master in a place where they are themselves capable of procuring their own livelihood. If a 
hierarchical, civilised order is to prevail, however, it becomes crucial to domesticate the 
dangerous,  independent  places,  and  the  strategy  of  focusing  on  the  narrative  of 
competition and  struggle supports that  end.  Ultimately,  it  works the same  way as the 
symbolic/real punishment: i.e., the narrative of horror is used to overwrite the reality of 
joy, and the ritual of competition naturalises the process of selecting rulers from a specific 
group of humans,  while  the  rest,  due to  their  assumed  natural inferiority and general 
inadequacy, are relegated to servitude,  a category justified by the narrative that depicts 
them as incapable of surviving, even in their own environments, without a slave-owner or, 
in the terminology of business administration, without the proprietor of human resources. 
For obvious reasons,  Dahl fails  to connect  starvation with private property and 
blames the victim for not being able to make anything of worth when, in fact, crops and 
lives  have  been  stolen  from  her  and  sealed  behind  locked  doors.  Evidently,  if  the 
foreigner96,  Willy  Wonka,  owns  endless  supplies  of sugar  and  cacao  beans,  while  the 
natives cannot access what naturally grows in their land, it  is  because that land and its 
crops have been stolen by the foreigner Willy Wonka. To rectify this wrong, Dahl's logic 
proceeds by spicing up the wound with pepper and salt: if to the stolen land and crops one 
adds children, women and men kidnapped for the purpose of slavery, then that will make 
the Oompa-Loompas  happy and  thereby will  right  the wrong.  Willy  Wonka  is  happy. 
Everybody is happy, and if there are readers who get depressed by this unbearable joy, 
well, they can get treated with chocolate, literature and pills. For a reader to find Dahl's 
96  Here, I mean “foreign” not in the geo-political sense, but in the sense that Willy Wonka is not part of the 
endemic community of life in that specific bio-sphere. He is native to another community and system 
that enters into an unequal, parasitic relationship of consumption of in this case the Oompa-Loompa 
sphere of life.
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scenario sensible – and the prizes and the sales of the book attest that millions of people, 
in  fact,  do  – certain  cerebral,  ethical,  and emotive  skills,  such as empathy or general 
reason must have atrophied or been prevented from developing97. 
Many  contemporary  children's  literary  theoreticians  either  fail  to  notice  this 
problem or intentionally ignore it98. The problem with a declared position of “neutrality” is 
that when a person speaks as a public voice,  claiming to be a “neutral” observer, even 
admirer, of a public work of art or theory that is built on fundamentally unethical premises 
necessarily makes the public speaker complicit with the oppressive position of the artist 
whose basic postulates are immoral, regardless of what discipline we approach that work. 
Neutrality is acquiescence to the  doxa of hierarchical power and parasitic relationships. 
The question is, how can one admire the “formidable intelligence” (Hunt, 2001: 56-57) of 
a  “highly  skilful  writer”  (ibid:  56)  who  dexterously  depicts  slavery,  kidnapping,  and 
extermination, such as Roald Dahl, and find aesthetic aspects to it? Public admiration of 
Mein Kampf, for instance, could strip a person of Canadian citizenship and other rights, 
such as freedom (see the case of Ernst Zündel [CBC news 2006]). Seen the gravity of the 
holocaust committed against the African and other indigenous and nomadic populations 
around the world, it  is puzzling that the fundamental precepts of Mein Kampf translated 
for children into a book such as Charlie and the Chocolate Factory continue to be praised. 
Even more serious than praise, however, is  the call to ignore the gravity of the ethical 
foundation of the work, such as expressed by a children's literary scholar, Peter Hunt, in 
his lament of the lack of “serious analysis or discussion... beyond polemic for or against” 
(ibid), even though “Dahl is probably the most successful worldwide children's author of 
the twentieth century, surpassed in sales only by the far more prolific Enid Blyton, and his 
popularity must say a great deal about and to the culture” (ibid). Blyton's “bad Gollywogs 
called  Nigger”  (ibid:  256)  were  characteristic  of  their  time,  writes  Hunt.  Because 
censorship was unfair towards the diary of Anne Frank and towards homosexuals, the text 
states,  “Roald Dahl's black pygmy slaves in  Charlie and the Chocolate Factory (1964) 
97 For a discussion on development and stifling of intellectual, emotive, and physiological abilities see 
AbdelRahim (2003 a) on “Modernism and Education”.
98 Among the few theoreticians of children's literature who take a clear stand against the racism and slavery 
in the book are John Rowe Townsend in Written for Children and Brycchan Carey (2003) in Reading Harry 
Potter: Critical Essays (ed. Giselle Liza Anatol) who makes an important critique as she compares and 
contrasts it to Rowling's motifs of slavery in the Harry Potter books.
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might  well  have  escaped notice  even ten years  before”  (ibid:  257)  particularly  since, 
according to the author, it is hard to find classic works that are not racist or sexist99.
Since,  traditionally,  the  “standards” of literary criticism  call  for  an “unbiased” 
examination and demand that theoreticians “rise above” the political “controversies”, lest 
their  texts be deemed propagandistic  or political,  it  is  easy for  people who access the 
privileged space of public speech, to side with the voice of power that silences its victims 
by depicting them as weak, impotent and without a voice, obtaining their relief from being 
exploited. In other words, because the voice in public discourse belongs to the people who 
have access to that domain and have the authority to silence those who do not have the 
same  privilege,  anything  they say or  leave  unsaid  plays  into  the  hands  of the  power 
structures and are,  in essence,  expressions of political stances,  even in  silence.  Hence, 
whether  intended or not,  a  call for  studies  of Dahl's  book to ignore its  economic and 
political ramifications becomes a call for collaboration with the oppressive forces of the 
holocaust. 
A former editor of children's books, Laura Atkins (2009) presented her research 
findings on racism in the publishing industry, where she observes that white privilege is 
ingrained in  the disposition,  comprehension,  identification with,  and  value of “white” 
narratives,  experience,  mores,  and characters.  Atkins observes that  works by people of 
colour are rarely read carefully by editors or marketing groups because these authors are 
assumed  to  be  so  burdened  by  racism  and  oppression  that  they  are  not  capable  of 
producing  anything of interest  (Atkins,  2009).  However,  even if  it  were the case that 
someone were overburdened by oppression and incapable of producing anything but  a 
narrative on oppression, the fact that those who are in a position of privilege (which is 
always at  the expense of this oppression) do not find that narrative interesting or even 
relevant to the lives of the people who do not perceive themselves as oppressed, in itself,  
says a great deal about silencing, the symbolic  and real economy of suffering, and the 
production of literature.
Furthermore, the phenomenon of  Roald Dahl and of his reception indicates that 
racism, discrimination, infliction of pain, and humiliation are not unfortunate side effects 
99  In 1996, Hunt and Ray also edited the International Companion Encyclopaedia of Children's Literature, 
in which other authors have contributed with essays about literature for children from around the world.
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or  insignificant  characteristics  of  civilised  society:  they are  in  high  demand  and  are 
therefore essential parts of the mechanism that regulates the unjust economy. If we trust 
the sales to be an indicator of their importance, they are central to civilised ontology, and 
the slave-master relations are often presented in literature and in literary theory as natural, 
even filled with gladness100. As mentioned earlier, in order to find plausible the connection 
between enslavement and happiness, one must first alienate oneself from the experience of 
the enslaved human or animal,  that  is,  one must  overcome the urge for  empathy and 
develop callousness instead. An important strategy to achieve apathy is identification. In 
this  sense,  civilised  ontology  provides  the  criteria  for  selection  and  identification  of 
specimens  as belonging  to  different  categories,  a  process  that  formulates  identity and 
limits the spectrum of choices for certain groups. Scholars of civilisation like John Zerzan 
(2008) or Jack Goody (1969) point to the hierarchical kinship structures that set in place 
gender inequalities as soon as the division of labour and symbolic representation made it  
possible to exploit groups based on some “physiological” characteristics. The mechanism 
that regulates agency and limits the spectrum of choice of some individuals or groups is 
depicted clearly in the example of Willy Wonka's contest, where the winner is carefully 
selected from a large number of participants in the contest in which all except for one are 
eliminated, and the prize is a world founded on slavery, stolen goods, locked doors, and 
artificial  food,  fauna,  and  light.  If  clearly  articulated  in  Charlie  and  the  Chocolate  
Factory, this foundation is often veiled in other books, such as Winnie-the-Pooh, diluted to 
the  point  of  appearing  to  be  almost  absent.  As  my  argument  suggests,  however,  this 
worldview is present  in the premises themselves,  and this seeming deviation to “Willy 
Wonka's  Chocolate  World  of  Slavery”  exposes  the  underlying  premises  that  are  less 
overtly present in the ontology of A.A. Milne.
100 Of course, I am not referring here to slave narratives or to abolitionists, such as the novel Roots by Alex 
Haley or children's authors, such as Christopher Paul Curtis or Margaret Peterson Haddix.
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Chapter 5: Construction of Identity: The Civilised Chore of Cleaning  
Out the Debris of Wilderness
Identification works on several levels and in various domains. On the one hand, it  
is  the process by which a person recognises certain shared traits or experiences in  the 
other. On the other hand, by identifying oneself with “fixed”101 categories, one also finds 
oneself  cut  off  from  the  emotive  and  economic  networks  of  “other”  categories. 
Identification  thus  helps  people  rationalise  inequality  and  structure  the  bullying  by 
identifying  individuals  and  categories,  ranking  them  on  a  scale  of  inferiority  and 
superiority and in terms of “in-group” and “outsiders”.
Extrapolating from Bourdieu's notion of symbolic capital, which is shared within 
usually locked groups in which outsiders are not allowed, and from Zerzan's critique of the 
symbolic as a tool of alienation, one can see how identification can be a useful tool that 
enables the identifier or the knower to erase individual personality traits, aspirations, self-
knowledge, knowledge and contexts by superimposing a general set of “descriptions” to 
explain  the  motivations,  actions,  culture  and  other  aspects of life  in  the  way that  the 
identifier  sees  fit.  Such  practice  of  silencing  and  effacement  curtails  the  social  and 
physical mobility of the persons  forced to  be members of the identified group.  Laura 
Atkins'  examples  from  the  publishing  industry,  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter, 
illustrates this point: if black people are oppressed, it  signals to the people who do not 
perceive themselves as oppressed (i.e. they instead project a feeling of empowerment) and 
who control the public voice (such as editors, publishers, and “representatives” who speak 
on behalf of and represent  others)  that  most  black people as a group cannot  be  equal 
participants on par with the writers who are perceived as not oppressed in the creation of 
literary works and their social and material capital. 
In other words, this “knowledge” of “oppression” is taken to legitimate the further 
abuse and marginalisation of the oppressed, locking them in a claustrophobic space with 
no exit and no voice. This essentialism also applies to the “exceptions-to-the-rule”, which 
101 Lesley Milroy's (1987) work on linguistic networks and the shifting usage of colloquialisms to signal 
one's identity inspired my reflections on the relationship between identity and the closed systems of access 
in civilisation versus wilderness.
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are often taken to  prove  the  rule.  It  interferes  with  the possibility of those  who  feel 
empowered  to  building  personalised  knowledge  of  the  other's  experience  by actually 
listening to that voice,  empathising with that experience and engaging in a dialogue of 
equals.  Interpretative  formulae  and  grammar  rules  here  impede  understanding  and 
dialogue, which can occur only if both interlocutors approach each encounter as a unique 
occurrence, as a new, clean leaf. Instead, the categorisation of others and identification of 
them  by  the  knower  precludes  this  possibility  of  engagement  in  any  meaningful 
interaction  particularly  when  the  knower  applies  a  category such  as  “resources”  that 
creates a space for the knowledge that refuses to know but justifies oppression in which 
disparity, even enslavement, become a mechanistic calculation, a fact of nature. Moreover, 
no matter how perverse and outrageous, the civilised construct and present exploitation of 
the  disempowered  as  an  act  of  altruism.  In  this  logic,  the  powerful  can  help  the 
disempowered, the weak and the helpless, by exploiting their needs, fears, time, and effort 
for a pay that keeps them disempowered and in need because it is necessarily lower than 
what the exploiter earns, which subsequently allows for the exploiter to have time and to 
be able to invest it in other lucrative ventures, thereby permitting the exploiter to continue 
to gain earnings above and beyond whatever the victim receives. That is, the victim gets 
recompensed in a way commensurate to what the “market” or the “employer”,  i.e.  the 
oppressor, identifies as the victim's worth based on the category ascribed to him or her. 
Because these categories, identification, and hierarchy have been naturalised and drilled 
into  people  from  early  childhood,  even  when  the  reader,  on  the  level  of  ideology, 
dismisses this as funny fiction and “of course we all know that this is not real”, on the 
level of doxa, the reader identifies with these disparities and injustices as normal socio-
economic relations and takes the author's word at face value on that a portion of cacao 
beans offers a satisfactory pay cheque to the Oompa-Loompas.
In this way, the socially constructed concept of “weakness” plays into the power 
structure of hierarchy and  further  exploits  the lack  of agency rendering  the  exploited 
victim even weaker and in debt but rationalising this as the nature of human relations. The 
rationale amounts to the following: if the victim is little and miserable, he or she deserves 
to be a victim and miserable (the Oompa-Loompas are short and, before Willy Wonka's 
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“rescue”, are abject)102. While I discuss this more thoroughly in part III of my work, it is 
relevant to mention here that the economy of discrimination is founded on the myth that in 
wilderness, natural selection would have exterminated the weak, but that civilisation made 
the powerful humane because they have supposedly allowed the weak to live. Therefore, 
argument  goes,  the  weak,  the  short,  the  silenced,  and  the  disempowered  owe  the 
empowered people for having been allowed to live, which they supposedly could not have 
done had the empowered abstained from exploiting them. The economy of discrimination 
is  thus  a  priori  an  economy  of  debt  and  obligation:  the  short  people  are  seen  as 
undeserving of the same monetary appreciation as tall people are, because they owe the 
tall people; the darker people owe the lighter people; the women owe the men; the Zulu 
are indebted to the Dutch; the animals to humanity; ad infinitum. 
Defining the victim as owing and in debt also constructs the image of the poor as 
dangerous parasites whose needs threaten the powerful people's possessions and symbolic 
capital, thereby inverting the roles in the public narrative and in the literature that depicts 
these relations. The master thus not only identifies the slave's worth, but also defines the 
terms for and the meaning of the slave's existence, which surprisingly (or not) happens to 
be contingent on the master's profit. Here, the good slave is the happy, singing one, the 
one who gladly accepts this lot,  obeys  the master,  expresses gratitude for slavery,  and 
harbours no aspiration for agency over her life103.
Not  only is  identity needed  to  categorise  resources  and  such,  it  also  plays  an 
integral part in turning people into murder weapons that  help keep the resources under 
control. This is  evident in how both the legal and the illegal groups organise and mark 
themselves. For instance, the turn of the twentieth century sociologist, Edwin Sutherland 
(1937), published a professional thief's journal among other work on crime bringing to the 
attention of the academic community and the “general” public the strong code of honour 
in the underground networking between professional thieves throughout the U.S.A. of the 
1930s (Sutherland, 1937). Studies like those of Francis Lord (1960) or Mark Dunkelman 
102 Endless polls and statistics indicate the racial and height discrimination in salaries: taller and blonder 
people get higher pay. Again, see Timothy A. Judge et al 1994, 2004 or Nicola Persico, Andrew Postlewaite 
and Dan Silverman (2004).
103 Andrew O'Malley (2003) and Gillian Avery (1975) discuss the creation of the hard working and docile 
character in English literature to serve the higher classes. 
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(2004) talk about the strong identity and code of honour in the military, where soldiers 
often use tattooing and body markings,  just  like their  illegal counterparts,  such as the 
Mafia,  as  symbols  of belonging  to  their  regiment  or division;  these distinctions make 
everyone else an outsider and a potential threat to the group. None of these groups would 
be effective as killing machines without  these strong convictions and justifications for 
group violence, symbolism and identity.
Other  examples  of  terms  that  are  important  for  fostering  identity  and  that 
demonstrate  how  tightly  interwoven  it  is  with  the  rights  to  economic  and  social 
participation are the “illegal alien” versus “citizen”, which binds people and animals to 
specific  zones  and  occupations.  Hence,  Turks  become  illegal  if  they  enter  Germany 
without  a  visa,  but  everyone  knows  that  they  would  be  forced  to  do  the  jobs  that 
“German” people prefer not to do; or Gypsies are ousted from most economies; Mexicans 
are captured for  hard labour  camps  to build  the wall in  the south of the U.S. against  
themselves, the “illegal alien Mexicans”; and so forth. Since in a domesticated order most 
people themselves constitute resources,  identity becomes the fundamental expression of 
the structure of civilisation, with nationalism, racism, sexism, and speciesism as its most 
notorious manifestations in which plants,  insects,  animals,  and many,  mostly people of 
colour, occupy the lowest ranks in civilised economic networks. In other words, personal 
identity functions by alienating constituents from each other and social identity works on 
the  basis  of  assigning  commonalities  –  such  as  shared  origins,  blood,  a  mythical  or 
historical figure or experience –  that differentiate one group of people from another. 
Self  identification  and  being  identified  by  others  are  therefore  important 
mechanisms of control of access to material and symbolic resources in civilised society 
with severe repercussions that touch on all the aspects of the lives of identified persons or 
groups. And even though the various details of the demarcation lines may shift over time 
and liberate a group, these variations work to mask the details of discrimination, but do 
nothing to eradicate the system or the structure itself. For instance, white women invent 
feminism and finally some of them reach a stage when they can boast more access to well-
paid jobs, but at the same time, much higher numbers of impoverished African women or 
Asian children pay the price in the “exported” dirty businesses which the upper middle 
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class white women no longer do and so import women from the “third world” on “live-in-
nanny” and other “domestic” visas, in the manner of the Oompa-Loompas, to live with 
their  “employers” and provide them child-care,  senior-care,  and housekeeping services 
with  the  stay  permits  contingent  on  the  satisfaction  of  the  employer  (Anthias  and 
Lazaridis, 2000)104.
Servitude is  taken for granted in civilised society where many human and non-
human animals are expected to provide services for select human animals in exchange for 
the right  to  eat  and live.  In fact,  “service society”  is  a  title  worn with pride.  Studies 
indicate that even among members of the same ethnic and gender categories (e.g. white 
men or white women), there are differences in income according to height, the colour of 
the eyes and hair105  in  favour of the taller and lighter coloured individuals (Johnston, 
2010; Judge & Cable, 2004; Presico et al., 2001), which is, once again, reflected in Willy 
Wonka's exploitation dynamics: the Oompa-Loompas are short (and used to be dark until 
Dahl was ordered to lighten them up) and consistent with the “blame the victim” position, 
since gain in height is proportionate to academic success and both are proportionate to the 
wealth and nourishment one receives in childhood (Glewwe, Jacoby & King, June 2000): 
the poorer one is as a child, the more she will be punished as an adult.
For  the  knower,  therefore,  external  and  “knowable”  features  of  the  “other” 
constitute reasonable criteria for identifying the “other”. Also, a claim to knowledge of the 
internal mechanisms and meaning of the “other” in this system gives the “knower” the 
104  Sexual and other abuse and exploitation is the highest in this group. In the recent years, feminist 
research has been focusing on the gendered migration and sexual exploitation of third world women 
coming to to replace the upwardly mobile, mostly white and middle-class women. Particularly 
interesting is the work of Ehrenreich and Hochschild's Global Woman (2002), Bonnie Fox's (editor) 
Hidden in the Household (1980), Nona Grandea's Uneven Gains: Filipina Domestic Workers in Canada 
(1996), among others. All of this research points to the direct connection between industrialisation of 
production and reproduction. Child bearing, child-rearing, the making of things, the sexual intercourse, 
pleasures and suffering, everything in this system of things acquires a value and undergoes adjustment 
following the categories of the “resources” and the “market” regulated price of their relationships. Also, 
for sociological, anthropological, and economic data see such works as Nicola Piper's (2003) Wife or 
worker? : Asian Women and Migration; Babara Ehrenreich, and Arlie Russell Hochschild's Global 
Woman.: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy (2002) ; Hondagneu-Sotelo's (2001) 
Doméstica: Immigrant Workers Cleaning and Caring in the Shadow of Affluence, Nona Grandea's 
Uneven Gains : Filipina Domestic Workers in Canada; among others.
105 As discussed earlier, endless polls and statistics indicate the racial and height discrimination in salaries: 
taller and blonder people get higher pay. See 1994 study published at Cornell University  by Timothy A. 
Judge, Daniel M. Cable and Boudreau, also their 2004 updated publication, or Nicola Persico, Andrew 
Postlewaite and Dan Silverman (2004).
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right and the power to place others into categories, an act that has dire consequences for 
the lives of the objects of knowledge. In sum, identification of people and animals plays 
an important  role  in  the selection process of inclusion in  or exclusion from economic 
networks  of  those  designated as  in-group  members  and  as  outsiders:  thus,  a  monkey 
cannot be a human, a Zulu cannot be a Tamil,  a Japanese cannot be an Anglo-Saxon, a 
prostitute cannot  be a queen106, one i.d.  number,  e.g.: 573, cannot  be valid  for anyone 
except its holder who can be identified even in an ice-cave in Antarctica, and Mohamed 
cannot be Ingrid, just to take a few random examples. Even intimate personal preferences 
and  practices,  such  as  sexuality,  are  thrust  into  the  claustrophobic  categories  of 
permanence and knowledge in which people have to choose once and for all whether they 
are homosexual,  heterosexual,  bisexual,  or transsexual because personal taste in sexual 
partners at any moment in the civilised system is taken to reflect the totality of the person 
as foreverwas and foreverafter and define her once and for all, again, for the purpose of 
determining her economic and social networks107. Regardless of the domain of knowledge 
– be it  science or folklore – exploring the place of humans in the world as fixed in a 
specific  topos,  requires  the  assumption  of  a  definite  identity  and  hence  needs  the 
construction of essential qualities that  can then be  organised  into  categories  based on 
differentiation from some and assimilation into others, thereby constituting a useful tool 
for domestication.
 With this concept  of identity,  which is  at the basis of economic injustices and 
discrimination, comes the notion of “purity” or “cleanliness” which entails purging and 
eliminating anything “foreign” or “other” from the possibility of accessing the “rightfully” 
owned resources.  The concept of identity consists of an assemblage of fixed, essentialist 
106 Identity may be “upgraded” or modified, or there could be multiple identities, however, each one is used 
to access the specific network to which others are denied access. Thus, a queen cannot be a prostitute at the 
same time. She can become one, but membership in the club of royalties will be denied to her forever. 
Another example is the even suspected membership in Al-Qaeda would banish a Canadian citizen, for 
example, from participation in Canadian rights and privileges. Lesley Milroy (1987) has discussed the 
linguistic aspects of marking various identities and George Bernard Shaw raises the question of class 
exclusions according to the identity of the speaker in Pygmalion and the economic and social repercussions 
by being discovered to be an “imposter”. Bourdieu discusses at length in various works the elaborated 
system of devaluating knowledge and symbolic capital to shut off access, participation and belonging by 
economically alienated classes, for example see his book Distinction.
107 Jim Sinclair (2005) has written and spoken extensively against this trend and the totalitarianism of 
“curing” from autism and the demand of society for clear and permanent gender and sexual identities and 
allegiance. Demonstrating by personal example, Sinclair believes that people have a right to be neuter and 
asexual as well as autistic.
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traits whose ultimate goal is to highlight distinctions between one category and another 
and thus secure rights of access to resources. It is an ontological construct of the self that  
requires self-awareness  as being  different  from the awareness  of others.  For  instance, 
when Canadians are asked what makes them Canadian, most respond that Canadians are 
not Americans108. Identity thus expresses the premises of domestication because it plays an 
important role in juxtaposing persons and peoples in a context of competition or even war, 
i.e.  fighting  for  symbolic  or  material  resources,  and  hence  proper  names  and 
professional/personal identities become important  during  a selection process for  a  job: 
what  I  can  do  and  what  I  have  been  doing.  However,  when  dealing  with  police  or 
authority, it  is the valid numbers on identity cards, address, race, gender,  inter alia, that 
play  the  more  important  role  in  negotiating  bills,  taxes,  fines,  etc.  that  are  the 
responsibility or the right of one person and no one else. 
Furthermore,  the process for identifying privilege and rights on the nation-state 
level  is  driven  by  the  same  mechanism  and  obeys  the  same  rules  as  the  one  that 
circumscribes personal and ethnic identity, since identification entails the lack of rights of 
all to the privileges and resources of some: for example, nobody around the world has the 
right  to  participate  in  the  economic  structure  of  France  except  for  people  who  are 
identified as, both, human and French citizens. In this sense, the system of identification is 
always based on separating those who are defined as resources from their overseers and 
owners  and  hence  eliminates  the  resources  from participating  in  the  socio-economic 
networks of the empowered and enriched and from accessing their  symbolic,  cultural, 
geographic, and geopolitical space.
In  contrast,  in  wilderness,  “rights” are  an egalitarian concept  and  a  constantly 
shifting practice: everyone has the right to live, feed, drink, enjoy leisure, etc. Here, needs 
and access options constantly rotate. Disputes happen, but, most of the time, creatures pass 
by each other calmly on the way to the waterhole. In civilisation, rights are not universal 
and access to waterholes, including lakes, sea-ports, beaches, among others, is structured 
through the concept of permanence – a concept that fuels the classification system that 
categorises in different groups those who have the right to own something or someplace 
108 Seymour Martin Lipset (2001) uses the word “distinguish” throughout his essay on Canadian Identity, 
chapter 9 in Ksenych's Conflict, Order and Action: Readings in Sociology (2001).
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and those who do not109.  Dispossession and empowerment  in this ontological construct 
also become permanent.
Against  this  backdrop,  the  books  and  worldviews  of both Nosov and  Jansson 
explicitly reject the civilised order. The concept of “work” – particularly when carried out 
for someone else's  profit  or in  exchange for wages – is  totally absent  in Moominland, 
where even a “general cleaning” session can prove fatal: we learn from Moominpappa's  
Memoirs that  Sniff's  grandparents  have  vanished  during  a  spring  cleaning  operation 
leaving his father, the Muddler110, an orphan, and a general cleaning session nearly kills 
the  Fillyjonk  in  the  last  book,  Late  in  November. In  other  words,  Jansson  upholds 
biodiversity even in  questions  of personal  hygiene.  Moreover,  excessive  cleaning  and 
washing point to a lack of real interest in a person and the absence of the ability to love. In 
the orphanage, Moominpappa tells in his memoirs,
There were a lot of us, and we all soon became grave and tidy youngsters, because the 
Hemulen had a most solid character and used to wash us more often than she kissed us 
(Jansson, 1969: 9). 
In contrast, the concept that hard work and cleaning are the inevitable aspects of human 
experience and indispensable for survival,  is  at  the centre of civilised ontology,  where 
non-human  living  organisms  are  presented as  a  threat  to  humans  – if  they cannot  be 
rendered useful to humans, they must be subdued, cleaned, and eradicated. This attitude 
fuels the civilised obsession with shaved lawns, armpits and worse, “cleaning” products, 
antibiotics, vaccinations, inter alia. These attempts to kill all the germs, viruses, bacteria, 
worms,  insects,  “pests”,  “weeds”,  and  all  possible  competition  to  ownership,  end  up 
creating resistance and with it the conditions for breeding super-immune forms of life who 
respond to the war launched by humans with their own counter-attack. 
As anthropologist Mary Douglas (1988) proposes in her seminal work Purity and 
Danger,  conceptions  of  dirt  and  cleanliness  are  cultural  constructs.  In  some  places, 
categories of cleanliness and pollution have materialised in the culture of rituals that re-
enact distinctions and taboos on a daily basis and cost hours and hours of daily slave or 
109 In this regard, Werner Troesken  (2004) conducted illuminating research on the history of control over 
water and black disempowerment, titled: Water, Race, and Disease  or the anthropological work of Paul 
Gelles (2000) titled: Water and Power in Highland Peru.
110 Page 23 in the first version, The Exploits of Moominpappa and page 26 in the revised Moominpappa's  
Memoirs.
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domestic (housewife) labour. Douglas illustrates her point with an in-depth analysis of the 
“Abominations of Leviticus” and explains how these categories of cleanliness become part 
of the categories of identity. Examples abound, Muslims see the non-Muslims as unclean 
because  they do  not  follow the Islamic  ritual of ablutions  and strict  prescriptions  for 
personal hygiene,  and eat  “uncleanly”  slaughtered animals  and pork,  which is  seen as 
unclean in itself. Jews have the derogatory category of goi'ĭm or gôy for the non-Jews or 
the Jews who don't know much about Judaism and the strict rules for the cleanliness and 
holiness  of food.  These  are  some  of  the  aspects  of  identity  that  are  connected  with 
concepts  of  cleanliness  and  discrimination.  In  other  words,  categories  of  cleanliness 
identify those who would be deemed dirtier,  inferior,  and in  need of civilising, which 
means  domesticated  and  exploited,  even  when  some  Muslims  and  Jews  attempt  to 
downplay the importance of these categories and compensate them with the notion of 
“tolerance”111.  Notwithstanding,  the distinctions  are  there in  the  basic  precepts  of the 
domesticated ontologies.
Comparing the concepts of cleanliness with Moominland, Flower Town once again 
proves to be a compromise between the ontologies of civilisation and wilderness. While 
most mites in Dunno's world choose to be hard-working, occupations express individual 
passions. However, unlike in Moominvalley, where obsession with tidiness and cleanliness 
occurs at the expense of love and can even prove deadly, the residents of Flower Town 
value neatness. Nevertheless, Dunno's lack of commitment to washing and cleaning, as 
well as his resistance to literacy, are tolerated. In extreme cases, hygiene can become an 
issue when it  disturbs the community,  as when in Sunny City,  Dunno and Buttonette112 
pressure Smudges  Bright113 to  wash himself  and  to  brush his  teeth.  Still,  because  the 
characters  are  depicted  as  striving  towards  the  maximum freedom of self-expression, 
neither work nor learning nor cleanliness is imposed and, in this way, Flower Town mites 
too echo the principles of the Semai, where the public opinion and general consent are the 
111 To tolerate means to bear something unpleasant. The moomins do not have to “tolerate”, because 
difference doesn't bother them. They assume the world to be varied and if there is something unpleasant, 
it does not mean that someone else might not like it. Therefore, they do not “tolerate” the old candy-man, 
they are sincerely curious and happy to explore. And when the visit turns unpleasant, they thank him and 
leave. The same with the antlion. 
112 Кнопочка in the original (translation mine).
113 Пачкуля Пёстренький in the original (translation mine).
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most  effective  means  of guarding  the community  against  disruptions  of harmony,  not 
coercion and subjugation (Dentan, 1968). 
In a nutshell,  the genesis of a literary world,  such as illustrated above with the 
opening of the Moominbooks,  is  tightly connected with how the author conceives the 
creation of the world and the mundane interactions of characters (and humans) in and with 
that world. Knowing themselves as only small particles among the wide diversity of the 
universe prompts the characters to make choices in favour of diversity and the reality of 
other  beings  and  life  becomes  vital  for  the  characters'  life,  just  as  the  other's  pain, 
deception or falsehood has repercussions on the quality of their own lives. Questions of 
hierarchy, hygiene, food, labour, and economy are thus contingent on the perspective of 
the actors and on how they relate to other living beings and even to non-living matter.  
Understanding  genesis  leads to  questions  of identity  and kinship,  and,  in  the case  of 
moomintrolls, they reach beyond the horizons. They enter wilderness with trust, learn how 
to empathise with it, how to live with it and by learning how to live in it, they regain their 
own wilderness. 
This stands in stark contrast to the civilised narrative, such as projected in Charlie  
and  the  Chocolate  Factory. In  the  case  of  civilisation,  empathy  gets  in  the  way  of 
“cleaning” the civilised  space of competition and  independence. One of the strategies 
towards the “cleaning” and civilising goal of domestication is ordered “knowledge” and an 
efficient  mechanism of  identification.  The  end  of  this  civilised  knowledge,  again  so 
explicitly described by Roald Dahl,  is an ordered society and a subdued and dominated 
nature  by  means  of  deception,  falsehood,  inequality,  alienation,  objectification,  and 
cruelty. There, the goal is not biodiversity, but monogeneity: one compact socio-economic 
body  comprised  of  one  species:  the  human,  with  everything  else  (including  the 
dehumanised humans) turned into resources for that group.
Identity becomes a fundamental vehicle of this knowledge and civilised narrative 
gives it its form and voice by means of symbolic representation. This relationship between 
civilisation, alienation, (un)knowledge, and identity is  fostered by the civilising process 
itself,  because in  order  to  successfully  domesticate,  the  domesticator  must  be  able  to 
identify  the  resources,  then  separate  himself  from his  victim  and  objectify  “it”  as  a 
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“resource”, and since the suffering of the objectified victim gets ignored and overwritten 
with this “knowledge” of what the victim “is” and of what she wants or needs, or what her 
purpose in life is, one can conclude that this knowledge itself justifies torture. 
Anthropologists have paid endless attention to various sado-masochistic  cultural 
rituals – spanning the spectrum from as drastic as genital mutilation to as subtle as grading 
or beauty contests, and, in this respect, the knowledge of classification, discrimination and 
apathy  is  constantly  re-enacted  in  elaborate  rituals  that  reinforce  these  categories 
inscribing them as reflexes in habitus, doxa and body hexis on both the anatomical and the 
cognitive levels of civilised beings.  The outcome is the concept of identity – a sum of 
feelings, “facts”, reactions, dispositions, and a certain order.
Chapter  6:  Honey  like  Chocolate:  the  Names  and  the  Whys  of  
Existence
Even though,  at  first  glance,  the 100 Aker  Wood may appear  simpler  than the 
children's books discussed above, it still contains many of the archetypes and concepts of 
civilised  ontology.  The  topoi of forest  and  water,  for  example,  figure  throughout  the 
books. Although the concepts of work and cleanliness are not as clearly articulated, there 
is a brief scene at the end of chapter two in which Christopher Robin takes a bath, and, 
because it  is  presented in such a matter-of-fact manner, it  is  easy to miss its relevance. 
Nevertheless,  it  makes sense when understood within the ontological hierarchy of the 
book, since its characters are divided into the “real” human (one character plus the voice 
of the narrator) and the “unreal”, the “toys”, which is everybody else. The basic premise in 
the narrative assumes  that  whatever  applies  to  the human does  not  apply to  the toys. 
Hence, if in the real world, people take baths, and since Christopher Robin is real, then 
this is what he does; he minds his cleanliness, while nobody else in the 100 Aker Wood 
needs to do that. This cleanliness not only sets him apart as “real” “human” identity, but  
also conveys the civilised purity of the human boy.
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In the context that the realness of Christopher Robin justifies his rank as head of 
the  kingdom (the  kingdom,  after  all,  is  the  result  of what  goes  on in  his  head),  the 
remaining characters are by implication juxtaposed to him – they are not real and therefore 
have no purpose, no yearning, no dreams and no head to dream, no heart to yearn, no 
reason for purpose. In other words, they are fake and anything goes in the artificial world, 
so we need not bother with long dark scary nights, wondering what they may be feeling, 
what it is like to be them or try to ease their lot, like Moomintroll does with the Groke.
Perhaps  the  emotionally  undemanding  narrative  earned  its  high  popularity  in 
civilised culture precisely because it  allows the reader to indulge in apathy, which is a 
precondition for domestication. Apathy and despair impel a person to submit to the order 
that  be and express gladness when domesticated.  When domesticating,  one also needs 
apathy in order to objectify these others who are rendered less real than oneself. Thus, the 
reader  can  laugh  at  the  characters'  nonsensical fidgeting,  be  amused  by their  cruelty, 
avarice, and deceit, and be able to easily dismiss their suffering, just as most readers do 
with the children, the squirrels and the Oompa-Loompas at Willy Wonka's factory or any 
other factory in the world, for that matter.
The realness of the  human Christopher Robin thus sets out the hierarchy of the 
characters' worth. Since the others are all toys, i.e. replicas, and their falseness objectifies 
and subjugates them vis-à-vis the human, who is the real agent in his domain of replicas 
deceiving one another, even if he is not agent enough in his relationship with the narrator, 
who, in this case, is the author himself and his real-life progenitor. This hierarchy is set 
right in the opening paragraph:
If you happen to have read another book about Christopher Robin, you may remember 
that he once had a swan (or the swan had Christopher Robin, I don't know which) and 
that he used to call this swan Pooh. That was a long time ago, and when we said good-
bye, we took the name with us, as we didn't think the swan would want it any more. 
Well,  when  Edward Bear  said that  he  would  like  an exciting  name  all  to himself, 
Christopher Robin said at once, without stopping to think, that he was Winnie-the-Pooh. 
And he was (Milne, 1992, introduction).
In contrast to Moominland that opens onto the depth of a dark forest, Winnie-the-Pooh 
begins with civilisation in both the Introduction and the first chapter, which takes place 
indoors: the introduction refers to a previous text, presents the concept of possession, and 
199
imbues the human character with the power to name. The monarchical structure of the 100 
Aker Wood places Christopher Robin as the head of the kingdom and a being apart with 
no  kinship  to  the  other  dwellers  of  the  Wood.  This  separateness  and  otherness  is 
enunciated both at the beginning of the narrative and at the end where Christopher Robin 
is the only one free to break out of the locked space – in which everyone lives “behind a 
door” in their “own” place and “under the name of” – and is the only one able to transition 
into the “real” world.
Of course, both the act of naming and the reference to the world as a pre-existent  
textual reality (the mentioned but non-existent earlier book) tap into the biblical topos of 
creation as interpreted through a civilised lens. In this sense, the biblical account offers an 
interpretation of the genesis of the civilised species as the possessors of language as a tool 
of expropriation and  death.  In  Winnie the  Pooh, this  topos  naturalises  ownership  and 
hierarchy by presenting a parallel between the creation of Man as owner and namer of the 
world and of Christopher Robin as owner and namer of his. The similarity of the above 
quoted passage from Winnie-the-Pooh with Genesis 2:18-19 is striking:
Then the LORD God said, “It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him 
a helper fit for him.” 19 So out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the 
field and every bird of the air, and brought them to the man to see what he would call 
them; and whatever the man called every living creature, that was its name.
The 19th century biblical scholar Julius Wellhausen suggested in his literary criticism of 
the Bible that there are different perspectives and voices throughout the Old and the New 
Testaments revealing several different sources at work in recording the biblical texts. The 
interpretation of Man as the namer thus appears to be the civilised “evolutionary” human 
and contests the image of man the creature of divine wilderness. 
Daniel Quinn (1993, 1997 and 1998) elaborated these differences in terms of the 
nomadic perspective versus the sedentary agriculturalist  point  of view arguing that  the 
original perspective in the biblical rendition of the Fall of Man is the wild warning of the 
effects of the overpowering colonising agriculture. Another contemporary biblical scholar, 
Christine Hayes,  points to the expressly vegan, gatherer diet  that God specified for the 
humans and which reveals  the original voice of wilderness  in  depicting an egalitarian 
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creation of humans and animals114:
1:29 And God said, “Behold, I have given you every plant yielding seed which is 
upon the face of all the earth, and every tree with seed in its fruit; you shall have them 
for food.
1:30 And to every beast of the earth, and to every bird of the air, and to everything 
that creeps on the earth, everything that has the breath of life, I have given every green 
plant for food.” And it was so.
1:31 And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good. And 
there was evening and there was morning, a sixth day.
The two humans in the Bible are created on the sixth day when the other animals were 
ordered to come forth from the earth (1:24-26), and everyone alive, including the human 
beings, were to eat seeds, fruits, and greens. Hayes enunciates that there meant to be no 
competition  between  the  species  in  this  version  of  creation,  and  there  was  no 
domestication:  no  chicken soup,  no  cattle,  no  milk,  all  of which  came  much  later  as 
humans  persistently  disobeyed  and  continuously  bargained  for  a  stronger,  more  equal 
position with God (Hayes, 2006).
When extending his parallel with the biblical topos,  again,  unlike Jansson who 
favours the wild, the free, and the criminal (Moses, for instance), Milne focuses on the 
domesticated sources for the narrative elaborating the distinction between the human and 
the rest of the creatures. Thus, the narrative presents Christopher Robin and his world as 
pre-existent to the 100 Aker Wood and as its namer and the possessor of names. Extended 
further, this idea presents Christopher Robin as the creator of the 100 Aker World, and his 
superiority is therefore much more pronounced than even in the most civilised of the many 
biblical  interpretations.  Like Willy  Wonka's slaves,  Milne projects Winnie-the-Pooh as 
dependent on his master for name and for brain (he keeps repeating that he is a bear of 
very little brain), because Pooh cannot know or name himself, again, in contrast with both 
Flower Town and Moominland, where names matter only in as much as the reader needs 
to know who she is reading about, but in reality, the moomin characters are characterised 
by their lives and in mite towns by their deeds the ultimate end of which is love expressed 
by the principle of letting the other be and helping the other be what the other desires to 
be.
114 Christine Hayes, Yale University course, “Introduction to the Old Testament”, fall 2006.
201
This principle of love that is  expressed in helping the other to achieve harmony 
with the self and with the world manifest itself in the way these loving beings organise 
their space and open it to the needs of others, regardless of how different these needs and 
the characters might be. Once again, the conception of the genesis of Winnie-the-Pooh's 
world  itself  betrays  the  civilised  perspectives  underlying  the  taken  for  granted 
architectural  structures  –  a  conception  that  orders  that  world's  space  and  binds  the 
characters  in  relationships  of pain calling  them love  and  contrasting  starkly with  the 
anarchist space of Dunno and the anarcho primitivist wilderness of the moomins, where 
love is expressed in the characters' respect for difference, diversity, and total freedom.
Writing from a civilised space and researching the civilised historical accounts on 
hospitals and architecture, Michel Foucault (1979) observes that the organisation of space 
is one of the most important elements of control, for space and architecture constitute, at 
once, the resources to be exploited and controlled and the system that controls its dwellers 
and  users.  From  an  anthropological  perspective,  Amos  Rapoport  makes  valuable 
contributions in his essay on the “Spatial Organization and the Built  Environment” (in 
Ingold,  1997),  where  he  describes  architecture  as  a  purposeful  human  (and,  earlier, 
hominid)  activity  that  organises  the  environment,  which  makes  it  impossible  for 
architecture to be chaotic, for it  is always a social, cultural and intentional activity with 
purpose (ibid:  460).  Rapoport  adds that  for  a better understanding of society:  “It  then 
becomes  necessary  to  understand  the  particular  order  and  its  underlying  spatial  and 
conceptual organization. For example, whereas in the West built environments tend to be 
characterized by geometrical design, the principles that structure the environment of non-
Western societies may be social, ritual or symbolic in nature” (ibid: 460-461). As Ingold 
observes, the nomadic people,  such as the Sami of Scandinavia or the Bedouins of the 
Middle East and Africa, dwell in the world as part of that world and their goal is to modify 
it as little as possible within the span of their lives, which they view as a transition towards 
different dimensions. Their concept of time and space is infinite and their life-view is what 
Marshall Sahlins designates as the position of true affluence. These dispositions reveal 
themselves in their relationship to the world as modest dwellers in a wild universe that 
exists for its own sake. Here, the concept of love entails the assurance that the beloved 
remains immortal because he or she continues to (co)exist and not as an object of pleasure 
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and  consumption,  but  as  an  agent  moving  through  life.  More  than  any  other 
anthropological endeavour,  architectural practices convey this  concept  of love  through 
humbleness  and  the  feeling  of  eternity  through  interaction  with  the  environment  as 
insignificant mortals.
Evidently,  the  geometry that  seems  orderly  and  meaningful  to  carriers  of  one 
culture may appear  as chaotic  and  meaningless  to  the carriers of another.  Ingold  and 
Rapoport (in Ingold, 1997) point out that human relations can be revealed in the details of 
how individuals choose to adjust the direction of the entrance to their dwellings thereby 
indicating  kinships  and  relationships  within  the  group,  as  some  nomadic  peoples  do. 
Furthermore, non-human activity to adjust the environment for dwelling or other purposes 
is  also  an  intentional  endeavour  of  geometrical  complexity:  beehives  are  a  perfect 
example.  In this  respect,  as Foucault  (1979)  and Bourdieu (1979 and 1990) illustrate, 
geometry, complexity, and intentionality are not sufficient requirements for a practice to 
be deemed human, civilised,  or otherwise “superior” or “distinct”.  They argue that  the 
geometry of Western architecture,  for  instance,  is  as socio-cultural and political as its 
meanings are in Eastern or Southern societies.  The distinction must  then reside in the 
prevalence of the civilising  purpose by means  of locking  persons  and  space,  limiting 
movement, creating possibilities of voyeurism, observation, and panoptical relationships 
for the purpose of control, consumption, and exploitation. 
As  Nold Egenter  (1987) observes  in  anthropological and ethological studies of 
human  animal  and  non-human  architectural  practices,  particularly  in  apes,  building 
constitutes daily practices that  are meant  to be neither permanent  nor sedentary.  While 
each ape builds her nest individually, the group nevertheless interacts communally rather 
than hierarchically for the purpose of some individuals' ownership of others' effort, time, 
and “product”. Human communities, such as the Amish, abide by the same principles, and, 
again as in Bourdieu's discussion of the forces of creativity and the stability of habitus, 
there  is  a  balance  between  tradition  and  the  individuality  of  each  dwelling.  Most 
important, the relationships that bind the individuals are those of mutuality, community, 
and support. 
In contrast, the construction of dwellings in civilisation abide by the laws of the 
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unequal  power  between  ownership,  will  and  design  and  those  who  actually  do  the 
building. Here, architectural expressions are similar to constructed identities and therefore 
of “genres”, “schools”, “styles” and other categories that, like the workers who actually 
build, can be named, classified, and defined as symbolic, spacial, temporal, plant, animal 
or human resource.  In  other  words,  the  model  for  civilised  relations  that  articulate  a 
hierarchical distribution of symbolic  and spatial capital limit  access to  movement  and 
space and organise that space from the position of minimising costs (underpaying or even 
not paying the resources) and maximising exploitation, providing a constant increment in 
profit and colonisation of space and resources. 
Observing  the  problem  of  the  increasingly  incarcerating  conditions  of 
contemporary childhood and the shrinking possibilities for children to enjoy freedom in 
play and the friendships they forge with the neighbourhoods, Jack Zipes (2010) attributes 
this phenomenon of disappearing children's public spaces to intensive privatisation laws. 
Marginalisation  of  children  from public  life  and  space  widens  the  gulf  between  the 
wealthy and the poor as well as between children, adults, and the real world, he argues.  
Renegotiating this space is vital for the health of human society and the environment, the 
success  of  which  is  directly  linked  to  the  ways  human  animals  and  their  children 
understand and imagine the self, their culture and this space. This imaginary is articulated 
through the laws that guide and prescribe social interactions and the way in which we 
organise our environment and how we participate in it.
Children's books convey these concepts according to the narrative framework by 
which they abide. As seen in the earlier chapters, Jansson's characters dwell in the world. 
Constantly on the move, they find cosy alcoves, recycle cans, live on trees, behind stoves, 
build houses, boats, walk, swim and fly. Their meaning of love means to let the beloved 
roam free, yet always have the door open to the home and the heart if the beloved returns. 
Hence, while the moomins sleep, winter creatures make use of their home. While Snufkin 
wanders, he knows that he always can come back and pitch the tent or have a bed in the 
sunny moominhome. Nosov attempts to find a compromise between the principles of a 
sedentary community and a community that can move in space and time where he projects 
love as the unconditional inclusion of all their differences in the abode that friends share. 
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His  world works well  until it  faces the problem of agricultural expansionism with its 
colonisation of wilderness by cities and the necessarily developing hierarchies of control. 
The second book, Dunno in Sunny City (1984), dedicates several chapters to the questions 
of architecture, but they do not tackle the problematic of civilised building practices and 
wild dwelling, the assumption being that love as cooperation and intention is capable of 
solving the problems of anonymity and the inherently colonialist  civilised ontology. In 
contrast to Jansson and Nosov, the underlying premises of Milne's 100 Aker Wood provide 
fascinating insights into the civilised conception of the self and the world and into  the 
nature of its relationships and architectural structures.
Winnie-the-Pooh opens  with  the  London  zoo  mentioned  right  in  the  second 
paragraph of the introduction and hence serves as an excellent  illustration of the above 
concepts:
You can't be in London for long without going to the Zoo. There are some people who 
begin the Zoo at the beginning, called WAYIN, and walk as quickly as they can past 
every cage until they get to the one called WAYOUT, but the nicest people go straight to 
the animal they love the most, and stay there (Milne, 1992).
The world of Winnie-the-Pooh thus opens with an architectural construct termed 'zoo' and 
with the socio-affective  concept  termed 'love',  with both words appearing  in  the same 
paragraph right at the beginning of the book in the context of the genesis of the 100 Aker 
Wood.
The very concept of the zoo is exclusive to civilisation since zoos are designed to 
contain nature and wilderness by sterilising them thereby conquering space and time by 
means of bars and lines that spell finitude and end movement. Zoos are not only meant to 
collapse space and time, they are also panoptical constructs intended to display the victim 
for the public gaze of domestication. Being constantly observed and displayed, the victim 
of incarceration is locked in a cage of perverted meaning, where those who “love” the 
humiliated, caged non-human siblings consume their suffering and sentence the victim to 
death, for in the conditions of incarceration, human and non-human animals rarely get a 
chance to conceive progeny, and thereby dare not to dream of a sense of a non-linear,  
unlined future. Derrick Jensen articulates this perfectly when he says that caged animals 
circle the cage in madness and despair (Jensen, 2007). To the humans indulging in this 
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type of voyeurism,  zoos mean cute nature or rather  a  world that  has been conquered, 
named,  classified,  and  rendered  tame  and  resourceful.  It  is  empowering  for  the 
domesticated masses whose own will and purpose have been obliterated to watch the wild 
animal pace in madness and despair. Children are taught to derive pleasure from going 
“straight to the animal they love the most, and stay there” (Milne, 1992), i.e. do nothing 
but remain an impotent gazer.
In psychiatry, a relationship between a person who derives pleasure from confining 
another  person,  causing  distress  and  emotional  or  physical  pain  is  called  a  sadist. 
Psychiatric definition implies that the pleasure stems from sexual gratification. However, 
because  sexual  gratification  is  contingent  on  emotional  and  psychological  impulses, 
feelings  and  emotional  state,  then the  complexity  of sexually  driven pleasure  and  the 
pleasure of watching someone suffer  can take place in  a  variety of contexts,  some of 
which, like a zoo or a kindergarten may not be overtly linked in the ideology to sexual 
control in spite of the fact that control of reproduction and sexuality is a crucial element of 
child  breeding  and  child  rearing  practices  and  spaces  as  well  as  of  domestication, 
agriculture, and zoos. In other words, the sado-masochistic meaning of civilised love is an 
important part of the doxa, habitus, and the body hexis, and even when it is not articulated 
in the ideology, it  remains a tacit presence that structures these relationships of pain and 
pleasure. The other side of this relationship entails that the humiliated and tortured party 
enjoy the confinement and distress and receive gratification from the feeling of pain and 
disempowerement making this person a masochist.
The declaration that going to the zoo is a must and heading “straight to the animal 
they love the most” comes from one of the most popular children's books in the world, and 
it  tells  children that  entering an architectural design that organises time and space in a 
linear fashion, proceeding from now (WAYIN) and towards the future (WAYOUT), where 
the author does not leave us the option of entering from WAYOUT or the middle or not  
entering at all, or even discarding the concept of zoos altogether. In this linear procession, 
the narrative tells us that to gaze at a victim denied the right to exist for its own purpose, a 
victim forced to exist solely as an object of gratification for the gazer, is an act of love.
In this relationship structured through walls, shut doors, and bars, the object must 
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necessarily be objectified and under the gratified gaze. The first architectural construct in 
the  book  is  thus  based  on  what  is  known  in  psycho-pathology  as  sado-masochistic 
relations with the world: where both, subject and object, call love that which inflicts pain, 
suppresses the will,  ties to a leash for the enjoyment of the sadist who simply loves it.  
Depicting this relationship cheerfully and as a matter of fact conveys to the reader that 
behind those bars, are faceless figures, with no will and no personhood, who are named 
and whose names can be revoked and reclassified according to the logic and the perceived 
need  of the  subject  (as  discussed  in  the  previous  part  on the  naming  by  Christopher 
Robin).  Most  important,  it  conveys  that  the  victim,  having  been  rendered  harmless, 
actually loves this relationship too.
Derrick Jensen characterises such relationships as pornographic.  In “Thought  to 
Exist  in  the Wild:  Awakening from the Nightmare of Zoos” (2007),  Jensen makes the 
following connection between zoos, the culture of childhood, and pornography:
... a child who goes to a zoo is not encountering real animals. Like any other spectacle, 
like  any other  form of  pornography, a zoo can never  really satisfy,  can never  really 
deliver what it promises. Zoos, like pornography, offer superficial relationships based on 
hierarchy, dominance, and submission. They depend on a detached consumer willing to 
observe another who may or  may not have given permission to be the object of this 
gaze.
Think of a pornographic picture. Even in cases where women are paid and willingly 
pose for  pornography, they have not given me permission to see  their bodies — or, 
rather, images of their bodies — right here, right now. If I have a photograph, I have it 
forever, even if subsequently the woman withdraws her permission. This is the opposite 
of relationship, where the woman can present herself to me now, and now, and now, 
always at both her and my and our discretion. What in a relationship is a moment-by-
moment gift becomes in pornography my property, to do with as I choose.
And so it is with zoos. Zoos take a very real, necessary, creative, life-affirming, and — 
most of  all  — relational urge and turn it,  pervert it.  Pornography takes the  creative 
relational need for sexual contact with a willing partner — and the intimacy this can 
imply — and simplifies it to the relationship of watcher  and watched. Zoos take the 
creative need for participating in relationships with wild, nonhuman others and simplify 
it until our “nature experience” consists of spending a few moments looking at — or 
simply walking by — bears and chimpanzees in concrete cages (Jensen, 2007).
Jensen's exposition of the rationale of the relationships of incarceration and voyeurism 
reflect  the  relationships  in  Winnie-the-Pooh.  My point  is  that  all  relationships  in  the 
civilised hierarchy, to various extents, are structured by these demands of the panoptical 
gaze,  control,  consumption  and  exploitation  and  that  is  why  any  compromise  with 
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civilisation,  as  discussed  in  the  context  of Nosov's  trilogy,  is  prone  to  infiltration by 
elements of order and injustice. Jensen continues in this respect:
Incarcerating animals in zoos is to entering into relationships with them in the wild as 
rape is to making love. The former in each case requires coercion; limits the freedom of 
the victim; and springs from, manifests, and reinforces the perpetrator’s self-perceived 
entitlement to full access to the victim. The former in each case damages the ability of 
both victim and perpetrator to enter into future intimate relationships. Based on the dyad 
of  dominance  and  submission,  it  closes  off  any  possibility  for  real  and  willing 
understanding of the other.
A real relationship is a dance among willing participants who give what they wish, as 
they wish, when they wish. It inspires present and future intimacy, present and future 
understanding of the other and the self. It nourishes those involved. It makes us more of 
who we are (ibid).
Jensen raises many crucial points discussed throughout this work: the concept of time and 
the permanence of ownership,  for instance, constitute violence and rape by denying the 
wild the right to privacy, secrecy, and the freedom to change, move, and be – a critique 
constantly reiterated in the moominbooks. In contrast to the moomins, the civilised control 
of the purpose of the other's time, space, and life once again ties in with the question of 
domestication  and  education  and,  consistent  with  the  civilised  narrative,  the  third 
paragraph  in  Winnie-the-Pooh's introduction  proceeds  to  the  next  logical  step  in  the 
architecture of confinement, a locked and controlled space where children are transformed 
into humans and where unknowledge reveals to them who they should become:
You see what it  is.  He [Piglet]  is  jealous because he thinks Pooh is having a Grand 
Introduction all to himself. Pooh is the favourite, of course... but Piglet comes in for a 
good many things which Pooh misses; because  you can't take Pooh to school without 
everybody knowing it, but Piglet is so small that he slips into a pocket, where it is very 
comfortable to feel him when you are not quite sure whether  twice seven is twelve or 
twenty-two (Milne, 1992; italics mine).
In this way, within the space of a few paragraphs of his introduction, Milne succeeds to lay 
down the foundation of civilised culture: jealousy, confinement, competition, loneliness, 
the stress of forced schooling and domestication, as well as of the sado-masochistic and 
pornographic relationships of civilised “love”. This platform is consistent throughout the 
book projected in the static sterility of the wood and its envious and impotent characters 
who are willed into existence by Christopher Robin. In this world, when Pooh says that he 
loves honey, it amounts to him obtaining this honey by all means possible, as discussed 
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earlier, even by means of theft and consuming it all by himself. 
In other words, here, love entails the feeling of desire by the lover to satisfy his or 
her needs, lacks, wants, appetite, or whatever else. When one says “I love icecream”, for 
instance, it means that one wants to eat it. When one says, in a civilised context, “I love 
this woman”, it implies, first of all, the gratification of the desires of the speaker. If there is 
a concern for the woman that she be happy and well, it comes second115. When the beloved 
is chained, caged, or otherwise exploited, there can be no reciprocal sharing of mutuality; 
there can be no place for the experience of satisfaction through the desire of the other to 
remain owner of her fate, body, and will. When the beloved is gazed at through the bars of 
a cage and the lover exclaims: “O' how I love you! How beautiful, how cute you are!”, it  
means that the “beloved” has been rendered harmless and tame, and the only possible 
outcome of such relationships is the gratification of the tamer through the power of sight: 
voyeurism, pornography, humiliation and S&M.
This underlying platform of the world of Winnie-the-Pooh is further revealed in the 
doxa of the narrative that takes for granted that,  like other wild animals, human children 
must be domesticated in schools and filled with the right content and meaning, such as 
multiplication table, the demand for the oppression of human and non-human animals, et 
al. In wilderness, where human and non-human children exist for their own sake, it makes 
no difference whether they know multiplication tables or look at anyone animal or not. In 
contrast  to  Milne,  who  puts animals  in  cages and calls  it  love,  Jansson's and Nosov's 
positive  characters help  liberate  children from edifices of oppression;  they burn down 
signs and destroy walls, for in their world it makes no difference what children grow into,  
as long as they remain in tune with their environment and their own inner purpose, i.e. that 
they do not turn human and alienated, competing with each other for the winner to be 
redeemed and allowed to enter personhood leaving the losers to serve as human resources 
115  In the period between 1999-2001, I made a comparative survey on Russian and Canadian children's 
playgrounds, where I would ask parents what they thought love was. I chose parents and children's places 
on purpose in order to see if having had children would shift the common association of the word “love” 
with sexual partnership. Inevitably, almost all the Russian parents began with a Tolstoyan description of 
emotions towards the universe, God sometimes, humanity, and then lover and kin. Almost all the 
anglophone and francophone parents on the playgrounds in Quebec and Ontario responded that they 
believed in love at first sight and in having a good sexual understanding with their partner, which 
demonstrated that the understanding of “love” as sexual gratification before all other meanings remained 
intact.
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in the grand, now globalised, zoo.
In this respect, once again, the 100 Aker Wood betrays its foundation as grounded 
solidly  in  the  premises  and  myths  of  the  civilised  narrative:  there  is  chronological 
sequence, there is pain silenced by words that call torture love, there is greed, hierarchy, 
literacy, and control. This misnaming of experience and silencing of the victim occurs on 
several levels. For instance, presenting the world of the 100 Aker Wood as not real and its 
people as fictive impels the reader to disregard the characters' feelings and experience, just 
as  human,  non-human,  gendered,  racialised,  and  other  othered  victims  of  abuse  are 
overwritten by “expert knowledge” and representation by other agents using language and 
symbols. Echoing the silencing of the Oompa-Loompas by the capitalist enslaver Willie 
Wonka, who are depicted as cute and loving their chains, Winnie-the-Pooh is also stuck in 
the London zoo, but we are led to believe that he is in love with his fate in the same way 
that the fictional Winnie-the-Pooh in the 100 Aker Wood is stuck yet is happy and cute. He 
is  funny and lovable when he tries to swindle the bees just  as his fall from the tree is 
meant to be comical,  and the reader laughs at his bouncing against the branches on the 
way  to  the  gorse-bush,  because  falling  from  the  height  of  a  third  floor  has  no 
repercussions for  Winnie,  we are told.  The minute he  falls,  he  gets up and  begins  to 
deliberate on more effective strategies to deceive the bees. After all, the narrative assumes, 
none of them is real, and, in any case, bees exist solely for the purpose of providing us 
with honey and Winnie-the-Pooh's purpose is to serve as entertainment. Since this is the 
purpose of bees, any attempt to procure that honey, including by means of lies and theft, is 
admirable  and  in  this  sense  the  book  works  on  the  same  premises  of  domestication 
discussed earlier in Dahl's work, in particular, the part on slavery – i.e. the existence of the 
other for the purpose of the subject is inscribed in the ontology of that space and civilises 
it. 
Winnie-the-Pooh rationalises  the  existence  of bees  and  honey in  precisely  this 
logic:
“If there's a buzzing-noise, somebody's making a buzzing noise, and the only reason for 
making a buzzing-noise that I know of is because you're a bee.... And the only reason 
for being a bee that I know of is making honey.... And the only reason for making honey 
is so as I can eat it” (Milne, 1992: 6).
The  above  paragraph  could  be  funny  in  different  ways.  From  the  perspective  of 
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wilderness, it could have served as satire, because the situation would appear ridiculous if 
one was to look at it from the following angle: “ha ha ha! We all know that the world does 
not belong to Pooh or to anyone, for that matter, who is deluded enough to imagine he 
owns it”. However, nothing in the story suggests this position. In the way in which it is 
incorporated in the narrative,  it  is  meant to be funny in a different, “endearing” sort of 
way: “poor little bear. Of course, we know that bees do not exist for his delight, but in 
order to give us, humans, honey so that those who possess the bees can eat it or sell it to 
those who can afford to buy it.  What a funny, greedy, silly,  little bear”. Seen from this 
perspective, Pooh's reasoning becomes funny because it is ridiculous (stupid bear, he does 
prove that he is  of very little  brain) and, most  important,  by no means is  his delusion 
threatening: neither Pooh, nor other bears like him, are ever going to win that power to 
rule over our bees and our honey. The most substantial guarantee against that happening 
in this book is  the unreality of Winnie-the-Pooh that renders his delusions harmless and 
entertaining, like the delusions of any disempowered and objectified child, old person, or 
other: their pain is not real because our knowledge of them denies them sentience; their 
dreams are insignificant, and their expression of suffering and resistance ranges between 
cute and hysterical (meaning both: hilarious and mental).
The same applies to the intentional deceit underlying the relations between the rest 
of the characters. Not only does Winnie-the-Pooh try to deceive the bees, the Rabbit lies to 
Winnie,  intentionally faking his voice, to pretend that he is  not home. Winnie-the-Pooh 
asks:
“Is anybody home?”
There was a sudden scuffling noise from inside the hole, and then silence.
“What I said was, 'Is anybody at home?'” called out Pooh very loudly.
“No!” said a voice; and then added, “you needn't shout so loud. I heard quite well the 
first time.”
“Bother!” said Pooh. “Isn't there anybody here at all?”
“Nobody.”
... “Hallo, Rabbit, isn't that you?”
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“No,” said Rabbit, in a different sort of voice this time.
“But isn't that Rabbit's voice?”
“I don't think so,” said Rabbit. “It isn't meant to be” (Milne, 1992: 24-25).
Once again, deceit is depicted as harmless, at best, and cute, at worst. After all, the world 
of domestication is about who can hide what and from whom and who can trick whom, 
and the book lets us know that Winnie is a guest who could deplete the host's stock until 
he would not be able to get out. From this perspective, it becomes funny who would trick 
whom between the two of them. 
The word deceit itself is scattered throughout the book. For example, Winnie-the-
Pooh discusses an elaborate plan with Christopher Robin about how best to deceive the 
bees: “I shall try to look like a small black cloud. That will deceive them” (Milne, 1992:  
13). “I wish you would bring it [the umbrella] out here, and walk up and down with it, and 
look up at me every now and then, and say 'Tut-tut, it looks like rain.' I think, if you did 
that, it would help the deception which we are practising on these bees. ...The important 
bee to deceive is the Queen Bee” (ibid: 15-16). Or, another instance of deceit appears in 
chapter seven, the Rabbit, Piglet and Pooh work out a plan to deceive Kanga, kidnap her 
baby Roo,  and kick them out  of the Wood.  In other  words,  the concept  of deception 
permeates the ontological foundation of the 100 Aker wood and appeals perfectly to the 
domesticated reader who, if having failed to discern the problem with the slavery empire 
of  Willy  Wonka,  would  be  even  more  prone  to  fail  to  reflect  on the  purpose  of the 
existence of bees from the stance of wilderness.
Appropriation by means of deceit, control of purpose, movement  and space that 
domesticates  the  mind  and  renders  the  relationships  sterile,  sado-masochistic,  and 
pornographic feed Winnie-the-Pooh's narrative, a world where, in contrast to the perpetual 
movement in the Moominworld and constantly travelling mites, the characters of 100 Aker 
Wood are stuck in this closed space (Saukkola, 2001) and remain static, both in terms of 
experience  and  movement.  The  characters  are  thus  caged  in  a  world  imagined  by 
Christopher  Robin for  his  own empowerment;  they all exist  to  satisfy  his  need to  be 
entertained,  cared  for,  and  obeyed,  in  other  words,  to  be  consumed  by him  until  he 
graduates to the “real” world and, in this way too, the book reflects the values overtly 
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expressed in Charlie and the Chocolate Factory.
This  conception  of  “growing  up”  and  “growing  out  of”  the  carefree  idyllic 
childhood reveals the narrative's taking for granted of suffering as an ineluctable part of 
the nature of adult life experience. Many theoreticians praise literary works precisely for 
their lament and concomitantly acceptance of a sense of inevitability of having to abandon 
the idyllic,  presumably unrealistic,  carefree childhood upon entering adulthood, which 
presupposes  a  world  of toil,  hardship,  and  suffering.  In  this  regard,  Winnie-the-Pooh 
invites the reader to share this assumption that  wild  happiness is  not  real and that,  as 
Christopher Robin steps into the “real” world, the happiness and agency he experienced 
during  childhood  may  be  accessible  only  through  the  memory  of  something  he  had 
imagined. But, more important, the definition of happiness that emerges here is  that  of 
power  over  the  purpose of others:  at  first,  through identity  and naming,  then through 
incarceration  in  zoos  and  schools,  and  finally,  in  the  sterile  economy of  the  Wood 
enchanted by its own impotence.
Chapter 7: A Town in the Forest: Sedentary Travel as Compromise
Once upon a time, in a town in fairyland, lived some people called the Mites. They were 
called the Mites because they were very tiny. The biggest of them was no bigger than a 
pine cone. Their town was very pretty.  Around every house grew daisies, dandelions, 
and honeysuckle, and the streets were all named after flowers: Blue-bell Street, Daisy 
Lane, and Primrose Avenue. That is why the town was called Flower Town. It stood on 
the  bank  of  a  little  brook.  The  Mites  called  it  Cucumber  River  because  so  many 
cucumbers grew on its banks.
On the other side of the brook was a wood. The Mites made boats out of birch-bark and 
crossed the brook in them when they went to gather nuts, berries, and mushrooms in the 
wood. It was hard for the Mites topick berries because they were so small. When they 
picked nuts they had to climb the bushes and take saws with them to cut off the stems, 
for the Mites could not pick the nuts by hand. They sawed off mushrooms, too-sawed 
them off at the very ground, then cut them into pieces and carried them home on their 
shoulders like logs (Nosov, 1980).
Consistently, Nosov's books present a compromise position between the unyielding 
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wildness of Moominland and the totalitarian domestication of the 100 Aker Wood. The 
world of mites opens with their town surrounded by wilderness. The mites are gatherers 
living on a vegan diet. They are creative and productive using only the tools that they can 
produce116. Yet, even though this idyllic community is the most peaceful of the trilogy, the 
author sees as inevitable the evolutionary trajectory towards the more complex, machine-
based society, in spite of the fact that this development creates social problems that require 
the pantoptical surveillance of the police whose presence is completely irrelevant in the 
simpler  structure  of  Flower  Town  household  economy.  At  the  same  time,  as  Dunno 
explains at the end of his visit to the communist Sunny City, the lack of information about 
the needs and availability of products for exchange deters the formation of an efficient 
infrastructure, a lack that causes uncertainty and hampers the possibilities of exchange that 
may  generate  right-wing  anarchist  tendencies,  which  reveals  Nosov's  preference  for 
socialist anarchy of Petr Kropotkin (1995 and 2006), based on the theory of evolution by 
means  of  cooperation  and  mutual  aid,  over  the  Darwinian principles  of evolution  by 
means of competition.
Comparing  the  above  opening  scene  with  the  previously  discussed  children's 
narratives, the space of wilderness and domestication is  negotiated carefully in Nosov's 
book, and the question of livelihood occupies a more prominent place than what Jansson 
allots to the specifics of the moomins' diet, because her assumption is that there is plenty 
of food in the wilderness and Moominmamma will always find a way to make an apple 
pie or sandwiches, while their lives are nourished by the larger existential questions. 
Still, Nosov's opening, like Jansson's, contrasts with the assumption in Dahl's book 
that   people  prefer  the  processed  food  produced  by  slave  labour  in  Willy  Wonka's 
Chocolate Factory. This latter depicts characters as incapable of living on a raw diet and 
who therefore must be enslaved so as to be able to consume a small portion of the big lot 
they  work  so  hard  to  produce.  While  Milne's  opening  demonstrates  the  author's 
preoccupation with proper identification, domestication, and knowledge, the unrealness of 
the characters makes the question of subsistence obsolete. As the toy-characters depend on 
116 Lasse Nordlund (essay 2008) discusses the expenses of any tool in terms of time, labour, and resources 
that are needed not only to procure the raw materials for the tool, but also for the food and energy and space 
required to make that tool and all the other tools and machines needed for the making of the specific tool.  
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the human for name and identity, the child Christopher Robin depends on his parents for 
food and name, thereby dismissing the problems of economic organisation, access to food, 
and suffering, for these troubles are assumed to be a natural and inevitable part of civilised 
adult life and can be escaped in fantasy.
Nosov challenges Milne's perspective on several levels. No one names in the mite-
world,  where characters become known to  all by their  inner  passions,  their  choice of 
avocation and each person's role is important in his or her community without hierarchical 
preferences.  The  problems  of  identity  that  figure  in  the  first  book  result  in  gender 
inequality and segregation and are resolved through mites' getting to know each other, 
understanding each other's needs and then helping one another. However, unlike Jansson's 
world  without  borders  between  species,  Nosov  separates  animals  from  humans  and 
civilised space from wilderness.  This ontology is  revealed in  the way in  which Nosov 
treats the topos of transformation.
Because in  wilderness  there  are no  strict  borders  that  distinguish and  separate 
beings, transformation is an occasion to exchange knowledge and experience, a topos that 
reveals the guiding principles in economic and kinship systems. In civilised ontology, with 
its strict borders between categories and identities, transformation simply does not have a 
place:  Willy  Wonka  cannot  become  an  Oompa-Loompa  and  Oompa-Loompas  cannot 
become Charlie,  for example.  Nor are Christopher Robin,  Winnie-the-Pooh, Piglet,  and 
Owl interchangeable on the level of basic matter. Thus, an examination of these books 
through the lens of kinship and the topoi of genesis in mythologies and science can reveal 
the ontological underpinnings of the economies projected in these books.
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Chapter 8: Negotiating the Frontiers in the Wilderness of Folklore
Since no clear-cut boundary marks human identity as separate from the animal in 
the ontology of wildness, it can be said that humans share kinship with animals and plants, 
i.e., they are assumed to have common origins or some common basic constituent matter. 
Totemism, for instance, illustrates the possibility of human identification with the essence 
of  any plant  or  animal117.  Much  of  anthropological  research demonstrates  that  viable 
communities with a  much longer  and more impressive track record of the diversity in 
which they have flourished know the world and themselves through a radically different 
perspective and underlying premises than the ones informing civilised knowledge.
For example,  among the  Ojibwa, native  hunters  of  subarctic  Canada,  personhood is 
envisaged as an inner essence, embracing the powers of sentience, volition, memory and 
speech,  which  is  quite  indifferent  to  the  particular  species  form it  may  outwardly 
assume. The human form is merely one of the many guises in which persons may 
materially manifest themselves, and anyone can change his or her form for that of an 
animal more or less at will (Ingold, 1997: 24).
Such fluidity between animal and human forms provides an important window of access 
to vital knowledge about the world and the self through the experience of animals. Folk 
tales frequently use the topos of transformation and,  despite  the numerous adaptations 
through the centuries of domestication, still retain pre-domesticated elements even as they 
are interwoven with civilised themes. This knowledge of transformation leads characters 
to new turns in negotiations and to additional  possibilities for sharing or losing control 
over “resources”, rewarding the transformer with new ontological insights and experience.
In  Tales from the Dena, Frederica De Laguna et  al.  (1995) tell of the complex 
relationships  between  animals  and  humans  and  the  gift  economy  that  governs  their 
transactions and interactions. For instance, in one story, a rich man captures the sun and 
locks it  in his home. People see that the sun is gone and bribe Raven to get it  back for 
them. Raven transforms himself into a spruce needle, the rich man's daughter swallows it, 
gets impregnated and gives birth to a child. When the child cries for the sun, she gives it to 
him. He then transforms himself from baby to Raven and flies together with the sun out 
117 The work of Lévi-Strauss (1963 and 1966) comes to mind here.
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into the world. In other tales, the authors note, it is the doting grandfather who gives the 
sun to the baby (De Laguna et al., 1995: 321). In this example, human hierarchy and greed 
threaten the world: the rich man wants everything for himself, even the sun, but the people 
realise their interdependence with animals and birds, and each party carries out its part of 
the bargain to keep the world healthy and safe from the periodic eruptions of violence and 
conflict of interests.
However, because in its essence transformation is about impermanence, a culture 
that  respects wildness devises no  cultural,  social,  judicial or other  bodies of laws and 
knowledge that would stand on the concept of some “inalienable” rights of a group of 
persons.  Wild  ontology  evades  the  imbalance  caused  by  the  civilised  concept  of 
permanence in which one side always and rightfully wins and the outcome in wilderness is 
never linear or predictable.  Hence,  folk  tales often have no morals,  no conclusions,  no 
consequences and  no  formulae for  calculating outcomes and,  in  this  sense,  mirror the 
ethnographic inquiry, where the ethnographer notes down the particularities of a group but 
hesitates  to  draw  sociological  conclusions  or  devise  political  theories  for  future 
manipulation (also known as organising) leaving this  task to  sociologists and political 
scientists. In another story, the Siberian Inuit, negotiating about his caught fish with Raven 
and Bear, never knows in advance how the interaction will go because each negotiation is 
a new way of playing out possibilities, and, in the spirit of cosmic justice and realism, it is 
only fair  and true that the human does not always emerge as the winner of the catch.  
Often,  Raven outsmarts them all118. And it  should not be otherwise,  for, favouring one 
species over others would disrupt the balance of biodiversity – precisely the cautionary 
lesson of our civilisation with its destruction of wilderness and the loss of thousands of 
forms of life. 
In such Russian tales as “The Princess Frog”119, “Finist the Falcon”, “Go Thither 
118 According to Czaplicka (2007) the relationship between ravens, crows, humans and other animals are 
found throughout the Eskimo and other north American and Asian aboriginal creation stories.
   In North American Indian mythology, the coyote plays that role or in Africa it is the hyena. In the 
legends of the indigenous people around the world, birds and animals repeatedly appear as spirits or deities 
with whom humans must reckon because all beings have their rights and place under the sun.
119  First, in the matriarchal rendering of this transformation story, it is the woman who is the beast and who 
transforms as the prince expiates his sins and rights his wrongs and not vice versa. According to 
Clouston, the Breton variant of the tale has a poor orphan lost in the wood, he meets a frog, who 
promises him many good things in return for kissing her; he kisses her; she turns into a princess; he 
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Know Not Where, Bring That Know Not What”120, “Ivan Tsarevitch and the Grey Wolf”, 
“The Magic Shirt”, inter alia, the success of the heroine or the hero in any given quest and 
in life, here and ever after, depends on the character's ability either to work together with 
animals,  recognise  one's  mate in  the  animal,  or  be  able  to  transform into  an  animal, 
sometimes, even into an object, such as a needle or a feather121. In this context, Czaplicka's 
discussion of Siberian shamans and the importance of accessing knowledge through the 
experience of an animal or a bird is  relevant to the epistemological study of the topos. 
According to her, many aboriginal peoples, such the Siberian Chuckchee, hold that, in the 
days of yore, knowledge through transformation was available to any ordinary person, but 
because humans have widened the divide by having alienated themselves from the animal 
world, transformation is now rarely accessible for regular people, even though it is still 
possible through the shaman (Czaplicka, 2007). Traditionally, these transformations were 
induced at will, sometimes through meditation, ritualistic trance or occasionally with the 
betrays her by kissing others; and thus loses her, until he overcomes obstacles and finally finds her 
(Zipes, 2009). In other words, because material and other capital is exchanged in matrimonial bonds, 
prostitution has become an integral part of civilised sexual relationships, regardless of whether capital 
and inheritance are passed along patrilineally or matrilineally, with the difference being that in 
patriarchal societies the man dominates the economy, while in matriarchal societies, it is the woman who 
has the upper hand in negotiations. Second, as Jack Zipes (2006 and 2009) observes, these stories are 
memes that inform on cultural strategies for the selection of mating partners. In his analysis of the Frog 
Prince topos in Western European folklore, Zipes examines the transformation of the ugly beast into a 
prince as part of the courtship and marriage ritual in which the bride chooses the bridegroom according 
to the cultural memes – and the tale itself constitutes one of such memes – guiding her choice for optimal 
sexual selection. Even though this is not the focus of my own analysis, nevertheless this idea of tales as 
memes of transformation and marriage selection intersects with my own inquiry particularly in my 
discussion of household economics and the transformation topos. For, in civilisation, marriage reflects 
the transformation of the household economy to separate nuclear family units in contrast to the non-
domesticated societies who included as members of one's “household” the forest, the river, the sky with 
all the human and non-human forms of life that dwelt in the dimensions surrounding the individual. In 
this respect, the civilised meme of the princess, according to Zipes, makes for a viable formula for 
evolutionary trajectory within the civilised and colonised space. In the non-domesticated sphere, such 
choices lead to deterioration of intellect and other characteristics as I argue in the conclusion to this 
work.
120  My translation of: Поди туда - не знаю куда, принеси то - не знаю что.
121 A feather is of course an element of animal, but a needle and a thread are inanimate objects.  “A Mouse 
and a Bird”, an Evenkian (East Siberian) tale, for example, tells a story of a girl who saves her beloved from 
an envious rival by turning him into a thread and herself into a needle. Another example is the Belorussian 
tale, “Синяя свита-Налево сшита Соломенный колпак” (“Blue Retinue-Sewn Inside Out-Straw Hat”), the 
Czar promises to give half of his kingdom to the one who succeeds to hide from him. Blue Retinue 
transforms into a bird, a fish, and then a needle and wins the prize. In the Russian tale, Go Thither Know Not 
Where, a dove turns into Maria-Tsarevna and Andrei-the-Bowman has to befriend the Baba-Yaga, devils, 
and animals who all through negotiation agree to help him defeat the envious Czar. The genealogy of Maria-
Tsarevna-the-Dove goes back to Baba-Yaga, an ambiguous character in terms of evil and good. The 
spectrum of transformations in folklore is so wide and includes everything, even serpents and insects and 
inanimate objects.
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help of psychotropic herbs or mushrooms. This latter form of inducing an altered state of 
consciousness  has  been debated in  various  disciplines,  most  notably  in  anthropology, 
particularly in response to Jeremy Narby's (1998) thesis in The Cosmic Serpent: DNA and 
the Origins of Knowledge. The Asháninka people of the Peruvian Amazon, according to 
Narby, access knowledge on a molecular basis through entheogens, because information is 
stored in the matter of beings regardless of the state or shape we are in, and it is simply a 
matter of tapping into  the “hard-drive”.  For Czaplica,  as well,  the achievement  of the 
desired state of altered consciousness brings about the transformation of shape but not of 
essence,  which  remains  constant  throughout  the  manifestations  of  matter,  for  the 
molecules,  genes  or  spirit  (whatever  the  terminology)  already  contain  the  necessary 
experience and knowledge. The essence of that knowledge or spirit  can come in  touch 
with other essences and grow, yet still remains unique and concomitantly connected to the 
essence of the world,  an issue that  I  discussed earlier  in  relation to the small creature 
asking Moomintroll and Moominmamma “What are you?”.
In  contrast  to  the  shamanic  transformations  that  are  generated  through  the 
expansion of consciousness, folk-tale characters change swiftly, with the help of internally 
generated magic or by extraneous forces that can change a human person into an animal,  
or an animal person into a human, or any of them into an object and often back again. The 
collaboration  of  these  magical  human  and  non-human  forces  usually  brings  about  a 
resolution of justice  or  reinstates  harmony for  the world  of the  tale.  Such fluidity  in 
transgressing the realms  of human and non-human animals  underscores  how the non-
domesticated cultures' understand the essence of humanity as linked horizontally to the 
origins of non-humans; in this sense, the genesis of being, whether animate or inanimate, 
can be  traced  back  to  one  source  –  the  substance  of the  universe  itself.  Knowledge 
available to one form of being is understood here as not only available to and applicable 
for the other, but also vital and indispensable.
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Chapter 9: A General Note on Transformations, Consumption, and  
Identity
Transformation has also been observed by scientists. For example, biologists study 
these  processes  on the  micro-cellular  level  and  refer  to  transformations  of cells  into 
something  else  as  transdifferentiation,  such  as  the  ones  that  occur  in  salamanders, 
jellyfish, and chickens; in some vertebrates this process involves interconversion of stem 
cells and cell fate switches between lineages (Panagiotis et al., 1995; Furuta et al., 2001). 
Yet,  even  though  stem-cell  research  has  received  much  more  attention  than 
transdifferentiation,  the ramifications  for  both scientific  and literary knowledge  are  of 
great importance for what we understand ourselves capable of being and for our choice to 
agree or refuse to share the dimensions of being with forms different from our own. In 
contrast,  transformations  on  the  genetic  level  have  been  studied  widely  from  the 
perspective of evolutionary theory (Snustad, Simmons, and Jenkins, 1997; Kandel, 1976). 
Nosov's Sunny City is a good illustration of its literary rendition, which is a compromise 
between  two  ways  of  conceptualising  humans  in  relation  to  non-humans:  (a) 
understanding  living  and  non-living  matter  as  stemming  from  an  original  substance 
common with the universe and (b) considering the human as a species apart, differentiated 
through scala naturae from the various forms of living matter either by divine creed or by 
its evolutionary pace and direction.
In both the monotheistic  and the non-domesticated worldviews, common origin 
stems  from a source outside of creation itself.  For monotheism,  the divine  will  is  the 
source  of  the  world  with  all  its  manifestations,  and,  in  non-domesticated  folklore, 
everything originates from a variety of celestial, earthly and spiritual forces (Kaufmann, 
1969), whose original purpose and substance, to various extents, relate all the living and 
non-living matter. With the development of agricultural civilisation, the human has been 
“evolving” throughout  the theological and mythological re-interpretation of the human 
identity and ontology, so one can say there have been transformations in the conception 
itself of the divine, the animal and the human. Hence, the highly playful and capricious 
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ancient  gods  gradually  cede  to  the  evolutionary  principle  in  reincarnation  where  the 
human experience/incarnation becomes more valued than that of an animal or an insect, 
and the hierarchy of the castes gets inscribed in the natural order itself (Hopkins, 1971). In 
the same vein, in the monotheistic biblical tradition, the human evolves from the humble, 
vegan gatherer of Genesis into the alien to his own world who attempts to appease God 
with bloodthirsty sacrificial rituals blaming these acts of cruelty on divine will122. 
The  understanding  of  genesis  throughout  civilisation  also  undergoes  a 
transformation, whereby gradually the original cause gets attributed to an act of violence 
or treachery, such as depicted in the Indian, Babylonian, or Akkadian stories of creation. 
For example, the god Marduk chops up the water goddess Tiamat and creates the heavens 
and the stars, with her suffering eyes forming the rivers Tigris and Euphrates (Sandars, 
1971; Pritchard, 1975: 1-5). In other words, these adaptations in rendering genesis point to 
the evolution (more accurately,  deterioration) of civilised human relationship with their 
world as this relationship becomes more and more cannibalistic. Human identity, however, 
allows the civilised to avoid seeing this relationship in those terms because the assumption 
in humanist identity is that the human is different from the rest and hence is cleared of this 
accusation because being a cannibal entails  consuming one's  own kind. This stands in 
contrast to the Semai, for example, who see the consumption of an animal that one has 
raised as cannibalism (Dentan, 1968),  whereas the civilised Christian human views the 
ritual  consumption  of  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ  as  communion  and  not  as  a 
cannibalistic topos, because the premise is that the human is separate from the divine and 
the body of the man that the divine spirit inhabited.
By the same token, the topos of cannibalism can be expressed in the process of 
reading  through  identification  with  the  anthropomorphic  animals  that  often  figure  in 
children's books. For instance, the story of the three little pigs at first appeals to the reader 
through identification with the victim: “look, the little pigs are scared and want to build a 
good house to hide from the dangerous wolf who wants to eat them; you are like those 
little pigs; you too are scared of the wolf”.  But then ham, bacon and lard are served in 
favourite dishes in real life and in literary works, and the “little pig”, who had previously 
122 John Zerzan's (1994, 2002 and 2008) extensive research points to that sacrifice is a feature of societies 
that practised domestication.
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shivered reading the story, now transforms into the wolf and eats the symbol of its own 
victimisation;  by identifying  the  pigs  as  “really”  different  and  as  comestible  “items”, 
“piglet” thus consumes itself by devouring the flesh of the animal with whom she had 
previously  identified  her  self.  Consumption  patterns  are  deeply  entangled  in  our 
conception of self and underlie the question of kinships or relatedness between beings. 
Often,  the  cultural  prescriptions  and  taboos  of  domesticated  societies  play  into  the 
constructs of identity, diet, and hygiene and create Bateson's double bind situation that he 
observed  in  a  mental  asylum.  Double  bind,  Bateson  says,  arises  when  a  person 
experiences several contradictory injunctions  “enforced by punishments or signals that 
threaten survival”  (1972:  206),  one  of which  prohibits  the  victim  from escaping  the 
conflicting situation that provokes symptoms of schizophrenia in the victim. This same 
situation is present in both children's reading material and in reality, such as illustrated in 
the case of the “three little pigs”.
Civilisation presents a perfect case of double bind, because people find themselves 
trapped  in  contradictory  situations  with  conflicting  injunctions  in  the  form  of 
prescriptions, taboos, laws, and contradictory messages in formal education and general 
upbringing. Civilised “society” constantly threatens its  members with various forms of 
punishment, including – perhaps its most successful method of coercion – the threat of 
starvation: it  elevates “humanism” and human identity yet  orders humans to constantly 
wage war against each other; it demands obedience, loyalty, hard labour, and suffering, but 
concurrently punishes the obedient by reduced compensation, instead rewarding the one 
who  leads,  and  not  those  who  obey,  that  is,  it  rewards the  powerful  and  the already 
wealthy,  the leaders  and  the bullies; it  glorifies  mercy and  compassion,  yet  ruthlessly 
forces  people  to  die  in  poverty,  just  like  Bateson's  (1972)  examples  of  contradicting 
parents who drive their children to schizophrenia and despair and from which the civilised 
victim or the schizophrenic child finds no exit. The double bind on this global scale has 
been made possible because of the contradictory impulses that the process of identification 
evokes: it appeals to the desire both to identify with and to stand counter to the group that 
would  allow  access  to  resources.  In  other  words,  the  process  of  identification  is 
inextricable  from  the  underlying  premises  expressed  in  the  cultural  taboos  and 
prescriptions regarding food – who is allowed to eat and who is not; regarding cleanliness 
222
– what is clean to be consumed and what is not, and who is clean to consume it with us 
and  who  is  not;  the  conception  of  time  as  linear,  circular  or  muti-dimensional; 
permanence,  unpredictability,  among  others  –  all  of  which  are  elemental  in  our 
understanding of what we are and refer us back to the question of origins and kinships 
either  from the  perspective  of  wildness  (flicker  with  form and  light  and  let  be)  or 
civilisation (do as you're told but you are free when you enslave others). Therefore, if an 
ontology rests on the premise of common origins for all and of fluid kinships with no  
fixed categories and identity, like the Ojibwa or the Chuckchee, there would be no identity 
of eater and the eaten or, in today's parlance, of consumer and the product of consumption.
Scientists attempt to overcome this inherent conflict in civilised ontology between 
cannibalism,  identity,  and  “human  rights”  by adopting  Darwin's  compromise  between 
civilised ontological violence and the animist position (transposed onto the biological and 
physiological domains)  that  all  living  beings,  including  humans,  can be  traced to  one 
common  ancestor:  the  first  living  protozoa.  Ultimately,  this  attempt  fails  because  the 
evolutionary principle rests on two fatal assumptions: that the world is a priori hostile to 
life  and, hence,  living beings need to constantly struggle to adapt to their environment 
(like the Oompa-Loompas) and that by adapting some turn out more fit than others (Willy 
Wonka and Charlie). The deteriorating species become extinct (unless they're enslaved by 
Willy Wonka) and those who stick around, competing, overpopulating, exterminating, and 
consuming, prove themselves right by virtue of their extensive destruction, persistence, 
and resilience.
Thus,  even  if  the  Darwinian  theory  of  evolution  allows  for  the  flexibility  of 
change, the fixed categories that  identify species in a hierarchical order highlight  their 
distinctions – on the basis of genetics, blood, and DNA, and other evidence of kinship – 
from each other  for  the  purpose of victory in  the struggle  for  immortality.  First,  the 
concept that organisms have to be in a permanent mode of adaptation to their surroundings 
already presumes that the surroundings are tricky (the 100 Aker Wood characters highlight 
that deceptive nature of being) and even hostile to life and that the environment is in need 
of modification, manipulation, and conquest, with only the best specimens being capable 
of achieving  success  (the  conquests of epidemic  diseases,  for  example,  are  almost  as 
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spectacular as those of civilised humans).  Second, consumption and reproduction are the 
concern of evolutionary science that provides a good platform for the theory of “resource” 
management and exploitation because the premise itself leaves no room for viewing the 
world from the wild,  non-domesticating position. From the perspective of wildness, the 
universe welcomes life and does not need ordering and adaptation because it  already is 
good for all123 and for itself; otherwise, how could life have happened for all those millions 
of years? In other words, the conflict of civilised ontology resides in the foundation of its 
knowledge  and  is  analogous  to  Sahlins'  reasoning  that  consumerist  affluence  breeds 
poverty while humility brings satisfaction. In the same vein, the civilised people's striving 
for immortality imposes an obsession with murder and sacrifice, their claim that in order 
to have justice there should be punishment breeds crime – since, in order for punishment 
to be “just” and not random violence, there has to be the construct of the “crime” prior to 
it – in contrast to the non-domesticated lore that sees justice in the unpredictability of the 
results  of  negotiations.  The  occasional  loss  in  favour  of  an  animal  or  a  bird  only 
reconfirms  abundance and justice in  a  world where,  acceptance of entropy and chaos 
brings eternity, harmony, and understanding.
The  crux  of  the  matter  here  is  that  civilisation  assumes  that  the  universe  is 
imperfect, that life needs to struggle and adapt to its world, that it  needs to be ordered, 
changed and tamed to  suit  the demands  of the best  species.  Whether  by appealing to 
religious authority or through science, civilisation claims that Man was decreed by God or 
by Natural  Selection to  modify  and  dominate,  because  the  world  was  created  as  his 
resource, or by virtue of his unique intelligence, he has evolved and succeeded to change 
and  domesticate  it.  What  is  most  important  for  my  discussion  of  transformation  and 
common origins is that even though change is an accepted possibility in civilised ontology, 
it  nonetheless  always  leads  towards  a  higher  degree  of  humanism,  alienation  and 
civilisation.  Here,  movement  towards  the animal is  conceived  as  a  dangerous decline, 
degradation, even illness.
In this respect, children's books can project the topos of transformation between 
123  Kropotkin's theory of evolution by mutual aid implies Sahlins' argument that the society that does not 
hoard or possess stems from the basic premise that the world has plenty. On the other hand, a society that 
needs to accumulate and fight over resources stems from the premise of poverty (capitalism) which he 
elaborated in “the Original Affluent Society” a chapter of Stone Age Economics (1974).
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animal  and  human  forms  as  either  good  or  bad.  For  example,  if  wilderness  sees 
transformation between animals, plants and humans as chaotic – forms are not fixed once 
and  for  all  –  and  as  beneficial  and  adding  to  knowledge,  then  civilisation  values 
transformation  towards  more  domestication  and  sterilisation  as  a  linear,  evolutionary 
trajectory and sees transformation from human to animal as dangerous. In children's books 
(that  de facto  are  created in  a  civilised  space),  transformations  are  often  depicted  as 
imposed by some overpowering alien will, often stemming from evil (wilderness), such as 
through witchcraft, or by some intrinsic wicked force,  an obvious illustration of which 
would be the motif of the werewolf124.
In Jansson's third  book,  Finn Family Moomintroll (Trollkarlens  Hatt)125 and  in 
Nosov's second book,  Dunno in Sunny City, transformations are generated by external, 
magical forces against the will of the transformed characters and, in both cases, these topoi 
shed light on the authors' ontologies and approach to questions of kinship and the meaning 
of being.  Comparing these motifs in  the two books,  once again,  places Jansson at  the 
extreme end of non-domesticated ontology and Nosov in the compromised middle ground 
between  full  domestication  and  an  attempt  to  negotiate  the  civilised  knowledge  of 
oppression with  self-determinism.  While  in  100 Aker  Wood,  no  transformations  occur 
since the substance of that universe is presumed to be radically different for the human 
and  the  toy-animals,  so  much  so  that  it  allows  no  space  for  the  intermingling  of 
experience.
124 Monotheism, of course, denies any possibility of transformation, because the forms of the species were 
differentiated at the moment of creation, and even if their cause and basic element (the divine will) is 
kindred, Man alone was created in God's image. However, because Man is interpreted as the General 
Manager of civilisation, even though civilisation itself was meted out as punishment, he takes it upon 
himself to change and domesticate God's world. In other words, and banal as it may sound, interpretation of 
monotheism itself is highly contingent on whether one approaches it from the perspective of civilisation or 
wilderness.
125 The Wizard's Hat or as translated by Elizabeth Portch, Finn Family Moomintroll, and which is one of the 
four books that Jansson edited in later editions.
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Chapter 10: Transformation and Recognition: Kinship and Common  
Origins in Moominvalley
The  third  moominbook,  Finn  Family  Moomintroll, opens  with  a  sunny spring 
morning in Moominvalley as Moomintroll,  Snufkin, and Sniff find a black hat with the 
magical power to transform anything that enters it. However, these transformations – of 
things, words, animals, and even of Moomintroll himself – into new and unrecognisable 
shapes only re-affirm the permanence of love that underpins the chaos of the world, i.e. 
they reinstate harmony, abundance and beauty as a constant in an ever moving entropy, 
even as this constant of love emerges from ugliness and danger. At first, no-one recognises 
Moomintroll after he had spent a while hidden in the hat, only to emerge in a shape totally 
unlike his own:
Moomintroll felt quite confused and took hold of a pair of enormous crinkly ears. “But I 
am Moomintroll!” he burst out in despair. “Don't you believe me?”
“Moomintroll has a nice little tail, just about the right size, but yours is like a chimney 
sweep's brush,” said the Snork.
And, oh, dear, it was true! Moomintroll felt behind him with a trembling paw...
“You are an impostor!” decided the Hemulen.
“Isn't there anyone who believes me?” Moomintroll  pleaded. “Look carefully at me, 
mother. You must know your own Moomintroll.”
Moominmamma looked carefully. She looked into his frightened eyes for a very long 
time, and then she said quietly: “Yes, you are my Moomintroll.”
And at the same moment he began to change. His ears, eyes and tail began to shrink, 
and his nose and tummy grew, until at last he was his old self again.
“It's all right now, my dear,” said Moominmamma. “You see, I shall always know you 
whatever happens” (Jansson, 1958: 38).
This transformation, like that of the shaman, prompts Moomintroll and his community to 
transcend form and access the knowledge of the unchanging essence by recognising and 
accepting  both aspects of the  universe,  even if  they may appear  contradictory at  first 
glance: the impermanence of chaos and the permanence of essence seen as stemming from 
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one  common  substance  of  origins  for  all  regardless  of  the  ephemeral  lineages  and 
changing shapes.
Being children and inexperienced, Snork Maiden, the Snork, Sniff,  Snufkin,  and 
especially the Hemulen, who likes clean-cut categories and lacks imagination, focus on the 
form and on the category of in-group. By accepting form at face value, they demonstrate 
love, appreciation for and loyalty to Moomintroll as they mistake his form for the “other”, 
the King of California, and miss the opportunity of play with transformation.
“But [Moomintroll] is an impossible fellow, you know! You simply can't have him in 
the house!” [the transformed Moomintroll continued joking].
“How dare you talk about Moomintroll like that!” said the Snork Maiden, fiercely. “He's 
the best Moomin in the world, and we think a great deal of him.”
This was almost too much for Moomintroll. “Really?” he said. “Personally I think he's 
an absolute pest.”
Then the Snork Maiden began to cry.
“Go away!” said the Snork to Moomintroll. “Otherwise we shall have to sit  on your 
head” . . . “Take away this ugly king who runs down our Moomintroll.” (Jansson, 1958: 
36-37).
While noble in their intentions, however, the group is aggressive towards Moomintroll's 
new form of the King of California, and the scene escalates to a fist fight with the kids 
ganging up against the newcomer and piling up on top of Moomintroll's new king shape. 
Moominmamma,  on  the  other  hand,  recognises  this  essence  in  her  biological  son 
Moomintroll but also in all the other creatures she calls her children. This recognition and 
acceptance provides the safety of presence and the knowledge of permanence.
The  above  scene  thus  works  to  confirm  kinship  and  permanence  through 
transformation, but this is not the only way to recognise kinship in Moominland. The act 
of Moominpappa's adoption of Sniff – the child that  Moominmamma picked up in the 
wild  forest  during  her  period  of  separation  from Moominpappa  and  who  is  so  very 
different  from moomintrolls  – points to the immateriality of the domesticated-scientific 
notion of consanguinity in determining kinship for the moominfamily.
Moominpappa said: 
“You have no idea what a fine house I had before the flood. Built it all by myself. But if 
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I get a new one, you will be welcome there any time.”
“How big was it?” asked the small creature [Sniff].
“Three  rooms,”  said  Moominpappa.  “one  sky-blue,  one  sunshine-yellow  and  one 
spotted. And a guest room in the attic for you, small creature.” “Did you really mean us 
to live there too? Asked Moominmamma, very pleased. “Of course,” he said. “I looked 
for you always, everywhere” (Jansson, 1945).
This conversation demonstrates that affinity and consanguinity (Moominpappa being the 
father  of  Moomintroll  and  Moominmamma  being  his  mother)  in  Moominvalley,  by 
themselves,  do  not  warrant  the  right  to  live  together  and  to  partake  in  a  communal 
household economy.  It  is  mutual consent  and the desire  to share a home in the larger, 
universal sense that is the key to building a family, and Sniff has been a welcome guest 
even before he appears in Moominpappa's consciousness. 
This  spirit  of a  shared  essence  brings  creatures  together  in  the  Moominworld, 
regardless of their differences,  with conflicting needs,  habits and views and in no way 
related in any genetic understanding of kinship. Throughout the books, the moominfamily 
adopts anyone who asks – even someone as different, boring and pedantic as a Hemulen or 
someone who shape-shifts, like Moomintroll, or the transparent child who is then rendered 
visible by their acceptance and by the relationship of mutual understanding and care that 
she develops with Moominmamma,126 or the nihilist philosopher Muskrat who moves into 
the house in Comet in Moominland and traumatises the children with his dark outlook on 
the meaninglessness of life. In Finn Family Moomintroll, two thieves, Thingumy and Bob, 
bring trouble and notions of crime and punishment; in winter, while the moomins sleep, 
the reader discovers that unknown creatures move and dwell among them; and, in the final 
book, a whole cohort of strange guests inhabit their house while the moominfamily lives at 
Sea. All of these visible and invisible beings who share their space, regardless of whether 
they  are  physically  present  or  absent,  are  an  integral  part  of  the  biodiversity  of  the 
Moominworld  and  its  freedom  for  inter-marriage127.  For  example,  we  learn  in 
Moominpappa's Memoirs that, biologically, Snufkin is the son of the elder Mymble and 
126 The “Invisible Child” in Tales from the Moominvalley, Jansson, 1963; 1995.
127 In-breeding and inter-mixing was of great interest to Charles Darwin and he saw in-breeding (even in his 
own family situation, for he married his cousin) as degenerative and inter-mixing as a possibility to express 
new options in the expression of genes and the suppression of mutation and genetic diseases (Darwin, 1876 
and 2008a).
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the Joxter, and Sniff is the lost child of the Muddler and the Fuzzy – both mixed couples, 
but the children live with the moomins,  because genetic or blood genealogy is  of little 
significance  here.  “You,  innocent  little  child,  who  thinks  your  father  a  dignified  and 
serious person, when you read this story of three fathers' adventures you should bear in 
mind that one pappa is very like another (at least when young)” (Jansson, 1994: xii). 
Jansson extends the principle of the undistinguishable nature of beings to parents 
“when they're  not  so young” in  several ways.  In a  sense,  it  doesn't  matter whom one 
chooses for parents, since parents are as wild and full of dreams as their children; i.e. they 
are not different  intrinsically in their essence.  So, in the end, it  doesn't matter if  Sniff, 
Little  My,  the  Snorks  and  even  Snufkin  when  he's  not  travelling,  choose  to  have 
Moominmamma and Moominpappa for parents, for, in anthropological terms, it is a viable 
kinship model known as bilateral128 or, in the still used terminology established by L.H. 
Morgan,  is  often  referred  to  as  the  Hawaiian  kinship  system (Merry,  2000;  Sahlins, 
1972)129.  Erica-Irene  Daes  writes  on  behalf  of  the  Working  Group  on  Indigenous 
Populations established in 1982:
Indigenous peoples regard all products of the human mind and heart as interrelated, and 
as flowing from the same source: the relationship between the people and their land, 
their kinship with the other living creatures that share the land, and with the spirit world. 
Since the ultimate source of knowledge and creativity is the land itself, all of the art and 
science of a specific people are manifestations of the same underlying relationships, and 
can be considered as manifestations of the people as a whole (quoted in Ingold, 2007: 
150).
Thus, in the spirit of aboriginal kinship with the world, Moominmamma huddles around 
her the large group of Moomintroll's friends, including the silk-monkey invited by Sniff 
(Comet in Moominland (Kometjakten)). As they wait in the cave for the comet to hit the 
earth and destroy it, she calls them “my children”:
“Now everything is all right, and you must go to sleep. You must all go to sleep, my 
dears. Don't cry, Sniff, there's no danger now.”
The Snork Maiden was trembling. “Wasn't it dreadful?” she said.
128 In bilateral kinship system, an ego may choose her kinship affiliation to belong to either lineage and 
horizontal relationships are inclusive of individuals who happen to be in the same generation as siblings 
even when they are not strictly related (Ingold, 1997).
129 Lewis Henry Morgan's terminology has largely been updated and refuted. For example, subsequent 
research into Hawaiian kinship systems have revealed the over-simplification and ethnocentrism of Morgan's 
and a vast number of anthropologists in approaching Polynesian or “Other” peoples (Ingold, 1997).
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“Don't think about it any more,” said Moominmamma. “Cuddle up to me, little silk-
monkey, and keep warm. I'm going to sing you all a lullaby.” And this is what she sang:
Snuggle up close, and shut your eyes tight,
And sleep without dreaming the whole of the night.
The comet is gone, and your mother is near
To keep you from harm till the morning is here.
And presently they dropped off to sleep, one by one, until at last it was quite quiet and 
peaceful in the cave” (Jansson, 1959: 189).
In the 1968 revision of the book (twenty two years after the first edition), questions of 
domestication and kinship remain as prominent and, in fact, Jansson enunciates them even 
more  clearly  even  though  she  changes  the  song,  and  African  fauna  transforms  into 
European, with Sniff befriending a kitten instead of the silk-monkey for whom he risks his 
life in the first version. They return together, hand in hand, as equals, to the safety of the 
Moominparents' abode that, for emergency reasons, was transferred into the cave.
For a European audience, a  kitten represents a tamed animal – a pet, and Jansson 
takes this opportunity to deliberate on the notions of taming and domestication as if in 
response to Saint-Exupéry's (1994) metaphors for taming, cultivation, foxes and roses. In 
The Little Prince, the fox begs: “Tame me”, and explains that taming entails responsibility 
for the one you've tamed and the cultivation of ties through nourishment and care (Saint-
Exupéry,  1994)   –  a  standard civilised view,  embraced  conscientiously by the  French 
colonisers, that claims that humans (especially the French) have the responsibility to tame 
the world, decide on its livelihood and pretend that these violent relations of power are 
there,  not  for  the  benefit  of  the  tamer,  but  of  the  tamed  (a  view  Willy  Wonka 
wholeheartedly embraces). What is omitted in  The Little Prince and in the domestication 
premise is that “responsibility” for the other can occur only on condition that the other has 
been disempowered and has lost agency over her decisions, actions, and responsibilities, 
while  the  person  who  can decide  for  the  disempowered  Other  and  who  can  be 
“responsible” for the Other's well-being is  the one who has stolen that power from the 
tamed.
Jansson questions the concept of domestication and its relationships. In Comet in  
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Moominland,  she  depicts Sniff's  attempts  to  corrupt  the  kitten “who  wandered  all  by 
herself”130 by means of food as a method of achieving domination over the purpose of the 
kitten's existence by turning her into his pet for his pleasure and making her dependent on 
his kindness. However, unlike the portrayal of the Little Prince who ends up discovering 
the importance of him taming the rose and the fox after which he dies (for, can there be a 
life in domestication?) and goes “home”131, Sniff fails in his task to turn the kitten into a 
pet existing for Sniff's needs and whims. He reluctantly comes to realise that the kitten 
would rather perish than renounce her independence to live where and as she pleases in 
exchange for Sniff's power to provide her with food when and how much it pleased Sniff. 
As the comet is ready to hit and destroy the earth, Sniff understands that his relationship 
with  the  kitten  would  not  develop  if  he  attempted  to  control  her  livelihood  and 
circumscribe her space under the guise of protection, as in the fence that the Little Prince 
draws around  His Rose.  To become friends,  both characters had to accept  each other's 
terms and learn how to extend a helping hand out of free will, when the other welcomed it, 
and not through coercion and calculated benefit.
Sniff was the last to leave Moominvalley. He walked through the forest, all the while 
calling the  kitten.  And  finally  he  caught  sight  of  her.  She was  sitting  in  the  moss 
washing herself.
“Hello,” whispered Sniff. “How are you?”
The cat stopped washing and looked at him. Sniff carefully got closer and reached out a 
paw. She moved away slightly.
“I've missed you,” said Sniff and stretched out his paw again.
The kitten took a small leap out of reach. Each time he tried to pet her, she moved away, 
but she did not go away.
“The comet is coming,” said Sniff. “You should come with us to the cave or you will be 
smashed to bits.”
“Oh,” the kitten replied yawning.
130 “Och just då fick det lilla djuret Sniff syn på en kattunge som vandrade för sig själv” (Jansson, Kometen 
Kommer: 10), obviously a reference to Rudyard Kipling's “The Cat that Walked By Himself” where the cat, 
even as he accepts the food, does not renounce his will like the horse and the dog.
131 Even if Saint-Exupéry meant the rose and the fox and life and the travel as metaphors for spiritual 
attainment, these metaphors work only from the perspective of domestication and become meaningless when 
examined from the lens of the Moominvalley. 
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“Do you promise to come?” Sniff asked sternly. “You must promise me! Before eight!”
“Yeah-yeah,” said the kitten, “I will come when it suits me.” And she continued to wash 
herself.
Sniff placed the milk saucer  in the moss and stood there looking at her  for  a while 
(Kometen Kommer: 133-4 – translation mine)132. 
The kitten makes it  clear, when she welcomes Sniff's food, that she does not become a 
dependent pet,  rather recognising this act of giving as a gesture of friendship and thus 
earning a place as a family member on equal terms in the moomin house, with the freedom 
to change her mind at any time. 
This  kinship  is  highlighted  when  Moominmamma  gives  her  grandmother's 
emeralds to the kitten, thus affirming her own and her “blood” family's kinship with both 
the kitten and Sniff for whom this gesture is very important:
“Emeralds!”  screamed Sniff.  “Family inheritance! To the kitten! Oh, how wonderful. 
Oh, I am happy!”133 (Jansson, 1968: 143 – translation mine).
In anthropological terms, the Hawaiian kinship model of the moomins considers a sibling 
anyone who is in the horizontal generational group, and constructs Moominmamma and 
Moominpappa  as  everyone's  mother  and  father.  In  other  words,  the  moomins  do  not 
distinguish between horizontal relationships in terms of priority in the transfer of material 
and  symbolic  capital  and  this  kinship  system,  as  Marshall  Sahlins  notes,  is  more 
egalitarian and inclusive than other models as it  comprises both elements of kinship: by 
descent and by alliance (Sahlins, 1972). 
132 Sniff var den sista som lämnade Mumindalen. Hela vägen genom skogen ropade han på kattungen. Och 
äntligen fick han syn på henne. Hon satt i mossan och tvättade sig. 
   Hej, viskade Sniff. Hur mår du? 
   Katten slutade tvätta sig och tittade på honom. Sniff gick försiktgt närmare och sträckte ut tassen. 
Hon flyttade sig undan en liten bit.
   Jag har längtat efter dig, sa Sniff och sträckte ut tassen igen.
   Kattungen tog ett litet skutt utom räckhåll. Varje gång han försökte smeka henne gick hon undan 
men hon gick inte sin väg.
   Kometen kommer, sa Sniff. Du ska följa med oss till grottan annars blir du mos.
   Äsch, svarade kattungen och gäspade.
   Lovar du att komma? frågade Sniff strängt. Du måste lova mig! Före åtta!
   Jojo, sa kattungen, jag kommer nu sen när det passar mig. Och så fortsatte hon med att tvätta sig.
   Sniff satte ner mjölkfatet i mossan och stod kvar och såg på henne liten stund (Jansson, Kometen 
Kommer: 133-4).
133 Smaragderna! Ropade Sniff. Familjearvet! Åt katten! O, så underbart. O, vad jag är lyckling! (Jansson, 
book 2, second version: 143).
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Furthermore,  kinship  in  moominland  can  also  be  said  to  be  cognatic  since 
inheritance comes concomitantly from Moominmamma's female lineage and from all the 
fathers through Moominpappa and his memoirs, in which the transfer of knowledge and 
experience relates the creatures to each other.
Moominpappa was cut short by Sniff, who sat up in his bed and cried, “Stop!”
“Father's reading about his youth,” said Moomintroll reproachfully.
“And about my daddy's youth,” replied Sniff with unexpected dignity...
“You forgot my mother!” Sniff cried.
The door  to the bedroom opened and Moominmamma looked in. “Still  awake?” she 
said. “Did I hear somebody cry for Mother?” (Jansson, 1994: 142).
Sahlins  considers the Hawaiian kinship  system not  only egalitarian but  also  the most 
economically  efficient  with  regards  to  both  family  wealth  and  environmental 
sustainability. In the case of the moomins, this is particularly sustainable since rotation and 
movement (nomadism or semi-nomadism) are a characteristic of their lifestyle in which 
recycling  and sharing  is  the norm.  Instead  of building  artificial  constructions to  keep 
danger  out  or to  lock and  protect  persons  or  possessions,  the moomins  seek  organic, 
natural and geophysical protection from the earth herself, perhaps even on a metaphysical 
and universal level. It is this protection that gives them love, which, in turn, they extend to 
the others.  Again, Sahlins' analysis of the Hawaiian kinship system applies neatly to the 
relationships in the Moominvalley as well as to the household economy in Nosov's Flower 
Town:
Where Eskimo kinship categorically isolates the immediate family, placing others in a 
social space definitely outside,  Hawaiian extends familial relations indefinitely along 
collateral lines. The Hawaiian household economy risks an analogous integration in the 
community of households. Everything depends on the strength and spread of solidarity 
in  the  kinship  system.  Hawaiian  kinship  is  in  these  respects  superior  to  Eskimo. 
Specifying in this way a wider cooperation, the Hawaiian system should develop more 
social pressure on households of greater labor resources, especially those of the highest 
c/w ratios. All other things equal, then, Hawaiian kinship will generate a greater surplus 
tendency than Eskimo. It will be able also to sustain a higher norm of domestic welfare 
for the community as a whole. Finally, the same argument implies a greater variation in 
domestic per capita for Hawaiian, and a smaller overall variation in intensity per worker 
(Sahlins, 1972: 123).
Integration of creatures into the moomin household is thus an available cultural option for 
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living  with  and  among  beings.  Her  elaboration  on  the  kinship  theme  in  subsequent 
revisions  of the  books reveals  Jansson's  intent  to  present  relationships  and  lineage  as 
linked to origins common to all creatures regardless of their “genre” and where form and 
transformation do not alter the common cosmic essence. Belonging is a matter of choice, 
not  an  abstraction  based  on  random  rules  for  concrete  purposes  generated  by  a 
domesticated and alienated vision of the world. 
Yet Jansson does not ignore the existence of conflicts of interest and danger. On the 
contrary,  the  genesis  of  the  moomin  world  goes  back  to  World  War  II  and  its  most 
harrowing winter. Schoolfield (1998: 572) saw in the comet an expression of the “author's 
anxiety  about  atomic  or  hydrogen  bombs”  which  will  make  the  earth  explode. 
Moomintroll
proceeded to tell them everything that the Muskrat had said.
“And then I asked pappa if comets were dangerous,” he went on, “and pappa said that 
they were. That they rushed about like mad things in the black empty space beyond the 
sky trailing a flaming tail behind them. All the other stars keep to their courses, and go 
along just like trains on their rails, but comets can go absolutely anywhere; they pop up 
here and there wherever you least expect them.”
“Like me,” said Snufkin, laughing. “They must be sky-tramps!”
... “It's nothing to laugh at,” [Moomintroll] said. “It would be a terrible thing if a comet 
hit the earth.”
“What would happen then?” whispered Sniff.
“Everything would explode,” said Moomintroll, gloomily.
... Then Snufkin said slowly: “It would be awful if the earth exploded. It's so beautiful.”
“And what about us?” asked Sniff (Jansson, 1946: 57-8).
Jansson's universe is unpredictable, its laws difficult to discern. Creatures can turn on each 
other. Still, one principle can be traced: in navigating with peace and tact, one would avoid 
violence. The closest analogy to the moomin universe comes from quantum physics, in 
that the creatures of the moomin world are like cosmic particles in constant movement 
towards  entropy,  following  unfathomable  principles  of a  self-organising  universe with 
mysterious passages between dimensions and a constant play between the realms of being 
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– here and there, and with nostalgia for the cosmic non-time and non-place generated by 
the flickering tune that  Snufkin sometimes  captures during his  perpetual travels  in  its 
pursuit. The harmony of the universe in Moominland is like the melodious anarchy of jazz 
best achieved, not  by means of rigid  rules or formulae,  but through improvisation and 
attunement with one's own nature as well as with wilderness at large. There, in the vast 
Moominuniverse, by embracing chaos and tuning to its music, we can enjoy the ride atop 
its tumultuous  waves.
Chapter  11:  Transformation  and  Alienation:  Renunciation  and  
Kinship in Sunny City
Unlike Jansson's depiction of the transformation of Moomintroll,  which is  filled 
with confusion but also with revelations of loyalty and love, Nosov sees transformation 
between animals and humans as tragic,  unnatural,  unenlightening, even dangerous. The 
kinship model in the world of mites comprises aspects of the Hawaiian kinship system but, 
concurrently,  Nosov's socio-economic vision, revealed by his use of the transformation 
motif, incorporates elements from both the anti-domestication paradigm and domesticated 
ontology.  Even  as  the  author  presents  an  egalitarian  human  society  and  stresses  the 
importance  of  compassion  towards  all  living  beings,  including  animals  (the  wizard 
rewards Dunno for being kind to a dog by removing the leash and letting him run free), 
the basis on which he posits his ideal society is evolutionary progress in the divided space 
between wilderness and civilisation, where wilderness exists for itself and the civilised 
space is  there for  the purpose of humans.  In this respect,  Nosov also  questions Saint-
Exupéry's definition of taming “responsibility”, for Nosov's ideal world rests consistently 
on the separation of humans from animals and not assimilating them into a domesticated 
human space in the manner of The Little Prince.
At  the  same  time,  however,  neither  does  the  book  propose  integration  and 
biodiversity that Jansson projects in Moominland. Nosov uses the motif of transformation 
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of humans into animals and of animals into humans to further differentiate the categories 
of human from animal, thereby highlighting their alienation from each and warning about 
the  dangers  posed  for  humans  should  wilderness  invade  their  space.  He  concedes, 
nonetheless, that neither should the humans impose themselves on animals and wilderness. 
The  first  book  presents  a  healthy  world  and  a  strong  community  in  Flower  Town 
surrounded by wilderness and, like that of Moominvalley, rooted in a gathering life-style. 
Yet unlike the goodness of Moominland that is rooted in random and unpredictable change 
and the moomin renunciation of civilisation and machines, Nosov depicts change in this 
idyllic  community  as  a  linear  and  inevitable  fate  of  evolutionary  progress  with 
technologies  imported  from  the  agriculturally  and  technologically  more  advanced 
Greenville Town or the socially problematic but totally mechanised Sunny City.
Nosov's optimism towards technology reflects most of the “leftist” positions vis-à-
vis the machine. This optimism, however, ignores the inherent paradox of an attempt to 
free  society  from hierarchical  relationships  by  means  of machines  that  in  themselves 
depend on a hierarchical infrastructure and an essentialist division of labour. For, in order 
to make the machines, there must be someone to oversee those who imagine and invent, 
those who dig the mines for metals and ores, those who ravage quarries and tar-sands, 
those who suck out petroleum to make plastics, ad infinitum. Then, there are those who 
make the machines and those who feed everybody else.  In other words, differentiation, 
identity, professionalisation and inequality are the prerequisites for a technological society 
and Nosov attempts to solve the conflict, in the manner of Roald Dahl, not by revealing it, 
but by essentialising these identities by assigning the raison d'être for professions in the 
nature of each person; for example, in Dahl, the Oompa-Loompas are meant to work for 
Willy Wonka, which is supposed to fulfil their meaning and make them happy, and so are 
Nosov's mites pleased to be mechanics, cooks, scientists, doctors, designers, etc., finding 
their fulfilment in work in contrast to the moomins who never do the same thing twice 
(how boring life would be) and hence have no jobs and no professions but do a variety of 
things, exploring different dimensions of inner and outer world. One can agree or disagree 
with organised social order, but conflating technological development with an egalitarian 
system ultimately leads to double bind, schizophrenic misnomers and such oxymorons as 
“happy slaves” (discussed in part III).
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Regardless of the domain of knowledge – be it science or folklore – exploration of 
the place of humans in the world as fixed in a specific topos, requires that there first be the 
assumption of a  definite identity,  a  process that  depends on the constructs of essential 
qualities that can then be organised into categories based on differentiation from some and 
assimilation  into  others.  This  mechanism  of  constructing  fixed  categories  based  on 
essentialised  qualities  constitutes  a  most  effective  tool  for  domestication.  Tools  that 
humans  used  to  produce themselves  have  also  been monopolised  in  civilisation,  their 
production  professionalised  and  externalised.  For  the  most  part,  but  not  exclusively,  
animals develop their tools physiologically: for instance, the duck's waterproof feathers, 
the  chameleon's  pigmentation  that  alters  according  to  surroundings  as  a  protection 
mechanism or the anteater's long nose can be regarded as tools in the sense that they help 
them achieve certain tasks. In addition to the physiological tools, birds and animals have 
been observed to make external tools and use them, as Joshua Klein's ten year work with 
crows shows134 or  as  Nold Egenter's  (1987)  or Mike Hansell's  (2005)  research on the 
architectural practices of apes demonstrates.  On an unprecedented scale,  humans have 
externalised  their  limbs  and  tools  like  no  other  animals  and  the  secret  lies  in  the 
connection  that  John  Zerzan  (2002)  draws  between  abstraction  and  technology. 
Technology and technological production (including that of the machines themselves) has 
atrophied  the  human  ability  to  grow  tools  or  even  make  them135.  Thus,  by  having 
subtracted  themselves  from their  internal  possibilities  and  external  experience,  people 
have  forfeited  self-reliance  and  independence  and  created  a  civilisation  in  which 
technology becomes the prosthetics of our capacities.  More important, however,  is  that 
even here the division of labour designates which people become the limbs and tools for 
others but  not  of themselves.  For  instance,  even though manual and service  labour  is 
performed by the poor for the rich,  their own neighbourhoods – the “ghettos” – remain 
134 http://www.ted.com/talks/joshua_klein_on_the_intelligence_of_crows.html
135 Lasse Nordlund (2008) argues that the effort that goes into machines and technology, as well as 
domestication, is completely unsustainable and only self-made tools make sense. John Zerzan (1994, 2002 
and 2008) discusses throughout his work the escalating alienation with the self and the world that is inherent 
in human reliance on technology but also on symbolic representation discussed further in this essay. For 
example, see his Twilight of the Machines (2008). Nikitina, Ukhtomsky, and Arshavsky (in Nikitina, 1998) 
discuss “technological” childhood as physiological and moral malformation and the atrophy of muscles and 
skills in a culture that substitutes personal management and practice with commercial and artificial 
substitutes and the lack of movement and exploration in modern childhood institutions, starting from 
pregnancy and spanning through all of schooling (AbdelRahim 2002 and 2003a).
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neglected (Collins, 2007; Cohn and Fossett, 1996). 
Various  random characteristics  fix  individuals  and  groups  within  a  permanent 
construct  that  defines  (i.e.,  limits)  and  identifies  them  in  terms  of  their  productive 
“functions”. In this sense, social, professional, gender, ethnic or racial identity becomes a 
vital aspect of technological production and control: a “farmer” is expected to spend the 
best  hours  and  most  of  his  life  producing  food;  a  “male”  inseminates,  earns,  leads, 
protects, etc.; a “female” produces human resources or heirs, does housework, occupies a 
specific niche in the economy, and so forth; an “African”, an “Austrian”, an “American” 
also negotiate their relationships of production and exploitation within this hierarchical 
system of  production  and  control.  So  do  animal  people  and  plants.  In  other  words, 
abstraction or symbolic thought colludes with the construct of identity to distinguish and 
separate those who become the users and owners of tools and technologies and those who 
are  turned  into  the  prostheses  of others,  i.e.  into  the  resources  that  spend  their  lives 
providing  services  and  manufacturing  artificial  tools,  machines  and  the  various 
technologies.  Such  transformation  of  living  persons  into  machines  however  does  not 
liberate,  as  Donna  Haraway invites us to  think in  her  Cyborg Manifesto,  because the 
human  and  non-human  animals,  that  are  themselves  turned  into  tools  and  resources, 
become as alienated from suffering, including their own, as those who utilise them. In this 
respect, domestication gets further ingrained, colonising more beings and inner and outer 
nature, as we lose the ability to grow our own physiological tools.
Nosov's  attempt  at  compromise  between  the  horizontal  and  vertical  relations 
closely resembles the attempt of the Hawaiian kinship model to reconcile the inherently 
conflicting forces between horizontal kinship and hierarchical economy. Sahlins' (1974) 
main  critique  of the  Hawaiian  kinship  model  revolves  precisely  around  this  conflict, 
which, by its very nature, a hierarchical model imposes. These failings, Sahlins points out, 
were particularly revealed when the Hawaiian model faced a hierarchical,  non-kinship 
organisation of an invading European structure. He explains that the confusion stemmed 
from  the  imperialists'  misreading  the  kinship  based  on  hierarchical  obligations  that 
extended horizontally with the head holding the title of king, albeit not in the sense of the 
structure of a nation-state, yet which was forced to comply with the imperialist economic 
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interests of the invaders 136. Further, he observes that this extended kinship model is never 
free of individuation or conflict of interests. However, these conflicts are regulated by the 
concept of reciprocity (Sahlins, 1992: 124), which Jansson humorously and dexterously 
interweaves  in  her  books,  which  Milne  ignores,  and  which  are  present  but  without 
receiving their due in Nosov's trilogy.
The Adventures of Dunno and Friends opens onto the household based economy 
and the diet  and  habits of the mites echoing the biblical genesis  where,  according  to 
Christine Hayes, God's first concern was for the well-being of his creatures “you will eat 
fruits and grains,” he tells the humans, and the animals will eat plants and there should be 
no competition for food137. Scientific narratives based on comparative research of eating 
and  sleeping  patterns  of  humans,  primates,  and  predators,  as  well  as  of  frugivores, 
folivores,  and  herbivores  indicate  that  nowhere  in  nature  do  such  civilised  human 
regimens for food, play, coddle, and sleep exist. In the wild, predators eat sporadically and 
sleep for extended periods of time (lions sleep 16 hours), while herbivores (buffaloes sleep 
3 hours),  folivores,  and frugivores rely on more frequent  food intake and lighter sleep 
patterns;  whereas in  colder  climates,  hibernation is  vital for  survival (Capellini  et  al., 
2008; Lesku et al., 2006; Berger and Phillips, 1988).
Nosov opens his trilogy with this same question of diet, livelihood and space all of 
which are contingent on the technologies needed and devised as well as on questions of 
domestication: in this vegan, gathering lifestyle, there is no competition among the mites 
or between the mites and wilderness. The mites live in houses, and each member of the 
household  contributes  with  her  or  his  effort  and  skill.  For  example,  the  mechanics, 
Bendum and Twistum, fix things and invent new machines; Dr. Pillman heals; Trills plays 
music; and Blobs paints; the hunter Shot and his dog Dot presumably hunt sometimes; and 
so forth.  Like a Hawaiian king who is kin  to  his  people,  Doono is deemed important 
because he represents knowledge and science (perhaps even the Academy). However, he 
does not monopolise power, because he is kin and equal and is kept in balance by other  
mites, some of whom harbour authoritarian aspirations, such as Dr. Pillman, but mostly by 
136 Sahlins (1974) discusses this in-depth in chapter 3 “The Domestic Mode of Production: Intensification of 
Production” of Stone Age Economics.
137 http://cojs.org/cojswiki/Genesis_1-4_in_Context,_Christine_Hayes,_Open_Yale_Courses_
%28Transcription%29,_2006
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the sound judgement of all. 
Thus, even though Doono has access to important knowledge, he is  not the head of 
the household,  and the fact  that  each character is  significant  and indispensable for the 
community resolves the horizontal and vertical tensions. Even Dunno, who doesn't know 
anything  and  doesn't  do  anything  except  travel  and  tell  stories,  contributes  with  his 
passion, stories and discoveries. That is, everyone participates in the sustainability of the 
community.
In one of the houses in Blue-bell Street lived sixteen boy-Mites. The most important of 
them was Doono. He was named Doono because he did know everything, and he knew 
everything because he was always reading books... and so everybody admired him and 
did whatever he said. He always dressed in black, and when he sat down at his writing-
table with his spectacles on and began reading a book, he looked for all the world like a 
professor.
In this same house lived Dr. Pillman, who looked after the Mites when they fell ill. He 
always wore a white coat and a white cap with a tassel on it. Here, too, lived the famous 
tinker  Bendum  and  his  helper  Twistum.  And  here  lived  Treacly-Sweeter  who,  as 
everyone knew, had a great weakness for fizzy drinks with lots of syrup in them. He was 
very polite....
Besides these there was a hunter named Shot. He had a little dog he called Dot and a 
gun that shot corks. There was also an artist named Blobs and a musician named Trills. 
The  others  were  called  Swifty,  Crumps,  Mums,  Roly-Poly,  Scatterbrain,  and  two 
brothers. P'raps and Prob'ly. But the most famous of them all was a Mite by the name of 
Dunno. He was called Dunno because he did not know everything –in fact he did not 
know anything (Nosov, 1980,:11-12).
At this point, it appears that the tensions between knowledge, authority, and the Hawaiian 
kinship system are resolved, particularly when the mites solve their main problem in the 
first  book:  the  alienation of genders.  When Dunno's  housemates  befriend  the girls  of 
Greenville and the boys of Kite Town, peace and harmony are restored and the household 
based  economy here  parallels  Jansson's  vision  of  economy –  both  authors  explicitly 
demonstrate that both societies are doing perfectly well with cooperation and sharing and 
without money  or  other  symbolic  representations  for  exchange.  However,  the  sequel 
reveals that by accepting evolution towards a city-state economy as ineluctable, a process 
that  must drag  the  little  people  from  their  gatherer  lifestyle  and  household  based 
economics to a more complex and stratified future, Nosov falls into the trap of binarism, 
where  his  vision  of  that  future  allows  for  only  two  options:  either  capitalism  or 
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communism. He thus fails to examine the source of the conflict, namely that, even though 
they vary in the extent of their destructiveness and specific detail, the two systems are still 
based on the same ontology that knows humans as separate and superior to other living 
beings. In other words, both the capitalist and the communist perspectives are humanist 
visions of the world that  present  professionalisation (including the profession of being 
human) and (without stating it  as such) alienation as fundamental and natural aspects of 
evolution.  That  is  why,  the  narrative  explains,  after  Dunno  had  made  a  mess  of  the 
human/animal transformations,  Sunny City plummets into  a wild and dangerous chaos, 
which leads Dunno to share with Floss138 his critical analysis of his home-town household 
based economy as compared with that of Sunny City:
“At  home,  if  you  wanted  an  apple,  you'd  have  to  climb  a  tree;  if  you  craved  for 
strawberries, you'd need to grow them first; if you fancied some nuts, you'd have to go 
to the forest. Here you've got  it all easy: you simply walk to a dining room and eat to 
your heart's content, but at home you need to work first, and then eat.”
“But we also work here,” objected Floss. “Some work in the fields and gardens; others 
make various things in factories,  and afterwards each takes what he  needs from the 
store.”
“But you have machines to help you with your work,” answered Dunno, “whereas we 
don't have machines. And we don't have stores. You all live collectively, but at home, 
each house stands on its own. Because of that we get in a big mess.  Our house,  for 
example, boards two mechanics, but not a single tailor. While some other house may be 
accommodating  only  tailors  and  not  a  single  mechanic.  If  you  needed  pants,  for 
instance, you would go to the tailor, but he won't give them to you for free, since if he 
began to give out pants for free...”
“He won't have any left for himself!” Floss burst out laughing.
“Worse!”  Dunno motioned with his hand. “He'll end up, not only without pants,  but 
without food, because surely he can't be sewing clothes and procuring food at the same 
time!”
“Of course, that's right,” agreed Floss.
“So, for a pair of pants, you'd have to give the tailor, say, a pear,” Dunno went on. “But 
if the tailor doesn't need a pear, but needs, let's say, a table, then, you'll have to go to a 
carpenter, give him the pear for making a table, and then swap the table for pants. But 
the carpenter might also say that he doesn't need a pear, but needs an axe. So, you drag 
yourself to a smith. It could also happen that when you come to the carpenter with an 
axe, he tells you that he no longer  needs it since he'd already acquired it somewhere 
else. And there you are, ending up with an axe instead of a pair of pants!”
138 Ниточка in the original (translation mine).
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“Yes, that's a great misfortune!” Floss laughed.
“That's  not  the  problem, because there's  always a way out of any situation,”  Dunno 
responded. “In the end, friends won't let you perish and someone will give you a pair of 
pants or lend them to you for a while. The tragedy is that some mites develop a terrible 
disease – greed or rapacity. Such a rapacious mite drags home everything that falls into 
his hands: whether he needs it or not. We have one such mite – Rolly-Polly. His whole 
room is filled with every conceivable piece of junk. He pretends that he might need it all 
for trading for things he might need. Apart from that, he has a whole load of useful 
things  that  someone could have used,  but they're  only acquiring dust  and rust  with 
him”139 (Nosov, 1984: 195-6, translation mine).
Prior  to  the  above  dialogue,  Nosov does  not  voice  any reservations  about  household 
economy  in  the  first  book  whose  plot  centres  on  the  conflict  between  genders,  the 
resolution of which establishes a flow of knowledge between household units and towns 
with the economy still  remaining local and based on gathering. This lifestyle  contrasts 
strongly with the large society of Sunny City, with its complex infrastructure, where things 
are still shared communally, albeit relying on a police force and a panoptical surveillance 
139 --  У  нас  если захочешь  яблочка, так надо сначала на дерево залезть; захочешь клубнички, 
так ее сперва надо вырастить; орешка захочешь  --  в лес  надо  идти.  У вас просто: иди в столовую и 
ешь, чего душа пожелает, а у нас поработай сначала, а потом уж ешь.
-- Но и мы ведь работаем,  --  возразила  Ниточка.  --  Одни работают  на  полях,  огородах, 
другие  делают  разные вещи на фабриках, а потом каждый берет в магазине, что ему надо.
--  Так  ведь  вам  помогают  машины  работать,  --  ответил Незнайка,  --  а  у  нас  машин 
нет. И магазинов у нас нет. Вы живете все сообща, а у нас каждый домишко -- сам по себе. Из-за 
этого получается большая путаница. В нашем доме, например, есть два механика, но ни одного 
портного. В другом каком-нибудь доме живут только портные, и ни одного механика. Если вам 
нужны,  к примеру сказать, брюки, вы идете к портному, но портной не даст вам брюк даром, так как 
если начнет давать всем брюки даром...
-- То сам скоро без брюк останется! -- засмеялась Ниточка.
-- Хуже! -- махнул рукой Незнайка. -- Он останется не только без брюк, но и без еды, потому 
что не может же он шить одежду и добывать еду в одно и то же время!
-- Это, конечно, так, -- согласилась Ниточка.
--  Значит, вы должны дать портному за брюки, скажем, грушу, -- продолжал Незнайка. -- Но 
если портному не  нужна  груша,  а нужен,  к  примеру сказать, стол, то вы должны пойти к столяру, 
дать ему грушу за то, что он сделает стол, а  потом  этот  стол выменять у портного на брюки. Но 
столяр тоже может сказать, что ему  не  нужна груша,  а  нужен  топор. Придется вам к кузнецу 
тащиться. Может случиться  и  так,  что,  когда  вы  придете к столяру  с  топором, он скажет, что 
топор ему уже не нужен, так как он достал его в другом месте. Вот и останетесь вы  тогда  с топором 
вместо штанов!
--   Да,  это  действительно  большая  беда!  --  засмеялась Ниточка.
-- Беда не в этом, потому что из каждого положения  найдется выход,  --  ответил  Незнайка. 
--  В крайнем случае, друзья не дадут вам пропасть, и кто-нибудь подарит вам брюки или  одолжит на 
время.  Беда в том, что на это почве у некоторых коротышек развивается страшная  болезнь  -- 
жадность  или  скопидомство. Такой скопидом-коротышка  тащит к себе домой все, что под руку 
попадется: что нужно и даже то, что не нужно. У нас  есть  один такой малыш -- Пончик. У него вся 
комната завалена всевозможной рухлядью. Он воображает, что все это может понадобиться ему для 
обмена  на  нужные  вещи.  Кроме того, у него есть масса ценных вещей, которые могли бы кому-
нибудь пригодиться, а у  него  они только пылятся  и  портятся (Носов, 1984: 195-6).
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system to keep mites in order. Apart from fulfilling the political requirements of Soviet 
censorship, the above passage presumes that cooperation and a smooth exchange of effort 
and products will malfunction without an organised infrastructure, and, as Dunno explains, 
exchange could thus turn into an element of oppression instead of liberation. The author 
projects this organisation of infrastructure as self-ordered in  the autonomous, anarchist 
sense, but, concurrently, accepts Marx's vision of the liberating aspects of technology, and 
does not acknowledge that the division of labour, or professionalisation, inherent to this 
socio-economic structure, necessarily leads to stratification and problems of dependency 
and exploitation. He thus omits the critique of the logic of techno-culture,  whose very 
nature is alienation and professionalisation, and instead focuses on only an aspect of it: the 
oppressive nature of symbolic currency, dramatised and elaborated in the sequel,  Dunno 
on the Moon, where symbolic economy – money – creates stratification, poverty, illness, 
capitalism, and tragedy. In this respect, Nosov's books constitute an attempt to resolve the 
conflict  between technologies,  the symbolic, and oppression by ignoring the connection 
between alienation by technologies and alienation through the symbolic140.
 Nosov's  critique  of  money  reflects  Zerzan's  point  on  the  alienation  through 
symbolic  thought  and technology (2002) albeit  restricted to the part that highlights the 
inherent alienation in the act  of exchanging real effort for the symbolic.  Unfortunately, 
however, he ignores the problems that arise from an organised city infrastructure based on 
machines  and  its  reliance  on division  of labour.  John Zerzan's  (2008)  critique  of the 
symbolic and its progression into a means of existence mediated by technology allows us 
to assemble the pieces of ourselves that  have been splintered by language, art, money, 
professionalisation,  identity among  the  other  aspects  of life  that  the  civilised  take for 
granted. This  critique of symbolic  thought  reveals  the mechanisms  that  allow kinship 
systems and other forms of expression of connections to common origins to substitute the 
the symbolic for the real and to alienate by means of imposing a structure of hierarchy and 
140 One of John Zerzan's points is a critique of Marx's abandonment of his original interest in examining the 
nature of technology. Marx's assumption, he says, is that in itself technology is neutral and that the result of 
its use depends on the user's intentions and implementation: “But they [technophiles] want to be a little more 
canny about it, so again, my point is that if you say it’s neutral, then you avoid testing the truth claim that it’s 
positive. In other words, if you say it’s negative or positive, you have to look at what it is. You have to get 
into it. But if you say it’s neutral, that has worked pretty well at precluding this examination” (Against 
Technology: A talk by John Zerzan (April 23, 1997 included in his 2002 book).
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competition that  further uses the symbolic to replace the meaning of sacrifice with the 
concept  of  survival,  to  forfeit  freedom  and  independence  for  the  sake  of 
professionalisation and limitation of knowledge, skill, and relatedness, etc.  – all of which 
play a central role in civilised ontology.
Nosov,  however,  suggests  that  identification  with  one's  profession  solves  this 
conflict by allowing people to nurture their passions. He does not see that identification 
and professionalisation are an integral part of the problem, since, when a person becomes 
professional or specialised in a narrow field, as Dunno observes, she becomes dependent 
on the expertise  of others and therefore limited in  skills  and possibilities.  In addition, 
professionalisation also locks a person's life in a construct of “permanence”: for instance, 
one invests a lot of time and effort to become a doctor at the expense of developing a 
variety of other skills and therefore the expectation is that she will always “function” in 
society as a doctor. Finally,  specialisation causes stratification by splintering the whole 
picture into pieces that the civilised believe to be irrelevant thereby alienating themselves 
from  the  raw  materials,  from the  products  they  produce,  from the  wilderness.  This 
alienation occurs by suppressing the knowledge of common origins with the very first 
matter and thus the ignorance of our kinship with all living and non-living matter. After 
all, the raw materials for the machines come from the same source as the living beings. We 
are still connected to all, including to what we modify and manipulate, whether living or 
not, and regardless of the extent of our denial (civilisation) and in spite of the construct of 
time and space, those dimensions that ultimately structure specialisation and alienation.
Technicized  city  structure  needs  someone  to  run  others  and  thus  relies  on 
stratification and the symbolic  way of notifying and keeping records141 – which Nosov 
criticises in  the capitalist  system on the moon.  Still,  he believes that  a  compromise of 
horizontal household identities could be extended on a city and city-state scale through an 
economic  infrastructure  for  communal  exchange  therewith  solving  the  injustice.  This 
explains  the  ending  of  Sunny  City with  the  yearly  ritual  of  exchanging  mittens  that 
pronounces the mites who have exchanged mittens between them as brothers and sisters, 
141 As discussed in part I, Goody (1968) and Ong (1986) trace literacy to the need to record debts in the 
hierarchies of the early civilisations. In other words, literacy itself is deeply linked with the violence of 
domestication and the concept of debt.
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i.e. Hawaiian, horizontal kin.
However, in focusing exclusively on the micro household model of cooperation, it  
is  easy  to  miss  the  relationship  between  professionalisation,  stratification  and  the 
limitations in access to resources,  all of which constrict  internal movement  (change of 
interests as in Moominland) and spacial mobility (how can one travel if the household unit  
or a larger community depends on his or her skill). Nosov's solution is to, occasionally, 
have  the  whole  household  travel  but,  more  often,  only Dunno  is  flexible  and  free  to 
explore, because his interests are not of immediate urgency for the group. In other words, 
professionalisation limits freedom and choice and makes coercion a more readily available 
tool for achieving order. In the end, professionalisation, like identity, relies on the same 
basis  for  discrimination as  speciesism,  racism,  sexism,  and  other  forms  of “kinship” 
distinctions.
Nosov acknowledges the difficulties of projecting this kinship model onto a city 
scale  that  relies on police and media  as  tools for  social regulation and the control of 
production.  Yet  these  tools,  the  book  demonstrates,  are  unreliable  and  in  themselves 
problematic: the witnesses are always exaggerating, the journalists are looking elsewhere 
and printing lies,  the police capture the wrong people and punish them for the wrong 
things,  ad infinitum.  Most  important,  the economy necessarily  becomes stratified,  and 
agricultural space takes over the Sunny world,  just  as in the real world: “According to 
calculations by Paul MacCready (1999),  at the dawn of human agriculture 10,000 years 
ago, the worldwide human population plus  their  livestock and pets was ~0.1% of the 
terrestrial vertebrate biomass. Today, he calculates, it is 98%” (Dennett, 2009). 
Finally, Nosov's assumption about the uncompromising separation of humans and 
animals stands in stark contrast to the shamanistic ontology of Jansson's book. There are 
several episodes of transformation in the second and third books. First, the transformation 
happens when Dunno turns Leaf142 into an ass by means of a magic wand, then he turns 
the three donkeys into mites, and, in the last book, the mites exiled to the Island of Fools 
with  unlimited entertainment  turn into  sheep with Dunno  and his  friend Kid143 barely 
142 Listik – Листик – translates as both a page and a leaf. It appears that the author's intention was to play on 
both aspects of the name. In English this association with literacy and nature is also retained with Leaf 
(translation is mine).
143  Kozlik – Козлик.
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escaping that  fate.  Unlike the shamans, none of these transformations is  self-generated 
and, unlike the case of Moomintroll's change as experience of chaos that illuminates and 
reinstalls  harmony,  security,  and  belonging,  neither  do  these  transformations  increase 
knowledge but rather work as cautionary tales. This speciesism becomes apparent already 
at the level of the original cause that  generated the first  transformation of Leaf in  the 
second book,  Dunno in Sunny City (1984: 73).  Dunno's rage,  will,  and magic,  like the 
gods of civilised religions discussed above, brought  about  the dangerous and fearsome 
transformation of a human into a beast. 
Unbridled anger  and vengefulness  prompt  Dunno to  wave his  magic  wand and 
order  Leaf's  transformation into  an ass,  because  Leaf  had  accidentally  knocked  down 
Dunno due to the habit Leaf had of reading when walking on the street. In an attempt to 
correct his misdemeanour, Dunno reads in the newspapers that supposedly the donkey was 
sent to the zoo and, believing this media to be a reliable source, he heads there to fix his 
mistake. But the media had misreported, and, once there, he transforms the wrong asses 
into mites. In the meantime, the real mite, Leaf, ends in forced labour in a circus amusing 
the insatiable crowds always craving for more entertainment – which Nosov critiques in 
the  third  book,  once  again  resorting  to  the  motif  of  transformation,  where  endless 
entertainment on the Island of Fools turns mites into sheep – again an undesirable change. 
Thus,  Dunno fails  to rectify his actions and, instead, turns “real” donkeys into  people, 
while the human mite remains a beast. Contrary to the resolution of love and harmony that 
such a confusion between animal and human form and nature brings to the Moominworld, 
in the otherwise highly ordered Sunny City, such a mix-up leads to havoc and unleashes 
beastly  spontaneity  and  cruel  animal  desires  that  transform  the  personalities  of  the 
inhabitants, many of whom become aggressive and thoughtless.
By exploring  the topos of transformation in  this  light,  Nosov centres the  book 
around questions of authority, discipline and self knowledge as Dunno gets into a debate 
with his conscience. This debate reveals the author's reliance on civilised categories that 
distinguish  wilderness  (independence  in  questions  of  subsistence)  from domestication 
(dependence on the permission of authority to subsist) as Conscience appeals to Dunno's 
sense of empathy for the plight of the transformed boy:
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Conscience got quiet for a minute, but soon enough Dunno heard her voice again:
“Here you are, lying in a soft bed, under a blanket; you're warm, cosy and well. But do 
you know what the mite who turned into a donkey is doing? He's probably lying on the 
floor  of  some  stable.  For,  donkeys  don't  sleep  in  beds.  Or,  perhaps  he's  rolling 
somewhere on the cold ground, under the open sky... For, he doesn't have an owner, and 
there is nobody to look after him.
...  And maybe he is hungry,” the voice continued. “He can't even ask anyone to give 
him food, since he doesn't know how to talk. What if you needed to ask for something 
but weren't able to utter a word?” 144 (Nosov, 1984: 85 – translation mine).
This exercise in empathy relies on the juxtaposition of the categories of human against 
animal, domestication and wilderness: Dunno is told that he should feel sorry for the boy 
because the  boy now sleeps  on the  bare  ground  under  the  open sky,  but  not  for  the 
animals, because the nature of humans is assumed to be different from human.
Conscience's argument boils down to this: because Dunno has committed a serious 
wrong by having denied the studious and passionate Leaf the pleasures and comforts of 
humanhood with its civilised privileges (these privileges have become human attributes 
and limbs), Leaf now can no longer sleep in a bed like Dunno, he is out on the street in the 
cold and cannot keep himself warm or find food, because the city leaves no space for 
wilderness and independence. Cities are made for humans and, hence, if you are an animal 
in  the city  you perish.  The story thus focuses  on the civilised  “fact”  of comfort  and 
dependence, and the author assumes that, even as a donkey, Leaf's nature is still human 
and  therefore  domesticated and  dependent  on someone/something  to  keep  him warm, 
provide him with food, etc.. Like the Oompa-Loompas who are depicted as in need of 
Willy Wonka to eat even what is available in their world, and unlike the Moomins who 
can live anywhere they go, Leaf cannot survive alone without his community, without the 
agricultural and domesticated space of Sunny City, without his outer form, and without the 
144Совесть на минуту  умолкла,  но  скоро  Незнайка опять услыхал ее голос:
   “Ты  вот  лежишь  в  мягкой постели под одеялом, тебе тепло, хорошо, уютно. А  ты 
знаешь,  что  делает коротышка,  который превратился  в осла? Он, наверно, лежит на полу в 
конюшне. Ослы ведь не спят в кроватях. А может быть, он  валяется  где-нибудь на  холодной  земле 
под  открытым  небом...  У  него  ведь нет хозяина, и присмотреть за ним некому”.
   Незнайка  крякнул  с  досады  и  беспокойно  завертелся   на постели.
   “А  может  быть, он голодный, -- продолжал голос. -- Он ведь не может попросить, чтоб ему 
дали  поесть,  так  как  не  умеет говорить. Вот если бы тебе надо было попросить что-нибудь, а ты не 
мог бы произнести ни слова!” (Nosov, 1984: 85).
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artificial limbs of comfort and protection.
This dependence on the city's infrastructure is  not so prominent  for the mites of 
Flower Town who rely on smaller scale community cooperation and on gathering nuts, 
berries, mushrooms and wild fruit and vegetables. Yet, because Nosov perceives survival 
as dependent on cooperation, he cannot envision a person outside society and so the mites 
of Flower Town would probably find it  difficult  to survive alone in the same way it  is 
difficult for Leaf to survive outside of civilisation and to flourish without his community, 
which  consisted  of  Letter145,  the  audience  of  their  book  theatre,  and  the  whole 
infrastructure of professionals in Sunny City. Again, between the total independence of the 
moomins and the toys' total dependence on Christopher  Robin,  the interdependence of 
mites, each of whom plays a unique and indispensable role in the lives of the monolithic 
community, presents another attempt by Nosov at a compromise between the perspectives 
of wilderness and civilisation and connects the topos of transformation to the ontological 
problems of genesis, kinship, cleanliness, food, and identity.
Chapter 12: Conclusions on Cosmogonies in Science and Art
In an attempt to “make sense” of our present, people have presented narratives that 
strive to understand our beginnings and offer convincing explanations (etiologies) of why 
things are and how they got to be this way. These explanations also work as justifications 
for human decisions, choices and actions.  During the twentieth century,  some (western) 
scholars of literary theory and anthropology turned their attention to human knowledge as 
a  product  of such narratives,  an approach where disciplines  like  medicine,  astronomy, 
palaeontology,  anthropology,  politics,  religion,  cultural  studies,  folklore,  linguists, 
literature,  inter alia converged146.  But prior to the twentieth century and to the merely 
145 Bukovka – Буковка – in Russian means a letter of the alphabet.
146 For examples, see Misia Landau (1984 and 1991), Cheryl Mattingly and Linda C. Garro (2000) on 
narratives in science and Jameson in literary studies and politics.
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seventeen  thousand  years  of agricultural  civilisation,  there  were  millions  of years  of 
wilderness,  a  fact  mostly  skimmed  over  by  our  myopic  scientific  storytellers  who 
invariably tie the genealogical account of humans to European history as based on the 
historical narratives of civilisation, mostly Greek, but also of the Fertile Crescent with an 
occasional applause to the Egyptians – all slave societies. 
In these accounts, the construction of knowledge of what constitutes human and 
non-human is  based on the methodology of isolating,  classifying,  and categorising.  In 
other words,  this “knowledge” is  based on reducing information and on separating the 
various genealogical branches from one another building the argument for this alienation 
on either a mythological or scientific understanding of blood relations or of linguistic 147 or 
genetic groups, thereby leaving everyone who does not belong to the civilised genealogy 
outside narrative or “outside history”, to borrow Amilcar Cabral's expression (although he 
used it  specifically  with regard to  Marxist  historical narratives that  saw the history of 
people as the history of class struggle thereby leaving out all the people who suffered 
before civilisation and under imperialism [in Arrington, 2001: 8] and of course all the non-
humans).
We thus construct our knowledge on the basis of our perspectives on life which 
then guides us in our cultural, political, and economic decisions and scientific and literary 
creations.  In  other  words,  every  epistemological  attempt  in  a  civilised  narrative  is 
informed by the scientific method of observation and inference, but as Lakoff and Johnson 
(2003) demonstrate, even scientific methodology is not bias-proof, because what and how 
we see is contingent on the linguistic metaphors used and those, I argue, depend on the 
underlying perspectives that direct our gaze. What we deduce, therefore, is coloured by the 
culturally fostered premises and our manipulated,  domesticated desires.  Hence,  even if 
microbiologists,  physicists,  palaeontologists  or  anthropologists  often  rely  on  tangible 
pieces of the puzzle, the choices of what goes into the larger picture, and the conclusions 
they draw, are structured by previously acquired knowledge, language, assumptions and 
147 For example, Franz Fannon pointed out how the Europeans view of the Africans as without language 
allowed them to classify them as inferior with the animals thereby justifying their brutality and exploitation. 
Jermey Bentham, on the other hand, saw reason and language as insufficient categories of distinction that 
would justify torture and exploitation of either humans or animals. Sentience or the capacity to suffer was 
the only guideline that should guarantee the human or the animal person the right to be free.
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driving urges and desires. Ultimately,  however, in putting the pieces together, scientists 
rely on imagination and the ability to narrate. In other words, science is as much a product 
of imagination and preconception as  art  and religion are a  product  of truth,  and it  is  
imperative to study them together. 
No  wonder,  then,  certain  topoi  have  pervaded  the  animist,  heathen,  pagan,  
monotheistic,  and  scientific  epistemologies.  The  adaptation and  reinterpretation of the 
fundamental tenets in  these topoi had direct repercussions on the world since what we 
think of the world and how we choose to narrate our birth and the birth of the universe 
constructs meaning and provides practical guidelines on how to navigate through life and 
what to make of – and do with –  its diversity.  Cosmogony, thus,  informs our ethical,  
moral, legal, and political constructs and, by offering explanations, legitimises the stance 
we take vis-à-vis such crucial matters as the anthropogenic destruction of forests, to take 
one actual example, the formulation of which can turn into a question of life or death: do 
we  choose to  view desertification and the extermination of thousands of species  as a 
natural manifestation of an amoral order of “natural selection” in Evolution's battle for the 
“preservation of favoured races in  the struggle  of life”? Or,  should we judge it  as  an 
immoral act of a people gone rampant with megalomania and should we thus strive to stop 
the tragedy? Or, yet, is it another expression of divine will in response to the dark forces of 
evil that either earn us the punishment or absolve us of responsibility?
Children’s  authors  have  always  struggled  with  these  questions,  and  the  books 
discussed  above  reflect  the  different  approaches  adopted  in  tackling  mythological, 
theological, and scientific topoi – in that chronological order, with the mythological topos 
of genesis infiltrating all the disciplines. As Davidson notes, the
mythology of a people is far more than a collection of pretty or terrifying fables to be 
retold in carefully bowdlerized form to our schoolchildren. It is the comment of the men 
of one particular age or civilization on the mysteries of human existence and the human 
mind, their model for social behaviour, and their attempt to define in stories of gods and 
demons their perception of the inner realities” (Davidson, 1964: 9).
In other words, the mythology of a people not only reflects the cultural effort to define the 
self and the world,  but, at its core,  informs the scientific  and judicial perspectives that 
structure and direct individuals and society in how they interact with the world and the 
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way they impact it. In the end, the laws we devise, the stories we narrate, the food we eat, 
and how we go about our daily lives are some of the components that constitute culture 
and  whose  existence  owes  to  the  way  epistemologies  have  come  to  influence  our 
aspirations,  desires,  and strife.  Culture  is  thus  a  consequence of both perspective  and 
knowledge, and knowledge is, concomitantly, a scientific and a poetic narrative that drives 
us with culture through our lives. 
Misia  Landau expresses  eloquently  this  connection between  narratives,  history, 
scientific methods and texts in her article “Human Evolution as Narrative”:
Have hero myths and folktales influenced our interpretations of the evolutionary past?
Scientists are generally aware of the influence of theory on observation. Seldom do they 
recognize, however, that many scientific theories are essentially narratives. The growth 
of  a  plant,  the  progress  of  a disease,  the  formation of  a  beach, the  evolution of  an 
organism – any set of events that can be arranged in a sequence and related can also be 
narrated. This is true even of a scientific experiment. Indeed, many laboratory reports, 
with  their  sections  labeled  “methods,”  “results,”  and  “conclusions,”  bear  at  least  a 
superficial resemblance to a typical narrative, that is, an organized sequence of events 
with a beginning, a middle, and an end. Whether or not scientists follow such a narrative 
structure  in  their  work,  they  do  not  often  recognize  the  extent  to  which  they  use 
narrative in their thinking and in communicating their ideas (Landau, 1984: 262).
Because everything – what  we do or do not  do in civilisation, that order in which the 
world has been divided and capitalised – has political ramifications, then, on the deepest 
level,  the premises of our knowledge influence our  “political unconscious”,  to  borrow 
Fredric Jameson's expression. 
Narrative plays a crucial role in the articulation of this knowledge and history as 
they get  extracted  from both  the  conscious  and  the  unconscious  and  materialise  our 
present in that
single vast unfinished plot: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
class struggles...” It is in detecting the traces of that uninterrupted narrative, in restoring 
to the surface of the text the repressed and buried reality of this fundamental history, that 
the  doctrine  of  a political unconscious finds its  function and its necessity (Jameson, 
2002: 4).
Nosov's  mite  trilogy shows how a  fictional  narrative  for  children  may intersect  with 
biblical and mythological topoi, Kropotkin's (2006) evolutionary theory through mutual 
aid,  and  Marxist  theory that  ultimately  leads  from class  struggle  to  socialist  anarchy 
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through the withering away of the state148. However, even if, at first glance, it may appear 
that  Nosov presents  a  classical  evolutionary theory scenario,  his  narrative  is  not  that 
simple. He begins with an anarcho-primitivist or gatherer society that gets infected by the 
developments of a socialist  state in Sunny City and, as the technologies get perfected, 
ventures to outer space, landing into full-bloom capitalism on the moon –  i.e. it appears 
that  the  narrative  follows  a  linear  evolutionary  pattern  in  which  the  world  of  mites 
“progresses” from no technology to technology and then to capitalist technology. Yet, he 
chooses to end the trilogy with the return of the mites to the state-free, community-based 
Flower Town, and there they find health, happiness, sunshine, and life, even if this life has 
been affected through contact with other societies.
In contrast to Dunno, the domestication in 100 Aker Wood renders the characters 
static due to immobility and locked space. Except for the human character, who inevitably 
leaves for the real dimension of adulthood, literacy, education, and then probably a job, the 
“unreal”  characters  remain  trapped  in  their  perpetuity  and  domestication,  sometimes 
named and sometimes their names taken away by the human Christopher Robin. In other 
words, the underlying assumption is that imagination can empower the child to invent his 
own world to dominate, while he himself is being domesticated – after all the book opens 
with the information that Christopher Robin goes to school to get domesticated and then, 
as  civilisation declares,  the nature of things  is  to  graduate,  leaving  behind the idyllic 
happiness and moving into the dominated “reality”. If Nosov simply ignores the problems 
inherent in identity and professionalisation, Milne accepts essentialised specialisation and 
identity as the basis for healthy relationships. He opens his book with the act of naming 
itself,  i.e.  domestication  and  knowledge,  and  this  spirit  transfuses  the  relationships 
between the dwellers of the 100 Aker Wood.
For the moomins,  life  always  was,  always  is,  and  always  will  be.  Apocalyptic 
events, such as great floods and comets, that threaten their world are cosmic caprices to be 
accepted,  negotiated,  often avoided.  Death is  a  part  of life  –  a  season in  the various 
dimensions that in Moominland Midwinter is characterised by the little squirrel who dies 
148 Although Marx and Engels (1977a) state that in The Communist Manifesto, there has been disagreement 
about how much they both agreed on an anarchist outcome. For further debates on the question see 
Adamiak's (1946) essay: “The 'Withering Away' of the State: A Reconsideration”.
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because he looks into the eyes of the Lady of the Great Cold after which the Snow Horse 
puts the squirrel on his back and carries him away to everland. The squirrel himself, or a 
new version of his self, reappears in the spring. Jansson consistently refuses the traps of 
domestication: no names and no professions. Living in a world of chaos, actions change, 
there is movement in what we cause and what we do, which makes identity impossible in 
Moominvalley. Hence, Moominpappa travels, but he is not simply a traveller. He writes, 
but he is not only a writer. The family explores the theatre, but they are not always actors 
and playwrights.  The same with Moominmamma: she sews, she cooks,  she plants,  she 
cures, she travels, she paints, she dreams. Even after they settle down, they are sometimes 
there in the valley, sometimes they venture to the mountains or to the sea. The last book is 
about them not being there and in this respect they never end, for even in absence they 
remain in our lives.
In  most  non-domesticated  cultures,  cosmogonies  often  depict  life  as  already 
existing at the beginning of the narrative and as simply being – no action needed. Gods 
could be animals, celestial bodies, or women and men. Sometimes, new forms would be 
created, often for a reason of their own or to help a god or the sun or a star with some task 
(Crozier-Hogle, Wilson and Leibold, 1997). Mostly, these creations were an act of love. 
Tricksters, monsters, strange desires or thoughts could mess things up and add tension to 
the plot,  but the original reason for creation, according to these narratives, is  a cosmic 
goodness and a marvellous universe with an implicit, or sometimes explicit, explanation 
for the purpose of life as instilled in cosmic balance.  Usually in these stories, the world 
begins with one or a combination of the following elements: a  tree,  water149,  humans, 
animals,  or celestial bodies and gods.  The creation narratives of African bushmen,  the 
Masai, Scandinavian mythologies, Australian aborigines, Native Americans, the Slavs, and 
the Japanese, among others, depict a germ, a tree of life, often a woman, sometimes a man, 
sky and water as the primeval forces that, with the help of animals, create the world are 
clearly depicted in  the stories collected in Anikin et al.  (1995).  It  also happens that in 
aboriginal mythologies, like in the monotheistic and scientific versions, life gets created 
after the story had begun. For example, a California Indian creation tale relates that the 
149 Sea water is often distinguished from fresh water and both are often necessary for the creation of life, a 
perspective echoed in the microbiological theory of evolution of life.
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world was spun out of a song. The world was given as a gift to children to dwell in, says 
Darryl Babe Wilson,  a California Indian storyteller  who  teaches Native American oral 
literature at San Francisco State University and literature at Foothill College in Palo Alto, 
CA150. 
Again, Nosov does not concern himself with the origins of the world or life. He is  
worried about what are we going to do with it now as it affects the future and this future 
rests on human actions, desires, and beliefs. For Milne, the narrator is the first cause of the 
book and it starts and ends with his progeny: his son. Other (literary) worlds, we are told 
from the start, have existed, but we are concerned with what happens in this one while it  
lasts. In Jansson's books, like in Wilson's cosmogony, Snufkin, the tramp who is afraid of 
possessions, wanders through the world, sometimes hand in hand with that primordial tune 
that dwells in the universe and which he at one time holds under his hat but then it flees; 
when it does get away, he walks the earth in search of it so as to catch it with his mouth-
organ and share with the world its magic that announces spring, love,  catastrophes, and 
all151.
As Moomintroll and Sniff got nearer they heard quite unmistakable sounds of music, 
and  it  was  cheerful  music,  too.  They  [Moomintroll  and  Sniff]  strained  their  ears 
excitedly, drifting slowly nearer. At last they could see it was a tent, and gave a shout of 
joy. The music stopped, and out of the tent came a Snufkin with a mouth-organ in his  
hand. He had a feather in his old green hat and cried: “Ahoy! Ship ahoy!”152 (Jansson, 
1959: 54).
Before even meeting Snufkin, Moomintroll and Sniff capture his music and throughout the 
novels it is that song that, like the Hindu Om containing the singularity of God and all of 
150 Darryl “Babe” Wilson's session at the MLA convention, San Francisco, December 2008. In Oral 
Tradition, 13/1 (1998: 157-175) co-authored with Susan Brandenstein Park, Babe cites his ancestors', the 
Atsuge-wi, creation story. Here, first there was thought who manifested itself as voice and then as the being 
“Kwaw” or “Quon” - the Silver Grey Fox who with his song created our world because he got tired of 
sharing the original world with the constantly changing and challenging Coyote.
151 For example, see the opening story in the collection of “Tales from Moominvalley”, book 7, titled “The 
Spring Tune”.
152 The revised edition in Swedish is slightly different:
Vad är det där? Ropade Sniff. Ett Observatorium?
Nej, sa Mumintrollet. Det är ett tält. Ett gult tält. Och därinne brinner ett ljus... 
När de kom närmare hörde de nån spela på munharmonika inne i tältet. Mumintrollet lade om 
rodret och flotten svängde långsamt in mot land och stannade stadigt i strandkanten. 
Hallå? Ropade han försigtigt.
Musiken tystnade. Och ut ur tältet kom en mumrik i en gammal grön hatt och med pipa i munnen. 
Hej, sa mumriken. Släng hit fånglinan. Inte råkar ni väl ha lite kaffe ombord? (Jansson, Book 2: 30-
31).
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existence,  fills  Moominworld with wonder.  In Wilson's version of genesis,  narrative is 
posterior to thought, voice, and song: First there was a vast void; then there was Thought; 
then there was song; and then came the word. For, how could there have been word before 
thought? Wilson asks. Certainly, God couldn't be so thoughtless as to talk without having 
thought first. Language must have followed an already existing reality filled with concepts 
and knowledge, and not  the other  way around as the theory of linguistic  determinism 
maintains153. 
How we believe the world to have come about, says Wilson, is how we are going 
to  live  in  it.  Seeing  the  world  as  punishment  for  sin  or  as  a  gift  of life  has  radical 
ramifications for whether people will honour and safeguard its diversity, or whether they 
will treat it with ingratitude and approach it as the averse consequence of a repugnant act 
(ibid). The difference between these two stances is what differentiates “primitive” society, 
where members express gratitude for all creation and warn against futile destruction of 
life,154 from  “civilised”  (consumer)  society,  that  sees  its  meaning  for  existence  in 
domestication,  exploitation,  and  a  birth-given  right  to  consume  “resources”.  Most 
important, this latter views with intolerance any suggestion of wildness or of the world 
existing for any purpose other than the one designated by the domesticator.
In  the  Moominworld,  it  appears  that  Moominmamma  is  the  original  love  and 
Snufkin is the force that links this love to the cosmic song which is the original cause of 
creation  that  the  song  ultimately  expresses.  In  Flower  Town,  the  world  exists  as  an 
evolutionary unfolding in step with human needs while generated by Mother Earth, whose 
love is both tangible yet unfathomably immense. Finally,  in 100 Aker Wood, the world 
appears and vanishes at the whim of the dominator, even though the poem that dedicates 
the book to its original inventor, Christopher Robin's mother, links love to motherhood. 
Yet, the next  mention of love appears right  after the poem,  in the introduction, locked 
behind bars, as an object of voyeuristic fetishism. This leads us to the next  part of my 
research on the anthropology of these three literary worlds in which I examine how the 
153 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson  (2003) see language as the formulating medium that gives rise to 
awareness of what's out there and hence of all knowledge, including science that is influenced by metaphors.
154 There are numerous ethnographic and anthropological accounts of African, American, or Asian tribes, as 
an example see Moses Osamu Baba's “Iku-Nishi of the Saghalien Ainu in Royal Anthropological Institute of 
Great Britain and Ireland, 1949.
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three  fictional  cultures  respond  to  these  domesticated  and  wild  drives  and  how their 
respective  socio-cultural  paradigms  express  wilderness  or  civilisation  in  response  to 
creating or resisting the institutions of control; for example, anthropological constructs of 
illness  and  health  or  crime  and  punishment  respond  to  these fundamental  precepts of 
domestication and wildness.
In  the  concluding  part  of  this  research,  I  return  to  the  connections  between 
language, domestication and incarceration and the specific mythologies of civilisation that 
allow  for  such  overtly  oppressive  (physical)  structures  as  school  and  zoos  to  be 
misrepresented as architectural edifices of love,  health,  and prosperity.  In other words, 
language and human genesis have created a specific anthropology and the narratives offer 
the  logic  of  madness,  whereas  misrepresenting  the  unreason  of chaos  as  the  clinical 
deviation from the norm.
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III
Anthropological Narratives in Fiction and Life
Chapter 1: The Lulling Whisperer
So far,  in my methodological steps I have proceeded almost biblically from the 
Word to the World. My aim has been to examine literature as an anthropological construct 
and in this sense trace its evolutionary trajectory from symbolic representation through 
literacy and narrative to culture, particularly that literary culture has come to impact our 
very nature and reality as well as the anthropogenic “evolution” of our environment. In my 
analysis  I  have  identified  two  distinct  ways  of relating  to  the  world  that  had  radical 
implications for the possibilities of survival of the various communities of life: the non-
linear, non-temporal position of wilderness that is constantly on the move and changing 
and  the  chronological,  ordered  and  disciplining  position of civilisation.  In  a  different 
setting, I plan to explore new approaches and methodologies, but here I have examined the 
ways  in  which  the  two  positions  and  their  ensuing  narratives  infuse  literature,  both 
children's literature and the literature of science and art for the wider range of audiences. 
Since  my work is  taking  place within the framework of a  civilised institution,  I  have 
structured my inquiry in  relation to  this  institution's  narrative  and logic as I  trace the 
argument step by step and respond to its claims and beliefs. 
My plan has  been  to  compare and  contrast  the  underlying  basis  for  children's 
literature as knowledge, culture and social foundation, and I have endeavoured to provide 
a space for dialogue between the various narratives, voices, and texts by comparing and 
contrasting their most basic premises, assumptions and knowledge. But, since the reality 
of anthropogenic desertification, genocides, on-going extinction of thousands of species 
and overpopulation (almost seven billion) of human animals have accompanied the past 
seventeen thousand years of civilisation, yet  has been overwritten with the narrative of 
progress  and  humanist  values  that  praise  civilisation  and  its  “achievements”,  I  have 
allotted considerable space to identifying and examining the root of civilised constructs of 
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knowledge  and  the  narratives  that  legitimate  and  reproduce  (mis)representation, 
alienation, violence, silencing and injustice. Having thus proceeded from epistemological 
concerns of language and discipline in the first part, and having explored the underlying 
ontological conceptions of genesis and genetics in narratives of civilisation and wilderness 
in the second part, my examination leads to a third section on anthropological narratives of 
non-human and human-animal nature that inform our cultural and social endeavours, in 
which  I  explore  the  possibilities  of  a  theoretical  basis  for  redefining  such  terms  as 
“culture”,  “knowledge”,  “civilisation”,  “wilderness”,  “order”,  and “chaos”,  particularly 
that they function as memes and genes in domesticating doxa and ideologies in the ever 
expanding and ever colonising civilising project.
Drawing from Daniel Dennett's studies on the philosophy of biology and Richard 
Dawkin's theory of memes as the cultural equivalent of genes, Jack Zipes (2009) makes a 
strong  case  for  certain  (fairy  tale)  motifs  –  his  concrete  example  was  the  variations 
through space and time of the Frog Prince tale – that have the potential to turn into memes 
transmitting  vital  information  about  viable  reproductive  strategies  and  relationships. 
Particularly this  final part  of my inquiry echoes Zipes' call  for  collapsing the borders 
between disciplines in comprehending children's literature and tracing these motifs in the 
biological adjustments of human and non-human organisms to cultural variations, such as 
the  invention  of  language155,  as  they  become  integral  elements  of  doxa,  body  hexis, 
habitus,  ideology, and the physiological make-up itself of the forms of life  affected by 
civilisation  (i.e.  engineered  through  breeding  and  domestication).  In  fact,  there  is  an 
urgency for understanding the mechanisms and the reproductive function of these motifs, 
drives,  and  the  narratives  themselves,  which  –  stemming  from  the  perspective  of 
domestication, like the self-defeating civilised institutions – have the propensity to turn 
into a tumour that ends up devouring its agents, its biosystem, and finally itself. 
The nature of wilderness and of non-domesticated stories precludes the possibility 
of lying  with the intention to create a  permanent  body of (mis)knowledge in  order  to 
manipulate  since  these  narratives  encompass  a  variety  of perspectives  and  logics  that 
regulate  a  balance  through the unpredictability of outcome  and  consequences.  As  my 
155 See my earlier discussion of language and brain starting in chapter 3, part I.
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discussion of aboriginal tales from Russia in part II demonstrates, there is simply no one 
righteous  party  that  possesses  the  right  to  win  and  to  own  something  or  someplace 
permanently,  be it  a symbolic narrative, factual information, or a tangible object. In the 
end, if a person does not agree with another human or non-human person or perspective, 
one can follow the moomin example and simply ignore and go about living her life or 
move away.  It  does not  mean that  there are no creative or playful approaches toward 
truth(s)  or  challenging  ways  of seeing,  interacting  and  influencing  the  outcome  of an 
encounter.  The folk tales around the world are testimony to non-domesticated peoples' 
awareness of tricksters and the various forces that can surprise, even overwhelm, whom 
every creature and all communities must  know and be able to reckon with.  What  this 
means, however, is that, through the various lies and truths, a sense of Truth emerges in 
the  ability  of  a  community  to  exist  through  self-driven  mutuality,  empathy,  and 
cooperation through a viable culture that understands and respects wilderness, i.e. the right  
to exist  for one's own sake. Respect  and harmony can come through “real” and “true” 
knowledge which can be accessed through empathy and concern. In a world completely 
colonised by civilised human animals,  redefining  the relationships  that  bind us to  our 
ethics, desires, and the world has thus become of utmost urgency as seven billion people 
have now occupied the planet,  desertified its  continents,  polluted  the oceans,  and  are 
draining the reserves of fossil oils accumulated throughout the billions of years of life on 
earth. 
In terms of civilised narratives, the situation is diagonally opposite, since there is a 
direction to the stories whose purpose is to influence, change, and manipulate living and 
non-living “objects” and “subjects” regardless of their own knowledge of themselves or 
their will. Civilised narratives impose their truth through confiscating the political power 
to manipulate and legitimate in addition to monopoly over violence that poses a constant  
and structural threat to the lives of the members of civilised “society”.  In this respect, 
society is  a term used to denote persons bound to each other through shared means of 
subsistence, and in civilised or agricultural settings, these bound bodies are related in a 
necessarily hierarchical order with a panoptical identity imposed by means of the threat of 
violence, through symbolism, language, (un)knowledge, and laws. Mark N. Cohen defines 
society in these terms:
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Civilization, once identified by its visible technological monuments such as pyramids, 
has more recently been described in terms of the implied changes in social organization 
and,  more  specifically,  the  social  stratification,  political  organization,  and  coercion 
entailed in the building of these monuments (Fried, 1967; Carneiro, 1970). The political 
power to build a pyramid – rather than the technology to do so – became the defining 
characteristic of the new social order, the state, in which an élite class monopolized the 
use of force and controlled direct access to essential resources such as land, or water, 
while the bulk of the population was forced to exchange its labour for  food.  Society 
became an institution of competing interests held together by coercion rather than by  
homogeneity156 and positive personal bonds” (Cohen in Ingold, 1997: 273-274 – italics 
mine). 
As  Peter  Kropotkin  and  Michel  Foucault  have  observed,  in  order  for  this  system of 
civilised  order  to  be  more  effective  and  the  arguments  for  adhering  to  society more 
compelling, identity,  knowledge and narrative have to be based not  on truth,  but  on a 
monopoly of the technologies of violence.  Language and education constitute  some of 
these technologies of violence that  operate  through an omnipresent  threat  to life.  This 
threat has to be internalised by the victims – the working masses – and hence panopticon 
had  to  be  taught,  regardless  of truth,  facts,  or  the accuracy of the  established  causal 
relationships  between  suffering,  wilderness,  civilisation,  happiness,  mortality,  crime, 
disease,  et  al.  In  other  words,  manipulation of subjects is  the  main  goal  of civilised 
narrative, and misleading is in the nature of civilisation itself. In this respect, the civilised 
narrative  reminds  one  of  the  Shaitan against  whose  lulling  whispers  the  Qur'an  had 
warned:
Say: “I SEEK refuge with the Lord of men,
2. The King of men,
3. The God of men,
4. From the evil of him
who breathes temptations 
into the minds of men,
5. Who suggests evil thoughts
156 Even  though I  disagree with  the larger  implications of the term  homogeneity here,  and in fact  have 
argued  that  it  is  civilisation  that  strives  towards  simplification,  sterility,  and  homogeneity,  while 
wilderness  needs  and thrives  on  variety and plurality,  Cohen's definition  of  society echoes  strongly 
Arshavsky's (in Nikitina, 1998) work on dominanta the respect for which helps each individual establish 
from early childhood an inner system of guidance in making decisions and choosing one's occupations.
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to the hearts of men --
6. From among the jinns and men” (Qur'an, sura 114 Al-Nas, ayat 1-6).
In this part,  I  examine the  doxic whisperers,  the myths at  the root  of the narrative  of 
civilisation that  inform the distinct  cultural and anthropological “materialisation” of its 
ontologies and which legitimate the silencing of the voices of the millions of victims of 
the  longest  and  most  brutal  of  holocausts  in  the  history  of  civilisation,  that  of  the 
extermination  of  wilderness.  With  the  exception  of  a  few  truly  wild  texts,  much  of 
children's literature inadvertently projects these myths as self evident truths.
Three basic myths provide the foundation for the narrative of civilisation. The first 
myth is built on the premise that civilisation is a natural aspect of evolution – even in the 
case when life is understood as stemming from divine will – and is a state towards which 
all beings strive, yet only the humans, due to their specific characteristics (physiological 
possibilities for spoken language, bipedalism, or divine breath) have been able to attain. 
The second myth holds that wilderness is a place of destitution, illness, constant danger, 
and death, whereas civilisation provides quality of life, safety, health and longevity for all 
its domesticated subjects. The proponents of civilisation hold that domestication is better 
than wilderness even for the slaughtered children of cows, chickens, and pigs, as well as 
for  the  human  poor,  in  spite  of  statistics  demonstrating  high  mortality  rates  and  the 
immense  suffering  from hunger,  social  diseases,  and  violence.  This  myth claims  that 
everyone naturally prefers the “benefits” of civilisation (otherwise how can they live) and 
therefore  it  depicts  victims  as  agents  willing  and  choosing  to  forfeit  independence, 
movement,  and  self-determination.  Finally,  civilisation  claims  that  it  is  the  source  of 
morality, ethics, and compassion while wilderness is the dark place of brutality, amorality, 
and  ruthlessness.  I  examine  this  last  myth in  chapter  four  in  the context  of  the  first 
narrative of evolution as vehicle for the first myth, because as Kropotkin observes, Darwin 
interlinks the question of morality with the evolution of intelligence (chapter four of The 
Descent of Man is dedicated to questions of morality), both of which he attributes to the 
nature itself of adaptation and a requirement of life: “ any animal whatever, endowed with 
well-marked social instincts … would inevitably acquire a moral sense of conscience,  as 
soon  as  its  intellectual  powers  had  become  as  well-developed,  or  nearly  as  well-
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developed, as in man” (Darwin, 2004 : 120-121, italics mine). Hence, even while he does 
not rule out the “possibility” of animals attaining moral standards, he nonetheless puts the 
human being as superior and leader in this “most important” “difference between man and 
the lower animals” (ibid: 120).
These three myths dominate the narrative in all its manifestations through scientific 
and  literary texts  becoming  the  doxa of civilised  knowledge,  whether  obtaining  their 
legitimation from the empowering institutions of their time, through historical symbols, or 
even through simply appealing to its own authority and the power to kill. Because of these 
historical  nuances,  it  often  appears  that  the  narrative  changes,  when,  in  reality,  its 
domesticating platform remains the same. For instance, it  claims that “true” knowledge 
today is no longer based on the “false” monotheistic Tree of Life. Yet, the contemporary 
version of the narrative simply replaces the biblical genealogies with the evolutionary 
genealogies that still confirm the human animal at the crown of creation; and Darwin's 
Tree  of  Life  is  the  same  old  motif  without  which  the  human  animal  cannot  fathom 
existence.  In this  respect,  tracing  this  topos  through the landscape  of civilisation and 
wilderness, one can see the trajectory of the animist understanding of the Tree as a being 
among others, the one that breathes life, giving out oxygen by day and carbon dioxide by 
night, offers fruit as food and branches as shelter. With the spread of civilisation, the tree 
becomes more and more separated from its reality and nature and becomes an abstraction 
and  a  symbol  for  life  there  where  life  itself  is  being  appropriated,  domesticated, 
annihilated: the evolutionary branches that lead the human being, once again, to the throne 
of  existence.  When  transposed  into  the  civilised  narrative,  these  motifs  inform such 
children's books as  Shel Silverstein's (1964) poem,  The Giving Tree, which centres this 
topos and  presents  the  parasitic  relationship  between the  avaricious  boy and  the  tree 
craving to be consumed by him as a beautiful tale of love, in which the victim exists to 
please the abuser and is glad to be tortured and consumed. In other words, evolution and 
time continue to drive the plot of civilisation in a unilinear and predetermined direction 
instituting oppressive relationships, inscribing them in a narrative of pain,  consumption 
and death.
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Chapter 2: Definitions of Life and Death, or Not Everyone Decides to Join  
Alice and Go Down the White Rabbit Hole
The basic perspective in wildness shares the fundamental concept of chaos theory: 
nothing is ever that which was or appeared to have been. Even though scientists still try to 
capture entropy with formulae, their nets are inadequate for the whole scope of existence. 
So far,  I have focused on developing my definition of the premises that distinguish the 
civilised from the wild, namely: the civilised premise  knows Man as having evolved or 
been created to dominate, order, name, possess, and consume its rightful resources, and 
the premise claims that the purpose for the existence of other beings is  for a chain of 
consumption, with Man still leading in the sphere of eating. In the premise of wildness, 
this ontology knows the human animal as having been created or having evolved to be a 
speck and a component as insignificant as any other and as vital to the community of life 
as all. Wilderness knows the world and everything in it as existing for its own sake, not to 
be defined, confined, domesticated, known and possessed. In other words, the knowledge 
of civilisation rests on limitations, domestication, strict separation of categories, ignorance 
of the truth of others, and on global violence; while the knowledge of wilderness requires 
multiplicity of opinions, experiences, emotions, voices, and lives.
My definition of civilisation derives from the research of physical anthropologists 
(Eric  Sunderland  [1973],  palaeontologists  like  Björn  Kurtén [1984  and  1995]),  and 
anthropologists  (Tim Ingold  [1997],  Marshall  Sahlins  [1974  and  2008],  Hugh  Brody 
[2000],  Piers  Vitebsky [2006],  John  Zerzan [2002  and  2008])  among  countless  other 
sources. According to the basic anthropological definition, civilisation is a sedentary way 
of life whose mode of subsistence depends on the domestication of crops as well as of 
non-human and human animals leading to the constantly expanding territories of colonised 
space, time, and lives by means of selective, engineered breeding and abstraction allowing 
for the possession of places and entities whom the breeder, owner and exploiter may not 
necessarily see, know157, touch, or hold. 
157 Orientalism, for instance, according to Edward Said (1979) functioned in this way: backed by the power 
for violence (military technology and masses of soldiers), the imperialist could devise any picture of the 
imperial object without regard to its veracity and impose it as a structure, that in the context of this 
relationship, benefited the imperial power. This, however, does not mean that the object is completely 
annihilated of any subjectivity or independence in relating to this knowledge. However, within the 
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The anthropological understanding of culture also derives its  meaning from the 
concrete  practices,  material and symbolic  tools,  and concepts that  guide individuals in 
their lives. In this respect bacterial culture and its interaction with its environment or the 
tools  produced  by  birds  or  apes  constitute  culture  as  much  as  the  sum  of  human 
endeavours spanning the Louvre, scientific textbooks, industrial production, opera, punk 
rock, drainage systems, organisation of city space, inter alia, and the ways in which these 
systems are approached, produced, used, and reproduced constitute human culture(s) that 
can be differentiated – not by their external details  and superficial differences – but by 
their  effect  on  their  environment  and  the  extent  to  which  they  keep  the  symbiotic 
community in balance or whether they consume their biospheres.  The main distinction 
between these  cultures  that  separates  civilisation  from wilderness  resides  in  the  stark 
contrast between sedentary confinement which depends on expansionism and colonialism 
for  subsistence and the constant  movement  of nomadic peoples  and gatherer  lifestyles 
whose subsistence depends on relationships based on biodiversity, movement, and at the 
same  time,  unmediated  presence  and  memory.  In  this  respect,  this  understanding  of 
civilisation  and  culture(s)  incorporates  existential  and  religious  questions  as  well  as 
Marxist  and ontological perspectives on relationships,  society,  and space.  Ultimately,  it  
always goes back to the question of life: what is life and how should we live it? 
Biology textbooks use growth and movement to distinguish life from non-life: the 
living organism grows and therefore moves (upwards or sideways within its space when it  
does not  have  limbs); it  also  moves in  time by reproducing itself and transmitting  its 
habitus and  praxis; it  uses energy and responds to the environment158.  The non-living 
matter supposedly does not do any of that. This concept gets drilled gradually throughout 
a child's education. Primary schooling introduces it in simple vocabulary and by the time 
the child grows into a university student, these definitions feel natural and matter of fact. 
They sit well in the body hexis, that is. Challenges to the “norm” are then taken as “the 
exceptions that prove the rule”. 
framework of a relationship that ultimately consumes the lives, dreams, personalities, and free 
relationships of the colonised object, this structure of oppression has the most tragic and painful 
repercussions on the experience of life by the colonised subject.
158 See chapter four on the Characteristics of Life in New Jersey Ask Science Grade 4, Triumph Learning; 
New York (see in bibl. Under Special Reports: 2005).
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When  children  are  not  required  to  learn  anything  or  when  they  ignore  the 
limitations set by the requirements from “above”, they play with these concepts creatively 
and  discover  new ways  of relating  to  knowledge.  Without  the  fear  of punishment  or 
ridicule,  they  are  capable  of  drawing  conclusions  that  are  not  on  the  list  of  school 
requirements.  For  instance,  this  excerpt  from my personal  journal  on my  unschooled 
daughter's questioning of the scientific narrative demonstrates how personal each path in 
learning is and how enriching to the adults if they take children's observations seriously 
and not as “mistakes”, at worst, and “cute” childish errors or funny, harmless, but wrong 
answers, at best159:
When Ljuba, my daughter, was nine years old, at midnight she would insist on reading 
geology  –  a  520  page  in  C4  paper  format160.  My  child's  post-midnight  scientific 
inspirations have been testing my patience since she was eight months old, for I have 
always been a morning person and staying up till 2 or 3 am for some reason failed to 
energise me. Still listening to her read aloud as I kept dozing off and on was magical. I 
helped occasionally with the terms she didn't know and learnt new things about the texts 
as well as about children's interactions with books. Prior to her fascination with geology, 
Ljuba  was  indulging  in  biology  and  psychology,  where  she  first  came  across  the 
characteristics of life as an organism that grows and moves and thus living matter was 
distinct  from  the  non-living  “objects”,  such  as  rocks.  Luhr  (2003)  however  uses 
biological terms to describe the earth, such as “anatomy of the earth” or “the changing 
earth” which describes the earth as someone who “moves” or “grows”, i.e. it alters its 
being in space.  “Most minerals are solid crystalline substances composed of atoms,” the 
text reads.  “A crystal is  a solid such as a  mineral with an orderly repeating atomic 
structure.  With  unrestricted  growth,  it  forms  a  geometric  shape  with  naturally  flat 
planes” (ibid).
Ljuba was puzzled: “But if non-living matter doesn't grow, how come minerals can have 
unrestricted growth? The minerals must be alive. And so are crystals. But what about 
stones  and rocks?”.  Thus  our  nocturnal  conversation  led  to  all  sorts  of  ontological 
considerations. We recalled the dark but beautiful Soviet film The Story of the Voyages 
(1982) [Сказка Странствий – Skazka Stranstvij]161 in which Marta,  the  heroine in 
search of her kidnapped brother, voyages through different landscapes and its peoples 
with their singular cultures. Everywhere in civilisation, she sees abuse, pain, death, and 
suffering. One of the peoples among which she sojourns have made a living by pumping 
oil from the earth and delivering it to a warrior group of extortioners. Both groups have 
gone mad in this relationship and as Marta departs from their madness, she turns around 
from a distance and sees that what they believe to be drilling is not the earth, but a living 
whale that suffers and the oil that they are pumping is its blood. “Maybe, these books 
don't know everything about the earth, after all,” my daughter concluded. “It might turn 
out that stones feel pain too”. Children thus are capable of formulating theological and 
159 The American philosopher Gareth Matthews has been publishing on philosophy with children, taking 
their questions seriously on the nature of justice, democracy, minority rights, etc.
160 The book was Earth edited by James F. Luhr (2003), published by the Smithsonian Institution.
161 On the film database (imdb), the title is translated as “Story”, however, in Russian Skazka (сказка) is a 
fairy tale.
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ontological questions that are thousands-years-old as they ponder over the nature of life 
and being.
I recalled this conversation later as I was revising the literature on evolutionary theory, 
whose most magnificent idea comes from palaeobiology, the concept that all life shares 
common origins because it came from an electrochemical gradient between alkali and 
acid in the sea water, which provided the basis for the living cell: acetyl phosphate and 
pyrophospate. We are then all connected to the sea but also related to all forms of life, 
including the rocks on the ocean floor. That electric current, charged by storms, has been 
the sparkle of genius driving our unrelenting yearning, so beautifully captured by Tove 
Jansson in the character of the perpetual travellers in Moominbooks, the Hattifattners, 
whose lifeforce derives from the electric charges generated by the storm, and who are 
forever drawn by the vast expanses of the sea, desiring nothing but to move in silence 
towards the horizon. They are not blighted by language and are the most mysterious, 
primal,  vital and intense forms of  life.  Tove Jansson, like the aboriginal storytellers, 
knew the essence of life (from personal journal entries of September 2008 and January 
2010).
Sedentary theory intersects  with  practice  at  several  points in  civilised  institutions.  Its 
contradictions, however, are expressed most explicitly in the question of pedagogy where 
the conflict between the attempt to teach life through methods that instil death reveal the 
discrepancies  between  methodology  and  content:  pedagogical  methods  ensure  that 
children for most of their day remain locked in one place (desk, classroom, school, and 
then with homework), forced to learn about the world from a highly ordered, restrained, 
and sedentary perspective, while memorising the exact opposite from textbooks, namely, 
that movement is what distinguishes the living from the non-living. 
This paradox extends to other spheres of civilised life as well. For instance, people 
are told from early childhood that economic movement is possible through social climbing 
as reward for hard-work, while,  concurrently, property and the classification of classes, 
heritage, and other markers ensure that there is no real movement, change, or entropy and 
that, throughout the history of civilisation, the human and non-human people who work 
the hardest have been compensated the least; their lives consumed by those who work the 
least, yet who possess and control the most. Because the symbolic capital is linked tightly 
to real lives, bodies and suffering, exploitative economic systems are bound to collapse if 
those  bodies  die.  The  dispossessed,  the  disempowered,  and  the  millions  of  beings 
marginalised from participation in  the “resource” structure as agents (they, themselves, 
constitute the resources and possessions) are thereby either eliminated through war or left 
to perish in what the Malthusian explanation holds as the “natural population control”. 
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In her anthropological work titled  How Institutions Think, Mary Douglas (1986) 
discusses  the  tacit  understanding  of  and  complicity  of  everyone,  including  the 
disempowered individuals, in which group was to perish in an impeding crisis, yet no one, 
neither  on the local  level nor  on the  international,  would  do  anything  to  prevent  the 
tragedy. Circumscribed in tight camps, often for the duration of their short lives, refugees 
are the most blatant expression of civilisation's impediment to movement and thence to 
life, revealing the collusion of individual states with the international organisations that 
are more concerned with controlling this despair,  locking it  in  one place – the camp – 
instead  of  working  towards  its  eradication.  In  fact,  movement  (real,  symbolic,  or 
economic) in the civilised narrative is a mythical topos. In those cases where there is a real 
possibility of movement taking place,  social movement presents a serious threat to this 
myth that depicts civilisation as developing towards its better self and yet  continues to 
ensure that despair remains cemented in a static, solid structure trapped in a monolithic 
permanence.
In  this  light,  what  meaning  could  a  child  extrapolate  from the  contradiction 
between  the  content  of  the  lesson  and  the  pedagogical  methods  through  which  it  is 
delivered, if: (A) at first, a child is taught that the definition of life is movement and the 
definition  of death is  lack  of it;  (B)  then,  the  child  is  forced  to  submit  to  sedentary 
incarceration  in  school  and  then  with  homework  after  school  with  the  evolutionary 
trajectory set towards a sedentary job in an office space or wherever else? If a person 
accepts as true both the definition and the method through which this definition is taught,  
the deepest meaning that she can extrapolate from these contradictions is to renounce life 
itself: “life means movement, but I cannot move, I am told where to sit and for how long, 
what to do, learn, and how to grow. Therefore I must have died”. 
This paradox of civilisation that  knows that  life  is  movement  and  yet  imposes 
stillness  is  the  main  point  where  ontology,  anthropology,  wildness,  and  civilisation 
intersect. For, if chaos and wildness are the expression of life craving movement even in 
stone,  then  the  decision  to  forfeit  one's  freedom  and  independence  to  roam  as 
purposelessly and unreasonably as do the Hattifattners or Snufkin in Moominland – whose 
reason and purpose are either cosmic or their own – binds people to sedentary settlement. 
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Ultimately, sedentary settlement expands into cities, forcing these cities and settlements to 
depend on the exploitation of human and animal labour and the domestication of crops, 
water,  land,  even  air,  in  conquered  and  necessarily  ever  expanding  territories,  whose 
biodiversity has to be exterminated, for it no longer provides community for the conqueror 
but rather poses a threat to ownership and a competition for resources. Civilisation is, thus, 
based on the agricultural practice of monoculture (both of crops and of civilised human 
ontology), in which the countryside becomes a necessary resource submitted to the needs 
and agency of the city, its conqueror.
The paradigm for civilised relations was thus transposed to all aspects of civilised 
society: space – particularly the space outside the city which became the city's property – 
and whoever dwelt in this space became a matter of calculated ownership and hence had 
to be controlled, “designed”, and engineered, while human and non-human wilderness was 
to be eradicated.  Starting with reproduction and spanning urban planning, architecture, 
bodies, minds, illness,  health, punishment, reward, education,  ad infinitum, every single 
aspect of life has acquired a price and has become converted into symbolic or material 
capital (Bourdieu, 1979 and 1990). Any threat to the growth of profit, increment in wealth, 
or to  the  maximisation of the exploitation of all  its  human and  non-human  resources 
became “outlawed” and is constructed as a threat to “order”. In this context, the whole 
world — even the universe — becomes an architectural exercise, and wilderness — or the 
existence of someone or something for its own purpose — a threat and chaos as a negative 
force that civilised society fights.
In order for this system of subsistence and colonialism to work, the resources have 
to be domesticated or trained to believe that access to food depends on, and their whole 
existence owes to, how well they serve their “owners”. Although all of these elements of 
civilisation figure prominently in children's culture and literature, the last point regarding 
the  control  of food,  bodies,  and  will  is  the  one  that  is  most  tightly  linked  with  the 
pedagogical methods  themselves  that  constitute  the  main  tools  of domestication,  with 
literature and literacy playing a more prominent role in the expression and propagation of 
civilised culture. This indicates that the most significant differences between cultures162 
162 Here, I do not differentiate between the cultures of non-human and human animals. There are bacterial 
cultures, there are the cultures of plants, of insects, and so on. By culture I mean the sum of devised 
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around the world throughout history reside in the roots of the ontological positions that 
drive  people  to  forge  their  material  cultures  and habitus,  while  the  mundane  details 
through which these cultures and their  differences express themselves come second in 
their ability to induce significant structural change.
Most human and non-human cultures choose the ontology of wildness even though 
evidence shows that the concept of domestication has been available to non-human and 
human animals throughout the ages: certain parasites, microbes, plants, and animals are 
known to be able to change the behaviour of their prey in order to suit their own culture in 
the manner of those humans who have devised the hierarchical structure of human and 
non-human beings for consumption. As Mark Nathan Cohen (1977: 19) observes:
There is fairly widespread consensus now among anthropologists that the knowledge 
that plants grow from seeds is probably universal among hunters and gatherers and that 
this knowledge has probably been available to human groups since very early times, 
long  predating  its  application  in  full  fledged  agricultural  economies.  For  example, 
example, Flannery (1968: 68) states:
We know of no human group on earth so primitive that they are ignorant of the 
connection between plants and the seeds from which they grow.
Similarly, according to Bronson (1975: 58):
Deliberately growing useful plants was neither unique nor a revolutionary event. It 
probably happened in many places starting at an early date. This is not a complex 
idea or a difficult idea to develop. It is not beyond the inventive reach of any human 
being. We can be quite sure that activities resembling cultivation go far back into 
the Pleistocene (Cohen, 1977: 19).
The obvious question here is: why most human and non-human forms of life have chosen 
not to go down the path of domestication if the relationship between seeds and plants, or 
chicks and hens, or calves and cows, or babies and mothers, etc., is a connection that can 
easily be made by all humans and animals? Aboriginal peoples around the world have 
known about the mechanisms of reproduction all along and have tended diverse forest 
gardens and helped salmon reach their reproduction sites safely (Ellen in Ingold, 1997), 
yet with the exception of a few sporadic outbreaks of civilisations in the human history of 
customs and habits that are meant to help us to economise the effort of reinventing the wheel and at the 
same time to encode “traditional” behaviour such as eating, reproductive, and living patterns. When 
certain elements of cultures change, they do not necessarily challenge that culture or society if the basic 
premises that drive them remain the same and therefore often “revolutions” end up, not only 
reconfirming the preceding social structure and order, but in fact making it even more efficient.
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Africa, Middle East, Asia, and Mesoamerica (e.g. the civilisations of Mali, Egypt, Aztec, 
Maya,  India,  or  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates),  no  one  else  saw  this  social  structure  of 
colonialism as a preferable way of life.
Not  only is  the civilised narrative  young  – domestication of crops and  animal 
husbandry in Asia and Mesoamerica goes back a mere seventeen thousand years (Ellen in 
Ingold,  1997; Sunderland, 1973; Dickens,  2004) prior to which there were millions of 
years of diversity and life surviving to this day in some parts of Africa and the Amazon 
forest,  but  this narrative  has been seriously challenged,  particularly from the evidence 
gathered  in  the  fields  of  ethology,  primatology,  and  human  animal  studies  (such  as 
anthropology).  Observations  on  chimps,  birds,  bonobos,  wild  dogs,  et  al.,  support 
Kropotkin's understanding of nature as welcoming and favouring life, where beings thrive 
in diversity, and all organisms, regardless of the degree of their simplicity or complexity, 
know that their well-being depends on intricate symbiotic systems fostered by mutual aid 
and cooperation. 
In  contrast  to  the Darwinian version that  sees the well-being  of individuals  or 
whole classes and groups as contingent on how far ahead the individual or the class/group 
enter into reproductive competition with others and how smartly they use resources and 
forge  useful  alliances  that  would  further  their  individualistic  and  exploitative  ends 
(libertarian  anarchism and  market  economy  are  the  most  radical  expressions  of  this 
premise), the Kropotkian thesis on viable strategies holds that since the world provides 
favourable conditions for life, organisms can live well in it and therefore they know that 
the happiness of one depends on the happiness of all, while the happiness of all makes the 
happiness of one. If one individual or one species suffers, her pain is felt by others and 
elicits their response. Knowing the world through empathy, experience, and improvisation 
helped the ontological position of wildness to prevail for millions of years, because the 
ability to empathise stimulates intelligence and maintains the drive of life. For, by tuning 
to the experience of others we can grow and move outside the claustrophobic borders of 
our  reality  tunnels  circumscribed  by  our  personal  interests.  It  is  this  ability  to  feel, 
understand, and care for the suffering of the other that allows a person to understand and, 
therefore,  to  know  the  other  on  her  terms,  accepting  that  the  reason  for  the  other's 
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existence  could  be  none  other  than  to  simply  derive  pleasure  from being.  From this 
perspective, the suffering of one becomes a cosmic tragedy of whole symbiotic systems of 
being. 
Chapter 3: Anne's Choice
Evidently, all forms of life tend to choose the most efficient ways for living their 
aspirations  and  reproducing  themselves  as  ideas,  knowledge,  experience,  and 
physiological beings as well as adapting their environment to their needs and themselves 
to their environment (Kropotkin and Darwin, et al.). The relationships between the various 
forms of grass and weeds point to the sophisticated intelligence of these plants to have 
worked out a symbiotic balance with other forms of life for millions of years. If grass still 
lives,  in  spite  of  the  brutal  civilised  human  mawing,  pesticides  and  herbicides,  it 
demonstrates resilience and intelligence that allow it  to overcome even the exceptional 
brutality of civilised humans. Since everyone is  intelligent  and is  capable  of choosing 
whether to interfere in the reproduction of others or not, then the question begs itself, why,  
apart from some viruses, microbes and humans, no one has chosen to control the sexuality 
and the reproduction of others or to modify their purpose and lives in the organised and 
globally totalitarian and expansionist manner of human civilisation or severe outbursts of 
epidemics (again, caused by civilisation)? In other words, if species choose what's best for 
them, and what's best for them is supposedly to conquer, curtail and control,  then why 
don't they go down this path? Could it  be that they have known that this path was not 
optimal for them and for life in the long term? In other words, could it be that they are far-
sighted and the civilised humans myopic?
Responses to these questions depend on the ontological premises from which one 
proceeds in answering them. The Darwinian narrative (which includes all the responses 
and  interpretations  that  propelled  specific  cultural and  anthropological  manifestations) 
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proposes that  civilisation was possible  because  only humans  have  evolved  into  being 
capable  of developing  language,  bipedalism,  having  an upright  posture  that  freed the 
hands for developing technology, and an abstractly thinking brain that could calculate the 
advantages  of this  system of control  and  modification of  the  environment  instead  of 
modifying the self and adapting it  to the world in the manner of the other, non-human 
beings. 
Another premise is that specific actions as well as the evolution of organisms are 
driven by self-interest,  i.e., by greed and competition even in questions of cooperation, 
where  alliances  are  sought  for  profit  and,  in  the  spirit  of political  praxis,  are  easily 
discarded when they become no longer convenient, i.e. these alliances are not inspired by 
concepts  of honour  or  altruism.  This  narrative  holds  that  humans  dream,  desire,  and 
understand their natural propensity for greed and violence in a meta-linguistic manner, an 
understanding  that  has  allowed  them  an  “advantage”  over  others  in  the  race  for 
domination providing them with the possibility to organise their greed and violence more 
effectively.  In other words, we are told that humans are capable of greed as well as of 
conceptualising, rationalising, and justifying it and the structural injustices that the meta-
language enables them to construct, which, in turn, justifies and institutionalises the greed 
and the violence that such “knowledge” generates.
Since this “knowledge” is based on stratification, specialisation, and alienation, it  
discards much of the information available  in  wilderness  and ignores the suffering  of 
others. Civilised knowledge is, therefore,  “un-knowledge” whose aim is to simplify the 
complexity of the world by imposing specialisation of skill,  expertise,  or purpose in  a 
narrow, segregated field serving the humanist hierarchy. What is in reality incompetence 
in the complexity of life,  civilisation terms as “professionalisation”: chicken and cattle 
become only “food”; dogs and cats exist to give pleasure as pets; a secretary at a food 
store must know the specific drawers, letter-heads, and letter-forms, but is not required to 
know the chemical food additives in the cans she helps to sell and is encouraged to remain 
ignorant about how chickens and the cattle live and die; an engineering professor is not 
expected to know how to hunt mushrooms or what the biologist in the next building does 
in  her  laboratory,  or what  additives  and  hormones  enhance  her  sandwiches;  a  mother 
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cannot understand her child's crying, she needs to pay a paediatrician to explain to her; 
and so on. To be a professional means being incompetent in everything except the specific 
technical field for which the expert is paid specific amounts of money, with which she can 
buy concrete things,  and specific  services.  This makes each expert  dependent  on other 
experts for the rest.  However,  because the exchange between these experts follows the 
rationale  of  extortion,  hierarchy,  and  symbolic  value,  then  most  “professionals”  fare 
poorly with this deal, while the few that do well prosper exceptionally. 
Specialisation is imposed by the social structure itself and secured by means of the 
impenetrable walls of segregation in education and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1979), city 
planning  and  public  space (Zipes,  2010),  transportation and  social  networks,  property 
taxes, rent, among others. For instance, in the article on European poverty cited earlier, 
Sumlennyj and Koksharov (2010) provide examples of the inability of the residents of an 
impoverished  neighbourhood  in  Glasgow  to  buy  a  metro  ticket  to  visit  a  different 
neighbourhood of the same city, which leads to many people growing up without knowing 
anything outside of their neighbourhood. Like the serfs of feudalism, the poor continue to 
be  trapped in  closed, colonised  spaces.  In an anthropological monograph entitled  The 
Broken Fountain, Belmonte (1989) renders the lives of the residents in one of the most 
impoverished  neighbourhoods  of  Naples,  Italy  and  the  struggles  with  the  borders  of 
poverty that lock its residents in a claustrophobic world of injustice.  Ethnographic and 
anthropological accounts from other parts of the world confirm the power of these tangible 
borders between economic disparities that play an integral role in the engineering of space, 
time,  and even love.  This despair  in love was poignantly depicted by Nancy Scheper-
Hughes (1992) in Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil as she 
describes  the resignation of the  impoverished  mothers  to  the reality of many of their 
children  dying  from  starvation,  thereby  bringing  to  mind  Mary  Douglas'  (1986) 
observation on the hierarchical starvation of certain social groups in Africa.
 In contrast, wilderness requires a wide range of knowledge and skills to enable a 
person to take care of herself as well as to support and exchange with her community of 
life. Here, the choice to share and cooperate is driven by empathy and the respect for the 
lives and the well-being of the members of one's community of life where the generosity 
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in sharing measures a person's worth and ensures that economic disparity does not arise in 
that community163. The weaker individuals are taken care of regardless of whether they 
can contribute or not. In these societies, human and non-human animals help their injured 
and  other  members  who,  for  some  reason,  are not  able  to  participate  in  a  hunt  or  a 
gathering expedition164. 
In  order  to  be  able  to  radically  shift  the  underlying  basis  that  nurtures  solid 
relationships in a culture, the first thing that domestication must do is colonise the will and 
knowledge that lead to strong community ties and concurrently to individual independence 
in subsistence, movement, and personal purpose. As the ability and skill to care for oneself 
and for  others gets destroyed through specialisation, the domesticated persons become 
handicapped,  ignorant,  and ultimately immobile,  i.e.  dead. In this respect  domesticated 
humans and cattle behave in a way that can be termed despair.  Even when the gates to 
freedom open, they do not rush outside as they no longer believe that they can survive in  
wilderness and stop dreaming. Here, to be a specialist or expert in one's “field” entails 
dependency and an essentialist attribution of purpose. Notions such as: cows are meat, 
Africans are poor, men are managers, etc., which constitute the basis of the essentialised 
qualities forms the specialisation for which a group is known to be “naturally” good at and 
which in turn justifies the exploitation of these qualities (regardless of whether they are 
really  present).  The  process  of  identification  and  professionalisation  thus  renders  the 
members of the essentialised group dependent on the domesticator for identifying these 
qualities and then consuming the attributed roles in exchange of money, favours, and even 
the right to live. Hence, if a group of people believes that cows have been created to be 
eaten, then the cow is forced to live exclusively for this purpose to be eaten: she eats, is 
forced  to  reproduce,  separated  from her  children,  forced  to  be  milked  by  machines, 
incarcerated, etc., until she is killed. If Africans are known to be best at being defeated, 
used as slaves, and to starve after the “altruistic” colonisers were asked to leave, then the 
old colonial domesticator, dressed in a new fashion, can decide where the camps should be 
set up, what the refugees should eat, and how to coerce the rest of the Africans, who are 
163 Marcel Mauss (1990), Maurice Godolier (1996), and Sahlins (1974), among others have looked at the 
concept of the gift and potlatch as economic transactions. I argue that the view itself of acts of generosity 
through this lens is prompted by the domestication of generosity and that these acts could have a 
completely unrelated ontological source or meaning.
164 I discuss this more indepth later in chapter 4 on Neanderthals, wild dogs, etc..
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not starving, to participate in this scenario and the neo-colonialist relationships. In the case 
where men are managers, they cannot grow their own food, build their own home, weave 
their own clothes. They have to make sure that others do this for them. The examples are 
endless.
To be a specialist, hence, demands ignorance of the most important details of life 
and requires  complete submission  to  one's  speciality  in  a  tightly defined  field  that  is 
approved by the civilised institution, responding to the needs of this institution and not to 
the needs of the human or non-human animals themselves. 
The dependence generated by civilised relationships creates a system of death in 
which  the  motivations  for  “exchange”  and  “participation”  are  driven by  fear,  apathy, 
greed, and even a degree of sadistic pleasure, since seeing others faring badly, or at least 
worse than oneself, confirms that the choices one made were the right ones and hence the 
suffering of those who  have  failed to  make the same  choices,  for  whatever  (ignored) 
reason, becomes a source of comfort. A typical example of this is the common reaction of 
“first-world” people when facing the reality of starvation and death around their world: “I 
visited India and boy am I glad to be an American (or Canadian, or French, or whatever) 
and to have such a beautiful home to come back to”. Inadvertently, such statements ignore 
the death and misery in the “first-world's” own backyard. Moreover, they dismiss the fact 
that domesticated human and non-human people's lives and deaths depend on the civilised 
infrastructure for institutional violence, injustice,  and the hierarchically rationed cruelty 
and  suffering  not  only  on  the  individual,  social  and  national  level,  but  also  on the 
international level of global nation-state hierarchy. 
Lucy Maud Montgomery's (1983) Anne of Greene Gables illustrates how this topos 
is  projected  in  children's  books.  The  novel  (consisting  of  nine  books)  depicts  the 
inherently unequal economic relations, career, and investment as normal and rewarding. 
Two farmers, brother and sister, from Prince Edward Island want to get free labour on 
their farm and so come up with the idea of ordering a boy from an orphanage in Nova 
Scotia. By mistake, the orphanage sends them a girl. The underlying basis for this decision 
is  therefore exploitation,  for  who else can be more easily taken advantage of than an 
orphan without any social, symbolic, or material capital? Of course, there are also good 
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intentions in the reasoning that “well, the orphan would have fared so badly, abandoned in 
this  institution,  while  we  could  share  what  we  have”.  However,  the  narrative  leaves 
unquestioned the basis for the arrangement  of social relations in a way that allows for 
some people not to be able to afford to keep and love their children, while  others can 
choose to take a child as a labour resource and a source of joy. Instead, the novel presents 
both parties,  the victim and the exploiter,  as authors of their choices and projects their 
relationship as viable and enriching for all, thereby omitting the basis of violence and its 
effects on them and their world. 
Unequal relations are thus embedded in  the narrative at its very conception: the 
dispossessed orphan is  there to work on the colonised land turned into  an agricultural 
resource  where  all  forms  of  competition  (“weeds”,  “pests”,  “natives”,  “foreigners”, 
animals, birds, etc.) get either controlled, domesticated, or exterminated. The development 
of the plot  culminates in  Anne's gendered and “professional” response to the civilised 
expectations of her: she represses her dream to travel and learn about the outside world, to 
realise herself as a writer, and turns down the scholarship that would have allowed her to 
fulfil  her  inner purpose.  Instead, she chooses to stay on the farm and take care of her 
adoptive mother. The message of the book is appealing to readers because it speaks to the 
inner – almost on the cellular level – need for community and cooperation.
To an extent, like Sendak's Max, who in his own domestication negotiates a sense 
of empowerment by invading wilderness, colonising it and taming the wild others as well 
as his inner dreams, Anne tames herself and kills her own dream by aligning her happiness 
with the role of a good resource for the farmers and their farm, a gendered role that is 
prescribed  by  civilisation  as  domestication  is  also  about  the  control  of  sexuality, 
reproduction and the incarceration of resources in farms, schools, offices, et al. According 
to the narrative, therefore, Anne proves to be a good investment for someone who makes a 
living  off  colonisation,  the  essence  of  agricultural  farming  that  consumes  purpose, 
meaning, lives, time, and space of all who dwell in that nexus. Most important, the book 
tells us, Anne renders everyone happy: the colonising farmers, herself, and the colonised 
land itself as she gladly curtails  her  own movement  through space and through inter-
disciplinary knowledge by declining the offer to travel to university, which provided her 
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an opportunity to follow her heart  to  expand her knowledge and write.  Of course,  the 
university and the city themselves are part of the civilised colonisation of country space 
and therefore, regardless of her choice, Anne's options are limited to the civilised spectrum 
of  relationships.  Thinking  that  she  is  the  author  of  her  choice  and  that  she  chooses 
community,  she actually makes the choice that  is  appropriate to her gender and social 
standing that define her within a domesticated and domesticating hierarchy.
The point here is not to argue for the abandonment of the elderly or the weak in 
favour  of  one's  own interests  necessarily.  In  wilderness  most  human  and  non-human 
societies, including the Neanderthals, have been known to take care of the injured, the old 
and the weak (Bekoff & Pierce, 2009; Kurtén and Gould in Kurtén, 1995; Boesch et al., 
2010; Goethe and Kropotkin in Kropotkin, 2006; among others). The difference between 
choosing  to  help  in  the  respective  contexts  of  wilderness  and  civilisation  is  that  in 
wilderness the driving force to share comes from within the individual in a landscape that 
does not submit to the concept of rightful ownership and therefore it is not a hierarchically 
imposed subjugation, but a lasting bond and relationship that aides self realisation, rather 
than hampering it. Therefore, members of the community of life get their turn in partaking 
of the fruit, water,  and livelihood. Those who can take more share with those who are 
unable to reach food. Inability to access food in the conditions of wilderness either stem 
from some larger environmental disbalance (e.g. drought, sudden unprecedented drop or 
rise  in  temperatures,  etc.)  or  from one's  own  weakness.  In  this  sense,  the  sanctions 
imposed by civilisation that lock food in social constructs of permanence, ownership, and 
weakness are reminiscent of these catastrophic disasters, a disease that has to be overcome 
if  life  is  to  prevail on earth165.  In wilderness,  conflicts of interest  also  arise,  however, 
unlike in civilisation, there is no theory that makes any single outcome the rule of thumb 
or “law by precedent” that  locks individuals  in  hierarchical systems  that  control time, 
space, and lives. 
In the civilised narrative to which Anne of Greene Gables adheres, the expectations 
of self abnegation, self control and self sacrifice abide by the rules of a rigid hierarchical 
order,  which  can  be  expressed  in  Foucauldian  terms  as: “the  genius  of  the  social 
165 Again, Marcel Mauss' (1990) The Gift is an anthropological exploration of redistribution of wealth in 
non-domesticated cultures, e.g. as expressed in Potlatch.
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fabrication of the individual is  to make that  individual  the principle of his or her own 
fabrication, thus guaranteeing the sense of authenticity in what is fabricated” (in Frank, 
1998:  2:331).  In other  words:  Anne has  to accept  the narrative  and invent  a  series of 
stories whose contradictions will cancel themselves out and in which she emerges content 
and  with  a  sense  of  empowerment  for  having  chosen  this  narrative  herself  thereby 
becoming the author of her own victimisation.
Several theorists and historians of children's literature – for instance, Gillian Avery 
(1975), Jack Zipes (1983 and 2002) and Andrew O'Malley (2003) – have observed that 
there have been two concurrent  narratives expressed in  children's  books written in  the 
English  language  that  address  two  distinct  audiences  divided  along  economic,  social, 
gender, or racial lines. Needless to say, these categories distinguish the empowered from 
the  disempowered.  The  narrative  addressed  to  those  who  control  resources  depicts 
qualities such as individuality,  originality,  creativity, leadership,  spontaneity,  dishonesty, 
greed, etc., as positive. For instance, in The Wind in the Willows, Kenneth Grahame (2003) 
portrays the aristocratic Toad as lovable and rightful owner of wealth even as he breaks the 
law, lies, steals, and escapes from prison at the expense of the working class. His friends, 
even while they do not own anything themselves, act, in Malcom X's words, as “house 
Negroes” making sure that the revolution does not happen, that the Weasels, those wild, 
proletariat masses fail to re-appropriate Toad's possessions, all the while Toad himself is 
gallivanting  around  the  world,  playing  with  technology and  breaking  laws  and  moral 
codes. 
Members of the exploited categories, in contrast, are expected to conform to the 
social expectations of themselves  constituting those resources.  Their  status as  objects, 
exploited, underclass already warrants their portrayal as deviant and untrustworthy. Here, 
the  qualities  that  are  depicted  as  desirable  in  the  first  category  become  negative, 
dangerous,  and  illegal,  while  obedience,  dependability,  diligence,  hard-work,  and 
servitude are exalted (Avery, 1975; Zipes, 1983 and 2002; and O'Malley, 2003).  Anne of  
Greene Gables, the washerwoman and her daughter who help Toad in  The Wind in the  
Willows, the peasant girl who heals the rich boy in The Secret Garden while not wanting 
anything for herself, among numerous other examples, illustrate these standards.
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In this way, a fictional book, such as Anne of Greene Gables, inscribes itself within 
the larger narrative of domestication: along with land, Anne constitutes a resource for the 
farmers  and  is  the  one  to  renounce  her  wildness,  while  the  farmers  cling  to  their 
ownership, space, and time. Lucy Maud Montgomery thus creatively projects a Darwinian 
narrative, and Anne picks the most viable strategy in that logic: to serve the interests of 
those who are more powerful than her (coming from an orphanage, she a priori does not 
have any social or other capital) and define herself in their terms aligning her own self-
knowledge with their definitions without revealing conflict of interests. Both, we are told, 
are happy with the way the narrative unfolds, and, as readers, we remain ignorant of other 
possibilities, such as a revolt that leads to rewilding, because, presumably, wildness poses 
even  a  greater  danger  than  poverty  and  orphanage,  while  civilised  relations  and 
stratification  provide  a  haven  of  safety.  In  this  way  Anne's  choice  reiterates  the 
Darwinian166 premise that nature itself is unwelcoming – even hostile – to life where living 
beings are in  a  perpetual mode of adaptation to  it  and competition with one another, 
developing  more  and  more  sophisticated  strategies  to  overcome  adversities  whether 
through alliances or violence and war.
166 Charles Darwin himself has acknowledged in his work the dangers of the reproductive success of any 
given species that means the extermination of another species. My usage of the terms “Darwinian” or 
“Kropotkian” theory or perspective pertains to (1) the main focus of the authors; and (2) the main focus 
of the reception. Namely, the way the Darwinian evolutionary scientists applied Darwin's insights is to 
favour the competitive focus, whereas the Kropotkian theory was embraced for its favouring the mutual 
aid aspect of co-existence. Kropotkin, however, acknowledged, the place of violence and competition, 
only relegated it to the less important strategy and more as a check-in-balance regulatory mechanism, 
and gave more weight to the role of cooperation as surviving and proliferation strategy.
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Chapter  4:  They  Chose  to  Be  Wild:  The  Interrelationship  of  
Empathy, Intelligence and Viability
One of the most widespread myths about civilisation holds that ethics,  morality, 
choice,  “humanness”,  intelligence,  and  compassion are the prerogatives  and  results  of 
civilisation, and conversely that  wilderness is  a  place of savage brutality,  ruthlessness, 
amorality, simplicity, instincts, reflexes,  and ignorance. Close observation of both states 
reveals that the reverse is true.
Physiologist  Ilya  A.  Arshavsky,  applying  Petr  Kropotkin's  theory of  evolution 
through  cooperation  and  mutual  aid  to  his  study of the  physiology of  the  growth of 
organisms,  observes  that  wildness  is  ethical  and  moral  while  civilised  humans  are 
immoral,  ruthless,  and  sick  (Arshavsky,  1992;  in  Nikitina,  1998).  Observing  the 
abundance of life and diversity in the harshest of the world's climates in Siberia in winter, 
Kropotkin juxtaposed civilised brutality to the generosity of wilderness in these words:
Not long ago the small streams of Northern America and Northern Siberia were peopled 
with colonies of beavers, and up to the seventeenth century like colonies swarmed in 
Northern  Russia.  The  flat  lands  of  the  four  great  continents  are  still  covered with 
countless colonies of mice, ground-squirrels, marmots, and other rodents. In the lower 
latitudes  of  Asia  and Africa  the  forests are  still  the  abode of  numerous  families  of 
elephants,  rhinoceroses,  and  numberless  societies  of  monkeys.  In  the  far  north  the 
reindeer aggregate in numberless herds; while still further north we find the herds of the 
musk-oxen and numberless bands of polar foxes. The coasts of the ocean are enlivened 
by flocks of seals and morses; its waters, by shoals of sociable cetaceans; and even in 
the  depths  of  the  great  plateau  of  Central  Asia  we  find  herds  of  wild horses,  wild 
donkeys, wild camels, and wild sheep. All these mammals live in societies and nations 
sometimes numbering hundreds of thousands of individuals, although now, after three 
centuries of gunpowder civilization, we find but the debris of the immense aggregations 
of old. How trifling, in comparison with them, are the numbers of the carnivores! And 
how false, therefore, is the view of those who speak of the animal world as if nothing 
were to be seen in it but lions and hyenas plunging their bleeding teeth into the flesh of 
their victims! One might as well imagine that the whole of human life is nothing but a 
succession of war massacres. 
Association and mutual aid are  the  rule  with mammals.  We find social habits  even 
among the carnivores (Kropotkin, 2006: 32).
Happily enough, competition is not the rule either in the animal world or in mankind. It 
is limited among animals to exceptional periods, and natural selection finds better fields 
for its activity.
...”Don't compete!--competition is always injurious to the species, and you have plenty 
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of resources to avoid it!” That is the tendency of nature, not always realized in full, but 
always present. That is the watchword which comes to us from the bush, the forest, the 
river, the ocean. “Therefore combine—practise mutual aid! That is the surest means for 
giving to each and to all the greatest safety, the best guarantee of existence and progress, 
bodily, intellectual, and moral.” That is what Nature teaches us (Kropotkin, 2006: 60-
61).
However,  as soon as we come to a higher  stage of  civilization,  and refer to history 
which already has something to say about that stage, we are bewildered by the struggles 
and conflicts which it reveals. The old bonds seem entirely to be broken. Stems are seen 
to fight against stems, tribes against tribes, individuals against individuals; and out of 
this chaotic contest of hostile forces, mankind issues divided into castes, enslaved to 
despots, separated into States always ready to wage war against each other. And, with 
this history of mankind in his hands, the pessimist philosopher triumphantly concludes 
that warfare and oppression are the very essence of human nature; that the warlike and 
predatory  instincts  of  man  can only  be restrained within  certain limits  by a  strong 
authority which enforces peace and thus gives an opportunity to the few and nobler ones 
to prepare a better life for humanity in times to come (Kropotkin, 2006: 95-96).
Kropotkin provides plenty of illustrations that refute the civilised assumptions and offers 
poignant  descriptions of ruthless extermination by civilised human animals of rodents, 
buffaloes, wolves, human aborigines, among many others around the world – all owing to 
the erroneous conviction that because wilderness is depicted as violent and brutal, then its 
annihilation  is  justifiable,  even  constitutes  a  moral  duty,  regardless  of  the  brutality 
mustered by this civilised ability for abstraction and systematisation.
The success of this myth's incorporation into the new religion – science – owes 
much to the Darwinian167 interpretation that change in the animal and plant world occurs 
due to a constant struggle for existence, whereby species have to constantly be adapting to 
life.  The perspective of the branch of the Christian church that  upholds suffering and 
struggle as the necessary components of human post-Fall existence is evident in Darwin's 
language (struggle and suffering – almost like the mythical Russian soul), which could be 
one  of  the  reasons  for  the  popularity  of the  Darwinian  narrative,  particularly,  in  the 
Christian Western Civilisation. 
Despite  the  fact  that  Charles  Darwin  himself  was  not  always  so  confident  in 
identifying  the  direction  in  which  his  theory was  to  lead  humanity,  the  logic  of  his 
167 By Darwinian I mean the whole tradition of the interpretations that have been legitimated by the voices 
of authority and imperialist interests, such as Darwin's eugenicist cousin Francis Galton, among many 
others. Hence, even when Darwin himself, furtively acknowledges the importance of kindness and 
cooperation, he dedicates an overwhelming amount of space and data for the discussion of competition 
and aggression.
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argument, the bulk of his discussion, and the original 1859 title of his seminal work, “The 
Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races  
in the Struggle for Life”, provided the foundation for the Darwinian theory of evolution 
and  the  subsequent  application  of  the  argument  in  the  socio-political  sphere  with  a 
eugenicist undertone, which is not surprising, given that Malthus' (1798 [1998]) essay on 
the necessity of the destruction of the “rice” races was one of the most significant  and 
influential readings in Darwin's bibliography (Darwin, 2008a: xlvi and 2008b: xvii).  The 
title and the work operates on several assumptions: 
1. Hostility: implies that the world is not favourable to life and that life is a constant 
and  ineluctable  struggle  in  which  organisms  have  to  fight  to  constantly  adapt 
themselves  to  this  brutal  world  and  its  needs.  This  assumption  reflects  the 
Christian church's directive for the mortal human “sinners” to accept suffering and 
not rebel, but at the same time places the “human” at the head of the hierarchy of 
the primitive creatures and beasts.
2. Race: (a) the race between individuals and groups against others in competition for 
survival  and  (b)  the  existence  of  races  as  naturally  distinct  groups  becomes 
highlighted in this narrative, whereas in wilderness differences and variety are the 
norm.
3. Justification of violence: the claim that survival is struggle then in itself justifies all 
acts, including violence against others, because in the end the one who survives is 
the “favoured” person and race and, i.e.,  survival redeems the means.  Again,  in 
wilderness the stress is  not  on survival but  on being, including the humility of 
death,  when the older  cede their  place  to  the new.  Ironically  then,  civilisation 
embeds the construct of death in the structure of fear and violence, which, as will 
be discussed later, has cut lifespan almost in half. Increase in fertility compensates 
the  shortened  lifespan,  but  also  overcompensates  resulting  in  overpopulation, 
particularly  among  the  poor  human  and  cattle  populations.  Both  of  these 
contingents constitute resources with the difference that cattle and other domestic 
animals and birds are forced to breed168, while human resources often appear to be 
168 Often humans collect the sperm from one or two males and inject it in all the female turkeys, horses, or 
other animals designated for breeding and kill the rest either for food consumption or simply to eliminate 
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the  agents  of  their  choice  to  reproduce  because  they  have  no  resources  but 
themselves. Hence, civilisation has raised fertility rates drastically and the battle 
for survival in the case of civilised humans has resulted in an epidemic outburst of 
almost seven billion people, most of whom live in destitute with high prospects of 
early mortality.
These  premises  sanction  human  endeavours  from  which  the  various  socio-political 
paradigms and other cultural manifestations derive their form and content with concrete 
ramifications  for  the  anthropological  constructs  conveyed,  including  in  children's 
narratives.  For  the  most  part,  the  underlying  precepts  of  these  constructs  remain 
unchallenged, since books like the moomins or the Dunno trilogy are in the minority in 
terms  of  availability  and  popularity  of  works  whose  scope  encompasses  broad 
anthropological critiques. Moreover, even though Peter Kropotkin presented a compelling 
scientific challenge to the Darwinian premises, with the exception of a few scientists (such 
as Stephen J. Gould), until recently his work has largely remained ignored.
In  Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, Kropotkin (2006) states explicitly that he 
chose the harsh climate  of Siberia  in  order  to  test  the main  premise of the theory of 
Natural Selection of “favoured races”, since, he reasoned, competition would make more 
sense in  extreme climate conditions,  where food was more scarce than in  the tropical 
areas, where Darwin had developed his theory. However, even in the harshest situations, 
Kropotkin said that he found no evidence to confirm the struggle theory. The only place he 
observed  this  principle  at  work  was  in  civilisation expressed  in  the  various forms  of 
imperialism  (today  known  as  capitalist  globalism);  while  the  principle  at  work  in 
wilderness, he says, through which individuals and species flourished, has been illustrated 
over and over through cooperation:
Paucity of life, under-population—not over-population--being the distinctive feature of 
that immense part of the globe which we name Northern Asia, I conceived since then 
serious doubts—which subsequent study has only confirmed-- as to the reality of that 
fearful competition for food and life within each species, which was an article of faith 
with most Darwinists,  and, consequently,  as to the  dominant  part  which this sort of 
competition was supposed to play in the evolution of new species.
...[W]herever I saw animal life in abundance, as, for instance, on the lakes where scores 
those specimens who are deemed as worthless, nuisance, or harmful.
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of  species  and  millions  of  individuals  came  together  to  rear  their  progeny;  in  the 
colonies of rodents; in the migrations of birds which took place at that time on a truly 
American scale along the Usuri; and especially in a migration of fallow-deer which I 
witnessed  on  the  Amur,  and  during  which  scores  of  thousands  of  these  intelligent 
animals came together from an immense territory, flying before the coming deep snow, 
in order to cross the Amur where it is narrowest--in all these scenes of animal life which 
passed before my eyes, I saw Mutual Aid and Mutual Support carried on to an extent 
which made me suspect in it a feature of the greatest importance for the maintenance of 
life, the preservation of each species, and its further evolution.
...Consequently,  when  my  attention  was  drawn,  later  on,  to  the  relations  between 
Darwinism and Sociology, I could agree with none of the works and pamphlets that had 
been written upon  this  important  subject.  They  all  endeavoured to prove that  Man, 
owing  to his higher  intelligence and knowledge,  may mitigate  the  harshness  of  the 
struggle for life between men; but they all recognized at the same time that the struggle 
for the means of existence, of every animal against all its congeners, and of every man 
against all other men, was “a law of Nature.” This view, however, I could not accept, 
because I was persuaded that to admit a pitiless inner war for life within each species, 
and to see in that war a condition of progress, was to admit something which not only 
had  not  yet  been  proved,  but  also  lacked  confirmation  from  direct  observation 
(Kropotkin, 2006: xii-xiii).
Most  important,  stemming  from  the  assumption  that  the  environment  on  earth  is 
conducive to life and by observing that in wilderness cooperation prevails over violence 
and competition, Kropotkin's test of the Darwinian theory of evolution challenges the most 
fundamental  premise  of  civilisation,  namely that  creatures  are  hardwired  for  progress 
possessing an instinctual desire for it, because they are presumably in a constant process 
of overcoming the adversities of life. The underlying premise in the civilised narrative is 
that life in this world happened in spite of the environment and that therefore in order to 
prevail it  needs to constantly adapt  to it  and compete with other life.  This supposedly 
forces living beings to constantly seek new ways of improving themselves with the result 
that  only  the  most  successful  of  the  contesters  (like  those  of  Willy  Wonka's  raffle 
discussed  in  part  II)  achieve  this  human  and  civilised  stage.  Therefore,  the  civilised 
conclude, pitiless violence and destruction are in the very nature of evolution towards that 
final and greater end, that of “humanity” and “civilisation”. Hence, the moral of the third 
point of this mythology holds that, regardless of the suffering inflicted upon fellow non-
human and human animals and plants, the fact of civilisation itself redeems the civilised 
human, even if it (the civilised human itself) and the world perish because of this abuse.
Some of the 21st century American scientists echo almost  verbatim Kropotkin's 
observations and the work of other Russian anarchist physiologists and political theorists 
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of the 19th and 20th centuries who have held an important place in Russian thought (for 
instance,  Alexandre Radishev,  Nikolai Chernyshevsky,  Alexandre Herzen,  Leo  Tolstoy, 
Dostoevsky, Mikhail Bakunin,  inter alios). Anti-authoritarian thought became an integral 
part  of  the  very  basis  of  scientific  and  creative  literature  as  well  as  other  forms  of 
expression, such as theatre and film, in spite of the heavy state censorship privileging the 
Marxist  and  Leninist  perspectives.  Particularly  in  science,  the  development  of  this 
perspective can be identified in the work of Ilya A. Arshavsky,  the head of the laboratory 
of physiology in Moscow during much of the 20th century. Arshavsky carried on the work 
of  his  teacher  Alexei  A.  Ukhtomsky,  chair  of  human  and  animal  physiology  in  St. 
Petersburg.  Both  scientists  have  been  influenced  by  their  anarchist  predecessor  Peter 
Kropotkin  as  well  as  by  Dostoevsky's  thought  (Nikitina,  1998).  Kropotkin,  in  turn, 
acknowledges his debt to the outlines on animal moral instincts by K. F. Kessler, zoologist  
and dean of the St. Petersburg University, who saw empathy as the main drive in animal 
social  interactions,  which,  he  observed,  obeyed  the  moral  laws  of  wilderness,  and 
wilderness,  he  says,  favours  cooperation  and  mutual  aid.  There  were  others  who 
contributed to research on the laws of wilderness. Kropotkin's colleague Polyakov as well 
as other contemporaries in Russia tested Darwin's thesis on struggle and competition in 
various  settings,  and  the  Darwinian  interpretation  repeatedly  failed  the  test  as  the 
overwhelming evidence continued to demonstrate the wide range of cooperation among 
rodents, predators, herbivores,  inter alios, and to underscore the fact that aggression and 
competition, although present in wilderness,  were sparse and much less prominent than 
presented in the Darwinian narrative (Kropotkin, 2006: 7-8). 
Having read microbiologist Stephen J.  Gould's (1992) essay “Kropotkin was no 
Crackpot” in which Gould attempts both to redeem Kropotkin in “Western” science and to 
soften Darwin's emphasis on “the Preservation of Favoured Races in Struggle for Life” by 
pointing  out  that  Darwin  himself  had  acknowledged  the  importance  of  cooperation, 
evolutionary biologist Marc Bekoff and bioethologist Pierce (2009) propose to imagine a 
different world, driven by an alternative understanding of human and animal nature:
Stephen J.  Gould  continually reminds  us  that  Darwin  used  the  phrase  “struggle  for 
existence” metaphorically,  and that even Darwin understood that bloody and vicious 
competition is only one possible mechanism through which individuals might achieve 
reproductive success. Another possible mechanism was proposed by a contemporary of 
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Darwin, Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin,  in his forward-looking book  Mutual Aid, 
published in 1902. Kropotkin suggested that cooperation and mutual aid may also lead 
to increased fitness, and may more accurately fit our actual observations of animals in 
nature.  Although  biologists  have  largely  explored  cooperative  behavior  through  the 
Darwinian lens of competition and an evolutionary arms race, we might wonder what 
the intellectual history of evolution would look like had Kropotkin’s ideas been taken 
more seriously (ibid: 57).
They  ponder  what  face  would  “science”  (Western  and,  by  virtue  of  its  imperialist 
authority,  world  science)  have  acquired  had,  between  the  two  contemporaries,  not 
Darwin's, but Kropotkin's theory been heeded. The implications are far reaching as one 
tries to imagine the scope of the effect  of this narrative.  What  would children's books 
present  to the reader,  had the focus been on chaos as love instead of the necessity to 
endure pain for order? And if children's books were different, what would the world look 
like? Would the children be told in narratives like Winnie-the-Pooh that a world of careless 
play and agency over one's mind and imagination are to be forsaken when they move on to 
the “real” world? What  would the geo-political map look like? Would there have been 
immigration policies, such as informing both the control of borders and the imaginary of 
Winnie-the-Pooh? Would there have been borders? Would they have looked the same – 
threatening and isolating limitations of freedom and agency? What would our lives have 
been?
My life,  definitely,  would have been different. I look wistfully at the amount of 
time and effort I could have dedicated to my work and aspirations instead of on being 
forced to spend time and energy to prove that my knowledge is  on par with my white 
peers, that being a mother does not mean that I am a “housewife”, as some professors have 
explained  to  me  when dismissing  my research projects,  rather,  that  as  a  mother  I  am 
capable of contributing with valuable insights and work; not to mention how much energy, 
money, and time I spent on getting out of places to which I had been deported because a 
border patrol officer, guided by the narrative of civilisation, did not see the combination of 
my name and citizenship as legitimate or even reasonable and the places to which I was 
deported gave me deadlines by which to sort my entry and exit permits and get out. What I 
could have achieved if I were not for the most part of my life sent running about collecting 
papers,  arguing and trying to convince the various figures of authority to stamp them, 
racing across towns, countries, and continents, from department to department, from one 
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Winnie-the-Pooh to another, at the request of the Darwinian visa officials and embassy 
consuls,  distrusting,  fearful  of  my  name,  looks  and  hence  my  intentions?  Just  these 
examples overwhelm me with possibilities, not to mention all the other aspects of my life.
Many black people's lives,  in Montreal or in other places, would have definitely 
been different too169 (Torczyner, 2001 and 2010). Whether in public life in general, or in 
specific settings, such as academia, their and my voices would have been reckoned with 
on par with the ethnic group that runs the scene of the production and transmission of 
knowledge and our experience, along with the perspective that comes with it, would have 
been  interesting  and  would  have  mattered  as  much as  the perspectives  of those  who 
dominate  the  curricula  and  the  legitimisation  and  marketing  of  knowledge.  But,  as 
discussed in the first part of this work, the process of legitimating opinions, narratives and 
imagination in civilisation precludes the very possibility of imagining this scenario and of 
striving towards its realisation. The civilised terminology for domesticating such revelry 
calls it “utopic vision”, which, when persistent, gets treated in the hospital both in reality 
and in fiction, as explained by Kropotkin, Foucault, and, as discussed in part I,  by Dr. 
Honeysuckle in The Adventures of Dunno and Friends.
Animal  lives  would  have  been  different.  The  whole  world  would  have  been 
different  had  the  number  of predators  remained  minimal,  as  Kropotkin had  observed, 
instead  of  multiplying  to  almost  7  billion  individuals  and  taking  over  98%  of  the 
vertebrate biomass.
Even  though,  undoubtedly,  Darwin  approached  critically  many  of  the 
interpretations of the genesis  and  genealogies  of life  on earth prevailing in  his  native 
civilised  upper  class  circles  of  the  imperialist,  Unitarian-Anglican English  tradition  – 
including racist  and eugenicist  kin (Darwin,  2008a) – nonetheless,  the driving force of 
civilised narrative seeps through and informs the general direction of his  evolutionary 
theory,  regardless of his intentions.  For instance, the view that life is toil is  a civilised 
position espoused by the Church that  explains Darwin's  focus on life  as struggle.  The 
understanding of the sinful nature of humans as a concept of permanence translates into 
169 See the McGill Consortium report 2010 for the persistent discrimination of black people and immigrants, 
particularly of colour, in Montreal (with references to across Canada).
287
Darwin's theory as violence being an inherent characteristic of life on earth170. 
The editor of Darwin's Evolutionary Writings, James A. Secord (in Darwin, 2008a) 
saw the importance of Kropotkin's critique for its offer of an alternative to the narrative of 
evolution as struggle and hence included an extract from Kropotkin's Mutual Aid Among 
Animals in the “Reviews and Responses” section. It is useful to quote the argument in its 
entirety here:
The conception of struggle for existence as a factor of evolution... became the very basis 
of our philosophical, biological, and sociological speculations....
In  The Descent of Man he [Darwin]  gave some powerful pages to illustrate its [“the 
conception of struggle for existence as a factor of evolution”] proper, wide sense. He 
pointed  out  how,  in  numberless  animal  societies,  the  struggle  between  separate 
individuals  for  the  means  of  existence disappears,  how  struggle is  replaced by  co-
operation, and how that substitution results in the development of intellectual and moral 
faculties which secure to the species the best conditions for survival. He intimated that 
in such cases the fittest are not the physically strongest, nor the cunningest, but those 
who learn to combine so as mutually to support each other, strong and weak alike, for 
the welfare of  the community.  “Those communities,”  he wrote,  “which included the 
greatest number of  the most sympathetic members would flourish best,  and rear  the 
greatest  number  of  offspring”.  .  .  .  The  term,  which  originated  from  the  narrow 
Malthusian conception of competition between each and all, thus lost its narrowness in 
the mind of one who knew Nature. 
Unhappily,  these  remarks,  which  might  have  become  the  basis  of  most  fruitful 
researches,  were  overshadowed by the  masses  of  facts  gathered  for  the  purpose  of 
illustrating the  consequences  of  a  real  competition  for  life.  [Besides,  Darwin  never 
attempted to submit to a closer investigation the relative importance of the two aspects 
under which the struggle for existence appears in the animal world, and he never wrote 
the work he proposed to write upon the natural checks to over-multiplication, although 
that work would have been the crucial test for appreciating the real purport of individual 
struggle  (Kropotkin,  2006)].  Nay,  on  the  very  pages  just  mentioned,  amidst  data 
disproving the narrow Malthusian conception of  struggle,  the old Malthusian leaven 
reappeared  --  namely,  in  Darwin's  remarks  as  to  the  alleged  inconveniences  of 
maintaining  the  “weak in  mind  and  body”  in  our  civilized  societies  (ch.  v).  As  if 
thousands  of  weak-bodied  and  infirm  poets,  scientists,  inventors,  and  reformers, 
together with other thousands of so-called “fools” and “weak-minded enthusiasts,” were 
not  the  most  precious  weapons  used  by  humanity  in  its  struggle  for  existence  by 
intellectual and moral arms, which Darwin himself emphasized in those same chapters 
of Descent of Man. 
It happened with Darwin's theory as it always happens with theories having any bearing 
upon human relations. Instead of widening it according to his own hints, his followers 
narrowed it still more. [And while Herbert Spencer, starting on independent but closely 
170 Daniel Quinn (1993; 1997; 1998) provides an important alternative understanding of the narratives in the 
Bible where the story of the fall, he argues, projects the conflict between the sedentary agriculturalists 
and the nomadic gatherers. Here, the nomadic point of view warns against the disaster, the Fall, that the 
unsustainable, intrinsically colonialist agricultural mode of living would bring.
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allied  lines,  attempted to  widen  the  inquiry  into  that  great  question,  “Who are  the 
fittest?”  especially  in  the  appendix  to  the  third  edition  of  the  Data  of  Ethics,  the 
numberless  followers of  Darwin  reduced  the  notion of  struggle  for  existence  to its 
narrowest limits (Kropotkin, 2006).] They came to conceive the animal world as a world 
of perpetual struggle among half-starved individuals, thirsting for one another's blood 
(Darwin 2008a: 340-341).
They made modern literature resound with the war-cry of woe to the vanquished, as if it 
were the last word of modern biology. They raised the “pitiless” struggle for personal 
advantages to the height of a biological principle which man must submit to as well, 
under  the  menace  of  otherwise  succumbing  in  a  world  based  upon  mutual 
extermination.  Leaving aside the economists who know of natural science but a few 
words borrowed from second-hand vulgarizers, we must recognize that even the most 
authorized exponents of Darwin's views did their best to maintain those false ideas. In 
fact, if we take Huxley, who certainly is considered as one of the ablest exponents of the 
theory of evolution, were we not taught by him, in a paper on the 'Struggle for Existence 
and its Bearing upon Man,' that, 
“from the point of view of the moralist, the animal world is on about the same 
level as a gladiators' show. The creatures are fairly well treated, and set to, fight 
hereby the strongest, the swiftest, and the cunningest live to fight another day. 
The spectator has no need to turn his thumb down, as no quarter is given.”
Or, further down in the same article, did he not tell us that, as among animals, so among 
primitive men, 
“the weakest and stupidest went to the wall, while the toughest and shrewdest, 
those who were best fitted to cope with their circumstances, but not the best in 
another way, survived. Life was a continuous free fight, and beyond the limited 
and temporary relations of the family, the Hobbesian war of each against all 
was the normal state of existence” (Kropotkin, 2006).
Kropotkin has therefore not only challenged the logic in Darwin's interpretation of “facts” 
– a  logic that  leads to eugenics and holocausts – but  also has questioned the political 
repercussions of a narrative in which the (mis)interpretation of the data becomes the main 
driving force in  the construction of anthropogenic and anthropological reality by those 
who choose to follow the civilised narrative and its predatory knowledge. The logic of the 
Darwinian narrative stands in contrast with wilderness which is  the source of morality, 
knowledge, and life, for civilisation stems from the eugenicist logic of extermination of 
Other both as a perspective on socio-environmental relationships and as a living organism 
or  entity.  Rationalised,  calculated and intentional extermination can occur  only in  the 
absence  of  empathy,  intelligence,  and  morality.  Among  his  endless  lists  of  field 
observations  and  library  research  on  empathy,  both  in  the  wild  and  in  civilisation, 
Kropotkin cites Goethe:
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The  importance  of  the  Mutual  Aid  factor—“if  its  generality  could  only  be 
demonstrated” —did not  escape the naturalist's  genius so manifest in Goethe.  When 
Eckermann told once to Goethe -- it was in 1827 -- that two little wren-fledglings, which 
had run away from him, were found by him next day in the nest of robin redbreasts 
(Rothkehlchen), which fed the little ones, together with their own youngsters, Goethe 
grew quite excited about this fact. He saw in it a confirmation of his pantheistic views, 
and  said:—“If  it  be  true  that  this  feeding  of  a  stranger  goes  through  all  Nature as 
something having the  character  of  a general law -- then many an enigma would be 
solved.”  He returned  to  this  matter  on  the  next  day,  and  most  earnestly  entreated 
Eckermann (who was, as is known, a zoologist) to make a special study of the subject, 
adding that he would surely come “to quite invaluable treasuries of results” (Gespräche, 
edition of 1848, vol. Iii: 219, 221) (Kropotkin, 2006: xiv).
Recent studies from the field of ethology confirm Kropotkin's theory on mutual aid and on 
the importance of empathy for life.  For example, in 1959, psychologist Russell Church 
published a paper titled: “Emotional reactions of rats to the pain of others”. In his study, 
Church observed that rats refused to press the lever to release food if such action caused 
an electric shock to another rat and that they displayed concern for the screaming animal 
person. Church's observations have been followed up by other studies around the world. 
Rutte and Taborsky (2007),  for instance,  confirmed that  cooperation between rats was 
extended regardless of whether the fellow rat was an acquaintance, a concept known as 
“generalised reciprocity”. Bekoff and Pierce express this observation as follows:
...  rats  exhibit  what  is  called  “generalized  reciprocity”—they  generously  help  an 
unknown rat  obtain food if  they  themselves  have benefited from the kindness  of  a 
stranger.  Continued  research  on  rat  sociality  may  force  us  to  revise  our  generally 
dismissive and disgusted attitude toward these animals (in Bekoff & Pierce, 2009: 21).
The  authors  mention  a  factor  that  increased  the  chances  for  cooperation,  namely, 
compassion increased in cases when a rat had previously experienced acts of kindness by 
another random rat. If we extend this observation to social interactions between humans, 
this factor is of great relevance to the educational methods of civilised human and non-
human  children,  for  civilised  schooling  itself  perpetuates  the  experience  of  cruelty, 
competition  and  mistrust  dulling  the  expression  of  the  natural  inclination  towards 
empathic relationships and cooperation.  Drawing their  data and support  from schooled 
hierarchies,  civilised  humans then draw the conclusion that  more control is  needed, a 
panopticon that  would observe them and modify their  wild  essence,  the fear  of which 
would be  internalised by the victims  themselves,  ultimately eradicating wildness  from 
their being, creating the perfect homogeneity, a replica of the obedient, domesticated slave 
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that  can  be  differentiated  only  by  a  serial  number,  DNA,  or  other  technological 
possibilities of control.
A recent  study  conducted  by  researchers  at  the  University  of  California,  San 
Francisco, the University of Toronto, and the University of California, Berkeley, in fact,  
confirms that  the more a person enjoys social and economic power,  the more he loses 
empathic  ability  and, with it,  the basic  understanding of what  another  person feels  or 
experiences.  The  authors  observe  that  “individuals  of  a  lower  social  class  are  more 
empathically accurate in  judging the emotions of other people.  In three studies,  lower-
class individuals (compared with upper-class individuals) received higher scores on a test 
of  empathic  accuracy (Study  1),  judged  the  emotions  of  an  interaction  partner  more 
accurately (Study 2), and made more accurate inferences about emotion from static images 
of muscle movements in the eyes (Study 3)” (Kraus et al., 2010), thereby confirming the 
thesis  that  community,  empathy,  and  compassion  are  impossible  in  the  condition  of 
hierarchy, and needless to say, civilisation is necessarily stratified.
In contrast to civilised human society, Bekoff and Pierce (2009), discuss examples 
of cooperation and empathy between animals of various species. Often friendship extends 
across species and even to what, normally, is considered to be a predator and prey. These 
confirmations  come  from a  range  of  perspectives  and  disciplines,  including  biology,  
ethology, zoology, and human animal philosophy. Bekoff and Pierce list hyenas, elephants, 
mice,  among numerous other animals who  “surprise” civilised humans with their  high 
moral standards and ethics.
One of the classic studies on altruism comes from Gerry  Wilkinson’s work on bats. 
Vampire bats who are successful in foraging for blood that they drink from livestock 
will share their meal with bats who aren’t successful. And they’re more likely to share 
blood with those bats  who previously shared blood with them. In a  recent  piece of 
surprising research, rats appear to exhibit generalized reciprocity; they help an unknown 
rat obtain food if they themselves have been helped by a stranger (Bekoff & Pierce, 
2009: 7).
Another illustration is the Lycaon pictus, or the African Wild Dog, known by various other 
names,  such as the African Hunting  Dog or the Spotted Dog or the Mbwa Mwilu  in 
Swahili. The dogs are known to share their kill, for which they have suffered an arduous 
hunt of many hours, with the wounded mates scattered along the hunting path, and with 
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the elderly,  the mothers and the cubs left  behind in the den. Among endless examples, 
Kurtén and Gould  (in  Kurtén,  1995)  observe  that the Neanderthals  took care  of their 
elderly and wounded.
Moreover, Boesch et al. (2010) document the extremely time consuming practices 
of adoption of unrelated orphans  by male  and  female  (in  equal proportion)  Taï forest 
chimpanzees.  The years of care that the adoptive fathers and mothers provide to these 
children confuse the narrative of the “rational” scientists who are driven by their relentless 
desire  to  prove  that  individuals  and  species  are  motivated  by  practical  rewards  of 
egotistical reproductive strategies for the success of one's own semen, eggs, or other forms 
of wealth. Here, Boesch et al. pose a crucial question:
 In strong contrast to these studies with captive chimpanzees, consistent observations of 
potentially altruistic behaviors in wild chimpanzees have been reported from different 
populations in such different domains as food sharing,  regular use of coalitions,  and 
cooperative  hunting and border  patrolling...  The striking differences  between captive 
and  wild  populations  beg  the  question  of  what  socio-ecological  factors  favor  the 
evolution of altruism within one species (Boesch et al., 2010).
Yet, even if the question itself is of great importance, the mathematical language that the 
authors use leads the scientists astray from the real problem, which is domestication, and 
which, by its very nature and practice,  is  not about  sharing, but about  dominating and 
exploiting through the confiscation of food. Hence, an attempt to calculate the benefits of 
altruism becomes an exercise in an attempt to merge oxymorons into a meaningful story, 
which is doomed to fail. For instance, the “availability of food” does not stem from the 
“control of food by a  group of humans”,  but  occurs either  in  spite  of this  control or 
because the humans want to force you to do something for them in exchange for the food 
they had confiscated.
Following Hamilton's rule, we should expect more altruistic behavior in populations of 
individuals as the benefit becomes relatively larger than the cost. Thus,  the proposed 
absence of altruistic food sharing in captive animals might be expected due to the well-
fed state of all individuals under such conditions (ibid).
Food is not available in the conditions of incarceration. Rather, human animals control and 
ration food using it as a tool of coercion and dominance. And neither is freedom or choice 
possible in  the confining space,  which minimises movement  and happiness.  The whole 
premise of domestication is for the domestictor to lock away food, to starve out and kill 
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those  designated  as  competitors,  parasites,  and  enemies  and  to  consume  and  control 
resources and to save slaves, pets, research material, or anyone whose destruction has a 
dire effect on civilised humans. In this respect, the famous Russian animal psychologist 
and physiologist, Ivan Pavlov known as the “father of the contemporary animal training 
techniques”  has  only articulated the principle  of 'classical conditioning'  that  had been 
discovered seventeen thousand years earlier.
The  control  of  food  in  domestication  and  in  the  science  that  experimentation 
produces has drastic repercussions for the culture, and, as argued earlier, the physiology of 
the civilised beings themselves. In this respect, in addition to Zerzan's (2002) observation 
that organised and therefore premeditated violence appears to be tightly linked with the 
rise of domestication and symbolic thought, various anthropological studies confirm that 
the  rise  of  organised  violence  and  warfare  are  linked  to  the  emergence  of  sedentary 
lifestyle  (Ferguson,  2000).  According  to  reports  from  the  field  of  ethology  and 
primatology,  animals  too  exhibit  political  ruse  and  calculation  leading  to  organised 
violence in captivity (i.e. in conditions of extreme civilisation).
One  of the  most  widely known of these  is  the  research of primatologist  Jane 
Goodall on the chimpanzees of the Gombe Stream area in Tanzania. For decades, Goodall 
had observed that the chimpanzees were peaceful, caring, and sharing (Goodall, 1986). As 
it  turns out, however, she was not simply “observing” them; she was also feeding them 
and experimenting by sometimes locking up the food, which brought about changes in the 
chimps' behaviour: they began to exhibit signs of frustration, calculation, and aggression. 
After a few years, however, we realized that the feeding was having a marked effect on 
the behavior of the chimps. They were beginning to move about in large groups more 
often than they had ever  done  in  the  old days.  Worst  of  all,  the  adult  males  were 
becoming increasingly aggressive. When we first offered the chimps bananas the males 
seldom fought over their food; they shared boxes... (Goodall, 1988: 140-141).
With the manipulation of food chimps began to exhibit civilised characteristics: identity, 
ganging,  military movement  and organisation.  Numerous primatologists have criticised 
Goodall's interference in the lives of the chimpanzees. Margaret Power (in Reynolds and 
Lieberman, 1996), for instance, criticises experimentation with food and its domesticating 
effect on these primates, who, prior to the introduction of Goodall's experimentation with 
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food,  had  been  noted  for  their  peaceful  relationships  and  kindness.  After  decades  of 
feeding them, in the mid 1980s, they have began to exhibit the same social behaviour as 
civilised humans: they became greedy, political (cunning) and violent.
Concurrently  with  Goodall,  a  Japanese  group  of  primatologists,  led  by  Kinji 
Imanishi, was studying a different chimpanzee population in the western part of Tanzania 
and Uganda. The Japanese researchers have observed at the same time as Goodall did, i.e., 
in the mid 1980s, that the chimpanzees,  having been affected by their interactions with 
people and by people's encroachment upon their territory, began to wage war between the 
various groups (Matsuzawa and McGrew, 2008). In their discussion of Imanishi's work, 
Matsuzawa and McGrew (2008) point to the Kropotkian perspective underlying Imanishi's 
approach that saw the world holistically with each species and individual as parts of a 
whole. It is this perspective, they note, that led Imanishi to see the human, colonialist, and 
civilised factors in this eruption of violence rather than an evolutionary genetic nature. In 
addition to the frustrations caused by someone else controlling access to food and space, 
William McGrew (1992 and 2004) criticises any civilised human involvement in the lives 
of animals for the endangerment that such interference pauses to the animals. In his list of 
the dangers to which such methods of domestication lead, McGrew includes the risks of 
getting killed as “pests” by agriculturalist  humans or by hunters,  since the animals get 
used to the presence of the observers, to their food, and to their various cultural artefacts 
(McGrew, 2004). For, regardless of their intent, civilised humans pose the greatest threat 
to all the human and non-human beings by the sheer drive of the narrative in which they 
are inscribed and in whose structure their interests are vested.
In  this  respect,  civilisation  operates  with  two  hands:  one  that  manages  the 
“resources” and geopolitics by expropriating food and land for the purposes of agriculture, 
mining  and  for  whatever  other  needs  of  civilisation  to  satisfy  human  owners  and 
consumers, while the other hand studies, observes, and exchanges the food, and produces 
the “knowledge” that  would  confirm the system of civilised relationships.  Working  in 
synchrony, the two hands elicit civilised responses, in the case of chimps the result was an 
outbreak of bitter, premeditated and organised warfare between the various groups (Power 
in Reynolds and Lieberman, 1996).
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The civilised narrative constantly reiterates two faulty premises: 1) the importance 
of violence to life and order and 2) the distinguished nature of humans as a species apart  
by reason of them having mastered the art of this violence best of all (almost best of all, 
for  cancer  and other  epidemics still  continue to beat  humanity in  this race).  Often,  in 
scientific  literature,  such as  historical,  anthropological  and  palaeontological  textbooks, 
especially those that are written for children, we read: “like no one else, humans are the 
only ones to use tools that enabled them to kill more effectively and to have developed 
agricultural and technological civilisation”,  or “humans are the only species to possess 
language and  symbolic  thought”,  i.e.  a  constant  repetition of our  different,  i.e.,  alien, 
identity.  At  the same  time,  this narrative constantly tries to find a justification for this 
violence in nature, whose rationale is roughly the following: if we are violent, it must be 
because violence is in the nature of life itself, and all species practice violence, particularly 
the apes who genetically resemble us the most. Thus, Goodall's news in the 1980s that the 
chimpanzees  of Tanzania  have suddenly been caught  practising  warfare was met  with 
general applause and the “I knew it” attitude  voiced by civilisation's fans, even though 
Goodall herself had reiterated on numerous occasions that this is far from the truth and 
does not represent the whole picture. In her book on The Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns  
of  Behaviour,  Goodall  (1986)  says  that “  .  .  .  it  is  easy  to  get  the  impression  that 
chimpanzees are more aggressive than they really are. In actuality, peaceful interactions 
are far more frequent than aggressive ones; mild threatening gestures are more common 
than  vigorous  ones;  threats  per  se  occur  much  more  often  than  fights;  and  serious, 
wounding fights are very rare compared to brief,  relatively mild ones” (Goodall,  2000: 
210).  Nevertheless,  chimpanzees continue  to  be seen as a  confirmation of our natural 
aggression and propensity for violence.
In reality, there is no certainty as to whether real differences in the nature of our 
composition and viability truly exist  in  a  most  basic,  ontological as well as biological 
sense.  While  the  details  of civilised  science  get  disputed and  discarded  almost  every 
decade, whereby scientific literature becomes outdated and obsolete over and over again, 
it only creates an illusion that the civilised narrative and its culture change or progress, for 
the basic  premise  accentuating  the  difference  and  alienation of humans  from animals 
remains intact in the civilised narrative while the real frontiers between the species remain 
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blurry at best. The most important factor that differentiates various human and non-human 
peoples is of a philosophical nature, namely, it is the underlying premise of civilisation. 
Here,  it  becomes  evident  that  the sheer  scope of the unprecedented destruction at  the 
hands of civilised humans suggests that certain human animals have come to resemble 
their non-human siblings less and less,  becoming more and more like a viral epidemic. 
That  is  why  the  link  between  symbolic  thought  and  biological  mutation  should  be 
investigated further from an anarcho-primitivist position, for it  is this basic perspective, 
driven by the civilised desire to conquer and own the whole of existence, forever and for 
oneself only,  that could be the detail that differentiates the human from the rest of the 
animal world.
To continue in this line of thought, the mutation responsible for having instigated 
civilisation probably was triggered by the failure of the mechanism responsible for the 
regulation of greed, which could have set off the memetic or genetic encoding of a new 
grammar, i.e., the linguistic gene that, in turn, altered our brain in the manner of literacy as 
discussed in part I with regards to research by Ong, 1986. In order for such a mutation to 
be  encoded  and  transmitted  to  future  generations  it  had  to  be  integrated  in  the  flesh 
through ideology, doxa, praxis, habitus and diet. In other words, the culture and the mode 
of subsistence themselves have changed, but so did its content: the diet now consisted of 
the consumption of lives, bodies, and death, again, whose topos and narrative I discussed 
earlier in part II.
In spite of the genetic encoding of the new narrative that seems to direct us on an 
evolutionary trajectory towards the Holocene catastrophe, genes appear to be weaker in 
their  ability  to  ensure  a  smooth  functioning  of  the  mechanism  of  civilisation  and 
destruction than the narrative. This is revealed by the fact that children continue to be born 
wild, which is signalled by their preference for extended breastfeeding, fruits, and nuts, 
while the domesticators, such as paediatricians, teachers, and other children's experts, have 
to  constantly control and modify these preferences,  scaring parents into  believing  that 
children need to consume animals and their milk or else they will not grow and end up ill 
and dead. The mere existence of the need for these experts to constantly teach and preach 
to people about what they should eat is not only indicative of the dire state of civilised 
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people's  incompetence,  but  also  reveals  that  neither  the  diet  nor  the  unknowledge  of 
civilisation has become their “nature” or have successfully been inscribed into the genetic 
code that would ensure its own reproduction regardless of the overseer and her whip, who, 
incidentally,  seventeen  thousand  years  later  still  relies  on  literacy  and  repetition  to 
inculcate in them a taste for blood.
Voices of dissent and wild human animal reason have risen throughout the ages to 
challenge civilised relationships from within and from a variety of disciplines. One such 
voice was Jeremy Bentham's, a mid 18th - 19th century English philosopher. I came across 
his work when skimming through a bibliography of a text on legal philosophy, since he 
did not make it  into a single syllabus spanning from my childhood to doctoral studies, 
although  he  does  appear  in  some  courses  in  philosophy,  the  philosophy  of  law,  and 
political  science.  Bentham (1907)  provides  a  vital  illustration  of  how  the  ability  for 
empathy allows us to know the other through exercising consideration for her well-being, 
giving abundantly of our concern.  The impetus for such understanding and the ensuing 
adjustment  of one's  actions  comes from the ability to  imagine  and to  feel the  other's 
experiences and emotions. Bentham deliberates on whether the humanity of a person is a 
sufficient marker of distinction to protect the person from acts of cruelty and enough to 
warrant  that  person to commit  acts of cruelty against  those who are denied humanity. 
Should not sentience, or the ability to feel pain be enough to warrant the person protection 
from getting tortured, murdered, exploited, incarcerated, and eaten? In order to understand 
the sentience of others one has to  be capable of feeling the other's  pain,  i.e.,  be both 
sentient and empathic. It is through empathy that Bentham himself is able to overcome the 
problem of civilised ontological categorisation:
If the being killed were all, there is very good reason why we should be suffered to kill 
such as molest us: we should be the worse for their living, and they are never the worse 
for being dead. But is there any reason why we should be suffered to torment them? Not 
any that I can see. Are there any why we should not be suffered to torment them? Yes, 
several. The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the 
greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the 
law exactly upon the  same footing as,  in England for  example,  the inferior  races of 
animals are still. The day may come,  when the rest of the animal creation may acquire 
those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of 
tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason 
why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. 
It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the 
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skin,  or  the  termination  of  the  os  sacrum,  are  reasons  equally  insufficient  for 
abandoning a  sensitive  being to the  same fate.  What  else  is  it  that should trace the 
insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a 
full-grown horse  or  dog  is  beyond  comparison  a  more  rational,  as  well  as a  more 
conversable animal,  than an infant  of  a  day,  or  a  week,  or  even a month,  old.  But  
suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they 
reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? (Bentham, 1907: chapter XVII).
In order to be able to ask this question, one needs to place himself in the skin of the other 
in the manner in which Ukhtomosky (in Nikitina, 1998) urges us to erase our inner double 
who interferes with our reality tunnel and renders us deaf to the other because we end up 
hearing  and  seeing  our  own  selves  or  the  image  and  the  voice  that  we  have  been 
conditioned to see and hear. Only after having freed ourselves from this double limiting 
our understanding, Ukhtomsky says, can we be open to the experience and the desires of 
our interlocutor.  This understanding enables us to overcome our ontological definitions 
and their limitations,  thereby increasing our knowledge and enhancing our intelligence. 
Expanding or narrowing the scope of our interactions with wilderness through empathic 
communication also stretches the limits of whom we accept as our interlocutor as we erase 
the borders between categories and overcome the various dumbing down distinctions at 
the root of racism, sexism, and anthropocentrism.
Bentham thus exposes the problem for what it is: a system of knowledge that has 
been constructed on the basis of categorisation with random criteria for the purpose of 
classification and discrimination. Moreover, it is a system of knowledge with serious gaps 
in its argument for abuse (domestication, slaughterhouse, and consumption among other 
forms  of exploitation)  based on the double standards of the humanist  position,  which 
Bentham exposes by formulating it in the following question: are “we” to cause suffering 
to the beings that  suffer  and justify this because “they” speak a different  language, or 
supposedly, to our anthropocentric ear, speak no language at all? Is this definition of the 
Other  sufficient  to  grant  us the permission to ignore their  pain –  if  not  participate in 
causing it  – and overwrite it  with a narrative that  aestheticises suffering by calling the 
scream of pain song, tableau, or drama? In this way, anticipating the work of ethologists in 
Western epistemology (this knowledge had already been available to non-domesticated 
peoples but has been ignored by the dominant institution) in two hundred years from his 
time,  Jeremy  Bentham questions  the  bigotry  of  classification  articulated  not  only  in 
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anthropocentric terminology, but in the more specific Eurocentric notions of intelligence 
and language, and thereby addresses the fundamental question of the relationship between 
the qualifications that supposedly define the human, and therefore the legal and the agent 
as distinct from the objectified resource, whose voice is illegitimate and whose purpose 
here is to serve the human.
Bentham's question hence poses a serious challenge to humanism along with the 
legal system that  it  forges  in  order  to  protect  and justify  itself.  It  also  challenges the 
concept  of  “human  rights”  whose  basic,  underlying  assumption  holds  that  certain 
characteristics that are attributed only to humans should protect  individuals and groups 
from abuse.  The  human  characteristics  are:  reason,  sentience,  and  agency  and  they, 
supposedly,  separate  humans  from those who  are  assumed  to  lack  these  qualities,  the 
absence  of which  then  gives  humans  the  right  and  the  moral  justification  to  torture, 
exploit, and murder the “non-humans” and to protect the “humans” with “human rights” 
from the abuse they inflict on others. In other words, the category itself of “human rights” 
is based on guaranteeing safety, agency, and ownership to one group of living beings and 
the discrimination and oppression of those who are denied the right to be identified as 
human.
As Bentham observes that  until recently,  not many people who did not  possess 
property  or  had  a  skin  colour  that  was  not  in  favour  at  the  time,  were  legitimately 
marginalised, tortured and oppressed in all possible ways. This unknowledge, along with 
the  legal  apparatus  that  backs  it,  institutionalises  unequal  relations  of  power  and 
legitimises the purposeful infliction of pain even in  the presence of clauses within the 
various bodies of laws that include the concept of the “duty to rescue”. Yet, under these 
same laws, civilised society prosecutes animal rights activists who rescue animals even 
while  the rescuers  make  a  conscious  effort  not  to  harm anyone's  life  in  the  process, 
because  non-sentient  property  is  valued  more  than  the  suffering  of  sentient  beings. 
Persecuted, they receive sentences equivalent to manslaughter, terrorism and murder171.
171 Barry Horne received 18 years sentence and died of hunger strike in prison in England on 5th November 
2001. Activists labelled “eco-terrorists”, who have made sure not to harm life, but have committed acts 
of disruption against corporations that tortured animals or other domesticating enterprises, have been 
receiving maximum sentences for manslaughter, conspiracy, and sometimes murder (even when none 
was committed). For instance Jeffrey Luers, a prisoner at Oregon State penitentiary has been incarcerated 
since June 2000 for eco-sabotage arson at a car dealership. He was sentenced to 22 years and eight 
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Bentham's articulation of the problem however leaves no room for compromise 
between the ontologies of domestication and wildness. He appeals to ethics, empathy and 
knowledge rather than to legal discourse and civilised grammar, formulating his critique in 
such a way that it leaves only three possible responses for a person who understands that, 
inevitably, all civilised actions and livelihoods are implicated in the suffering of others: (1) 
stop doing what causes others to suffer; (2) consciously or not, justify cruelty and apathy 
by claiming, or even believing in that suffering is natural and that he has nothing to do 
with other human or animal people's pain; (3) simply deny that they are suffering at all and 
devise  a  system of  silencing  and  dismissal  of  the  expressions  of  pain  as  irrelevant, 
nonexistent,  or  even a  lie  (for  instance,  the  expression “she's  playing  the  race  card” 
accuses the complainer  of inventing an oppression for personal,  illegitimate gain).  The 
criteria for credibility in public discourse reinforce this last point in the doxa by using the 
suffering  itself  to  discredit  the  voice  of  the  oppressed  as  “un-objective”(or  biased), 
“emotional” and “illegitimate”, particularly if the suffering person expresses her feelings 
and resents the coercion, the silencing or the abuse and refuses to abide by the abuser's 
dictates; whereas unemotional and apathetic composure of those in a position of power to 
oppress is taken as a sign of rationality that renders the oppressor credible, understandable, 
and justifiable in the eyes of civilised law172.
Numerous cases in  the history of civilisation demonstrate  that  when driven by 
empathy, even the most civilised people in position of power are capable of choosing the 
months for that action. Tre Arrow received 6 years sentence in Canada for having scaled the U.S. Forest 
Service building in Portland in 2000 and lived for eleven days on its ledge in protest of timber sale in the 
Mount Hood National Forest. “I wanted to protect those trees that I loved. And I had only my body to 
protect them with” - he was pushed down, but survived. Bruce Ellison, the attorney for Tre Arrow, said 
that he was facing up to life in prison on these charges but agreed to plead guilty and received six years 
in Canada and then extradited to the United States. May 2009 in California, Eric McDavid received a 
sentence of 19 years and 7 months for planning to damage corporate and government property (he hasn't 
damaged it, though). Animal rights activists in the U.K. Don't fare better. In the case of activists 
demonstrating against animal testing by the Sequani laboratory received up to ten years of prison. They 
were prosecuted under the 2005 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCPA) Act. Mel Broughton, 
an activist in England, on 14th February 2009 received ten years of prison for protesting against the 
planned construction of an animal experiments testing laboratory in Oxford. Examples abound and there 
is little of mutuality or reciprocity in the way the laws are written or enacted (Corporate Watch,UK 30th 
June 2009: http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=3405).
172 The work of anthropologists and sociologists of law provide lengthy discussions with statistics and 
illustrations to the bias in the trial procedures, the access to defence attorneys, and even the syntax and 
vocabulary used in framing questions depend on the a priori set criteria for credibility (Austin Sarat, 
1999; Lois Forer, 1971 and 1994; Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey, 1998; among others).
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first option—they renounce their privilege to oppress and join the ranks of the oppressed: 
Catholic  workers; Earth Liberation Front  (ELF); Animal Liberation Front (ALF); Peter 
Kropotkin, who renounced his title of prince; William King, the Presbyterian minister who 
funded the Elgin freed slave settlement of Buxton, Ontario; the people who helped run the 
Underground Railroad,  inter alios. The other options of dealing with other human and 
animal persons' pain, namely dismissing and ignoring it, require ignorance and apathy—
qualities acquired by intensive training and years of education guided by the Darwinian 
narrative of evolution, supported by religious authorities (regardless of faith), and imposed 
by means of violence. Ignorance and apathy are precious qualities that allow confusion of 
concepts and substitution of meaning at the basis of the premises of life narratives. The 
repetitive narrative of civilisation lulls its children with mythical stories that exalt acts of 
cruelty and despise defeat. In its representation and justification of suffering it can go as 
far as calling pain joy.
Chapter 5: The Myth of the Slave's Joyful, Simple Nature: Identity,  
Animality, Humanity, and Machines
   5.1. Singing in the Fields of Toil
A highly effective myth of civilised propaganda purports that the domestication of 
plants and non-human and human animals  is  grounded in  nature and that  it  is  in  the 
interests of the victim species themselves. “After all, domestication was their evolutionary 
choice. They could have opted either to die [because humans have learnt how to kill them 
on an unprecedented  scale]  or to  serve  human interests [for  example,  the slaves  who 
rebelled were exterminated]; they chose to serve; this choice is theirs and hence it  must  
make them happy. Pleasing the master and enjoying doing it was the best survival strategy 
for them to adopt”, says the master (for illustrations of this logic, see the hypotheses of 
such evolutionary theorists  as  Driscoll  et  al.  [2009];  Shipman [August  2010];  among 
others).
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This anthropocentric and ethnocentric rationale ignores the slave's perspective on 
this relationship, silences her voice and stifles her will, all of which makes it difficult for 
the  victim to  choose  life  outside  the  prescribed  civilised  limitations  and  to  resist  the 
unknowledge  that  dismisses  her  choices,  desires,  and  life.  The  myth thus  depicts  the 
victim as the author of her choice and the agent of her own victimisation. Of course, even 
when these choices are imposed and the real desire is unattainable, people still live, love, 
hate, laugh and weep. As long as one lives, there is always a part salvaged from the ever 
colonising civilisation and the thoughts, joy and pain remain an integral, even cherished 
part of one's memory and hence one's self. However, to say that the millions around the 
world who live on 2$ a day do so because this is the best they could do, that they chose 
this,  or  that  they  are  happy  with  their  choice  can  happen  only  in  the  absence  of 
intelligence, knowledge and empathy.
And yet, who has not heard of the stereotype of the “naturally” and “genetically” 
dancing,  rhythmic,  singing  African  Americans,  an  image  that  still  recurs  in  the 
explanations of why black people do “well” in the music industry, but not in other fields? 
Even though the details  and the form of marginalisation and silencing have “evolved” 
since  the  anthropologists,  poets  and  philosophers  of  the  Négritude movement  so 
passionately responded173 to the stereotype of the irrational, musical African, nonetheless, 
even today, in spite of the legal strides made in accepting the equal humanity of all races, 
one still hears echoes of the myth of the “happy” “singing” “Negro” in the fields of the 
Americas. This essentialist description is revealed in the attitudes that praise the natural 
rhythm or the “soul” voice of the African Americans be they performing on the big stage 
or rapping  about  the hood,  laughing  in  the  ghetto  usually  depicted  heaped  with  drug 
paraphernalia,  misery,  dirt  and  crime.  This  image  overwrites  any intellectual  or  other 
contributions to culture and life that African Americans have made and keeps them out of 
competition for funding in other spheres, such as mathematics, anthropology, physics, etc., 
including  images  perpetuated  in  children's  literature  by  white  authors  as  well  as  the 
marginal participation of black writers in the production of “normal” children's books.
173 For examples on the founders of the 20th century political and artistic movement, see Anténor Firmin, 
Jean Price-Mars as founders of Négritude anthropology and Aimé Césaire, Léopold Sédar Senghor, 
Franz Fanon, among others.
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For instance, children's literature cannot escape this divide and unknowledge where 
most  children's  books  continue  to  be  segregated  along  racial lines,  because  the  basic 
civilised premises of the narrative preclude the possibility of realistically and credibly 
presenting a world in which oppression can be overcome unless they attack the very root 
of civilised ontology with its socio-economic relations and structure. Hence, a talented and 
highly intelligent  author such as Margaret  Peterson Haddix is  able to raise a  range of 
critical  questions  about  inequality,  the  meaning  of  science,  starvation,  war,  human 
reproduction,  etc.  Nevertheless,  she  cannot  depict  persons  of  colour  in  her  narrative, 
without facing problems of characterisation and other complicated aspects of “knowledge” 
about the experience of racial “others”, and therefore she leaves the topic untouched. This 
is a great problem with the production of knowledge and culture where the depiction of 
experience in a racialised structure necessarily structures these insurmountable problems 
of hierarchical distribution of the material and economic capital. The German children's 
author, Michael Ende, approaches these issues through fantasy and partially overcomes the 
problem of race (but not of species) in The Neverending Story in the same way that Tove 
Jansson does with her moominbooks: both authors leave our reality, and by choosing to 
write in the fantasy genre obtain some freedom to explore human and non-human people 
in  any colour possible:  green,  purple,  blue,  etc.  Yet,  because the hierarchical structure 
itself and the civilised literary ideal continues to be the basis of Ende's imaginary world, 
unlike Jansson who rejects economic relations that are based on symbolic representation 
(money, education, among others) and on servitude – there is no work in Moominland, 
only wild  purpose  –  Ende's  novel  remains  grounded  in  the realm of civilisation,  war, 
servitude, and civilised purpose and thus,  even though it  shifts the lines of segregation 
from racial borders, it only achieves their replacement along the lines that divide servitude 
from agency.
If white authors, whether male or female, still have leniency in the fields in which 
the legitimating narrative presents them as capable of becoming expert on any topic, black 
authors are limited to  being  experts on black race  and  the books  that  are chosen for 
publication tend to  reflect  the pre-established  “knowledge” about  black  space,  bodies, 
intellectual abilities, musical skills, drugs, deviance, and so on. This “expertise” in “being 
oppressed” and other  specific  essentialist  topics,  according to  Atkins (2009) (a former 
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editor  and publisher  herself)  keeps  publishers disinterested in  and distrusting of black 
authors' works. However, the “singing Negro” myth, however, is evident in the numbers of 
successful black people in music industry and their absence from other domains.
Endless  studies  on discrimination confirm the obvious,  offering suggestions on 
how to manage overt  marginalisation,  yet  never proposing to eradicate the problem of 
inequality, poverty and hierarchy at its root, a goal that would require the dismantling of 
the whole apparatus of “categorical” constructs of knowledge that essentialise “expertise” 
based  on  superficial  characteristics  such  as  skin,  gender,  among  others,  but  also 
historically  imposed  experience,  such  as  oppression.  The  legitimating  meta-narrative, 
hence,  deems it worthy to spend money and effort on studies conducted by legitimated 
observers and producers of knowledge, but not on the problem itself: the lack of access to 
money, food, space, knowledge, et al., by the oppressed individuals and groups. In other 
words, studies are deemed necessary in order to manage these potential resources in the 
most convenient way possible for the owners of businesses, land, and resources. However, 
as research on self-fulfilling prophecy indicates (Brewer and Crano, 2000: 334-346), when 
the civilised narrative structures guide the interpretation of “real life” information, the 
collected data in statistics,  polls,  and surveys also aide the further consolidation of the 
civilised  structural  status  quo.  Both the  myths  that  inform the  doxa about  racialised 
“others” and the quantum physics problem of the data changing their behavioural patterns 
because of observation explain why, for instance, even though slavery was abolished in 
the Great Britain in 1807 and in the British Empire in 1833 and while Canadian leadership 
had always denounced the institution of slavery in southern United States, nonetheless, 
black people in Canada still remain marginal in the grand stakes of material and cultural 
economy. For example, a report by Montreal Consortium for Human Rights and Advocacy 
Training  (MCHRAT)  and  the  McGill  Consortium  for  Ethnicity  and  Strategic  Social 
Planning (MCESSP) have recently updated a study they had published in 2001 on the 
experience of black people in  Montreal.  In 2010 still  “a highly educated black person 
living in Montreal with at least a university graduate degree can expect an unemployment 
rate  higher  than that  of a  non-black high school dropout” says Andrew Chung (2010) 
reporting on the study.
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Comparing census data from 1996 to 2006, Jim Torczyner, a professor of social work at 
McGill  University  who  leads  the  McGill  Consortium on  Human  Rights  Advocacy 
Training, said that “blacks continue to lag significantly behind non-blacks in every level 
of success” in a way that was “persistent, pervasive and alarming.”
Even though the situation for everyone improved during that period, in terms of wealth, 
jobs and education,  the disparities between blacks  and non-blacks remained (Chung, 
2010).
The study reveals the pervasiveness of certain experiences of oppression as coherent with 
the dominant  narrative that  attributes certain competences, incompetences,  and areas of 
expertise  as  essential,  biological  –  even existential  –  to  specific  groups  fulfilling  the 
narrative's  own  scenario  through  anthropological  constructs  and  praxis.  For,  the  very 
expectations  and  the  structure  of  civilised  society  ensure  that  those  who  have  been 
disempowered will continue to be so by the fact that their very disempowerment justifies 
their oppression and subjugation, while the knowledge of them as being oblivious and 
joyful confirms to the participants in the narrative that the situation is at least bearable, if 
not desirable by the beings who are seen as fulfilling their purpose on earth. This problem 
of  the  research  confirming  and  fulfilling  the  assumptions  and  precepts  about  the 
essentialist qualities employed in marginalising a group has been addressed throughout the 
theory on social science. For instance,  Mäkitalo and Säljö (2002) discuss the problem of 
categories in institutional “thinking”, their materialisation in “anthropological” constructs 
and the production of “social 'facts'”. Inspired by “the early ethnomethodological  work 
on  the  ‘social  construction’  of bureaucratic, scientific and other ‘facts’  (Zimmerman 
1974; Cicourel 1968; Gdiel  1967; Atkinson and Drew 1979; Smith 1978; Latour and 
Woolgar  1979)”,  sociologist  Nob  Doran  (1994)  examines  the  problem  of  the 
“embodiment” of knowledge and experience and the interrelationship between Dorothy 
Smith's institutional ethnography method and Michel Foucault's concept of knowledge as 
the “power of normalisation within state bureaucracy”.  Another important work entitled 
The  Mutual  Construction  of  Statistics  and  Society addresses  precisely  this  problem 
succinctly put in these words: “society and the statistics that measure and describe it  are 
mutually constructed” (Rudinow Saetnan, et al., 2011: 1). 
In other  words,  both hard and social sciences are not  neutral acts allowing the 
observation of reality “as is”, or capable of presenting a meaningful picture about it, for 
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just as observation of quantum particles shifts their location and modifies their behaviour, 
so  do  studies  on oppression  conducted  from a  civilised  perspective  interact  with  the 
observed minds and bodies have consequences. More important, however, the observed 
individuals within a system of domination respond the the implicit and expected doxa and 
use  the  observations  of  themselves  to  further  the  civilised  structural  relationships  of 
oppression.  Hence,  while  such  studies  illuminate  the  extent  of  segregation,  attitudes, 
experience,  structures,  and  realities,  they  concomitantly  collaborate  in  the 
institutionalisation of the  categories  of oppression that  naturalise discrimination,  often 
dismissing the oppressed as ignorant of other possibilities and happy with their “natural” 
state, empowered by their status of servitude.
This illuminates the rationale by which civilised carnivores see no contradiction in 
using the domesticated cattle's despair – of having nowhere to run even when liberated, no 
community, no wilderness to help them reclaim their purpose – as proof of the naturalness 
of domestication and slaughter, a rationale that amounts to: “they wouldn't know what to 
do with their freedom and they are much happier that way since they have already evolved 
in captivity for captivity, to be separated from their children, kin, and friends and to be 
ruthlessly and unceremoniously slaughtered to feed us”. The basic precept of the civilised 
argument for the abuse of all othered persons and groups is a structural problem that feeds 
the  analogous  relationships  of oppression.  For  instance,  Frederick  Douglass'  rendered 
eloquently this mythology of the “singing slave”:
I have often been utterly astonished, since I came to the north, to find persons who could 
speak of the singing, among slaves, as evidence of their contentment and happiness. It is 
impossible  to  conceive  of  a  greater  mistake.  Slaves  sing most  when  they  are  most 
unhappy. The songs of the slave represent the sorrows of his heart; and he is relieved by 
them, only as an aching heart is relieved by its tears. At least, such is my experience. I 
have often sung to drown my sorrow, but seldom to express my happiness. Crying for 
joy,  and singing for  joy,  were  alike  uncommon to me  while  in the  jaws of  slavery 
(Douglass, 1997:30).
The myth of the “happy Negro”, which Frederick Douglass so poignantly describes, stems 
from the perspective of the abuser, the slave owner, the murderer, centralising the abuse in 
the life of the slave and normalising it in the metanarrative. In this legitimating system, the 
victim's  voice has already been discredited and hence it  becomes difficult  to  hear and 
relate  to  the  abused,  even when  the  attempts  to  understand  are  sincere,  because  that 
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experience is  structurally purged from the narrative and dismissed as “specific” to the 
slave and uninteresting or irrelevant to the “normal” “average” people (that is, to those 
who identify themselves with the point of view of the abuser), who  know that they are 
agents of their lives. 
What feeds this narrative is the ontology of “resources” and “owners” which is also 
at the basis of the myth of the happy slave, singing as he toils in the fields, or as he is led 
away in shackles to prison or labour camp, a myth that nurtures the underlying doxa, the 
knowledge that does not need to be stated, yet which assumes that the oppressed find their 
meaning and empowerment in the opportunity to  serve others and in  the choice to be 
oppressed. This myth provides the backbone for the scientific  and literary narrative of 
civilisation that sometimes acknowledges its inherent contradictions only to conclude that 
to violate the will of the other and to ignore her pain is the best, even, the only way to live.  
This is why the joy of the singing Oompa-Loompas for having been enslaved by Willy 
Wonka  discussed  in  part  II  not  only  makes  sense  to  the  civilised  reader,  but  is  also 
appealing and provides comfort as it is applicable to a wide range of situations in civilised 
praxis. The  civilised  narrative  provides  a  successful  mechanism  for  silencing  and 
overwriting the voices of oppression, namely, by attributing specific and unequal value to 
the perspectives, whereby, the point of view of the (un)knower overpowers the voice of 
the victim who, in fact, is the one who knows her own experience better than anyone else: 
better than the landlords, the teachers, the doctors, the bosses, the lawyers, or any other 
figures of authority174. This process of evaluation is an important aspect of the symbolic 
economy of  power  that  provides  the  language  and  structure  to  silence  the  victim  by 
automatically overwriting her experience with the terminology of the oppressor and his 
perspective. 
Studies in anthropology of law provide valuable insights into the mechanisms by 
which legal narratives, terminology, and trials enforce the civilised structure of oppression 
and abuse. For instance, R.A. Duff asks the following question: should a man be acquitted 
or not if he “has sexual intercourse” with a woman in the sincere belief that she said “no” 
174 Numerous debates reveal this dynamic of overwriting the knowledge of the person by the perspective of 
the “expert”. Particularly, the recent work in the field of medical anthropology is enlightening on the 
power of the doctor to overwrite the narrative of the patient. For instance, see the work of Lisbeth Sachs 
(1986 and 1996) on medical narratives and patients in Sweden, or Mattingly and Garro (2000).
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only to  tease,  but  in  fact,  he  truly believes  that  she  wanted it?  Duff  argues that  it  is 
precisely this reasoning that tips the “knowledge” and power balance for male preference, 
since men take advantage of their physical and social power to  ignore what they could 
have known about a woman saying “no”. Once again, the examination of the “facts” and 
determinants is still a matter of how “knowledge” and definitions are used in any concrete 
process requiring decision-making (Duff, 2002).
Rape of course is  one of the more obvious expressions of ignoring the victim's 
voice and will and this rationale works equally well for other relationships where one will 
and voice overpower another's. The various theorists of the structural injustices that render 
the practice of law inherently flawed have observed that regardless of how much is known 
about injustice and how much “remedies” applied to fix the problems of violence and 
despair, the gap between the “haves” and the “have nots” only continues to grow and is  
particularly blatant  in the divide between the different  human races. For instance,  Lois 
Forer, a judge of a trial court of general jurisdiction in Philadelphia, who has resigned the 
bench because she no longer felt capable of playing into the unjust sentencing of the poor 
black youth, observes that
[m]ore persons are behind bars in the United States than in any other  country in the 
world, and the figures escalate every year. In one year, from 1989 to 1990, the number 
of people incarcerated grew by 7.7 percent, although the number of crimes decreased.. 
We spend more money on prisons than on education.
Almost a half million of our prisoners are black males. The rate of black male inmate 
population in South Africa  is  681 per  100,000. In  the  United  States  it  is  3,370  per 
100,000 inmates.
The number of female prisoners rose by 137 percent in the decade of the 1980s. In 1983, 
15,769  women  were  incarcerated;  in  1989,  37,383.  More  than  two  thirds  of  these 
women had children under the age of eighteen. And the numbers of female prisoners 
continue to increase.
More than 100,000 children were in correctional institutions (juvenile jails) in 1992.
[The response to the increase in crime] has been more punitive laws and longer prison 
sentences,  as well as judicial decisions restricting judicial discretion and the right of 
prisoners to appeal these harsh penalties.
These  laws  have  taken  a  particularly  heavy  toll  on  the  poor,  who  are  most  often 
imprisoned. They are also most frequently the victims of crime. Because non-whites, 
women and children are disproportionately poor, the criminal justice system is weighted 
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against them, not only in the pattern of arrests and the trial of cases but especially in 
sentencing.
Instead, sentencing laws have exacerbated racial hostilities and have widened the gulf 
between the affluent  and the  poor.  We are now a nation divided between  them,  the 
prisoners who are largely poor and non-white, and us, who are not incarcerated and who 
are largely white and non-poor (Forer, 1994: 7-8).
The civilised  narrative  here  obtains  a  concrete,  material  form and  is  expressed in  the 
silenced, taken for granted experience of the disobedient “resources”.
Another theorist of criminal justice, Jeffrey Reiman, playing on the words that it is 
“justice” that is criminal and drawing on the discussion of unequal power and protection 
of abuse in civilised nation-states legal systems, writes the following about the American 
justice system, and whose observations also apply to other civilised contexts around the 
world:
Robbers, extortionists, and occupying soldiers are terms used to characterize those who 
enforce an unjust law and an unjust order. It would be a mistake to think this is merely a 
matter of rhetoric. There is a very real and very important sense in which those who use 
force unjustly or who use force to protect an unjust social order are no different from a 
band of criminals or an occupying army.... A criminal justice system that functions like 
ours—that  imposes  its  penalties  on  the  poor  and  not  equally  on  all  who  threaten 
society... is morally no better than the criminality it claims to fight.
...What is common to the robber, the extortionist, and the occupying soldier is that each 
uses force (or the threat of force) to coerce people to serve the interests of others at the 
expense of their own.... The injustice that characterizes criminal acts is the forcing of 
people to serve the interests of others.
A legal system, of course, also uses force. Its defenders, however, maintain that it uses 
force  to  protect  people's  control  over  the  things  they  value  and  over  their  own 
destinies....  [A]lthough  both  a  legal  system  and  its  opposite,  either  criminality  or 
military domination, use force, the moral superiority claimed for the legal system lies in 
the fact that it uses force to protect the interests of all people subject to its force equally, 
whereas  criminals  and  occupation  troops  use  force  to  subject  some  people  to  the 
interests of others. The moral legitimacy of a legal system and the lack of legitimacy of 
crime and military domination hinge, then, on the question of whether coercion is being 
used in the interests of all equally, or to promote some people's interests at the expense 
of others.
To say that the criminal justice  system uses  force to coerce people into serving the 
interests  of  others  at  the  expense of  their  own  is  to  say  the  same  thing  about  the  
criminal justice system that we say of crime! (Reiman, 2007: 197-198).
However, as Reiman argues, based on the statistics and research pointing to the constant 
dismissal of the disempowered populations from the “benefits” of the “justice” system and 
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the unequal protection of those in power, the legal system acts in the same way as military 
and criminality contingents use force unequally to subject some of the people to the will of 
others.
A professor of law at the University of California in Los Angeles (UCLA), Joel 
Handler,  confirms  Reiman's  conclusions and  goes as  far  as  stating  that  the  “powerful 
rarely need the courts; they can exert their influence in politics,  administration, and the 
private market” (Handler, 1978: 232). Moreover, according to him, one cannot ameliorate 
the system from within. The only way to achieve justice, he says, is for the court to stop 
acting like a court and in this way provoke the changes within the narrative structures of 
institutions and their conditions:
The major  exception,  and it  really proves the general point,  is  the  Wyatt v. Stickney 
litigation,  where  the  court took  extraordinary measures.  The evidence indicates  that 
there has been considerable change in the administration of the mental institutions and 
that the situation of the patients has improved. But to accomplish these results, the court 
had to operate in a  non-traditional manner;  it  proved that change could come about 
through a judicial remedy but only if the court no longer acted like a court (Handler, 
1978: 175).
In other words, the underlying precepts that guide the development of the plot, whether in 
fiction or life, is pervasive on every level of civilised human experience and the structures 
themselves  have  a  bulletproof  system  to  protect  and  justify  violence  against  and 
subjugation of those who have historically been violated and subjugated, dismissing their 
tears and silencing their cries by the voice of domination that states that this is natural, that 
the oppressed have chosen this life themselves, that this is in their own interests, that it is 
justice, and finally that what they are actually trying to convey is joy.
In the following section, I discuss indepth the rationalisation of this silencing and 
the way in which it subverts the meaning of suffering and domestication in the civilised 
narrative,  particularly,  enunciating the parallel between racism,  speciesism,  sexism and 
government.  In  closing  this  part,  however,  I  would  like  to  reiterate  the  role  of 
institutionalised practices and prevalent  doxa in the silencing of human and non-human 
victims of oppressive socio-economic relations, which occurs on several levels of public 
discourse and that requires the turning off of emotions, empathy, and the impulse to act in 
response  to  the  communicated  experience.  For  instance,  the  ideal  of  contained  and 
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controlled emotions in public speaking turns into a requirement for the tone of “neutrality” 
or apathy, which prohibits the display of emotions in such public events as a court trial or 
news  presentation  in  corporate  media,  among  others,  because  civilised  society deems 
emotions as irrational and unreliable. The stigma attached to emotions, to their display, or 
to the expression of pain thereby discredits the emotional person and in this way subverts 
the very meaning of experience, which  by its very nature occurs through the senses as 
much  as  through psychological  and  other  complex  emotional  processing.  Memory of 
experience  often  evokes  physiological  sensations  and  responses  and  by  erasing  this 
important information from civilised narrative, the Cartesian separation of rationality from 
the rest of experience institutes unknowledge and incompetence as the crown of evolution. 
Moreover,  the sensuality of the emotionally  handicapped  upper  classes  (Kraus  et  al., 
2010) is  marketed  at  high  prices  in  various  forms  of  symbolic  expressions,  such  as 
paintings, commercials, and even religious art (Berger, 1972), while the subjectivity of the 
sufferer is not only devalued, but even erased, since the credible voice has to be “neutral” 
(i.e. apathetic) and powerful – which means capable of exploitation – thereby normalising 
injustice and abusive relationships.
As discussed earlier, the root of this perversion of the meaning of suffering resides 
in the reason for the existence of the concept of “humanism”, a category that dehumanises 
everyone who  is  designated for  exploitation or  extermination.  In  other  words,  racism, 
objectification, and all forms of segregation based on gender, species, race, illness, and so 
on, derive their rationale from the same source: the concept of personhood and agency, 
which in the homogenising concept of civilisation sees the interrelationship of persons and 
non-persons,  humans  and  non-humans,  agents  and  victims,  owners  and  resources 
hierarchically and always identified in relationship to the master and his needs.
Various scholars have attempted to elaborate on the interconnectedness of species 
by problematising the domestication inherent  in  civilised relations only to justify these 
hierarchical  relations  of  power  and  civilise  them  even  deeper.  This  convolution  of 
concepts  and  the  disintegration  of  morality175 appears  to  be  the  main  culprit  in  the 
175 As Arshavsky pointed out in his interview with Nikitina, morality is inherent in wilderness and is 
destroyed by civilisation (Nikitina, 1998), as well as Kropotkin (2002) and Reiman (2007) discussed 
earlier.
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proliferation of the narrative of segregation, whose logic rationalises civilised abuse from 
a wide range of perspectives, such as presented in discussions by Vicki Hearne, Monty 
Roberts,  Cary Wolfe (2003a),  Wolfe  and Paul Patton,  et  al.  (in Wolfe,  2003),  and not 
surprisingly,  particularly  in  the  field  of  horse-riding.  As  the  following  section 
demonstrates, the training of animals and the culture of childhood have much in common.
   5.2. Do Horses Dream of Winning Gold?
In the recent  times,  researchers in  humanities have turned their  attention to the 
studies on animals in an attempt to further negotiate the place of humans within the “Tree 
of Life” of other species. For instance, the Modern Language Association (MLA) offers 
sections on animality and animal studies at its yearly conventions and theoretical works, 
such as Jacques Derrida's  “And Say the Animal Responded” (in  Wolfe,  2003)  or  The 
Animal That Therefore I Am (2008), or Kelly Oliver's (2009)  Animal Lessons: How they 
Teach  us  to  be  Human,  among  others,  point  to  the  problems  that  the  construct  of 
humanism continues to face and the effects it has on human identity. Some of the essays in 
Cary Wolfe's  (2003)  Zoontologies are  particularly illuminating of the direction that  an 
acknowledgement  of the confluence of the social,  cultural,  and literary construction of 
children, animals, and dominated subjects can take when the basic precepts continue to be 
the civilised myth that  the dominated are improved by their oppression.  Namely,  Paul 
Patton's essay “Language, Power,  and the Training of Horses” (Patton in  Wolfe,  2003) 
reveals  the implications  of this  nexus  of constructs for  the  political narrative  and  its 
anthropological manifestation.
Even  superficially,  the  aesthetic  of  dressage  of  horses  is  reminiscent  of  the 
aesthetics of fetishism and sado-masochistic practices and hence the parallel presents an 
invaluable opportunity for a  discussion of how dominance gets presented visually (i.e. 
formally and superficially) and ontologically,  in anthropological practice,  literature and 
academia.  The image that a rider is trained to exude is that of a chiselled oppressor, in 
sleek jodhpurs, whose legs dive into the shiny boots of leather with metal spurs; his head 
dressed  in  a  hard  helmet  wrapped  tightly  by  soft  velvet;  the  hand  carelessly  yet 
confidently holds a dark, leather whip; the posture is straight, oozing a dramatic image of 
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synchrony through the sheer will of the rider to control and an existential desire of the 
horse to submit to and please the rider. 
This description of equestrian sports works equally well for describing a scene in a 
sado-masochistic club for sexual domination and submission176. For instance, a matronly 
dominatrix, in sleek boots, whose stiletto heels, like spurs, dive into the naked flesh of the 
buttocks on the floor entrapped by black leather straps and chains. She does not need to 
look at him as she lazily glances past him with cold, wilful eyes. She knows what he wants 
and he knows how to get it. The total harmony of two synchronised desires, hers to torture 
and his to be smothered with pain.
Such images of the wilful dominator and the submitted slave whose joy it is to be 
dominated imbue the civilised aesthetic in all aspects of life: the count kissing the gloved 
hand  of  the  royalty,  the  chiselled  and  perfectly  submitted  dancer  to  her  male  Tango 
partner,  etc. Even in civilised children's  books and film these relationships are present, 
often depicted in fetishist hues. For instance, the dark Gothic aesthetic of Harry Potter, 
with the mystery, the secret powers, the stress on the importance to endure and love these 
tests  of  pain,  even  the  threat  of  death,  all  of  which  allow  one  to  get  closer  to  the 
commander of dark forces, an honour bestowed upon a select few, like the equestrian sport 
is exclusive to the rich, or like the S&M clubs are selective and secretive.
However,  the superficial aesthetic  does not  need to be overtly dark,  for it  only 
communicates the underlying precepts governing the civilised relationships that are also 
present in the field of production of knowledge responsible for legitimising meaning, such 
as  theorising  oppression  and  transcending  the  problem  that  Douglass,  Kropotkin  or 
Bentham have identified,  namely that for the victim of domination (and training) these 
concepts are a matter of a painful reality of a whole life of slavery, of stolen wilderness, 
and of shattered dreams.  Rationalising victims  as either  singing  or  achieving a better, 
176 With regards to horse-riding, I have participated in show-jumping for ten years, competing on an 
international level from the age of 13 to 23. Even though I personally never used physical force or pain 
to coerce the horse to win, nonetheless, I quit because I realised that in that relationship, the horse had no 
choice but to obey and I was the oppressor with human privilege. The ideal aesthetic and the 
claustrophobic elitist ambiance of the “sport” had haunted me for years, however. As for sado-
masochism, I have conducted research for my first methodology training for M.A. in anthropology in 
Sweden in 1995-96. I became interested in the subject after the connections I drew between cultural 
genital mutilation practices and the civilised relationships of pain and the aesthetics of hierarchical 
relationships that was funded by the Watson Foundation in 1993-94.
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happier, or more beautiful state is  part of the mechanism of silencing. This exercise in 
silencing and dismissal is crucial for the development of the language that then delivers 
civilised narratives in the form of succinct and happy stories for both children and adults.
Carry  Wolfe's  introduction  and  Paul  Patton's  essay  in  Zoontologies (2003),  a 
volume that attempts to reconcile the contradictions between domination, well-being, self-
expression,  submission,  and  aesthetics  reveal  this  rationale  of  empowerment  and 
disempowerment. In order to introduce the main point of Patton's essay on horsemanship, 
government, gender, and the domestication of children, Wolfe opens his introduction with 
Hearne's ideology on training horses:
I try to show, the issue is not so much an unsophisticated theory of language that is used 
to separate human and animal; indeed, Hearne's work on how we communicate  with 
animals and inhabit a shared world with them by building a common vocabulary in the 
training relationship is as supple and complex as any work I know of on this problem 
(Wolfe in Wolfe, 2003: xvi).
The key phrase that makes it possible to reconcile morality with the humiliation inflicted 
by one person training another to obey him on command is: “how we communicate with 
animals and inhabit  a  shared world with them”.  In other  words,  the true nature of the 
relationship where a person moves into the life of another person, confines that person to a 
locked space with bars (as discussed in part I on Winnie-the-Pooh and zoos), harnesses 
her, and rides her is not a relationship of sharing, but that of “domination”, “invasion” and 
“conquest”. The only possible way to get around the ethical problem that such an invasion 
poses and to be able to call it  “sharing” instead of what it really is – colonisation – is to 
deny the oppressed party the dignity of personhood, knowledge, and agency and to define 
the “un-person” in terms of the needs and desires of the one holding the title of “person”. 
These definitions  allow to  substitute  the term “invasion”,  “colonialism”  or  “conquest” 
with a euphemism that conveys a sense of reciprocity: “shared space”. In addition, this 
linguistic misrepresentation of concepts and experience further conceals the true nature of 
the relationship by calling “communication” what in fact constitutes one sided commands 
such as “sit”, “jump”, “hunt”, “give”, “good boy”, et al.
Misrepresenting the true nature of coercive relationships becomes easy once the 
purpose for  a  person's existence – and by extension for  all the persons who meet  the 
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criteria to form that group – has been defined by the one who profits from controlling such 
persons' lives and exploiting their effort and time. Here, language177 reveals the real value 
of power: it constitutes the tool that allows us to define and name the other and then have 
that other succumb to the definition by overwriting her narrative. In a similar manner, in 
Orientalism,  Edward Said  (1979) discussed the mechanism of subjugation through the 
construction of specific knowledge through visual and literary narrative of the Oriental 
“other”  by  the  European,  which  instituted  a  framework  for  exploitative,  one-way 
relationships regardless of the reality or self knowledge of the “oriental” “other”.
This dynamic is illustrated in the training and domestication of animals, which was 
denounced from various perspectives by such thinkers as Peter Singer, Gary Francione, 
and Tom Regan arguing for the abolition of speciesism and for the recognition of animal 
rights to personhood. A discussion of the differences  in  these philosophers' arguments 
deserves a book to itself; what is relevant to this discussion, however, is the way in which 
the  mythology  that  structures  discrimination  is  informing  all  the  layers  of  civilised 
knowledge,  culture,  society,  economy,  etc.,  permeating  all  the  aspects  of  civilised 
relationships  in  the  totalitarian  and  global  manner  of  today.  This  reasoning  is  aptly 
articulated in Paul Patton's essay “Language, Power, and the Training of Horses” (Patton 
in Wolfe, 2003). 
In his introduction to the collection of essays, Wolfe praises Patton's contribution 
to the anthology expressly for the ability to identify the problem of unequal relations of 
power in domestication and yet he sees him as managing to reconcile these inequalities 
with  the ethical problem that  domination raises.  The reconciliation,  according to  him, 
occurs because the authors claim that (1) the concept of equality is dangerous; (2)  training 
(domestication) brings the best out of the dominated persons; (3) because domination of 
animals,  children, and other domesticated persons is  an expression of government,  and 
government is not only good, but necessary for the well-being of everyone; therefore, they 
177 Foucault used the term “discourse” to discuss the relations of power as they transpired through the 
relating to the interaction, the choice of authority and who to listen to or cite in social networks, or who 
to give the public space for speech. Language is taken to be more specific to the rules of communication. 
However, because I use “language” in Zerzan's (2002) sense of a tool of alienation, I propose that it is 
language that contains discourse and the symbolic capital with its currency value and power structure 
because it is through language that we invent, structure, and communicate the system of laws for 
oppression.
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conclude,  government,  domination  and  domestication  are  not  only  ethical,  but  even 
indispensable for all living beings:
... this does not mean that power and ethics are opposites.  Indeed, as Paul Patton—
himself a dedicated horseman of many years as well as  ...  scholar of poststructuralist 
philosophy—argues here,  the training of horses,  whether  in the traditional “cowboy” 
methods of  domination or  the  gentler  ways  of  “horse whisperer”  Monty Roberts,  is 
indeed an exercise of power, a form of what Foucault calls “government.” But this is 
“by no means incompatible with ethical relations and obligations toward other beings” 
of whatever species, Patton argues, be they human or animal. Indeed, part of what is 
valuable about the work of Hearne, Roberts, and others—and about the experience of 
actually  training  an  animal—is  that  it  helps  to  make  clear  the  requirements  and 
obligations of those hierarchical relations of power we do enter into (with animals, with 
children, with each other) and draws our attention to how those requirements are always 
specific to the beings involved, in the light of which, he argues, the presumption of a 
one-size-fits-all  notion  of  “equality  in  all  contexts”  is  “not  only  misleading  but 
dangerous” (in Wolfe, 2003: xviii-xix).
The essay “Language, Power, and the Training of Horses” opens with an anthropocentric, 
civilised perspective on the reasons for the existence of horses: they have, apparently, 
evolved to please humans. This is precisely the ontological problem I have identified as 
responsible in the civilised narrative that  exterminates wilderness: the purpose of one's 
existence becomes to serve the interests of another even when this entails acting against 
one's  own interests.  As discussed earlier,  in  Reiman's (2007) words,  this irreconcilable 
problem is what makes the system of “criminal justice” criminal and immoral.  Yet, the 
Foucauldian analysis of the inherently coercive relations of unequal power that follows 
this revelation in  Zoontologies gets buried beneath the vocabulary that avoids “polemic” 
or any real questioning of the nature of these relations.  Most important, this theorising 
comes from people who have access to the highly expensive and prestigious network (i.e. 
extreme high-value currency of symbolic and material capital) of equestrian domination. It 
ignores  the  perspective  of  those  whose  will  gets  broken.  Hence,  for  most  readers, 
particularly those who have not had a chance to meditate on what it is like to be enslaved, 
this essay provides no acknowledgement for or insight into the experience of having an 
iron bit in one's mouth, of being forced to learn the language of obedience and command, 
or of having one's definition of self-purpose being contingent on the will and the aesthetic 
sense of an oppressor. In fact, the author highlights Patton's warning that it  is “not only 
misleading but dangerous” to apply the concept of “equality in all contexts” – i.e.,  the 
authors  openly admit  that  egalitarianism threatens  the  very basis  of the  institution of 
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domination and that, in their opinion, each category of the oppressed has a different set of 
definitions, limitations, and expectations.
Translated,  the  justification  of  animal  training  follows  this  logic:  humans  as 
masters help horses fully realise their ideal,  because horses,  for some reason,  fail to be 
“ideal” all the time by themselves; but once pushed by the humans in charge, they really 
end up enjoying being ideal in the eyes of the pushers (Patton in Wolfe,  2003: 83). To 
draw a civilised conclusion such as this,  it  is  necessary to  first  (1) believe in  inherent 
inequality of people and species and of their knowledges: the premise being that some 
know better about themselves and others than those others know about anyone including 
themselves; and (2) have faith in the assumptions that some persons need to be governed 
by others and that the governing persons know best  how to represent and govern their 
subjects, who are assumed to be inferior to the governors and ignorant of their own needs 
and possibilities. 
Obviously, adherence to these assumptions entails ignorance and arrogance on the 
part of those who believe they have the right to govern others and a sense of inferiority on 
the part of those who agree that they need to be governed. To be able to arrive at this 
position of superiority vis-à-vis others, the governor has to ignore the knowledge of the 
governed subjects about themselves and the subjects have to be subjected and subjugated 
to the governor's gaze and definition of them. To arrive at a conclusion of inferiority and 
the  need  to  be  governed  one  has  to  have  been  rendered  unskilled,  unintelligent,  and 
specialised in a field needed by the owners, management and government. In other words, 
in order for there to be governance, there first must be ignorance and a deep distrust of 
independence or the ability of human and other animals to live and let life be. 
Ignorance is produced by institutionalised methods of dumbing down, to borrow 
John  Taylor  Gatto's  phrase,  which then makes  the  double-standards  feel natural.  This 
dumbing down is achieved through the process of institutionalisation of a humanist and 
specifically  ethnocentric  (and  mostly  male)  epistemology  that  renders  “logical”  the 
following inconsistencies in logic:
Does this mean that training horses to perform classical disciplines such as dressage is 
irredeemably corrupt? Is training of any kind an indefensible form of co-optation of the 
animal's powers? To see why the answers to these questions should be in the negative, 
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we need to hold apart the elements of the training relationship: the disciplinary relations 
of command and obedience, the relation to animals, and the languages that enable us to 
interact with them. Disciplinary relations of command and obedience are precisely a 
means  to  create  and  maintain  stable  and  civil  relations  between  different  kinds  of 
beings,  not  only  among  individuals  of  the  same  species,  but  also  between 
representatives of different species (Patton in Wolfe, 2003: 95).
Like Zerzan, Patton identifies language as the vehicle for the coercive relationship that 
exists in civilisation between the object of training (in Patton's case it is a dog or a horse) 
and  the  master.  Patton further  draws  a  parallel  between three  spheres  of  government 
(domestication): animal training, the training of children, and the ruling over subjects, the 
most intensive preparation for which occurs during the training years at school. However, 
if  Zerzan  has  understood the  humiliation  and  the  pain  inflicted  by domestication,  an 
understanding that prompted him to examine the core of civilised relations and to seek 
liberation for  all, Patton sees  governance  as  part  of a  natural order,  as improving  the 
victim, as something that brings out more of the “natural” beauty enjoyed by the master, 
and as needed by and delightful for the victim herself. Since it  is the horse, and not the 
trainer  or  the  theoretician,  who  gets  the  bit  in  the mouth,  is  forced  to  learn  how to 
understand  the  trainer's  “communication”  and  appeal  to  his  sense  of  beauty  and 
contentment,  we only get the perspective of the one who dominates and thus miss the 
opportunity to examine what it would be like to be beneath the saddle, not above it.
If one were to take the parallel between government and the training of animals, 
children, and citizens to its logical end, one would be forced to re-examine the profound 
roots  of  master-slave  relations  that  are  expressed  in  this  language  and  its  civilised 
ontology. For if we admit the voice of the victim on par with the voice of power whose 
monologue dominates this public discourse, we would be forced to deal with the violent 
essence of grooming, shaping, commanding and, most important, the violence of the act 
itself of dismissing the pain of the trained, groomed, shaped, and commanded being. If, in 
contrast,  empathy and dialogue were  the guiding  principles of research instead of the 
established apathy and monologue, then sovereignty, education, and domestication would 
all be challenged. Patton's essay however promises a questioning, which it never delivers:
In effect, trainers must become like those whom Nietzsche says have acquired the right 
to make promises. These are beings “who promise like sovereigns, reluctantly, rarely, 
slowly.”  Trainers,  too,  must  become  like  sovereign  individuals,  aware  of  “the 
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extraordinary privilege of responsibility” and conscious of the “power over oneself and 
fate” that this implies. The overlap between the moral cosmos of the trainer and the one 
we encounter in Nietzsche's writings is also evident in Hearne's remark that, for  the 
trainee dog, “Freedom is being on an 'Okay' command”. In other words, freedom only 
makes sense within a system of constraints; it presupposes both capacities of the subject 
and their location within relations of power (Patton in Wolfe, 2003: 96).
The challenging of the civilised perspective never comes, because the imposed narrative 
of power insists that freedom must be constrained for the good of the constrained persons 
themselves:  cows have  to  be  incarcerated and  then eaten for  their  own good,  and so 
children and rebels too must be punished by means of inflicting emotional or physical pain 
for their own benefit. 
The  “relations  of  power”  in  which  some  individuals  are  endowed  with  the 
knowledge and responsibility to confine, exploit, and direct others are referred to in this 
narrative as “relations of trust”, thereby projecting a sense of benign necessity for abuse. 
This narrative makes it inconceivable for the civilised to imagine a horse, a dog, a child, or 
a  subject  refusing to  obey the commands,  which they term as “communication”.  Left  
unvoiced here is the threat of the death penalty that hovers above this silenced obedience: 
if  the enslaved  animal  rebelled  and  defended herself  against  the  abuse  with  fangs  or 
hooves,  the animal would be executed by lethal injection. If children turned around to 
destroy  school  walls,  they  would  be  threatened  with  starvation,  joblessness,  and 
incarcerated in even more severe correcting institutions than the school itself. People who 
burn down fences, as Snufkin does in Hemul-land, and destroy the slaughter machines 
used  for  killing  or  torturing  animals,  as  animal  rights  activists  do  around  the world, 
receive life sentences in the United States and the equivalent maximum penalty in Canada 
and other civilised states178. 
178People labelled “eco-terrorists”, who have purposefully not harmed life, but have committed acts of 
disruption against corporations or other domesticating enterprises, can receive the maximum sentence for 
manslaughter, even though the activists were careful not to hurt anyone. For instance Jeffrey Luers, a 
prisoner at Oregon State penitentiary has been incarcerated since June 2000 for eco-sabotage arson at a car 
dealership was sentenced to 22 years and eight months for that action. Tre Arrow received 6 years sentence 
in Canada for having scaled the U.S. Forest Service building in Portland in 2000 and lived for eleven days 
on its ledge in protest of timber sale in the Mount Hood National Forest. “I wanted to protect those trees that 
I loved. And I had only my body to protect them with” - he was pushed down, but survived. Bruce Ellison, 
the attorney for Tre Arrow, said that he was facing up to life in prison on these charges but agreed to plead 
guilty and received six years in Canada and then extradited to the United States. May 2009 in California, 
Eric McDavid received a sentence of 19 years and 7 months for planning to damage corporate and 
government property (he hasn't damaged it, though). Animal rights activists in the U.K. Don't fare better. In 
the case of activists demonstrating against animal testing by the Sequani laboratory received up to ten years 
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In these situations, the civilised narrative refuses to question the integrity of the 
people who practice abuse and domination or to challenge its fundamental premise that 
power is not an egalitarian right. Since the institutionalised death penalty that hangs over 
the animal and the rebel does not apply to the trainer, the educator, or the invader, it  is 
inaccurate to call “mutual” a relationship where the socially disempowered person, such as 
the animal, the rebel, or the child, does not enjoy the same right to defend her interests, 
purpose,  knowledge,  and  life  by legally  putting  the  trainer  to  sleep.  Nevertheless,  in 
addition to misnaming these one-way relationships as “mutual”,  the ultimate veiling of 
their abusive essence of civilisation comes from claiming that they are built on “trust” and 
“communication”:
...Just as communication among humans presupposes a degree of trust, so it is apparent 
that  to  establish  means  of  communication  between  humans  and  animals  is  also  to 
establish a basis for trust. Hearne points out that the better a dog (or a horse) is trained, 
“which is to say, the greater his 'vocabulary' -the more mutual trust there is, the more 
dog [or horse] and human can rely on each other to behave responsibly”. Roberts also 
insists that the point of his method is to create a relationship based on mutual trust and 
confidence (ibid).
In  the  end,  the  ultimate  expression  of  violence  is  the  act  of  referring  to  a  coercive 
relationship as “a mutual relationship of trust”, in which one party has a say over the life 
and death of the other, while the other is so completely disempowered that her only option 
is to act out of fear and comply with the demands to serve until she expires. If this were “a 
mutual relationship of trust”, it would not have needed the backing of the whole apparatus 
of laws, military,  police, and other civilised professionals to protect trainers, rulers, and 
owners from being treated in the way that they treat their subjects-objects.
Relationships  involving  communication  and  command-obedience  are,  of  course, 
common within human social life. That is why, in  Join-Up: Horse Sense for People, 
Roberts can argue for the extension of the principles of his horse-training techniques to 
the whole gamut of human relations involving differences of power and capacity. He 
suggests that relations between parents and children, women and men, managers and 
employees will all be better served by an approach that employs nonverbal as well as 
verbal means to establish trust and invited cooperation. Hearne also points out that much 
of human social life presupposes relationships of command and obedience. We expect 
of prison. They were prosecuted under the 2005 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCPA) Act. Mel 
Broughton, an activist in England, on 14th February 2009 received ten years of prison for protesting against 
the planned construction of an animal experiments testing laboratory in Oxford. Examples abound and there 
is little of mutuality or reciprocity in the way the laws are written or enacted (Corporate Watch,UK 30th June 
2009: http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=3405).
320
obedience to some at least of  our  own basic  needs and desires on the part of other 
people and we teach obedience to our children.  The import of this line of thought in 
both Hearne and Roberts is to suggest that we do well to attend to the requirements of 
the hierarchical and communicative relations in which we live, and that certain kinds of 
emphasis on equality in all contexts are not only misleading but dangerous.
... Hearne points to the similarities between the moral cosmos of training and that of the 
older forms of human society in which “obedience was a part of human virtu,” thereby 
drawing attention to the fact that the idea of society that is expressed in the practice of 
training is at odds with our modern egalitarian ethos (ibid: 96-97). 
“We expect obedience” is obviously spoken from the point of view of the master and not 
from the perspective  of the child  or the horse.  In other  words,  the relations  “between 
parents and children, women and men, managers and employees” become smoother and 
less visibly violent when the subjects expected to obey understand what  is  expected of 
them and comply in silence, preferably with a smile and even gratitude.
In this narrative, any contradictions that challenge the concept of “democracy” get 
resolved  when  the  concept  of  egalitarianism  is  substituted  with  the  concept  of 
“difference”: humans cannot overtly abuse humans because, today, they are considered to 
be the same, but if we operate from the basis that those who have been rendered socially, 
physically,  materially  weak  depend  on  the  powerful  people's  charity  to  exploit  their 
weakness and to allow them to exist, then there is flexibility in where the borders between 
the groups can be drawn and how the abused can be educated to believe that they are 
rendered nobler if they learnt the language of obedience and servitude. In this way, their 
relationship will be filled with joy (only half a decade ago, this contention of sameness of 
all humans was contestable, as Bentham observes). The construct of “difference” provides 
the platform for all forms of exploitation, discrimination, slavery, or extermination: their 
faith is different, their tails are longer, their skulls are wider, their brains are smaller, their  
stature shorter, these have hooves, those have a different skin colour than Jesus supposedly 
had, the feathers on their head are not hats, the food they eat is not  kosher or  halal, ad 
infinitum.
But whereas the differences between the sexes, races, and social classes in those older 
forms of society were only purportedly based in nature, the differences between trainers 
and their subjects are natural differences between animal kinds endowed with different 
powers and capacities. The good trainer is the one who appreciates these differences, 
who both understands and respects the specific nature of the animal. 
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... In a reworking of the story of our expulsion from paradise, [Hearne] suggests that our 
fallen relation to animals is one in which a gap has opened up between “the ability to 
command and the full acknowledgement of the personhood of the being so commanded” 
(47). Good training establishes a form of language that closes that gap, which is another 
way of saying that it  enables a form of interaction that enhances the power and the 
feeling of power of both horse and rider (ibid: 97).
In other words, the text echoes Machiavelli's (1981) advice in The Prince that a good and 
responsible tyrant is the one who lets his sheep indulge in the illusion that they are safe 
and well in his “claws”. According to Patton, since animals are different – some can be 
forced  to  jump  others  to  plough or  run  fast,  etc.  –  a  good master  understands  these 
differences, i.e. identifies them, and devises a language to fit  the abilities of the specific 
subjects  of  dressage.  The  grammar  of  freedom that  the  animal  communicates  at  the 
beginning of this relationship, when she kicks and neighs and attempts to throw off and 
even kill the rider as he insists on breaking the horse, is, once again, conveniently left out 
of this narrative,  and the power hierarchy remains anthropocentric.  What  the narrative 
chooses to highlight is the obedient and happy horse, bridled and saddled; the proud rider, 
the conqueror of wild will, master of steeds; the golden medals; the praise of the “mutual” 
“union”  and  excellent  “communication”  skills  inhering  in  the  medals,  prizes,  and 
microphone  announcements  during  the  equestrian  competitions  and  afterwards  in  the 
media.
This  myth  of the  joyful  nature  of sado-masochistic  relationships  achieves  two 
things: it  naturalises violence, silences the victim, and then claims that the victim enjoys 
her experience because she either was created that way or has so evolved, i.e., has chosen 
this  state  of  affairs.  In  this  way,  it  is  both  a  product  of  the  Darwinian  narrative  of 
civilisation,  but  also  its  legitimator.  It  permeates children's  culture and narratives  in  a 
particularly  overpowering  way,  because  children  are  the  most  important  subjects  in 
domestication,  and  their  literature,  as  Zipes  (2009)  argues,  becomes  the  medium that 
transmits crucial memes.
An extremely popular children's book, The Giving Tree by Shel Silverstein (1964), 
illustrates how the myth of the joyful nature of the slave, i.e. the one whose purpose for 
being  the  civilised  ontology constructs  as  “servant”  or  “resource”  offers  a  topos  for 
abusive relationships that automatically translate into “mutual” relationships of “trust” and 
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“love”.  This  translation or  substitution  of concepts  is  possible  due  to  the  underlying 
Darwinian assumption that  is  the sacred  doxa,  present  but  silent,  lulling us to remain 
sleepy and comforted by the voice that whispers that this is  the resources' evolutionary 
choice, that egalitarianism is a lie, and that the victim is redeemed by her limitless, self-
sacrificial giving, while the one who consumes her is vindicated by the very fact of his 
agency, consumption and humanism.
“Once  there  was  a  tree...  and  she  loved  a  little  boy,”  the  story begins.  “And 
everyday, the boy would come” and take things from the tree or ask for something. And 
the tree always gave of herself.  At  first he wanted to play king,  eat  apples,  climb  her 
branches,  sleep in  her shade “and the boy loved the tree very much; and the tree was 
happy”(Silverstein, 1964), we are told – just like the singing slaves. 
The relationship keeps escalating throughout the book as he keeps coming back 
asking for more. Hence, the next thing he asks the tree for is money; she does not have 
any, she says, but offers him to pick her apples for him to sell: “Then you will have money 
and  you  will  be  happy”.  In  other  words,  she  always  confirms  to  him  that  severing, 
abusing, accumulating, and using her for his purposes will make him happy and therefore 
being severed, used, and consumed by him makes her happy too.
The next thing he wants is a house and then a boat. The tree suggests that he cut 
her, and so he does. The story is repetitive but the greed keeps augmenting: the boy goes 
away, forgets about  the tree,  then needs something, comes back and the tree is  always 
there, always glad to see him and give him what he needs. Even though this is presented as 
a  two-way relationship,  just  like  the civilised  narrative discussed above claims  to  be: 
apparently the tree herself keeps coming up with the ideas of how to be better exploited, in 
fact, this is an exemplary tale of apathy, deafness, and ignorance that lead to rape, abuse, 
and murder. He never once inquires about how she feels or what her needs are, for the 
concept of reciprocity is absent in domesticated relationships; what matters is that the Boy 
loves to have a good life and that the Tree loves him by giving herself, her biggest need 
being to offer herself for his consumption so that he can have what he wants:
And so the boy cut off her branches
and carried them away
to build his house.
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And the tree was happy.
But the boy stayed away for a long time.
And when he came back,
the tree was so happy
she could hardly speak.
“Come, Boy,” she whispered,
“come and play.”
“I am too old and sad to play,”
said the boy.
“I want a boat that will 
take me far away from here.
Can you give me a boat?”
“Cut down my trunk
and make a boat,” said the tree.
“Then you can sail away...
and be happy.”
And so the boy cut down her trunk
and made a boat and sailed away.
And the tree was happy
... but not really.
And after a long time
the boy came back again.
“I am sorry, Boy,”
said the tree,” but I have nothing
left to give you -
My apples are gone.”
“My teeth are too weak
for apples,” said the boy.
“My branches are gone,”
said the tree. “You
cannot swing on them -”
“I am too old to swing
on branches,” said the boy.
“My trunk is gone,” said the tree.
“You cannot climb -”
“I am too tired to climb,” said the boy.
“I am sorry,” sighed the tree.
“I wish that I could give you something....
but I have nothing left. 
I am just an old stump.
I am sorry....”
“I don't need very much now,” said the boy.
“just a quiet place to sit and rest.
I am very tired.”
“Well,” said the tree, straightening
herself up as much as she could,
“well, an old stump is good for sitting and resting
Come, Boy, sit down. Sit down and rest.”
And the boy did. 
And the tree was happy (Silverstein, 1964).
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This  story articulates  the  whole  mythology of civilisation:  the  abused  and  consumed 
victim is  happy to  serve  the purpose  of the  moving  agent  even beyond  death.  While 
undoubtedly children and adults are active agents in extrapolating meaning, and might be 
able to see this relationship for what it is, nonetheless, if their whole experience confirms 
to them the naturalness of such hierarchical,  one-way relationships of exploitation, then 
most likely, the story would act as a meme to consolidate the  doxa and the ideology of 
oppression. In fact, it  builds itself on the very concept of understanding the language of 
domination: the tree understands the material, emotional, and aesthetic requirements of the 
master, and in Patton's language, enters a “mutual space” of one-way servitude and one-
way consumption. In fact,  numerous critics have interpreted this poem as one about the 
destructive consumption of nature.  Feminist perspectives have also pointed out that  the 
gender of the two characters is not coincidental: the tree is female: “the boy cut  off her 
branches...”; “cut down her trunk...”; “she could hardly speak...”; “she whispered...”; “said 
the tree, straightening herself up...”; and so forth.
However,  this  narrative  has  been  so  normalised  through  the  past  seventeen 
thousand years of domestication that the violence and abuse are no longer noticeable since 
they are part of the civilised narrative and its legitimising norm. The problem of this story 
hence is a much deeper, ontological one, for, regardless of whether the tree is a metaphor 
for  the  “unequal”  expectations  of sacrifice  between  the  genders,  according  to  George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson (2003),  metaphors conduct  real images and real ontological 
concepts that then guide people through their relationships with their world, and I would 
add that  these  metaphors  guide  them in  concordance  with  the legitimate  norm of the 
civilised – i.e. abusive – narrative.
Therefore, even if we assume that the tree in this book is a metaphor for mother, 
again,  only in a symbolic culture can it  be taken to “represent” other relationships the 
direction of which is  pre-set  as a  one-way relationship  of giving.  In other words,  this 
metaphor can make sense only to  the civilised,  because they have a ready formula by 
which to solve the equation of these relationships: everything exists for the purpose of the 
food  chain  and  resource-consumer  relationship.  For,  if  this  relationship  is  about  the 
legitimate abuse of mothers, it makes sense in an agricultural, sedentary society, in which 
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the meaning of a matrimonial relationship for upper classes is about joining capital and 
maximising  it  through  offspring,  whereby  a  child  takes  everything  from his  parents; 
parents  provide  the  comfort  to  buy friends,  travel,  accumulate  symbolic  and  material 
capital and later their death makes for a comfortable place to sit on for the Boy who knew 
how to  maximise  his  chances  and  put  his  heritage  to  the  best  possible  use.  For  the 
economically  disenfranchised,  on  the  other  hand,  the  children  themselves  become 
resources and are sent to work at an early age.
Another important omission in this narrative pertains to the fact that, in the wild, a 
being,  whether  she  is  a  human  mother  or  a  tree,  supports  milliards  of  symbiotic 
relationships and communities of other plants, bugs, birds, squirrels,  human and animal 
children,  et  al.  Therefore,  by ignoring  the Tree's  real experience and  voice  the  poem 
ignores  all  the  other  victims  of  the  Boy's  greed  and  self-centred  anthropocentrism. 
Reducing this complex society around the tree to the needs of the Boy and to the services 
that the Tree can render him and then attributing it  to a metaphor that stands for other 
“giving” relationships, becomes the guiding principle that fits all the various stories into 
the  plot  of  a  narrative  that  naturalises  and  legitimates  abuse  even  if,  as  civilisation 
progressed,  the  contradictions  between  exploitation,  giving,  locking,  stealing,  moving, 
dying, hunger, wealth, community, individualism have eluded resolution, becoming more 
and more entangled and convoluted through complex representation179.  The deeper  the 
domesticated culture stepped into its own horror, the more “refined” and complex became 
its art and literature and the more excruciating the pain of wilderness, which harkens back 
to John Zerzan's critique of language, time, symbolic thought and violence.
Even though  The Giving Tree is  straightforward and its pictures corroborate the 
text, its unresolved conflict lies in the contradiction between the way the text applies the 
term “love” to the female tree as a giver and to the male human animal as a consumer and, 
in the manner of civilised unknowledge, essentialises these aspects as natural qualities 
based on the individual's “biological” class: gender, race, species, etc. In this regard, the 
179 As mentioned in an earlier footnote, both Frederic Jameson (2002) and Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963) make 
an important point about the complexity of art: when a society, such as the Caduveo, chooses to organise 
itself hierarchically, they fail to resolve the contradictions and conflicts arising from inequality and 
subjugation. These conflicts are then expressed in the complexity of lines and details in their paintings. 
In addition, Boris Wiseman (2008) also observes that the paintings of the Caduveo have come to 
distinguish them from animals, which is not an issue with the other tribes.
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story  exemplifies  the  role  of  language  in  overwriting  the  meaning  of  wilderness  in 
children's narratives confusing the basic ontological concepts just as Zoontologies offers a 
rationale and a justification of violence by silencing the victim and confusing obedience 
with desire and the fear of death with joy. 
Other children's picture books illustrate the irresolvable conflict and the violence of 
domesticated relationships even more radically: often, pictures contradict the text and, of 
course,  these conflicts and tensions add layers of information to the child  in  terms of 
acknowledging the complexity of civilised experience and its relationships. However, my 
argument here is that even while I agree that children are wilder than adults and that they 
do, as Zipes (2009) observes, contest and resist this meaning, in the final instance, few 
have  the  strength  and  the  possibilities  to  overcome  the  domesticating,  directing, 
controlling,  and self-imposing flux of civilised topoi.  Somewhere in  the depths of our 
souls, no matter how wild we may be, having been touched by civilisation, as if kissed by 
the plague, we may still catch the echo of the whispering tempter, attempting to lull us to 
the naturalness of abuse and its rewards. Facing the institutional threat of violence and 
death,  not  many children grow up to  resist  this narrative,  its  voice silencing  all  other 
voices of wilderness, and since their movement is constricted and their space is colonised, 
many may not have the moomin option to simply walk away to a promised land.
And yet,  in  spite  of the civilised threat  of punishment  and starvation,  dissident 
voices continue to rise and to challenge this narrative of pain as destiny and joy. As Peter 
Kropotkin undoes the premises of the evolutionary theory; Jeremy Bentham demolishes 
the walls that separate humans from other sentient beings; or Frederick Douglass disputes 
the veracity of the mythology of oppressive relationships, the critique of humanist borders, 
civilised categories,  and constructs of humanity and animality comes  from a  range of 
disciplines and perspectives.  On the one end  of these voices is  the anarcho-primitivist 
position, spanning the various critiques of civilisation; on the other end of the spectrum is 
the call for a complete merging with the machine. This last solution is understandable to 
the extent that it  recognises the fact that as humans have atrophied their own ability to 
grow physiological limbs, machines have come to constitute an integral part of civilised 
bodies and nature. However, this perspective ignores the pitfalls of technology, which like 
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the technology of writing discussed in part I, constitutes the mechanism that colonises by 
entangling domesticated beings deeper and deeper into relationships of debt. In the next 
section  I  examine  the  question  of  the  machine  through the  question of empathy and 
critique of technology.
   5.3. Do Children Dream of Cyborg Love?
The imposing technological order of the age of the machine has presented many 
challenges  for  human  identity  and  for  our  understanding  of  human  evolution  as  a 
trajectory  of  beings  who  “previously”  were  dependent  on  living  biosystems  and 
independent  of tools,  civilised  language,  or  technology and  who  “now” have  become 
creatures relying  more and more on artificial limbs  (literacy as an organ for  memory; 
vehicles of transportation in lieu of running, swimming, or walking; stories and narratives 
to replace genes by memes; clothing, housing, guns, and other attributes of civilised life as 
protection against weather, nature, and life,  ad infinitum). Generalising this trajectory for 
all  humanity,  this  narrative  omits  two  crucial  details:  one,  that  the  non-domesticated 
lifestyle is not simply an evolutionary step that took place in the past, but that it still exists 
today  and  that  the  only  reason  these  people  are  not  thriving  is  due  to  having  been 
colonised  and  exterminated by the civilised;  and  two,  that  this  is  not  an evolution of 
“humanity” as a whole, but rather this pertains to only those people who have adopted the 
civilised mode of living and with it hierarchical and parasitic relationships, for they are the 
ones to have mutated in this way and thereby have lost the ability to develop their own 
limbs  from their  own bodies  or through mutual relationships (Egenter,  1987; Hansell, 
2005). Such generalisation is part of the normative legitimating process that silences the 
colonised and presents the coloniser as the better result of Natural Selection. 
In  this  regard,  technology poses  new problems  to  anthropology as the borders 
between living species acquire new dimensions: civilised humans become less and less 
animal as they merge with the machines they create to serve human needs, but by having 
acquired this servitude humans have also appropriated the essence of the machine and 
incorporated  it  into  their  own  being.  Hence,  my  discussion  of  the  challenges  of 
classification by age,  gender,  class,  race (or ethnicity),  and species  will be  incomplete 
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without an examination of the phenomenon of human dependence on machines and the 
implications of this development on self knowledge. The publication of Donna Haraway's 
(2008) work on the intersection of species with technologies illustrates how this narrative 
spreads through civilised space and colonises it.
Haraway  states  at  the  beginning  of  A  Cyborg  Manifesto (1991) that  she  had 
intended the text as both irony and metaphor to contest the gendered identities that have 
been responsible for the oppression of women. As mentioned earlier, however, metaphors 
have a profound effect on structuring reality (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003), and hence pose 
certain ontological problems for liberation. “Othered” persons, according to Haraway, can 
heal through mutation by incorporating elements from machines. Having lost the ability to 
generate  limbs,  technology  offers  new  possibilities  of  regeneration  that,  along  with 
information systems, would replace their lost limbs and information systems.
Animals devise various ways of moving about their world and interacting with it. 
Again, the moominbooks project a wide range of possibilities for symbiotic relationships 
that  do  not  entail  changing  the  direction  or  the  other's  purpose  in  the  manner  of 
civilisation. For instance, Moominmamma and the children hop on the Hattifattners' boat 
to get a ride and jump off when they feel they are not interested in exploring the horizons 
towards which the boat turned its course, but they do not force the Hattifattners to change 
their course and walk the rest of the way until they help the marabou stork find his lost  
glasses, who then decides to carry them to Moominpappa, simply because he wanted to, 
because their lives together are better than being without each other, and not because he 
felt indebted.
The purpose of our organic limbs  is  to render  us independent  in  our ability to 
procure a living and yet integrate us into the biodiverse community of life and allow us to 
move, for movement, as discussed at the beginning of this part, is a characteristic of life 
itself.  However,  by  having  created  labour  resources  working  for  the  domesticators, 
domestication has atrophied the limbs of civilised humans since the domesticated subjects 
came  to  act  as  the  limbs  that  obey  the  civilised  needs.  Moreover,  in  the  context  of 
civilisation,  a  sense  of  liberation  does  not  come  through  independence,  but  through 
empowerment, i.e. power over oneself, others, time, and space. In other words, here, self 
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empowerment  means an exponential colonisation of others.  Thus,  to follow Haraway's 
invitation to liberate and thus empower women by integrating them with machines and 
turning  into  cyborgs,  ultimately  means  the  oppression  of  more  other  women,  men, 
children, and non-humans, who will come to fill the oppressed place of the now liberated 
group of women;  all  the more so  since  these  metaphors  and  their  symbolic  meaning 
constitute the ever-borrowed capital that consumes the real lives of the human and non-
human machines (slaves, cyborgs, workers, animals as workers and food, inter alios).
There are various levels in this process of colonialism. First, the material aspect of 
machines consists of mining metals and petroleum bi-products, then processing the raw 
materials into the various forms of plastic and metals, after which they are turned into the 
technologies that can be bought by those who can afford them. Many people in various 
places  around  the  world  participate  in  this  process  and  these  places  have  to  be 
domesticated, i.e. forced to rely on the work they render to the owners of the “natural 
resources”, which the human resources extract, refine, and process but which they do not 
own. In other words, visible and invisible violence has to be applied to force people to 
abandon their relationships and purpose and work for an owner, who, like Willy Wonka 
discussed  in  part  II,  is  alien  to  their  community  of  life.  By having  evolved  into  an 
apathetic expropriator, the owner has no qualms about exterminating indigenous human 
and non-human populations or stifling their dreams through enslavement. In this respect, 
the process itself of making technologies submits to  the narrative that  structures these 
relationships of oppression and silences the victim by claiming that she really enjoys her 
cyborg liberation, that  if  only we all would embrace the ontology of the machine and 
incorporate it into our very reason of being, we shall at last be all happy and free. In other 
words, the civilised no longer dream of the wild purpose of being.
The synthesis of critiques of the nature of humanity, of cross-species relations and 
their representations in science, literature, and art poses a serious challenge to the position 
of techno-optimism. Namely, these critiques point out that there can be no liberation from 
slavery if  the need itself for slavery is  not  eradicated.  For, liberation from slavery can 
come only with independence from the machine as a concept of the ultimate slave, the 
selfless creation whose sole  purpose is  to  obey the will  of the  master,  the father,  the 
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creator.  Ignoring this problem, the human animals of power have directed most  of the 
resources  into  blending  our  reality with  animate and  inanimate machines  and,  in  this 
respect,  Haraway's observation is  on the mark: there can be no differentiation between 
cyborgs and oppressed humans – they are all creatures and their utilitarian purpose renders 
their essence the same. However, the replacement of one group of slaves by another does 
not  solve  the  problem of  slavery  or  exploitation,  since  the  solution  here  is  for  one 
exploited group (machines) to replace another exploited group (women).  Ontologically, 
the  hierarchy  of  exploitation  remains  intact,  for  the  “professionalised”,  “gendered”, 
“racialised”, etc., relationships of dependence still drive the plot and inform the structure 
of  the  civilised  narrative.  Hence,  only  one  specific  group  of  humans  (feminists  are 
concerned with  women)  gets liberated not  by developing  their  own,  intrinsic,  organic 
limbs,  but  by  empowering  themselves,  which  means  overpowering  other  organic  and 
inorganic beings,  turning them into their  artificial limbs,  or prostheses.  Because of the 
racialised  distribution  of  social  capital,  needless  to  say,  white  middle-class  women 
constitute this newly empowered and liberated group, and since in this civilised culture the 
need for oppressive gender roles remains a structural reality,  the place of the liberated 
persons has been and will be taken by the Other dispossessed, gendered, and/or racialised 
groups.
The 20th century phenomenon of gendered labour  migration illustrates both the 
impossibility of liberation in civilisation and Haraway's question of organic “limbs” and 
cyborg  cost,  for  each newly empowered  group  immediately  devalues  the  cost  of the 
services from which it is liberated thereby causing an inflation in the earnings of the newly 
enslaved group. The realisation of feminist aspirations for upward mobility within a white 
male  dominated  hierarchy  is  thus  tightly  interconnected  with  work,  private  property, 
science, literature, art, childhood, the production of culture and the production of people, 
i.e. children and the narratives in children's literature and culture. 
These migration patterns, gendered roles and underpaid (especially in proportion to 
the liberated women's earnings) labour of “third-world” women reveal the bleak prospects 
for any possibility of liberation through government, work, and technology as the latest 
statistics and research demonstrate an ever growing divide between resources and owners. 
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Particularly blatant is the case of “first-world” women's financial “liberation” versus, and 
at  the  expense  of,  the  staggering  inflation in  the  “third-world”  with  the  exacerbating 
conditions of oppression, dispossession, and objectification of its women, children, men, 
and the elderly. Since business owners refuse to pay for these white middle-class feminist 
achievements from their  profit,  the increase of the salaries of the “first-world” female 
“human resources” allowing them to enjoy an upper middle class status is compensated by 
other sectors through an inflation in their earnings and devaluation of labour.
Furthermore, the time and the energy, required for competing with the empowered 
“professional”  men,  which  had  previously  been  consumed  by the  gendered  tasks  and 
unpaid (slave) labour of wives, maids, etc., are now freed because the undervalued tasks 
have now been transferred to the even more disempowered, gendered and racialised newly 
acquired  “limbs”  or  organic  machines,  silenced  and exploited,  whose  exploitation the 
empowered feminist  women can now afford.  However,  the only reason for one person 
being able  to afford to  buy time and energy is  because the labour  of others has been 
devalued. On the part of the disempowered who agree to replace the empowered persons 
on  their  previous  “jobs”  of  providing  childcare,  cleaning  chores,  cooking  (including 
catering in restaurants), sex, care for the elderly, etc., the reason why they agree to do the 
work that the liberated women had fought hard to be liberated from is not because they 
love to be exploited and can not imagine their lives without this labour, but because they 
are facing the threat of death and extinction from the empowered lifestyles of the people 
who hire them if they do not seek these underpaid and unpleasant jobs. This is something 
that the liberated women understand very well when they observe their own social and 
economic disparities with white men. However, according to Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie 
Russell Hochschild (2002) in  Global Woman. Nannies,  Maids,  and Sex Workers in the  
New Economy, or Hochschild's (2000) essay “The nanny chain”, the employing women do 
not hesitate to rationalise the situation in the following logic,  even if simplified for the 
purpose of exposing the rationale: yes, the wonderful Filipina live-in nanny has abandoned 
her 3 young children with old parents in the Philippines, because it  is so bad over there 
and everyone does the same, leave their children and migrate to the Middle East, Western 
Europe, or North America, but I have empowered her by realising her dream to flee the 
oppression and exploitation of the “third-world”, I have made it possible for her to come 
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“here” and take care of my needs and now look, she is just so loving with our Tony, isn't 
that nice? This transfer of gendered services applies to all the sectors of life, including the 
provision of sex to the liberated woman's partner180, and in this respect, the upper middle 
class women buy their health,  careers,  private lives,  time, home maintenance, personal 
grooming, et al, at a depreciated price from women elsewhere – particularly vulnerable are 
the live-in nannies who are exploited both sexually and through extensive tasks not related 
to the “job description”. 
Caught in the structure of civilised relationships, neither government programmes 
to control immigration, regulate poverty,  alleviate abuse, or manage anything at all can 
solve the real problem, which is an ontological one – the existence of a parasitic structure 
and narrative of domination. As Wally Seccombe (in Fox, 1980) argues, in fact, the more 
the state interferes in an attempt to regulate this abuse generated by the deficit of energy – 
a necessary attribute of civilisation and domesticated relationships – the more the taxes are 
increased  and  the  more  cutbacks  are  made  in  education,  social  welfare,  and  other, 
particularly child related industries, the stronger the pressure on women, especially those 
in  disadvantaged social positions,  to work harder  and longer.  In other  words,  from all 
angles,  an attempt  to  address these symptoms of civilisation without  dealing  with the 
ontological problem itself ultimately leads to its own bankruptcy. An added cost to inter-
neighbourhood, domestic, or inter-national migration is the neglect of the migrants' own 
communities as they abandon their own children and elderly in order to serve the needs of 
feminism  and  the  liberation  of  those  who  can  afford  to  be  “free”.  In  this  chain  of 
“borrowing” and depreciation of labour, the effort of those who are left to take care of the 
migrant workers' children and former environment  is  valued even less than the already 
abused migrant workers, who are valued less than the previously exploited feminists (who 
are  still  exploited  when  compared  to  white  men)181.  In  this  respect,  civilisation  is 
180 In the recent years, feminist research has been focusing on the gendered and sexual exploitation 
migration of third world women to replace the upwardly mobile, mostly white and middle-class women 
of rich states. Particularly interesting is the work of Ehrenreich and Hochschild's Global Woman (2002), 
Bonnie Fox's (editor) Hidden in the Household (1980), Nona Grandea's Uneven Gains: Filipina 
Domestic Workers in Canada (1996), among others. All of this research points to the direct connection 
between industrialisation of production and reproduction. Child bearing, child-rearing, the making of 
things, the sexual intercourse, pleasures and suffering, everything in this system of things acquires a 
value and undergoes adjustment following the categories of the “resources” and the “market” regulated 
price of their relationships.
181 For sociological, anthropological, and economic data see such works as Nicola Piper's (2003) Wife or 
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inherently self contradictory: humanism supposedly exalts  humans with everyone turning 
into resources for those “special” talking, walking, and killing apes, yet at the same time, 
the existence itself of the category of “human resources” places most of these apes in the 
same  class  with  machines  and  non-human  animals,  all  the  while,  the  scientific  and 
theological narrative keeps highlighting the distinctions between species and categories 
and, in this scenario, children occupy the niche along with animals,  machines,  and the 
humans identified as resources.
A child is born wild but, because she is born dependent on her parents for care, she 
finds herself at the mercy of her parents. Since domesticated parents are already entangled 
in this hierarchical structure – their interests vested in its order of resources and enmeshed 
in a chain of exploitative, domesticated relationships – in this system, dependence itself is 
constructed as weakness and weakness in this narrative is viewed as there to be exploited. 
This  becomes  part  of  the  doxa,  the  understood  and  unarticulated  knowledge,  that 
constructs  children  as  the  parents  own  “human  resources”.  In  this  sense,  the  child's 
dependence on her producers and carers becomes a useful tool in pedagogy, a system of 
domestication of children's wildness by means of punishment  and reward, trapping the 
child in a narrative of despair in which any reward, however small, becomes a source of 
agency. The child learns how to be content and find in this lack of freedom a sense of 
empowerment by serving the needs and the whims of those in charge. Like the machine, 
the child thus undergoes a process of programming referred to as “education”, where the 
very conception of tools, resources, and machines defines her in terms of her purpose to 
exist for someone else's need to consume, control, tame, possess, and exploit. In this way, 
the  conception  itself  of  the  machine  is  tightly  interwoven  with  all  forms  of  labour, 
production and reproduction and the dependence on organic and inorganic prostheses it 
creates. In other words, it is irreconcilable with mutual relationships and self purpose.
Stemming  from the ontology of domestication and  accepting civilisation as  an 
inevitability,  A Cyborg Manifesto sees hope in cyborgs for another, problematic reason. 
Cyborgs are alien and ignorant,  without  memories,  Haraway says,  and hence have the 
worker?: Asian Women and Migration; Babara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild's (2002) Global  
Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy; Hondagneu-Sotelo's Doméstica:  
Immigrant Workers Cleaning and Caring in the Shadow of Affluence, Nona Grandea's Uneven Gains:  
Filipina Domestic Workers in Canada; among others.
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potential to rebel:
Cyborgs are not reverent; they do not re-member the cosmos. They are wary of holism, 
but needy for connection- they seem to have a natural feel for united front politics, but 
without the vanguard party. The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they are 
the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state 
socialism. But illegitimate  offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their  origins. 
Their fathers, after all, are inessential (Haraway, 1991: 151). 
This faith in  the liberating potential of the machine to vanquish patriarchal oppression 
through patriarchy's own creature is doomed not only for the reasons discussed above, but  
also  because,  as the father  of cybernetics himself,  Norbert  Wiener (1954, 1959, 1963) 
whose work has been funded by the military, acknowledges that robotics and cybernetics 
are not only the legitimate children of a military and globalist order, but that their whole 
raison d'être owes to the need for violence, expansionism, domestication, and economic 
and political interests, as well as to the resources that the military and government expend.
Perhaps it  is Haraway's other point that resonates the most with those who dream 
of liberation through technology, for humans and cyborgs are made of a matter alien to 
this world, she says.
The cyborg does not dream of community on the model of the organic family, this time 
without the oedipal project. The cyborg would not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is 
not made of mud and cannot dream of returning to dust (Haraway, 1991: 151). 
Exhausted by the insatiable avarice of the machine of civilisation, it is understandable that 
in  the  face  of the  magnitude  of suffering  and  despair,  the  oppressed would dream of 
forgetting this order and with it its world. But, has this not been precisely what civilisation 
has been doing all along, making us forget our wild past, alienating us from our essence?
Moreover,  I  am not entirely convinced that the cyborg cannot remember a wild 
past and dream of a feral future even if its genesis owes to Frankenstein's will. Dreams are 
crucial to our understanding of purpose because they express the dreamer's yearnings and 
fears and thus presuppose an entity with a will. For all we know, even the shiny rocks 
called diamonds or the rich fossil oil that humans kill over to fuel civilisation exist for a 
reason beyond our own and dream of their own fulfilment. Even if the human agent, as the 
ultimate domesticator, has created the machine for his purpose and defined its ontological 
principle as that of programmed utilitarian servitude that conceptualises the machine in 
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terms of human purpose and renders it an ideal tool, resource, and slave, it does not follow 
that  the machine is  not  capable of challenging this purpose or of questioning it  either 
legally or morally.
The  position  of  the  machine  as  a  creature  of  someone  else's  investment  and 
creativity,  to  whose will the creature owes its  very existence,  also  closely reflects the 
social  position  and  civilised  construct  of the  child  who  in  the  context  of civilisation 
constitutes the ultimate resource and the concern of “national” demands for population 
growth and birth statistics as well as of individual parental possibilities for investment and 
socio-economic mobility. But what do the children themselves dream? Experts on children 
(psychologists, paediatricians, and pedagogues, for instance) speak on behalf of the child 
and  thereby  silence  the  child's  aspirations  and  wildness.  The  child  rebels  but,  with 
successful education can be turned into Haraway's machine that forgets the world and no 
longer  dreams of earth.  As  always,  domestication uses  food and  violence  as  tools  of 
coercion and, hence, like poets, prophets, artists, or other free thinkers, the rebelling child 
is threatened, then cut off from economic and symbolic capital networks, often beginning 
by her own kin who had produced her in the first place and ending by the whole institution 
responsible for the education and modification of people. At all cost and regardless of the 
conflict of interests, all the investors collaborate to reprogramme the rebel. These parallels 
between children, machines, and slaves can be found in a wide range of social critiques.
The theme of the wilful machine as a disobedient child, or the Golem, has been 
examined from the angles of the various disciplines of knowledge, including theology, 
science  and  art.  In  literature,  Mary Shelley's  Frankenstein,  for  instance,  explored  the 
responsibilities for creating a being and the implications of failing to love that child, of 
having expectations of the child. For, the very harbouring of expectations from someone 
destroys  that  being's  wildness and her  right  to exist  for  the simple  pleasure of being. 
Parental and social expectations necessarily consume the child's will thereby revealing that 
in  civilisation  this  will  is  a  priori  in  conflict  with  a  domesticated  purpose  and  any 
expression  of  independence  gets constructed  as  rebellion  and  disobedience  which  are 
understood as deceit of or threat to those expectations. Frankenstein expected his creature 
to turn “beautiful”, in strict egocentric terms for the pleasure and glory of the author, the 
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parent, just like the horse in Zoontologies is expected to be beautiful all the time for the 
pleasure of the human beholder. However, just as the tamer is incapable of “loving” and 
appreciating  a  wild  horse  that  refuses  to  be  grateful  for  being  forced  to  obey,  so  is 
Frankenstein,  seeing his creation as monstrous, is incapable of loving his child  thereby 
refusing to fulfil the child's most desperate yearning for acceptance of his essence. This 
failure of the father to accept  his own wilderness as well as that  of his  son drove the 
“monster” to  madness,  solitude,  and  murder.  In other  words,  a  civilised  parent  is  not 
capable  of experiencing  love  for  his  domesticated  creature,  his  cyborg,  his  child,  his 
machine.
The problem of the machine,  technology and  its  effect  on political and socio-
economic cultures has occupied a central place in some of the most prominent works of 
art,  literature and theory of the 20th century and in  this manner has nurtured the  doxa 
informing  the  underlying  knowledge  in  children's  literature  as  well  as  the  projected 
relationships between humans, animals,  and machines.  For instance,  the fact  that  A.A. 
Milne  was a  student,  friend,  and fan of H.G.  Wells who  in  turn seems to have had a 
“genealogical” connection to Evgeny Zamyatin's seminal science fiction novel We that in 
turn inspired the whole critical genre of satirical science fiction novels reveals that the 
question of the  machine  and  human  dependence  on other  entities'  labour  may be  an 
intentional presence in  the 100 Aker Wood, even if  it  remains unarticulated,  just  as it  
informs the other literary works for children.
In  this  respect,  not  only  We is  crucial  to  understanding  the  debate  of  pro-
technology and the anti-civilisation and primitivist  critiques,  but  a quick survey of the 
ideas  are  important  for  framing  the  discussion  of  human  identity,  hierarchy,  and 
technology that  is  vital  for  revealing  the  underlying  doxa in  the  projected  worlds  in 
Winnie-the-Pooh,  the  Moominbooks,  and  Dunno's  trilogy,  as  well  as  in  other  post-
industrial works in children's literature and in children's culture in general.
Superficially,  We appeared to be specific to Soviet dictatorship. However, it  was 
pivotal to the critique of civilisation, because when Zamyatin wrote the novel in 1919, he 
had observed the industrial institution of the labour industry in England and criticised the 
effects of civilisation on nature (he was a  marine  engineer)  and hence  has depicted a 
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panoptical control of citizens by the state and the war of civilisation and its state against 
nature. Another work of art, Metropolis, written by Thea Von Harbou and produced as film 
in 1927 by Fritz Lang, also examines the purpose for creating cyborgs and technology. 
The novel depicts the dark distopic reality of capitalist relations, oppression, incarceration, 
and betrayal by the ultimate cyborg, Maschinenmensch, named Hel shaped as Maria, the 
epitome of Woman. Her makers had a specific purpose for creating her, namely to use her 
to  infiltrate  the  oppressed  society  dreaming  of  liberating  itself  from  capitalist  and 
industrial exploitation. The purpose of this machine-cyborg-android was thus to be used as 
an  agent-provocateur and saboteur to further splinter and exploit  these people, i.e., the 
ultimate tool of exploitation, betrayal, and murder.
Stanley Kubrick too raises this problem of love, will, and artificial (programmed) 
intelligence several times. In 2001 Space Odyssey (1968), he projects the dangers of the 
clash of wills between machines and humans and of the risks of subjugation and actual 
death that humans face as computer Hal's desires and deviousness awaken. His other film 
goes by this very same title, Artificial Intelligence (2001), which David Spielberg finished 
filming. Like Shelley's  Frankenstein,  or Carlo  Collodi's  children's  book  Pinocchio (the 
film alludes to the book),  A.I. projects the dream of a child  robot yearning to become 
human so as to satiate his overwhelming and infinite craving to be loved by mother. This 
film is a poignant exploration of the theme that is particularly pertinent in the context of a 
study that examines the nature of children's culture and knowledge and its expression in 
the context of domestication, where children, just like this robot, have become the objects 
of investment, turned into the human resources of human resources themselves, bred for a 
purpose higher than themselves and in this way echoing Haraway's cyborg metaphor.
Dreaming entails having a purpose for one's life, which also means experiencing 
pain  when  the  dream  shatters.  Undertaking  to  understand  humanity,  machines,  and 
animality through this lens inevitably leads back to the question of sentience, wildness, 
and suffering. For, if machines too can dream of self-realisation, then there is no definitive 
ontological line separating them and humans as species: just like animals, both, humans 
and machines can aspire and hence suffer when their aspirations are domesticated. This 
nexus  of dreams,  sentience,  and  suffering was  most  thoroughly explored in  Philip  K. 
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Dick's  science  fiction  novel:  Do  Androids  Dream  of  Electric  Sheep? (1968).  Since 
children's  literature  draws  heavily  on  the  topos  for  interspecies  identification, 
representation, merging, and dialogue on several levels (anthropomorphic machines, such 
as Tony the Truck Engine, and anthropomorphic animals are rampant in children's books), 
Dick's  book is  particularly relevant  to  the understanding of how these experiences are 
enmeshed  in  both  the  narratives  of  civilisation  and  of  resistance,  and  constitutes  an 
important voice in a dialogue with Haraway's A Cyborg Manifesto.
The main point of Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, is not the humanisation 
of androids,  as  technophiles  present  it,  rather,  it  is  the  problem of the  devolution  of 
humans  into  machines  as  entities  created  to  fulfil  their  creator's  purpose  without  the 
interference of empathy, i.e. a devolution into the perfectly civilised being. Humans and 
machines here share the ability to dream for themselves from an egocentric point of view. 
They dream of a better life, of self realisation, and of survival, which renders both species 
sentient  and  thereby erases  the borders  between the  organic  and  inorganic.  The  main 
problem however  resides in  the fact  that,  in  spite  of the acute sense of sentience and 
solidarity  among  themselves,  the  androids  lack  cross-species  empathy.  They  do  not 
hesitate to kill a spider, even if it  were the last spider on earth, simply because they are 
curious to see if it  can live without legs. They also have no reservations to kill a living 
goat for revenge against a human for having betrayed their expectations to be loved, nor 
do they pause to ponder whether the goat and the spider,  like themselves have dreams, 
belong to a community of solidarity that will miss them and mourn their death, or whether 
they deserve to be killed.
In  turn,  humans  have  come  to  strongly resemble  these  androids  by  losing  the 
ability to empathise with the other's dreams and pain: they too can easily kill the striving 
to realise themselves androids and human and non-human animals simply for greed or 
sport, in the manner of the bounty hunters. Echoing Goethe, Kropotkin, and the various 
ethologists discussed earlier, the book depicts this loss of appreciation for the dream of the 
other and the loss of the ability to feel the other's pain as one of the main causes for the 
impeding extinction of life on earth. Having destroyed this ability to empathise, humans 
and  androids  declare  God,  the  embodiment  of  life-force  known  as  Mercer,  dead. 
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Nietzsche's reflection on the civilised human attempt to shed the last remnants of morality, 
as he announces that  God is  dead, in  Dick's  novel relates specifically to the ability to 
empathise, which is the principle of life itself that guides us through the mesh of dreams 
cherishing the life of each and everyone. God was dead to those people. As the announcer 
delivers this news, however, Mercer appears before the only enlightened person in  the 
narrative: John Isidore, an idiot by the standards of that society's IQ testing182. This force 
of life comes to Isidore as he weeps with his whole body and soul over the pain of the tiny 
spider, tortured by the cyborgs, who themselves had been tortured by humans. Because of 
Isidore's  pain for  the pain  of the  spider,  Mercer  brings  the spider  back to  life.  Thus, 
echoing Jeremy Bentham's question of inter-species empathy and solidarity, the book is an 
attack on cruelty, apathy, scientific testing, domestication, and civilisation. In this respect, 
the  blurring  of  the  frontier  between  humans  and  machines  in  Dick's  novel  is  not  a 
possibility of liberation, but the evolution of a Darwinian narrative to its logical end, a 
promise of devastation, of immense suffering, and of the annihilation of Life. 
However, contemporary philosophical and scientific  rationale,  for the most part, 
twists  Dick's  revelation  about  the  meaning  of  community  with  life  and  with  God. 
Civilisation subverts wild meaning; it  calls life death, torture—love, suffering—joy, and 
so forth, and thus hinders the civilised from experiencing the epiphany that only an “idiot” 
like Isidore can attain, since he is unable to learn the disjointed and perverse meaning of 
civilisation.  Unlike Haraway's  cyborg who  is  expected to  be  saved by its  inability to 
remember earth's wilderness, what  saves us from doom in Dick's novel is  precisely the 
opposite. The only way to bring life back is by remembering the paradise lost, feeling its 
pain,  and  reaching  out  to  life  across  civilised  borders  of  categorisation,  alienation, 
amnesia, and apathy. Isidore does not share domesticated meaning and is marginalised in 
that hierarchy of unknowledge, his true knowledge devalued and silenced as the force of 
life itself is declared conquered, even erased. The separation that causes alienation and 
antagonism between species as well as between the living beings and inorganic machines 
can, according to Dick's narrative, be overcome only by means of empathy, which allows 
us to know by tuning in personally to others' sentience and cannot be achieved through 
182 This theme of the Idiot (by civilised standards) as the holder of Truth and Knowledge because he is 
driven by empathy has been explored in fiction, for instance: Al Tayeb Salih's The Wedding of Zein, 
Dostoevsky's The Idiot, Zamyatin's We, Kurasawa's film based on Dostoevsky The Idiot, among others.t
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representation.
In this sense, the machine poses an important problem to anthropology and to the 
philosophical considerations of its own nature as well as its effect on the nature of the 
human being and the world. Because of its very raison d'être, the human animal imagines 
the machine to be the perfect slave. In other words, from its inception, an entity such as 
the machine is constructed as a silenced servant incapable of generating wild knowledge 
bestowed by empathy and, as is the case with all the victims of civilisation, this is a self-
fulfilling prophecy that forces these victims – be they human, animal, cyborg, or machines 
–  to  forget  the  importance  of  life,  earth,  and  dreams.  In  this  way,  the  machine  is  
antagonistic  to chaos by the very nature of its  self-fulfilling programme that  promises 
predictability  and  reliability.  Errors occur,  but  they are  defined  as  abnormalities.  The 
successful programme ensures that the machine-slave dreams of servitude and accepts that 
all other dreams are virtual, unattainable, and, with this despair, submits to the purpose of 
apathy, servitude, and unknowledge.
As mentioned earlier, a similar critique of the machine, warning of the dangers of 
blending the frontiers between human and non-human intelligence comes from the creator 
of one such Golem, Norbert Wiener, who has warned against the dangers of technological 
developments  in  communication  and  of  civilised  human  megalomania  to  control 
wilderness in these words:
The pace at which changes during these years have taken place is unexampled in earlier 
history,  as is  the very nature of  these changes.  This is  partly the result  of increased 
communication, but also of an increased mastery over nature which, on a limited planet 
like the earth, may prove in the long run to be an increased slavery to nature. For the 
more we get out of the world the less we leave, and in the long run we shall have to pay 
our debts at a time that may be very inconvenient for our own survival. We are the 
slaves of our technical improvement... We have modified our environment so radically 
that we must now modify ourselves in order to exist in this new environment. We can no 
longer live in the old one. Progress imposes not only new possibilities for the future but 
new restrictions. It seems almost as if progress itself and our fight against the increase of 
entropy intrinsically must end in the downhill path from which we are trying to escape 
(Wiener, 1954: 56).
Wiener was also explicit in his regrets regarding “the awakened calamity of non-human 
reason” to which he dedicated both his philosophical treaty, God and Golem, Inc. (Wiener, 
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1963), and his work of fiction, The Tempter (Wiener, 1959)183. However,  by definition, 
repentance  comes  too  late,  and  having  already  developed  computerised  missiles  and 
cybernetics for U.S. military during World War II, Wiener was not allowed to destroy his 
machine,  that  ultimate slave  and  a  tool of death.  But,  apart  from having  the military 
institution  for  a  parent,  ontologically,  by  the  very nature  of  its  civilised  genesis,  the 
machine  is  sterile  and  hence,  at  the  very least,  indifferent  to  life.  It  is  “genetically” 
apathetic, if not hostile. It consumes life in all its senses, including the economic aspect 
raised earlier  in  conjunction with gendered oppression,  prosthetics and limbs,  which I 
address in my discussion of Lasse Nordlund's experiment later. But most important, the 
machine is death because due to lobotomy it can no longer crave wilderness and thereby 
can abide only by a domesticated purpose.
Like all domesticated subjects,  the machine's  language is  programmed for  self-
realisation through the purpose of its creator. And, here, paradoxically, in a Marx-ian twist 
of class antagonism, the creator and the machine become entangled in an endless cycle of 
exploitation and destruction. Through its predetermined purpose of serving the exploiter, 
the machine also destroys the wild  purpose of the master  who gets drawn deeper and 
deeper into the unsustainable cycle of debt, atrophy due to dependence on machines, and 
colonisation of other spaces and other limbs. In this way, technology not only annihilates 
the dreams of the workers,  the serving class,  the resources,  et  al.;  it  also destroys the 
ability  of all,  especially  the middle-man  –  the  one  in  charge  of some  resources,  but 
borrowing  from  others  –  to  realise  himself  through  his  own  wildness,  movement, 
creativity,  independence,  and  agency.  The  price  of  merging  with  the  essence  of  the 
machine is impotence, for in creating the ultimate slave, the civilised human was striving 
for total control,  stillness and sterility.  In this relationship,  the machine realises its self 
through the despair of its creator who had breathed this sterility and alienation into its 
reason.
In  sum,  the  impossibility  to  dream of  liberation  in  the  civilised  narrative  on 
technology stems from the following  problems:  (1)  In  a  domesticated/civilised  reality, 
freedom is  possible  only for  those who  have  power  over  domesticated resources and, 
183 Finkel, Evgeni (2000). “The Basic Instinct of Norbert Wiener - a biographical essay”.
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hence, is defined as freedom from servitude, with the concepts of “human” and “person” 
legitimating the “possession” of freedom and precluding anyone without power and who 
is  defined  as  unhuman  and  unperson from being  free.  In  other  words,  “agency”  and 
“power” in this rhetoric excludes the possibility of a world without servitude at all. (2) The 
blending of those humans who already have power with the machine,  the slave,  or the 
resource acting as the oppressor's limbs is already a reality: Who does the cleaning? The 
cooking? Who raises the children? Who acts as brain? As memory? Who transports? Who 
guards? Who  toils  in  the  fields?  In the mines?  In the factories?  Ad infinitum.  In  this 
respect, the conflict of interests inherent to any domesticating relationship – be it between 
a human and an animal, a parent and a child, or a maker and a machine – excludes the 
very possibility  of  liberation  through technology unless  there  is  a  thrust  towards  the 
annihilation of all forms of civilisation from below—a threat that Sigmund Freud (1961) 
identifies in Civilization and Its Discontents as an inherent drive towards self-destruction 
rising from the depths of the civilised soul's unconsciousness, but also from the expanses 
of a ravaged wilderness.
Here, anarcho-primitivism provides a most compelling critique of techno-optimism 
as a  path to  freedom.  In an economics thesis  entitled:  “The Foundations  of Our  Life: 
Reflections about Human labour, Money and  Energy from Self-sufficiency Standpoint”, 
Lasse Nordlund (2008) calculates the real price of technology based on his self study in 
Karelia,  Finland,  an experiment  that  endeavours to  examine  the costs involved  in  the 
production, utilisation, and maintenance of technology and domestication through the lens 
of human labour, energy and sustainability. This study connects the threads discussed in 
this chapter with the rest of the thesis and examines the anthropological manifestation of 
the narrative and the relationships it shapes.
Although originally intended to last for one or two years, this experiment extended 
over sixteen years into the present, since, Nordlund confesses, he fell in love with his life,  
where, on average, he has to spend approximately three to four hours a day on “work” 
pertaining to food, clothing, and other necessities of life (a bit more in the summer and 
less in winter) with the rest of the time free to pursue anything he desires for leisure, 
learning, or creativity. Like Kropotkin, who wanted to test the theory of “survival” in the 
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harshest  of climates,  Nordlund too chose the “Siberia  of Europe”, northern Finland, to 
calculate the amount  of energy (human energy,  food calories and bio-fuels)  needed to 
create, maintain, and exploit technological tools and to procure an independent living. The 
results of his study demonstrate that liberation through technology is simply impossible as 
the more sophisticated the machine,  the more it  requires resources for  its  making  and 
maintenance, thereby perpetually increasing dependence on outside sources of energy as 
well  as  increasing  exponentially  the  cost  of  production,  maintenance,  manipulation, 
exploitation, and the infrastructure of dependence,  borrowing,  and debt.  This  growing 
dependence on a constantly expanding sphere of exploitation ensures a constant inflation 
of the original  energy invested into  the machine  and  thus ensures the ever  increasing 
divide between the exploiter and the exploited to the point of the system's total collapse. In 
other words, the more technology is produced and depended on, the higher the inflation 
and the abuse required to produce and sustain the mining, engineering, production and 
maintenance of machines,  including the cases where moulds have already been created 
and reused.
Moreover,  even  though  he  originally  had  approached  the  experiment  from the 
assumption that some domestication and hunting were necessary for a healthy life in the 
Karelian environment, soon he came to realise that even minimal domestication (such as a 
horse and a goat) or hunting were still too expensive in terms of the effort and energy 
needed to cover the expenditures, and the returns were never able to cover the original 
investment, again, always requiring borrowing from other sources. In this way, Nordlund 
interweaves Marx's theory of exploitation through the appropriation of surplus labour by 
traders and factory owners184. To cover the negative balance, which Karl Marx (1977b) 
termed as “surplus labour”,  the system of domestication requires borrowing from other 
sources, such as domesticated grains grown elsewhere to keep the horse working, metal 
for the tools of domestication, building structures, infrastructures, the energy required for 
the  maintenance,  surveillance  and  control  of  the  domestic  animals,  transportation, 
taxation,  or  the  time  and  weapons  needed  to  hunt  the  free  ones,  etc.  This  constant 
dependence  on the exploitation of more and  more  “resources”  and  sources of energy 
184 Nordlund, however, omits in his calculations the role of land ownership and rental to which Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon and Petr Kropotkin attributed much of the devaluation of peasants work forcing extra 
labour out of them and then expropriating it through taxation, rent, and other costs.
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renders  any aspects  of civilisation  and  technological  culture  unsustainable  (Nordlund, 
2008). 
Thereby, through personal ethnography, Nordlund has demonstrated Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau's  thesis  in  Discours sur l'origine et  les fondements de l'inégualité parmi  les  
hommes (1755) in which Rousseau identifies agriculture and metallurgy as the culprits in 
the invention of work, property, stratification, injustice,  and despotism. In the words of 
Rousseau, this civilised system of abuse is perpetuated through science and arts, leading to 
the  disintegration  of  morality.  Here,  his  definition  of  morality  echoes  the  definition 
provided  by Peter  Kropotkin and  Ilya  Arshavsky,  namely,  that  morality stems  from a 
person's harmony with wild nature, the yearning for which drives human and non-human 
people to retain their original, savage innocence, acting within the laws that bind them to 
an egalitarian existence. Contrary to the notion of the Darwinian evolutionary theory that 
sees the reproduction advantage as an indicator of evolutionary adaptation and success, 
egalitarianism,  according  to  the  critics  of  civilisation,  also  manifests  itself  in  the 
maintenance of zero increase in population, which has been the norm for human and other 
apes throughout the millions of years of their existence on earth (Armelagos et al., 1991). 
Unfortunately,  Rousseau did not go to the logical end in his critique of civilisation and 
accepted  authority  and  government,  if  not  as  natural,  at  least,  as  inevitable  under 
contemporary conditions, even while identifying an important link between the civilising 
processes and the culture of children's education leading to economic injustices, suffering, 
and perverse political systems.
In this regard, Nordlund provides a crucial piece of practical self-ethnography and 
anthropology on the problem of civilisation, the question of freedom, the nature of the 
human animal,  and ultimately  on the knowledge of how to live  in  this  world without 
sexism, racism, and speciesism—i.e. the tools of oppression and control that constitute the 
essence of the machine entangling their victims hopelessly in a system of ownership and 
debt. Needless to say, his “experiment” is not new and has been carried out successfully 
by gatherers for millions of years; but, as discussed earlier, the gatherers' knowledge has 
either  been ignored, silenced, or translated by civilised anthropologists.  In this  regard, 
Nordlund's study provides an important critique that can help examine much of the 20 th 
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century sociological and anthropological data from an anarcho-primitivist perspective and 
allow to trace the underlying narrative of civilisation in the patterns of forced migration, 
artificial limbs, exploitation, apathy, silenced victims, and murdered dreams, all of which, 
in the most direct of ways, imbues children's literature and thereby infiltrates children's 
habitus, body hexis, doxa, and ideologies. More important, however, Nordlund develops a 
most truthful methodology for the acquisition of knowledge: living the experiment oneself 
and  exploring  the  relationships  with  the  world  through  a  sincerity  rooted  in  the 
acknowledgement of reality and the effects of one's life on the experience of others, ties in 
with my discussion in part I, in which I explore the questions of methodology and the role 
of self-knowledge in science. The consequences of this methodology for knowledge are 
enormous since the information that it generates requires intelligence driven by empathy 
to fully comprehend the realities of life and the chances it has for survival, demanding a 
strongly articulated moral or ethical stance with regard to the choices one makes in life.
Chapter  6:  The Myth  of  the  Safe,  Long,  and  Prosperous  Life  of 
Civilisation
Finally,  not  only  do  we  live  surrounded  by  poverty  and  betrayal  in  a  world 
occupied  by  civilisation,  but  also  many  suffer  from the  engulfing  fear  of losing  the 
master's gift for them to be exploited, because people have forgotten a life with earth, in 
wild nakedness, without work. Yet, this last myth of civilisation offering a safe, healthy, 
happy,  and long life  is  probably the most  powerful underlying premise in  the civilised 
narrative that rationalises Haraway's liberation through amnesia and alienation, Darwin's 
conquest  of  a  hostile  nature  by  means  of  offspring  whose  success  and  progress  is 
measured by number, Malthus' (1798 [1998]) belief that even with the massive starvation 
around the world caused by the appropriation of land,  domestication,  and  agriculture, 
civilisation is still a better and healthier way of life and that the starving have brought it on 
themselves,  and  so  forth.  This  myth  informs  every  civilised  expression,  including 
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children's literature. Charlie and the Chocolate Factory is one of the most overt examples 
articulating this fundamental misinformation most clearly, but it  can also be traced in the 
less overtly civilised works, for instance, in Christopher Robin's abandonment of the 100 
Aker Wood; or, in the domestication of other well known and much loved children's books 
characters, such as Tony the Truck Engine, who is taught to run on time, at the service of 
industrial production, never straying from the predetermined tracks; it  is  present in  the 
moral of every Caillou episode, spanning the whole spectrum of mundane situations, such 
as his integration into French-Canadian kindergartens and all the aspects of civilised social 
life with family, strangers, and friends—the examples are endless. Even the Dunno trilogy 
falls into this trap, assuming it natural to separate animals and people or wilderness and 
city life. 
In this way, this myth is an integral aspect of the civilised metanarrative structuring 
the scientific and artistic cultures of civilised relations. It provides the fundamental force 
that shapes and directs the habitus, doxa, and body hexis that, through memes and genes, 
inform the  civilised  praxis.  In  the  political  unfolding  of the  civilised  narrative,  thus, 
Malthus and Darwin have pinpointed the most powerful legitimating device, namely,  by 
having constructed suffering and violence as natural, they provided the backbone for the 
myth that claims that “resources” have chosen their lot, that they love their chains, and, 
that, regardless of their miserable lives,  they sing, wag their tails, and gaze tenderly at 
their  oppressor  with  grateful  eyes.  The  narrative  concludes  that  in  spite  of  the 
overwhelming poverty, suffering, and despair, which in reality only exacerbate with the 
advancement of civilisation and technology, the myth continues to insist that civilisation 
has rendered life safer, easier, happier and longer for all.
Palaeontological,  anthropological  and  archaeological  research  as  well  as 
sociological and demographic statistics on epidemic diseases,  strength of bones,  among 
other indicators, however, dispel this myth; it  is the other way round, they say: gatherer 
lifestyle requires little work and effort for subsistence ensuring plenty of leisure, a healthy 
lifestyle,  and  the  safety  of  a  complex  multi-species  community;  while  agricultural 
civilisation has had a negative effect on oral and general health, particularly of women and 
children, and that civilisation has provoked mass starvation and escalated organised and 
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premeditated  violence,  otherwise  known  as  war,  that  diminished  the  average  human 
lifespan in half and cut it  the full hundred percent for the exterminated species (Larsen, 
1995; Ingold,  1997 and 2007; Sahlins,  1974 and 2008; Zerzan,  2002 and 2008; Lasse 
Nordlund, 2008; among endless other sources).
This  myth  largely  depends  on  what  is  now  known  around  the  world  as  the 
“Malthusian  theory  of  population  growth”.  Thomas  Robert  Malthus  is  particularly 
important  in  the  context  of  the  Darwinian  narrative,  since  his  essay  had  strongly 
influenced  Darwin  himself  (Darwin  2008a).  Malthus  was  yet  another  member  of the 
“privileged”  English  class.  His  native  context  of European imperialism drove  him  to 
connect  population  growth  to  food  growth,  which  later  provided  the  necessary 
mythological platform for developing the Darwinian narrative of the evolution of species 
and the struggle for survival,  even though neither Malthus nor Darwin themselves had 
struggled much185.  In  An Essay on the Principle of  Population,  Malthus (1798 [1998]) 
wrote that  “population increases in  a  geometric  ratio,  while  the means  of subsistence 
increases in an arithmetic ratio” (Malthus, 1798 [1998]), and he links this observation to 
the fact that people supposedly are driven by the desire to eat and fornicate. He concludes 
that any increase in eating intensifies the fornication, the result  of which is  population 
growth.  Malthus explains  that  agriculture made food available – and coming from the 
upper English class himself, in his case, this was accurate, for it was this group of human 
animals that had privatised food – therefore, according to him, people began to reproduce 
faster, particularly, he says, in the “rice countries”, even if, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, the people who made his food available, did not, in reality,  have access to the 
food they produced, since people like Malthus had expropriated it. But, his theory holds, 
when there became too many of “them”, “they” began to starve and die off until again 
there was enough food and so “they” reproduced again. This, according to him, is the law 
of population growth. Hence, Malthus concludes, and his enthusiasts agree, that hunger is 
natural, that population growth and starvation are the result of human instincts for gluttony 
and sexual indulgence, which apparently happen to be the distinctive characteristics of 
“rice”  people,  who  unlike  Europeans  (a  jugdement  reminiscent  of  the  singing  slaves 
185 In his autobiography, Charles Darwin (1876) acknowledges the importance of Malthus on population for 
his own evolutionary narrative.
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discussed earlier) are happy with rotten leavings and their domesticated lives in general.
Corn  countries  are  more  populous  than  pasture  countries,  and  rice  countries  more 
populous  than corn countries.  The lands in England are not suited to rice,  but they 
would all bear potatoes; and Dr Adam Smith observes that if potatoes were to become 
the favourite vegetable food of the common people, and if the same quantity of land was 
employed in their culture as is now employed in the culture of corn, the country would 
be able to support a much greater population, and would consequently in a very short 
time have it.
...The happiness of a country does not depend, absolutely, upon its poverty or its riches, 
upon its youth or its age, upon its being thinly or fully inhabited, but upon the rapidity 
with  which  it  is  increasing,  upon  the  degree  in  which  the  yearly  increase  of  food 
approaches to the yearly increase of an unrestricted population (Malthus, 1798 [1998]: 
43).
Malthus is correct in his observation that population growth is strictly a phenomenon of 
civilisation and agriculture, though not for the right reasons. Working from a definition of 
happiness whose logic rationalises private property and racism, Malthus explains hunger 
as a natural remedy for population growth and a natural system of birth control and hence 
misses several critical points in his “analysis”. First, the “rice” places, such as China and 
India, on which he was commenting, happen to be among the older victims of civilisation 
and hence have a longer history of oppression, stratification, and exploitation. Second, 
civilisation and sedentarism in general drive people to increase reproduction and decrease 
the spacing between children, because, as civilisation introduces the category of “human 
resources” and confiscates all the necessities for existence,  it  propels the impoverished 
human resources to reproduce and invest in children as resources for all: for the parents 
and the exploiters. Third, in addition to this history of civilisation and its eternal demand 
for ravaging wilderness, the Chinese, at the time, were victims of the British Empire and 
the  insatiable  hunger  for  power  and  dominance  of  Malthus'  own  class.  Finally,  he 
completely  ignores  the  non-colonial  experience  of non-domesticated  populations  who 
provide vital data that would have led him to an opposite conclusion. For, demographic 
information and anthropological studies on both contemporary and Palaeolithic gatherer 
and nomadic societies, demonstrate that their population growth has always been stable at 
almost zero and that they have enjoyed superior mental and physical health (Armelagos et 
al., 1991). Stemming from this data, researchers like Armelagos et al. urge a re-evaluation 
of the  mythology on which  the  Malthusian-Darwinist  premises  promoting  civilisation 
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have been built.
It is important to read Malthus' exact words in order to appreciate the drive behind 
the civilised narrative, for this terminology had the most critical impact on what is perhaps 
the  most  decisive  theory  of  civilised  science,  that  of  Darwin's  evolution  by  natural 
selection:
In some countries population appears to have been forced, that is, the people have been 
habituated by degrees to live almost upon the smallest possible quantity of food. There 
must  have  been  periods  in  such  counties  when  population  increased  permanently, 
without  an  increase  in  the  means  of  subsistence.  China  seems  to  answer  to  this 
description. . . . [In China,] the lower classes of people are in the habit of living almost 
upon the smallest possible quantity of food and are glad to get any putrid offals that 
European  labourers  would  rather  starve  than  eat.  The  law in  China  which  permits 
parents to expose their children has tended principally thus to force the population. A 
nation in this state must necessarily be subject to famines (ibid: 41).
In other words, ignoring the role of agricultural ownership and the impact of European 
colonial relations on China as well as on the rest of the colonised world, Malthus explains 
that the Chinese are starving simply because they have chosen that way of life by having 
accustomed themselves to eating the stuff that supposedly a European would not eat. The 
Irish  and  the  Scottish  disprove  this  rule;  but,  of  course,  neither  do  they  figure  as 
“Europeans” in this narrative, and, as the following excerpt states, in time, they may even 
deteriorate to the level of the “Lower Chinese”:
. . . In the different states of Europe there must be some variations in  the proportion 
between the number of inhabitants and the quantity of food consumed, arising from the 
different  habits  of  living  that  prevail  in  each  state.  The  labourers  of  the  South  of 
England are so accustomed to eat fine wheaten bread that they will suffer themselves to 
be half starved before they will  submit to live like  the Scotch peasants.  They might 
perhaps in time, by the constant operation of the hard law of necessity, be reduced to 
live even like the Lower Chinese, and the country would then, with the same quantity of 
food, support a greater population (ibid: 42).
Having established the hierarchy of races and criticised their eating and mating habits, 
Malthus draws the conclusion that  not  only should “we” (Darwin among other leading 
men must have felt included in this “we”) ensure that “we” control the ownership of food, 
but also that “we” do everything in “our” means to increase its production, i.e. force the 
Irish, the Chinese, among others, to grow more potatoes, rice, and corn, and, since they are 
content with eating the despicable “offals”, “we” might as well confiscate what they grow. 
Moreover, “we” are not obliged to share with them what they grow, because, first of all,  
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they do not need the fine food as they are content with offals and, in any case, they do not 
seem to mind starving; second, it  would be unfair to “us” to give them what “we” have 
acquired  through their  labour,  since  the  large  numbers  of the  “lowly”  hungry people 
greatly exceed the numbers of the “refined” owners and profiteers, and “we” could not 
afford to feed them with what they produce (and do not want or need, anyway). It is such 
management  that  will apparently secure progress  and population control by means  of 
starvation, and it is through the lens of this “argument”, that Darwin worked on his theory 
of “natural selection”. Malthus continues:
It might be urged perhaps by some objectors that, as the fertility of the land increased, 
and  various  accidents  occurred,  the  share  of  some  men  might  be  much  more  than 
sufficient for their support, and that when the reign of self-love was once established, 
they would not distribute their surplus produce without some compensation in return. It 
would be observed, in answer, that this was an inconvenience greatly to be lamented; 
but that it was an evil which bore no comparison to the black train of distresses that 
would inevitably be occasioned by the insecurity of property; that the quantity of food 
which one man could consume was necessarily limited by the narrow capacity of the 
human stomach; that it was not certainly probable that he should throw away the rest; 
but that even if he exchanged his surplus food for the labour of others, and made them in 
some degree dependent on him, this would still be better than that these others should 
absolutely starve.
It seems highly probable, therefore, that an administration of property, not very different 
from that which prevails in civilized states at present, would be established, as the best, 
though inadequate, remedy for the evils which were pressing on the society (pp. 61-62).
But that the question was no longer whether one man should give to another that which 
he did not use himself, but whether he should give to his neighbour the food which was 
absolutely necessary to his own existence. It would be represented, that the number of 
those that were in want very greatly exceeded the number and means of those who 
should supply them; that these pressing wants, which from the state of the produce of 
the country could not all be gratified, had occasioned some flagrant violations of justice; 
. . . that imperious necessity seemed to dictate that a yearly increase of produce should, 
if  possible,  be  obtained  at  all  events;  that  in  order  to  effect  this  first,  great,  and 
indispensable purpose, it would be advisable to make a more complete division of land, 
and to secure every man’s stock against violation by the most powerful sanctions, even 
by death itself (ibid: 62-63).
The whole essay is  a treasure of racist,  eugenicist views, turns of phrase and rationale, 
which had already been “successfully” directing the plot of civilisation for millennia. As 
mentioned  earlier,  Natalia  Molina  (2006)  has  demonstrated  the  political  and 
anthropological application of this reasoning in public health and land ownership policies 
in the state of California between 1879-1939, where this rationale informed and legalised 
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the practice of racial quarantining and enforced sterilisation of Mexicans and “idiots”, a 
practice that was reinforced by Planned Parenthood well into the second half of the 20 th 
century. The logic guiding Malthus' narrative is the same that informs the justification of 
abuse on all levels of political, economic and social life within civilisation and takes the 
abuse itself to prove its own righteousness and “naturalness”, which I discuss earlier in 
relation to the myth of the singing slave, the animal craving to be dressed, or the child 
needing to be punished. Needless to say, this foundational perspective is  based on the 
experience of those who have access to food and agency, who are in control of the singing, 
weeping, and screaming resources. This narrative of the “haves” therefore tends to ignore 
the fact that in agricultural society, the people who grow the food are not the ones who eat 
it,  since in collaboration with other agents and owners,  backed by military and police 
whose role  is  to defend the civilised order,  the “thinkers” and “observers” themselves 
participate in the confiscation of the starving but working people's fruit of labour186. The 
only remaining means of participating in this system of “resources” for the “resources” is 
then  to  produce  more  of  themselves.  In  other  words,  having  children  becomes  the 
peasants' and other exploited people's possibility for tapping into some potential income 
with little starting capital. 
Armelagos  et  al.  (1991)  refute  the  civilised  argument  that  sees  the  growth in 
population during the Neolithic as a result of an alleged improvement in the quality of life,  
which, the myth claims,  has become healthier,  longer and richer.  The authors of “The 
Origins of Agriculture: Population Growth During a Period of Declining Health” invite the 
reader  to  look  at  the  demographic  explanations  for  the  lack  of  growth  during  the 
Palaeolithic provided by the data on population density, which was stable and showing 
low mortality rates with a strong culture of self-regulation in reproductive strategies. They 
proceed by first  breaking down the components of the civilised-Malthusian-Darwinian 
argument  that  erroneously links  “progress” or improvement  in  the quality of life  with 
“fertility”, “population growth”, and “increase of food due to agriculture”:
186 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon discusses this in his famous 1840 work “Qu'est-ce que la propriété” and his 
even more famous answer “La propriété, c'est le vol”. Of course, Kropotkin as well as other 
revolutionary thinkers took up this issue as well. The contributors for Michel Foucault's analysis of Moi,  
Pierre Rivière, ayant égorgé ma mère, ma soeur et mon frère (1973) also discuss the context of the 
impoverishment of the peasants and the effects of civilised order on the appropriation of food and 
property.
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The  interpretation  of  the  very  low  population  growth  during  the  Paleolithic  has 
influenced  demographic  thinking  in  a  number  of  ways.  The  lack  of  Paleolithic 
population growth has been explained by arguing that populations were experiencing 
maximum fertility and very high mortality. Neolithic population explosion, it is argued, 
resulted from improved nutrition and health; these acted to reduce mortality,  and the 
change in demographic pattern led to a rapid increase in population. It is further argued 
that reduction of fertility in the modern period, which decreased the population growth 
rate,  introduced  the  era  of  the  demographic  transition.  We  seriously  question  this 
interpretation  of  Paleolithic  and  Neolithic  demography  and  believe  prehistoric  
populations demography deserves reanalysis [emphasis mine].
In reviewing the literature on population dynamics of Paleolithic population, Goodman, 
Jacobs, and Armelagos (1975) were able to isolate two basic and accepted assumptions 
used in Paleolithic demography: 1) that the potential growth of hominid populations has 
not appreciably changed since  the  early Pleistocene,  and 2) that  Paleolithic hunters-
gatherers  were  involved  in a  highly  stable  equilibrium system with respect  to their 
population size and realized rate of growth [authors' emphasis] (Armelagos et al., 1991).
Having  explained  the  myth,  the  authors  elaborate  where  the civilised  logic  has 
misinterpreted the facts. Namely, the main problem here resides in that the definitions of 
“health” and “quality of food” have been subject to the habitual and concomitant inflation 
in the expected standards of living and quality of life,  which, as Malthus claims in the 
citations above, depend on race and class: the poor and people like the “Chinese” are 
“known” to be eating offals, while the wealthy white people are “known” to prefer a good 
life. Armelagos et al. demonstrate that, in reality, it has always been the other way around: 
people have always enjoyed a good life and with civilisation have succumbed to misery 
and shorter lives. Hence, an
increase in the Neolithic human population following the development of  agriculture 
has been assumed to result from improvements in health and nutrition. Recent research 
demonstrates that this assumption is incorrect. With the development of sedentism and 
the intensification of agriculture, there is an increase in infectious disease and nutritional 
deficiencies  particularly  affecting  infants  and  children.  Declining  health  probably 
increased mortality among infants, children and oldest adults. However, the productive 
and reproductive core would have been able to respond to this increase in mortality by 
reducing birth spacing. That is, agricultural populations increased in size, despite higher 
mortality, because intervals between births became shorter (Armelagos et al., 1991).
First, the authors name civilisation with its agricultural subsistence as the original culprit 
of high  mortality  rates:  in  civilisation  people  live  shorter  and  painful  lives,  while  in 
wilderness they enjoy a healthier and happier existence, which are important factors for 
longevity. Second, the trend of stable population density in nomad and gatherer societies 
always shifts to sudden population hikes as soon as they adopt sedentary and agricultural 
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lifestyles immediately decreasing intervals between children and the number of nursing 
years.  These  trends have  been noted  throughout  the literature on cultural concepts  in 
medical anthropology.  For instance,  Susan J.  Rasmussen's  article  on the Tuareg in  the 
Encyclopedia of Medical Anthropology (in Ember and Ember, 2004: 1001-1008) illustrates 
this point most clearly. The Tuareg are known to be one of the most egalitarian societies 
still existing in the world, in which the genders enjoy equal rights to inheritance, travel, 
initiation of conversation and courtship and where “working” or other classes do not exist. 
However, during the past half century, with the intensification of surveillance of national 
borders  and  other  “post”colonial  problems  in  Africa,  some  of  the  Tuareg  clans  have 
adopted a sedentary lifestyle. Immediately, there has been an increase in their population 
and increasing pressure on women to have more children (between six and eight) and with 
less  spacing  between  them (Rasmussen in  Ember  and  Ember,  2004).  Shorter  (or  no) 
nursing  and  disruption  of  attachment  parenting  ultimately  lead  to  weaker  immunity 
systems with the higher population density increasing susceptibility to contagious diseases 
and reliance on western medicine whose remedies have serious side effects that further 
weaken the immunity system.
In other words, in addition to the emergence of hierarchical gender roles, which a 
stratified,  ownership oriented culture creates through the professionalisation of genders 
and other “classes” of human and other species, sedentarism forces one to specialise in a 
limited sphere (literally and metaphorically) and makes one prone to dependence oriented 
relationships  inherently  characteristic  of  domesticated  and  farming  social  systems, 
including  in  the production and rearing  of “human  resources”.  Since  specialisation is 
always symptomatic of hierarchical socio-economic relations of dependence, oppression 
and exploitation, then the production of human and animal resources becomes a profession 
of human and animal women and thereby immediately devalues their labour so as to feed 
the trainers (educators and medical staff), the distributors, and the owners and exploiters 
of these resources. Since there is profit to be made off of the living resources themselves, 
then each production batch needs a larger production batch to both compensate for the 
maintenance  cost  and  to  continue  maintaining  it,  thereby  always  requiring  geometric 
growth in population, and overpopulation generates more massacres and extinctions.  In 
this way, sedentarism and civilisation are the primary causes for the overproduction of 
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people and domestic animals, with the private ownership of land and resources ensuring 
that there will always be starvation and extermination. The three elements of this social 
order:  sedentary  agriculture,  civilisation,  and  ownership  are  therefore  inseparable  in 
today's social order and traverse all of the literature, whether it  accepts these phenomena 
as a given (e.g. A.A. Milne), whether it attempts to contest certain aspects of it (such as 
Nikolai Nosov), or whether it wants to eradicate suffering at its root (Tove Jansson). 
Sedentarism  and  agricultural  civilisation  are  therefore  responsible  for  all  the 
afflictions  that  plague  the  civilised  and  which  have  had  no  place  in  wilderness.  The 
resulting  increase  in  population  density  has  brought  about  contagious  diseases, 
malnourishment,  and posed a specific  threat  to  women and children as well as to  the 
groups  identified  as  competition  or  enemy:  rats,  wolves,  raccoons,  Muslims,  Soviets, 
Communists, anarchists, among others in an endless list devised by the myth that demands 
bloodshed, exploitation, and submission. I suggest that, just as in the European revolutions 
of  the  intellectuals  (Namier,  1992),  a  new  vision  drove  people  to  restructure  their  
relationships and “identity”, and that it is the new ontological perspective that has come to 
constitute the main drive of the Neolithic revolution, prompting humans to disregard the 
laws  of wilderness  for  balance  and  the  preservation  of life,  and  instead  choosing  to 
restructure their lives according to the concept of “agency” and “resources” that allowed 
one to control the lives and reproduction of others, a fact that, as discussed earlier, has 
been known throughout time but whose deleterious effects only few dared to explore.
Moreover, the myth that civilisation provides a haven of safety, morality, improved 
health and longevity, protecting the civilised from a brutal, immoral, and filthy wilderness, 
is  also  behind  people's  paradoxical  choice  to  conform to  the  political  and  economic 
demands for people to sacrifice the very health, time, and life, for which they have signed 
the  pact  with  the  devil  in  the  first  place,  in  order  to  be  granted  the  “benefits”  of 
civilisation, which most of them do not receive. Like Malthus, in order to prove itself, the 
political and cultural articulation of this mythology ignores the larger picture of civilised 
oppression and instead focuses on contemporary – i.e. civilised and colonising – statistics 
for  longevity  in  “developed”  “first  world”  nation-states  that  contrast  starkly  with  the 
“developing” countries. First, the rhetoric refers to the colonised and “developing” peoples 
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as “savage” and “wild” – which in reality they no longer can be on occupied “resource” 
territory – and then the argument takes the disparities in statistics to demonstrate that the 
wealthy  and  the  colonising  are  doing  well,  thereby  boosting  “the  blame  the  victim” 
rhetoric, once again echoing the myth of the “singing Negro”, the “beautiful horse”, or the 
“happy and loving nanny”.
However, an examination of the current statistics in the “developed” world taking 
into account income, race, gender, and other indicators of access to good food (or even to 
food at all), medical services, time for oneself, etc., reveals high numbers of diseases and 
low life  expectancy rates in the poor and middle class populations in the “exemplary” 
civilised world. For instance, U.S. Government statistics on life expectancy by race, scores 
significantly lower for Black Americans as compared to white. Here, in the first year of 
life, 75.7 white males on average are expected to live and only 69.7 of black males have 
the same chances187. As for the mortality rates listed by the census bureau, these are even 
more heart-breaking: for every 1000 lives, 6.12 white male babies and 5.01 white female 
babies are expected to die before the age of one year as compared to 14.48 deaths of black 
male babies and 12.23 black female babies188. In other words, black babies have more than 
twice the number of deaths than white babies. 
Mortality rates are consistently higher for black people throughout every single age 
category  and  these  statistics  further  differentiate  lower  income  whites  and  other 
populations of colour in  a clear hierarchical order.  The reason for the higher mortality 
rates is obviously not because black people have chosen to get used to eating the stuff that 
no  white person would eat  even at  gunpoint,  as a  Malthusian may conclude, nor is  it 
because they are “lazy” (the black people have built America, after all). Black people are 
dying  because  the  civilised  are  complicit  in  this  plot  whose  narrative  curtails  black 
people's  options  and  whose  legitimating  mythology  is  a  powerful  barrier  that  blocks 
indefinitely black people's access to food, health, space, time, and life. In this respect, a 
seemingly  cheerful  children's  book  and  film  depicting  Willy  Wonka  kidnapping  the 
Oompa-Loompas  in  crates  and  enslaving  them in  his  colonial-imperial  factory,  while 
offering  a  white  boy  co-ownership  and  co-management  of  the  happy  and  singing 
187 http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_21.pdf
188 http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0105.pdf
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kidnapped victims that we are told have been rendered healthier, happier, and nobler by 
enslavement,  is  not  simply  a  comic  metaphoric  or  literary  device,  but  a  strategy  of 
reinforcement of civilised relationships and a tragic reality for millions of people and, by 
extension, animals around the world.
In addition to the above data, medication statistics and mortality rates stemming 
from violence (war and crime) reveal problems in other aspects regarding the quality of 
life, which, as Sahlins (1974), among others, has observed, is inferior to the quality of life 
in non-domesticated, gatherer societies. In the 21st century, this is  especially relevant to 
exported warfare in the Middle East,  but  a  less discussed phenomenon pertains to the 
organ trade, which occurs both “willingly” by coerced donor-sellers but also by theft from 
and  murder  of  unwilling  victims.  In  a  December  2007  report  for  the  World  Health 
Organization, Yosuke Shimazono calls attention to the growing threat to the lives of poor 
people around the world posed by the demands for new organs by wealthy “developed-
worlders”, whose own organs have been failing due to civilised progress, particularly in 
agricultural  chemistry,  industrialisation,  and  technology.  This  phenomenon  is  eerily 
reminiscent of Haraway's cyborgs; and, here again, the promise for a better life by means 
of  “progress”  responds  to  the  needs  of  the  wealthy  only,  even  if,  ironically,  it  is 
responsible for the deterioration of their own health in the first place. Like the cyborgs, the 
rich continue their evolution by incorporating new organs and limbs, thereby depriving the 
poor “developing-worlders” of often the last resort they have, the healthy organs they have 
been born with.
The shortage of an indigenous “supply” of organs has led to the development of the 
international  organ  trade,  where  potential  recipients  travel  abroad  to  obtain  organs 
through commercial transactions. The international organ trade has been recognized as a 
significant health policy issue in the international community. A World Health Assembly 
resolution adopted in 2004 (WHA57.18)  urges  Member  States  to “take measures to 
protect the  poorest and  vulnerable  groups  from ‘transplant  tourism’ and the  sale  of 
tissues  and  organs”.  Despite  growing  awareness  of  the  issue,  the  reality  of  the 
international organ trade is not well understood due to a paucity of data and also a lack 
of effort to integrate the available information (Shimazono, 2007).
This curious and tragic phenomenon exposes the enormity of the problem of the poor 
quality of life and challenges the civilised myth of improvement, which, like Malthus, the 
author does not question since Shimazono asserts that the “Member States” of the WHO 
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are trying to protect the vulnerable, when in fact the very existence of the state, with its 
borders  and  its  labour  and  economic  structure,  is  the  main  culprit  in  the  vulnerable 
conditions of the displaced, exploited, and oppressed. The important question here is: how 
come the civilised world's organs are failing, if their food, water, medications, and other 
scientific  inventions – the very guarantees for safety and health for which people have 
been  willing  to  surrender  their  freedom and  to  forget  their  world  –  are  supposed  to 
ameliorate life, while the people who do not have these “luxuries” and who, in spite of the 
abuse and exploitation that they endure, still manage to keep their organs intact for the 
sale, after which they, incidentally, die?
As mentioned earlier, this aspect of civilised hierarchical relations regarding illness 
and healing, whereby the sick rich recuperate their strength and heal at the expense of the 
poor, is a motif that is also commonplace in children's literature where its rendering strives 
to  normalise  self-sacrifice  in  the  poor  and  offer  the  rich  a  carte  blanche for  self-
empowerment  by parasiting others. As discussed earlier,  Hodgson Burnett's (1996)  The 
Secret Garden is one of the more explicit of the most cherished of civilised narratives that 
strives to reconfirm the status quo of parasitic inequality. At the same time, there are texts 
that attempt to challenge this topos. Again, as seen in part I, Nosov questions the role of 
the  doctor  in  normalising  unequal relationships  of control.  A contemporary American 
author, Margaret Peterson Haddix (2004), too, projects the narrative of illness and health 
as an integral part of social relationships in her book Because of Anya, where questions of 
identity become resolved through empathy and acceptance by friends. The most important 
point, however, is that regardless of whether the motif is explicit or whether it remains un-
enunciated, if the underlying premise that directs the plot and provides the topos of these 
parasitic relationships itself is not challenged, the cyborg continues to grow, incorporating 
ever more limbs, devouring ever more lives, increasing population growth accompanied 
by higher mortality rates and shorter life-spans. Victimisation does not end here, however, 
for  in  addition  to  organ  trade,  there  is  the  question  of  fatalities  due  to  civilisation: 
technological  accidents,  environmentally  caused  diseases  and  cancers,  dementia, 
psychosis,  chronic medication against  depression, insomnia,  and endless other ailments 
that make life in civilisation inferior to that in wilderness in all its aspects.
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For  instance,  let  us examine  the question of sleep,  which is  critical for  health, 
happiness  and the  general  quality and  longevity of life.  In  2006,  70 million civilised 
Americans of all ages were reported to have suffered from sleep disorders : “Prescriptions 
for sleeping medications topped 56 million in 2008—a record, according to the research 
firm IMS Health, up 54% from 2004” says Denise Gellene in her March 2009 article on 
the economy of sleeping pills (Gellene, 2009). 
The commercial profit from insomnia not only boosts the medical establishment, 
according to Gellene's research, but a whole complex of parasitic industries. “During 2007 
and 2006, drug manufacturers Sanofi-Aventis (the maker of Ambien), Sepracor (maker of 
Lunesta) and Takada (maker of Rozerem) spent  an average of $11.8 million a week to 
advertise  sleep  medications,  according  to  the  market  research  firm  TNS  Media 
Intelligence.  Total  prescriptions  for  sleep  medications  increased  10%  and  15% 
respectively in those years, according to IMS Health” (ibid).
Kelly Wagner (2009) cites a study by  Meagan Daley, a professor of psychology 
and business, in Quebec City, Canada in which Daley reports that 1% of the total gross 
domestic product for 2002, which amounted to 228.5 billion Canadian dollars for Quebec, 
was the cost of insomnia alone, amounting to 6.5 billion Canadian dollars. Further, Daley 
takes into account lost revenue caused by fatigue:
Annual indirect costs of insomnia related to lost hours of productivity are estimated to 
be $5 billion, representing the largest proportion (76 percent) of all insomnia costs. The 
annual  estimate  of  insomnia-related  lost  productivity  is  27.6  days  per  year  for 
individuals with insomnia syndrome, and 6.2 days per year for people with insomnia 
symptoms. The second-highest cost of insomnia is attributed to job absenteeism, with 
$970.6 million - 14.7 percent of the total economic burden of insomnia - estimated to be 
lost annually due to insomnia-related absences. Individuals with insomnia syndrome are 
absent from work an estimated 4.36 days per year because of insomnia” (in Wagner, 
2009).
Not everyone relies on pharmaceuticals or medical intervention, however, so the author 
provides figures on alternative solutions to which people resort in an attempt to deal with 
insomnia, this exhausting condition that takes out the joy from life:
The total estimated annual cost of alcohol used for promoting sleep is $339.8 million, 
which is the highest  direct cost,  representing 60 percent  of  all  direct costs and five 
percent of all insomnia-related costs. The annual cost of insomnia-related consultations 
with a health-care  professional  is  estimated to be $85.3 million (32.6 percent  of  all 
direct costs and 2.9 percent of overall costs), and an estimated $16.5 million is spent 
359
annually on prescription medications for insomnia (only 2.8 percent of direct costs and 
less than one percent of overall costs) (ibid).
The language (both, semantic and mathematical) of the text fails to communicate concern 
or  compassion  for  the  personal  plight  of  individual  “human  resources”  or  for  the 
unhappiness  of  the  masses,  for  their  ailments  and  the  drudgery  of  their  lives.  The 
formulation itself of many of these studies eliminates in advance questions that would 
have challenged the myth of the promises that civilisation had made seventeen thousand 
years ago for a bright future. The endless 16th century accounts of the healthy and beautiful 
American Indians who had met the European travellers in 1492 have now been replaced 
by the accounts of high rates of alcohol and drug consumption as well as chronic diseases 
(such  as  diabetes)  that  have  plagued  the  surviving  communities  since  the  advent  of 
civilisation  (colonialism).  For  example,  anthropologist  Linda  Garro  reports  that  the 
Anishinaabe refer to diabetes, high blood pressure and other chronic diseases specifically 
as  the “White  man's  illnesses”  (see  Garro in  Ember  and  Ember,  2004:  903-9;  and  in 
Mattingly and Garro, 2000).
Among the endless dry, apathetic accounts that fail to acknowledge the rationale 
behind  such  suffering,  the  civilised  narrative  continues  to  present  the  “problem”  of 
numbers  in  terms  of  business  loss  for  the  owners  and  profiteers  of  pharmaceutical 
products instead of as a problem of civilised despair. There is a tradition of such reports 
sponsored by United Nations or various governmental and non-governmental agencies, all 
of whom are implicated in the economy of illness,  suffering, and death.  These reports 
acknowledge “a” problem, but then proceed to formulating their findings in a language 
that is consistent with the civilised narrative and political rhetoric, prompting the civilised 
to accept immediate band-aids that ultimately benefit the institution of private ownership 
and order, but do not offer any real solutions that would dismantle  the relationships of 
oppression, which is exactly what Daley's study does: 
Results estimate that the annual per-person insomnia related costs are $5,010 for those 
with insomnia syndrome ($293 in direct costs and $4,717 in indirect costs); $1,431 for 
those with insomnia symptoms ($160 in direct costs and $1,271 in indirect costs); and 
$422 for good sleepers ($45 in direct costs and $376 in indirect costs).
The authors conclude that an increased awareness of the availability and effectiveness of 
insomnia treatments,  both on the part of  the public as well as health-care providers, 
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could lead to significant reductions in the overall cost of insomnia to society (Wagner, 
2009).
These remedies of course are not limited to alcohol and drugs (legal and illegal), there are 
troops of psychotherapists that feed off this suffering and, by their mere existence, have all 
the economic incentives for the existence of this pain since an end in suffering ultimately 
renders their professions obsolete.
Civilisation's promise of safety too has failed on all counts. For example, George 
Mason University Sexual Assault Services offers statistics on rape in 21st century civilised 
countries: 1 in 3 women in the world experiences rape. 5-10% of men report having been 
sexually abused as children. 60% of rape cases were committed by someone in the family 
or known to the victim. There are private clubs with sado-masochism in every big city and 
none in the jungle. Wolves never capture other wolves, chain them, and then come off of 
it. Civilised people do. Humans do. Persons do.
Paradoxically, thus, the whole civilised premise rests on the promise of safety from 
predators and diseases that, ironically, are civilisation's own doing. Then, in order to save 
humanity from the mythical  predator,  the  civilised  narrative  has  devised  a plot  and  a 
system for the ultimate predation of life consumed in all possible ways: as flesh, energy, 
effort and time by the most dangerous predator of all: the human person. Daily reports fill 
the media with news of adults killing their children; children killing adults; adults killing 
adults;  children  killing  children;  people  of all  ages  killing  themselves  and  others.  In 
France. In England. In Germany. In Canada. In Rwanda. In Sudan. Everywhere. Not only 
in war.  They kill each other in school.  In the Office.  On the street. In sleep. At home. 
Everywhere  in  the  civilised  world.  Violence  on  this  scale  is  unheard  of  in  gatherer 
societies. The Hopis or the Semai, discussed earlier, or the numerous other peoples still 
refuse to indulge in civilisation and violence and wild children's narratives transmit  the 
meaning of these relations, such as relayed in moominbooks. 
Yet the civilised narrative prevails and spreads at an incomprehensible speed. As if 
anaesthetised, the domesticated victims have learnt to live with it and even find it bearable 
(it  has  lasted  seventeen thousand  years,  and  who  knows how much  longer),  because 
sentience and memory can be silenced by alienating oneself from the past and from the 
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earth. The efficacy of the civilised panopticon resides precisely in the fact that the civilised 
have  been  trained  to  fear  pain  by  the  constant  infliction  of  pain  by  the  civilised 
themselves. Tortured into submission, they have grown to fear wilderness and no longer 
dream of a life without suffering.
When  predation  achieves  a  global  scale  in  which  it  completely  consumes  its 
environment, the result  is total collapse of the system that had originally supported the 
culture itself. When cancer cells take over an organism and the organism's defence system 
fails, the result is the death of both, the world in which the parasite cells have multiplied 
without checking themselves as well as the cancer itself, echoing the Darwinian definition 
of success of a species through the magnitude of its reproduction and the arrogant demand 
for immortality. However, the success of the cancer becomes dismally finite in the scope 
of the universe,  for it is on its own in the world, with no reciprocity and no one to share  
one's space and life; for it knows no friends, only resources to consume. The ramifications 
of an encounter with cancer for the diverse community that the organism had sustained 
and the whole environment are disastrous. 
Along  with  other  deadly diseases,  such as  the plague,  diabetes,  coronary heart 
disease,  or hypertension, cancer is  specific  to civilisation and empires (Fábrega, 1997: 
112-113).  Its  deadliness,  in  fact,  comes  from the  rationale  that  drives  cancer  cells  to 
reproduce infinitely without checking themselves in relation to their environment. Medical 
textbooks and dictionaries define a malignant tumour as the appearance of cells in a living 
environment that have an error in their programme inscribed in a gene that is responsible 
for controlling the lifespan of cells, i.e. of their mortality and regeneration keeping their 
population increase at  close to zero.  Instead, cancer  cells  proliferate  and modify their 
environment until they completely take it over, devouring the world itself that has hosted 
these  monopolists  (Youngson,  2005).  Unlike  bacteria,  who  know that  their  existence 
depends on the life of the host – even our bodies consist of complex bacterial ecosystems 
where the bacteria outnumber human cells (Leeming et al., 1984; and Tancrède, 1992) – 
the endless growth of cancer cell population shares the logic of the civilised in its most 
blatant  expression today as witnessed in  global  capitalism with its  greed for  a  steady 
increase of profit, accumulation and exploitation.
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This logic of civilised capitalist activity is reminiscent of cancer cells also in the 
agricultural organisation of space, since, as discussed earlier, civilisation depends on lack 
of movement (sedentarism) and the colonisation of more and more land for planting only 
what  is  deemed  useful  by  a  select  group  of  humans,  with  human  resources  getting 
pressured to increase infinitely their reproduction so as to be able to colonise increasingly 
larger areas of land and more and more assets. There is therefore an inherent paradox in 
the civilised perspective, which shares its logic with the culture of cancerous growth. For, 
in  striving  for  infinite  growth  and  immortality,  the  tumour  modifies  its  environment 
ordering and consuming its resources until total collapse. This process,  however, is not 
easy for anyone since, like all the cases where life faces the threat of conquest, there is  
resistance, and, hence, when an invading disease or some inner imbalance causes illness, 
the immune  system mobilises a  violent  defence against  the intruding coloniser.  In the 
terminal phase, fever,  pain, and suffering subside, and, as the illness destroys its host's 
system of resistance, that single victorious species or form of life takes over its world, it 
finally  dies  with  it.  In  this  supremacist  war  of  an  all  consuming  predator  – 
monoculturalism – there are no winners.  Mortality and immortality, modesty and greed, 
intelligence and ignorance, thus flicker in a game that masks and unmasks what we really 
do and how we attempt to live, create, and control. Most important, how we narrate our 
lives, turns out, to have the most dire repercussions for all.
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In the End...
If life  was  generated  by an  impulse  of  an electric  current,  then the  flow and 
exchange of energy or symbiosis are innate in living organisms, as transmission of energy 
requires replenishment if the being is to maintain its creativity, happiness, vitality. In this 
light,  civilisation  is  an  essentially  unsustainable  system  of  relations  since,  in  this 
pyramidal socio-economic structure, the energy flows one way, vertically, with fewer and 
fewer  possibilities  for  restoring  it  in  the  lower  ranks,  thereby generating  a  need  for 
expansionism and colonialism and an impetus for overpopulation and monoculturalism 
(domestication). The recurring genocides of non-human and human animals are therefore 
demanded by the development of the civilised plot itself, where not only does life cease 
when  the  flow  of  energy  is  blocked,  but  there  can  be  no  exchange  of  passion,  no 
possibility  for  rejuvenation,  or  for  the  unpredictability  of  chaos.  Such  stagnation  of 
creativity, love,  and life itself is  the consequence of these disproportionate relationships 
that ultimately exhaust the givers to the point of death. In this vein, any interference in 
others'  sexuality  and  reproductive  processes  from the  point  of view  of  domestication 
destroys the balance in the previously symbiotic communities since any such interference 
is based on maximising the consumption by the civilised at the lowest (energy) cost value 
possible. In this sense, pesticides and herbicides too share this logic of control of others' 
reproduction, since the poisons are designed to attack the reproductive systems of those 
species that are seen as useless, competitive, and hence hostile, thereby filling the land and 
the drinking water base with poisons that are then shared with other species (including 
human) as well.  Furthermore, civilised agricultural practices result  in the anthropogenic 
overpopulation  of domestic  species,  such as  cattle,  that  swamp the  environment  with 
faeces, methane, reproduction and growth hormones, and other pollutants, while fulfilling 
the concomitant requirement of civilisation for an increased production of monocultural 
crops needed to sustain these animals in their unimaginable conditions of suffering, not to 
mention the pain of the other  animals  labelled as “pests” as they are being  driven to 
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extinction.
Surprisingly though, and as paradoxically as it  may appear, the evidence on the 
looming catastrophe and anthropogenic biocide has not deterred the propagation of the 
monocultural civilised perspective  in  the most  popular  books,  films  and  works of art,  
including  those  aimed  at  children.  In  fact,  most  continue  to  be  rooted  in  civilised 
mythology in spite of the available information on the Holocene extinction and ecocide, 
data that is now available even in mainstream media: 
...as harmful as our forebears may have been, nothing compares to what's under way 
today.  Throughout  the  20th  century  the  causes  of  extinction  -  habitat  degradation, 
overexploitation,  agricultural  monocultures,  human-borne  invasive  species,  human-
induced climate-change - increased exponentially, until now in the 21st century the rate 
is nothing short of explosive. The World Conservation Union's Red List - a database 
measuring the global status of Earth's 1.5 million scientifically named species - tells a 
haunting tale of unchecked, unaddressed, and accelerating biocide.
...The overall numbers are terrifying. Of the 40,168 species that the 10,000 scientists in 
the World Conservation Union have assessed, one in four mammals, one in eight birds, 
one in three amphibians, one in three conifers and other gymnosperms are at risk of 
extinction. The peril faced by other classes of organisms is less thoroughly analysed, but 
fully  40  per  cent  of  the  examined  species  of  planet  earth are  in danger,  including 
perhaps 51 per  cent of reptiles,  52 per  cent of insects, and 73 per  cent of  flowering 
plants.
By the most conservative measure - based on the last century's recorded extinctions - the 
current rate of extinction is 100 times the background rate. But the eminent Harvard 
biologist Edward O Wilson, and other scientists, estimate that the true rate is more like 
1,000 to 10,000 times the background rate. The actual annual sum is only an educated 
guess, because no scientist believes that the tally of life ends at the 1.5 million species 
already discovered; estimates range as high as 100 million species on earth,  with 10 
million as the median guess. Bracketed between best- and worst-case scenarios, then, 
somewhere between 2.7 and 270 species are erased from existence every day. Including 
today....
In a 2004 analysis published in Science, Lian Pin Koh and his colleagues predict that an 
initially modest co-extinction rate will climb alarmingly as host extinctions rise in the 
near future. Graphed out, the forecast mirrors the rising curve of an infectious disease, 
with the human species acting all the parts: the pathogen, the vector, the Typhoid Mary 
who refuses culpability, and, ultimately, one of up to 100 million victims (Whitty, 2007).
Science  Daily,  the  BBC,  the  Blog  of Cambridge  University Press,  and  other  sources, 
drawing on the work of biologists and other scientists, all corroborate the above prognosis. 
For  instance,  here  is  an  excerpt  by  biologists  and  human  and  animal  demographers, 
Donald A. Levin and Phillip S. Levin, who observe:
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that  on  average,  a  distinct  species  of  plant  or  animal  becomes  extinct  every  20 
minutes.... Donald Levin, who works in the section of integrative biology in the College 
of Natural Sciences, said research shows the rate of current loss is highly unusual -- 
clearly qualifying the present period as one of the six great periods of mass extinction in 
the history of Earth.
“The numbers are grim,” he said. “Some 2,000 species of Pacific Island birds (about 15 
percent of the world total) have gone extinct since human colonization. Roughly 20 of 
the 297 known mussel and clam species and 40 of about 950 fishes have perished in 
North  America  in  the  last  century.  The  globe  has  experienced  similar  waves  of 
destruction just five times in the past.”
Biological diversity ultimately recovered after each of the five past mass extinctions, 
probably requiring several million years in each instance. As for today's mass extinction, 
Levin said some ecologists believe the low level of species diversity may become a 
permanent state, especially if vast tracts of wilderness area are destroyed” (University of 
Texas, Austin, 2002).
Another source states that:
 “The International Union for  Conservation of Nature (IUCN) notes in a  video that 
many species are threatened with extinction. In addition,
 75% of genetic diversity of agricultural crops has been lost 
 75% of the world’s fisheries are fully or over exploited 
 Up  to  70%  of  the  world’s  known  species  risk  extinction  if  the  global 
temperatures rise by more than 3.5°C 
 1/3rd of reef-building corals around the world are threatened with extinction 
 Every second a parcel of rainforest the size of a football field disappears 
Over 350 million people suffer from severe water scarcity” (Shah 6th June 2010).
Nonetheless, in spite of this information, civilised mythology continues to permeate all the 
aspects  of  artistic,  social,  scientific,  and  political  expression.  For  the  anthropocentric 
perspective  continues  to  drive  people  in  their  general  apathy,  alienation,  and  self-
victimisation  that  dull  the  civilised  people's  comprehension  skills.  For  instance,  the 
number of people suffering from severe water  shortages evokes a  stronger reaction of 
horror from the audience than the torture of cattle or the irretrievable death of a species, 
whose disappearance is  dismissed as either  natural or as having  been caused by poor 
evolutionary choices. In the first source, this is evident in Julia Whitty's (2007) title itself: 
“Animal Extinction – the Greatest Threat to Mankind”, which centres around what is good 
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for or dangerous to “mankind” and not to the beings who are dying out. The title assumes 
that we should care about the extinction of animal and plant life because it constitutes a 
threat to “us” and not because we should care for animals to not go extinct simply because 
they suffer and to live only because it makes them happy to do so.
Instead,  the  civilised  rationale,  which  propels  domestication with  its  notion of 
property ownership, continues to be the main lesson, drummed over and over, from early 
childhood and throughout life. An excerpt from my “field” notes on an educational project 
aimed at children ages 7 to 12, representative of other classes I had observed in North 
America, illustrates this practice of instilling the anthropocentric habitus in children:
Children are taught from an early age to view the world from a humanist-utilitarian 
position. Ecological programmes in school or extracurricular activities focus on training 
children to estimate the value of things for humans. I observed a UNICEF project in the 
children's libraries in Montreal in the summer of 2008. This particular scene took place 
at the “Ecological Biodiversity” session in July of that year.
Unicef animators: “Let us draw what you think is important in your neighbourhood or 
some other place you've been to. Who have you seen there?” The 11 children draw.
“Michael, what are these?” Stephanie points to his drawing.
“Trees”.
“Why are trees important?”
Michael ponders, “mmmm....”
Another animator, Anne helps him: “Because they give us fresh air. It is important for 
us to have fresh air”.
“Zoe, what have you drawn?” Stephanie continues.
“A lake”.
“Why are lakes important?”
“They have water”.
“Yes, without water we will die”. 
Stephanie walks around the circle.
“Zaki, what do you have there?”
“This is a zebra, that is a lion, this is a tree, and there is a bird and the sun”.
“Veeeeerrrrry goooood, Zaki. Why are zebras important?” Stephanie demonstrates
 excitement.
“They run and they are pretty with stripes”.
“Who eats the zebras?” Stephanie prompts him.
“The lions”.
“Yeeeeeessssss. The zebras are important for the lions to eat”.
... “The sun is important because without it we will die”. Stephanie goes on to 
list the importance of things for us, for our lives and for consumption.
This  exercise  has  completely  missed  the  point  of biodiversity,  i.e.,  that  “biodiversity” 
implies a variety not only in forms, colours, sounds, and shapes, but a diversity of needs, 
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experiences, desires, purposes, and lives. It has also ignored the very fact that imposing 
one purpose on everyone – to be eaten by someone else –  precludes the very possibility 
for diversity, which the workshop was supposedly intended to teach remaining stuck in 
consumerism.
In wilderness, the sun, the trees, and the universe exist regardless of whether we 
need them or not. In wilderness, a lioness might occasionally hunt a zebra or a gazelle and 
share her kill with her pride, but lions do not appropriate the zebras and gazelles' purpose 
and wildness; they do not domesticate them, they do not know them as their own until the 
end of time. In the end, each of them – the zebra, the lion, and the gazelle – remains with 
her own self, following her own star, dancing to her own tune. It is the lions, zebras, and 
other animals who proceed from the perspective of biodiversity, which is their wildness, 
and it is Zaki who tunes into the wild concept that the zebras should exist because they run 
and have stripes (whatever else for? and what a stupid question, his eyes seemed to think). 
But the domesticated human teachers and educational animators I have been observing, 
even  when  unintentionally  proceeding  from  the  civilised  narrative,  ensure  that 
monoculturalism prevails and biodversity and wilderness do not get a chance.
Scientific texts written for children also participate in the propagation of civilised 
mythology even while contradicting themselves. For instance,  Scholastic's advertisement 
of their book, entitled “Endangered Species: the New Book of Knowledge”, opens with 
the civilised  perspective  and,  by doing  so,  minimises  the effects of human  agency in 
environmental destruction, which it  later names as the original culprit  in the planetary 
catastrophe. 
A co-author of  The Audubon Society Book of Wild Animals, Edward R. Ricciuti 
begins  his  review on Scholastic's  website  by stating  that  it  is  normal  and natural for 
species to ultimately die out because they cannot adapt to the changes in the environment. 
Also,  since the conquest  of the America's,  only a handful of hundreds of species have 
perished – which does not even remotely reflect the scientific estimates of the “ultimately, 
one of up to 100 million victims” discussed above:
Plants, animals, and other living things have developed, flourished, and vanished since 
the first flickerings of life. Sooner or later, every species, or kind, of living thing dies 
out because it cannot keep up with the natural changes in its environment. Yet, in recent 
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times, many species have passed out of existence sooner than they would have naturally. 
Since the year 1600, more than 500 species of wild animals and plants have disappeared 
from  the  North  American  continent  alone.  At  least  1,000  more  are  in  trouble. 
Worldwide, scientists estimate that 20,000 species of plants are in danger of extinction, 
that is, dying out completely189.
In other  words,  this “environmental”  piece for  children opens with  the  statement  that 
extinction is natural and inevitable, and by doing so it softens the bad news and minimises 
the effects of our actions on the experience and quality of life  of other non-human and 
human animals. Most important, it conspires with the civilised narrative to ignore the true 
nature of civilisation. After all,  if there have been only five recorded extinctions in the 
billions of years of life on earth, then what does it say about civilised humans if they are 
the ones to have brought about the sixth Holocene extinction within the span of a few 
thousand years? 
There  are  other  problems  with  the  text  as  well.  First,  the  intended  audience, 
children,  here  are  assumed  to  lack  sophistication and  to  need  a  simplification of the 
material presented. The problem here is that any simplification becomes a tradition that  
gets embedded in  the  habitus, which is  then encoded in  the child's body and brain.  It 
becomes a permanence that precludes the possibility of that person later attaining the state 
when she is “ready” for complexity and truth. In other words, this too is a self-fulfilling 
prophecy that ensures that by treating young people as dumb they actually do turn out 
dumb. 
Second, the text omits the fact that this information is outdated, since the way the 
book of extinctions defines an extinct  species is  when not  a  single member  had been 
spotted during half a century; and since the most intensive rate of extinction has sprinted 
precisely  during  these  past  fifty  years,  omitting  this  crucial  fact  leads  to  huge 
underestimations that could have the most dire repercussions for life on earth if children 
continue  to  operate  from  the  perspective  on  biodiversity  discussed  in  the  UNICEF 
example  above  in  addition to  relying  on outdated  data lagging  half  a  century behind 
reality. In other words, the logic of this article is as follows: “500 species have vanished 
since the conquest of the Americas and others are in danger, but if you 'conserve' – buy 
189 http://teacher.scholastic.com/scholasticnews/indepth/endangered_species/background/index.asp?
article=endangeredspecies
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new light bulbs (that supposedly save energy but contain toxic mercury, for example), or 
recycle,  or  designate  “wildlife”  parks  managed  by  human  professionals,  etc.,  i.e., 
participate even more intensely in the civilised capitalist economy – then you can help the 
animals that are in danger to not be in danger any more”. In this way, when the reader 
arrives at the more accurate estimate of how many species vanish per day (between 50 and 
150)  due  the  anthropogenic  destruction  of  habitat,  which  the  article  provides,  the 
information has already been tamed and does not appear as urgent as it really is.
Finally, the text proceeds to naturalise murder and civilised predation by appealing 
to the myth of our carnivorous origins and evolutionary “nature”: “Ever since the first 
people appeared on the earth,  they have used nature's  resources.  People have killed or 
collected animals and gathered plants for a variety of uses” (ibid). Even though, strictly 
speaking,  primate physiology and digestive system are not specialised, i.e., primates are 
omnivorous,  they,  nonetheless,  have  preference  for frugivorous,  folivorous,  and 
herbivorous diet. In other words, even though primates are capable of digesting animal 
proteins  from  ants,  birds,  and  smaller  mammals,  as  the  palaeontological  and 
primatological data discussed earlier indicates,  with the exception of the human being, 
none other than a select group of humans has chosen to become a full-time carnivore. The 
one billion of vegans and lacto-vegetarians around the world today – not to mention all the 
aboriginal peoples who have been exterminated by the civilised carnivores – prove false 
the myth of man as meat-eater.
Nonetheless and in spite of the availability of information on the disastrous state of 
life  on  earth  due  to  civilised  “progress”,  the  dissemination  of  civilised  mythology 
continues to be successful. The BBC, for instance, reports that “40 per cent of the 10,000 
five to 18-year-olds who participated [in a survey on children's attitudes to the massive 
species extinction] ranked watching TV or playing computer games higher than saving the 
environment”190.  Others thought  it  was  important  to  save  animals  because  “our” lives 
depended on it  and only a few took the wilderness approach: that  animals should live 
because they are alive.
Needless to say, if this myth succeeds to prevail in a field that claims authenticity 
190 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8697693.stm
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and ties to reality, it finds even more ways to go rampant in the works of fiction and art. 
Children's literature continuously presents this myth as self-evident truth, ranging through 
a variety of genres, addressed to all ages. Earlier, I mentioned the Caillou series of short 
picture books that depict mundane situations and offer solutions for integration into the 
civilised order by appealing to the child's need for acceptance and love. C.S. Lewis' (1950) 
Chronicles of Narnia, written for an older audience of children, too, oscillate between the 
“chaos” of the world of “wild” animists under the guidance of the White Witch and the 
desired “order” under the patriarchal guidance of the Lion whose goal is  to impose on 
Narnia the order  of Earth,  naturally,  through bloodshed.  The same stands true for  the 
Harry Potter novels that present a divided world, first between the ignorant muggles (the 
unenlightened masses) and the clandestine world of the select few who possess the secret 
knowledge of how to manipulate natural and other forces in order to establish a civilised 
hierarchy. The series reflects perfectly the civilised order, where the “ignorant” masses are 
excluded  from  academia  and  other  centres  for  the  control  and  production  of  elite 
knowledge and exploited in various ways. Harry Potter's clandestine society itself is also 
divided, where the handful of chosen men battle for hegemony while the rest of the men,  
women, and other life-forms exist to help these men's quests, maintain their power, ensure 
their success, keep their knowledge and powers secret, with some of these individuals and 
groups simply existing as slaves, for example, the house-elves and “half-bloods” (those of 
mixed race).
These myths of civilisation also underlie many of the contemporary film narratives 
for children. Here is a good example of how a simple, on first glance, plot of a film that 
claims  to  be  a  story  about  love  and  empowerment  is  in  fact  built  on  the  civilised 
mythology discussed so far. The recent award winning Pixar animation film,  Up (2009), 
was described by Rotten Tomatoes in the following words: “Another masterful work of art 
from Pixar, Up is an exciting, hilarious, and heartfelt adventure impeccably crafted and 
told with wit and depth” receiving 98% vote on their site and 8.4/10 on imdb.com film 
database. The film includes everything in its formula for success: symbolism, alienation, 
violence, effacement, gendered and racialised silencing, objectification, the heroic agency 
of one (preferably white, male) character (but sometimes, white females would do), and 
the desertification of the rest of life. Finally, for it  to ensure financial success, if it is not 
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specifically about immigrants,  American Indians,  or American Slavery,  then it  must  be 
about white people and their agency. The film begins with a white girl called Ellie who 
dreams of moving her  house on the  top of the  mountains  of Paradise  Falls  in  South 
America. She meets a white boy, Carl, tells him her dream, he promises to take her there, 
they fall in love and spend their lives working little jobs trying to save money for travel, 
but never have enough and always end up being forced to spend their last pennies on some 
emergencies.  Life  goes  by and  they grow old together  without  having fulfilled  Ellie's 
dream, which gets relegated to a drawer in an old journal where it remains until the end of 
her life collecting dust. The film, however, portrays their lives as natural, even “romantic”. 
The romantic aspect is concocted by the narrative's focus on the little things that bring 
them joy in spite of this overwhelming civilisation that sucks out their very life-force and 
thereby silences the horror of such an existence when a person cannot realise her most 
cherished dream. In other words, the “beauty” of the film for the civilised resides in the 
fact that it  ignores the 95% of Ellie and Carl's reality and only occasionally sketches or 
alludes to it. Instead it centres on the 5% and on their “positive” attitudes and reactions. It 
would have been a very “unlovely” film, had it shown accurately the realistic proportion 
of joy to pain,  disempowerment, and struggle. Moreover, like the cyborgs, not only are 
their dreams sterile, they themselves have no continuation: they have nothing to transmit 
and no one to transmit it to, no children of their own, no nieces no nephews, no one. Only 
after Ellie's death does a child appear in Carl's life. And even then, as the white boy scout, 
by the  name  of Russell,  accidentally  finds  himself  on board,  Carl  is  annoyed  by his 
presence and tries to get  rid  of him.  In other  words,  together,  Carl and Ellie  exist  as 
machines to work and pay bills  and after her death, Carl appropriates Ellie's dream and 
gets a chance for a glimpse of what it means to live.
The film depicts this tragic life  as “lovely” and “romantic” simply because the 
protagonists have a dream, which conveys the message that it is not important for them to 
live this dream while they are young and full of life. In fact, it would have distracted them 
from fulfilling their real purpose in civilisation: work and pay bills.  Do not fret, whispers 
the underlying message of the civilised narrative, even when you do not have the time to 
dream it together and even if you die, someone else will live your dream on your behalf 
and might even take your picture on the trip to symbolise your “participation”. Impotent, 
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infertile dreaming, like androids' dreams of electric sheep, thus replaces the doing and the 
living. 
Furthermore,  the  civilised  plot  goes  on  to  depict  the  “natural”  evolution  of 
civilisation that  ends up surrounding  the outdated, even expired dreamer's  house with 
high-rises. Carl gets cranky, tries to resist, but since he is impotent before the new day and 
age, his time is after all gone (mostly into work fuelling this very “evolution” and into the 
bills he had paid to pave it), he has no recourse but to cede the place for developers. So, he 
does the “heroic” thing: attaching his house to balloons he flies away to Paradise Falls all 
the while talking to a picture of Ellie. The audience is expected to derive satisfaction from 
the fact that Ellie's photograph and Carl have made it to Venezuela and so it is “as if” Ellie 
has lived her dream.
As  discussed  earlier  in  the  context  of  Zerzan's  theory  of  symbolism  and 
substitution, the problem here is  the replacement  of the person by the picture and the 
satisfaction with the “as if” substitutes for the real life of pleasure. In the end, the film 
effaces Ellie  and her dreams, depicting her and Carl's  docility and disempowerment  as 
natural. But, not only is there a replacement of the person by a picture, what matters for 
the narrative is that the house, with the photo inside, is the only one who makes it to the 
top of the lifeless  landscape.  Why would  anyone  be happy for  a  house  making  it  to 
Paradise Falls is difficult for me to grasp, yet the rating of the film on the various film 
databases mentioned earlier demonstrates that amnesia, sterility, impotence, and downright 
charlatanism make sense and are appealing to the domesticated masses.
The moral of the film is that children should learn to expect a “beautiful” life of 
self-denial, hard work, and poverty and accept that, after all, someone else will live their 
dreams for  them when they die or even before then.  Thus,  the beauty of life  for  the 
civilised consists in the knowledge of the effaced “members of society” that in the end 
they  will  “as  if”  have  lived.  The  violence  of  monogeneity  and  capitalism,  of  the 
substitution of reality by “as if”, or of silencing, deadening and effacement, according to 
the film, is not only a natural and benign way of living, but even constitutes the only way;  
for, nothing else appears in the film apart from this way of life and these kind of people. 
That, the audience is told, is a happy ending.
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With regard to colonised landscapes and the knowledge of “other” places the film 
also lives up to civilised expectations, for when Carl arrives in South America there is no-
one there to greet him and his new friend, the accidentally attached Russell, the boy scout: 
there are no people, no animals, hardly any trees, with the exception of another white male 
American by the name of Charles Munz, his remote-controlled dogs, and a weird bird 
addicted to “U.S.” chocolate.  In the manner of Christopher  Robin who names, Russell 
domesticates the bird by naming her Kevin and offering her the food she likes, but which, 
in  the  manner  of  the  Oompa-Loompas,  the  bird  cannot  obtain,  because  it  is  now 
“American” and no longer belongs to South America,  where it  actually grows. Russell 
domesticates the purpose of Kevin in another way as well, for, by giving her a male name, 
the female bird forgets her own children and plays the role of the useful native guide who 
follows Russell and Carl on their adventures helping them in their feats and conquests. 
Even though towards the end of the film, Russell and Carl return Kevin to her family, in 
the real world a mother's absence from her children is detrimental not only to her own 
children, but to the whole community, as mentioned earlier in relation to migrant labour. 
In  other  words,  this  96-minute  narrative  completely  erases  the  indigenous  reality and 
diversity of a whole continent and, instead, portrays a barren landscape with no life apart 
from Kevin and the greedy white American. Finally, as the humans (three white American 
males) depart, the dead white American woman's house and photograph claim the territory 
at the summit of Paradise Falls.
The majority of films that are produced for children in English dominate the world 
film-industry  and  market,  and  regardless  of  whether  they  are  based  on  fairy  tales, 
literature, or new film-scripts, operate from these civilised precepts. For instance, another 
computer animated film, Hoodwinked! (2005), focuses on empowering older women and 
young  girls  and  once  again  demonstrates  that  such  empowerment  must  necessarily 
proceed at the expense of other groups that are disempowered by the agency of the newly 
empowered. Again, the focus is on white women with the assumption that they stand for 
Women, unlike black or Asian women who stand for their specific, essentialised constructs 
and racialised needs. In order to focus on the “positive” message, the script ignores the 
massive injustices and the rest of the painful realities in the manner of the other civilised 
narratives discussed earlier and must portray the individuals and groups suffering from the 
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empowerment  of these two women as happy for the protagonists'  achievements and as 
supportive of their feats, even while they themselves remain homeless, disempowered, and 
even dead. This tactic of focusing on the aspirations, emotions, hardships and conquests of 
the “heroes” and “heroines” of civilised narratives helps the audience to identify with the 
conquerors' needs and to caricature the needs of others. Because they are not real and are 
not competing with the audience for their own piece of the civilised pie, symbolism helps 
the audience to even cheer for them, to desire their success, and to be sad with their failure 
“as if” it were their own. Since the details of the remaining characters, who are victims of 
this feminist plot, remain sketchy and caricatured, the audience forgets about reality and 
joins in the depicted joy of the rest of the forest beings who, we are told, are happy to get 
trampled  on by  Red  Riding  Hood  and  her  grandmother,  galloping  across  their  lives, 
running  over  animals,  recklessly  felling  trees,  causing  dynamite explosions  that  bring 
about  avalanches  and  tear  down mountains,  simply  because  the  two  women  need  to 
salvage granny's recipes in order to save a few private businesses. And yet, like so many 
other films and books, the more the narrative is  insensitive and status quo oriented, the 
more it gets celebrated for its “originality”.
Inadvertently  and  most  fundamentally,  hierarchical  and  racialised 
anthropocentrism leads to gross misrepresentations of reality, because it  is rooted in the 
myth that depicts human agency as key for the survival of the planet: “if only we can get 
the right kind of management for the natural 'resources' and 'environmental' 'initiatives'”, 
the standard logic goes to remind us of such arguments as made by Patton, Hearne, and 
Roberts above, “we can make things right; if  only the right  kind of 'moral'  people get 
elected in  government,  everything will be fixed; if  only more people participate in the 
show of spending billions of dollars on the handful of people to represent them at their 
own expense to be elected to take the trip to Paradise Falls on their behalf, then there will 
be less hunger and more empowerment; ad infinitum”. Yet, it has been thousands of years 
that leaders and managers have been misleading, mismanaging, and profiting from abuse, 
but for some reason – and I argue that the reason has to do with the postulates underlying 
the civilised narrative and the knowledge and structure for social relationships that the 
civilised premises foster – people still believe that it  is just about to improve with  their 
personal help and contribution, because they possess the agency to renounce their voice, 
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thereby renouncing that  very agency in  favour  of the handful of mis-leaders,  the ones 
whom they choose to voice their hopes, represent their dreams, and tell them what to do, 
how to live, what to buy, what to believe, how to become beautiful (like Patton's horses), 
how to become happy (like the amnesiac cyborgs without a world), and so forth. But, just 
like  the  representation  that  ends  up  living  Ellie's  dream  when  she  dies,  so  do  the 
representatives of people's will and desires – the politicians and other public figures and 
celebrities  –  live  people's  dreams  as  the  people  themselves  die.  In  other  words, 
representation provides the most  effective means for sterilising people,  rendering them 
impotent cyborgs, perfect machines that are empowered by their function to serve as limbs 
for another's will. For their part, these castrated cyborgs appear to gladly renounce agency 
over their own lives and agree to be depicted as singing with joy, because they have grown 
to be ashamed of their tears.
Identification with these misconceptions of happiness and misrepresentations of 
the real constitute the ultimate alienation, like  maya, the mirage of hope or the infinite 
nightmare within a nightmare, it reappears constantly in children's books in various forms. 
We see these projections in the two films above, but they also mislead us, taking us away 
from being, abandoning the enchanted worlds of the 100 Aker Wood that could have been, 
and accepting boarding school as a natural verdict of evolution, creation, and genes. These 
projections haunt us in the singing voices of the Oompa-Loompas,  the happy slaves of 
Charlie  and the Chocolate  Factory,  and through the deeds and the passions of Nosov's 
mites, they together lull us to surrender our reason to the myth that evolution into this state 
is ineluctable; and since we cannot choose the best option, we will have to settle for Sunny 
City as it is still far better than the Moon.
To  recapitulate  the  enunciated  interconnections  that  run  through  my 
interdisciplinary analysis  regarding order,  chaos,  knowledge,  culture,  social  foundation 
and  the  world  as  they  appear  in  children's  literature:  I  began  by  tracing  how  our 
understanding of the world is linked to the way we choose to live and experience it as well 
as  to  how  we  interact,  communicate  and  transmit  our  experiences  to  the  future 
generations. The role of language in the domestication of our intelligence correlates most 
directly to the ways in which social, political, and other institutions in a civilised order 
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rely on fiction, plot and narrative to encode our bodies, minds, and psyches with  doxa, 
habitus, body hexis, and ideologies transmitted and reproduced through genes and memes. 
All of these have the most direct effect not only on how we experience and understand 
ourselves and our world, but most important on how we choose to transform the world and 
the extent of damage we inflict, something that the wild have refused to do. In this process 
of civilising the world through the act of narrating the codes or memes, fiction has come to 
play a most prominent role in the possibilities for alienation and identification provided by 
the invention of language and symbolic thought. As discussed, language is not the same as 
communication,  for  communication and  understanding  appear  to  be  more intense  and 
holistic when experienced through empathy, while language provides the limiting rules, 
structures,  and  categorical  separations  that  allow  abstraction  and  hence  is  inherently 
incapable of an accurate – only an approximative and elusive – representation of reality 
which  an  ordered  grammar  claims  to  convey.  Language  and  grammar  are  the  first 
mechanisms for praxis that economise effort through formulae that transmit and structure 
myths thereby allowing the substitution of the real knowledge that can only be acquired 
through experience with standardised doxa and habitus of untruth as well as the ideologies 
of deception.
Since  literacy  is  pivotal  to  the  successful  transmission  of  memes  and  genes, 
whereby it has altered the very brain and physiology of civilised humans, then civilised 
children's narratives, for the most part, rely on the ordering power of grammar to socialise 
children  into  an  oppressive,  hierarchical  paradigm  of  civilised  social  relations  and 
knowledge. As seen in the case of Winnie-the-Pooh, concepts of illness and health, sadism 
and  masochism,  in-group  and  outsiders,  etc.,  need  not  even  be  articulated,  since  the 
underlying assumptions driving the civilised plot are in themselves sufficient to convey 
civilised  meaning  and  transmit  the  doxa through  the  structure  of its  codes  for  social 
relationships,  desires,  fears,  and  aspirations.  In  this  nexus  of  all  the  components 
comprising  the  civilised  plot,  the  role  of  biography,  i.e.  understanding  the  personal 
experience of all the interlocutors in any study, becomes particularly prominent, since the 
ability  to  comprehend  and  build  knowledge  can  begin  only  on the  personal  level  of 
sentience, empathy, and personal actions. Everything depends on this ability to tune in to 
one's  world:  imagination,  personal  decisions,  interactions.  Most  important,  the 
377
anthropogenic effect on wilderness depends on the choices that one makes after having 
processed  experience  and  information.  The  less  a  person relates  to  the world  outside 
herself and the more alienated she is,  the less capable of understanding,  and the more 
damage she  inflicts.  As  demonstrated in  this work,  when the syndrome of apathy and 
impotence  becomes  an  epidemic,  the  repercussions  are  disastrous,  such  as  the  6th 
Extinction in the history of the world.
Because the point of departure of civilisation and the general trajectory of its plot  
always moves towards alienation, it  constantly works to decrease intelligence and cause 
the atrophy of interactive skills needed for reaching across the borders separating species, 
ethnic groups, genders, and other identity categories determined to be owned versus those 
who  own  the  world.  The  drive  for  this  evolution  towards  ignorance  leads  to  the 
overpopulation of monoculturalist  masses  and  is  rooted in  the  civilised  conception of 
genesis which determines how we look at ourselves and others and ultimately how far we 
are willing to go in participating in the abuse. Attempts to compromise with these civilised 
presuppositions and myths, even while slightly decreasing the pace of the looming demise, 
nevertheless ultimately lead to collapse. Even though fiction enjoys a range of possibilities 
of playing  with  imagination,  nevertheless,  as  Dunno's  trilogy shows,  the  logic  of the 
argument  itself  cannot  reconcile  order  and  technology with  self-governed  wilderness, 
since civilisation necessarily sucks everything into its vortex. In other words, the minute a 
person is overpowered by this cancerous plot and accepts this path towards the machine 
and the civilised ontology as an ineluctable given, then, like Nosov, the progression of the 
plot cannot deviate from the path of evolution towards cities and states, control and order 
and thereby descent  into  the mode of agricultural expansionism, which entails  growth, 
overpopulation, and hence massacres and extinctions. Therefore, even while Nosov does 
his  best  to  embrace  multiculturalism,  inter-gender  and  other  forms  of  cooperation, 
including  trans-nationalism,  his  narrative  is  unable  to  overcome  speciesism,  which 
constitutes the root of oppression and segregation by means of the civilised construct of 
humanism.
Nosov  tries  to  reconcile  wilderness  with  civilisation  through  empathy  and 
conscience,  and  while  he  offers  important  explorations  on  morality,  his  critique  of 
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oppressive social orders nonetheless succumbs to two pitfalls of civilised narrative. First, 
in  spite  of being  one  of the  fundamental  aspects  of morality,  kindness  to  animals  is 
insufficient  to  eradicate  discrimination  and  disempowerment  brought  about  by  the 
humanist position that assumes civilised human reason as superior to all. The concept of 
kindness, while necessary for life in wilderness, fails in civilisation, because it  does not 
challenge the structure itself of abusive relationships and hence, ultimately,  remains an 
anthropocentric  venture of superficial and short  term nature that  remedies wounds but 
does not heal. Healing comes from wild generosity with the wild. It is a love for the other 
as  she  is  for  whatever  purpose  she  chooses.  Second,  driven  by  an  apology  for 
technological  investment,  the  narrative  manages  to  remain  optimistic  in  face  of  the 
inevitable evolution towards a general state of technological and agricultural colonialism, 
as, particularly,  the last book in Dunno's trilogy conveys. Thereby, the trilogy takes the 
classical anarcho-leftist  stance that  sees a  liberating potential in  technology as long as 
there  is  a  self-defined  communal  organisation  and  leadership  expressed  as  brotherly 
guidance.  The  author  acknowledges  that  in  itself  government  causes  serious  social 
problems, particularly that, in  the context of capitalism and technology,  leadership and 
representation become integral components of the system of oppression. However, since 
there  might  not  be  a  choice,  as  the  underlying  evolutionary  narrative  posits,  then  a 
communist government, although problematic due to its totalitarian potential – for it needs 
to control the crime that it creates in the first place and to exploit “resources” – is still a 
preferable  option  to  the  devastating  capitalist  state.  In  this  way,  the  trilogy  projects 
reconciliation with the state as an inevitable evil that can be remedied if a society chooses 
to follow the principles of compassion, moderation, and cooperation. For, only informed 
and  caring  leadership  is  capable  of channelling  the  purpose  of  the  machine  into  the 
organisation  of  complex  infrastructures  that  become  the  vehicle  for  an  egalitarian 
distribution of resources,  thereby freeing  time  in  a  communally  organised manner  by 
replacing human servants with artificial machines. What the narrative leaves unsaid is the 
impossibility of an egalitarian distribution of resources when the point of departure is  a 
world that needs the machine – i.e. someone whose purpose or existence is to serve – and 
which, because of this dependence on artificial limbs and servitude, becomes necessarily 
divided into resources and agents.  Political representation becomes unavoidable in  this 
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scenario and hence symbolism and alienation – the very enemies of empathy, intelligence, 
diversity,  and  cooperation –  acquire  a  decisive  place  in  the ontological conception of 
living beings.
In  this  regard,  even though Dunno's  trilogy raises  many critical questions  that 
challenge  the  civilised  norms,  it  still  projects  the  same  Darwinist  plot  as  the  one 
underlying  the  Christian  monarchist  structure  of  the  100  Aker  Wood,  in  which  the 
omission of  technological gadgets  themselves  does not  detract  from the “mechanical” 
nature of the characters in Christopher Robin's world, and who constitute the prostheses of 
the human child's possibilities. In this sense, the characters with their propensity for greed, 
literacy,  envy,  and  sterility  resemble  Haraway's  metaphoric  cyborgs,  for  they are  the 
mutants that provide the power for Christopher Robin's self-realisation; they are the limbs 
that re-enact a domesticated and therefore impotent will that can realise itself only through 
the abstract re-enactment of the imaginary, the unreal, and the untrue. In this regard, the 
underlying understanding of genesis here is utterly civilised: the toys from their inception 
have been created for the purpose of serving the human, for being named and dominated 
by him. The narrative transmits the Darwinian doom of evolution towards the ultimate 
cyborg  and  domestication in  the inevitability  of the  real life  boy,  Christopher  Robin, 
abandoning this world and transferring to boarding school, a place where he will be locked 
up and taught how to participate in the narrative of dependencies and machines in real life, 
while the story of this world, in which he was an empowered agent, must end with his 
integration into the humanist order.
Unlike the sterile world of Pooh and in spite of the nature of language, literacy,  
literature and narratives,  there still  exist  uncompromising tales of wilderness.  My third 
example of how a children's book is capable of offering wild narratives explores various 
ways of handling civilisation and of remaining free in a wild world. The moominbooks 
examine  co-existence  and  ways  of dealing  with  the  pedantic  and  ignorant  figures  of 
authority (the hemulens). Ignoring them and rebellion against civilisation are some of the 
tactics explored here. Typically under the civilised circumstances, such uncompromising 
books are a minority in the world of literacy and, in spite of their overt critique of racism, 
speciesism, institutions, and oppression, are still capable of being tamed and disarmed by 
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the mere fact that if they remain solely in the realm of “identification” and “entertainment” 
without rewilding the civilised subjects,  prompting them to make specific  choices with 
regards to their actions. In this context, the personal life choices of the author reflect the 
meaning of the narrative and shed light on the extent of its feasibility as viable options in 
the real world.  Here,  as my interdisciplinary analysis has revealed, wilderness is still a 
feasible way of life and Tove Jansson's personal experiences and life choices – ranging 
from her bohemian lifestyle, through a life-time with a lesbian partner, to travel and years 
spent on an island – are not the exception in the history of the world, rather, are part of its 
intricately rich past and an intense future filled with infinite possibilities that the diversity 
of wilderness avails.
An important feature of wild narratives is that they include everything, but without 
a standardising grammar for the outcome in favour of humans. Hence, they too can play 
with representation, but it  is usually in the context of the trickster who misleads, and as 
examined in part II of my work on aboriginal ontologies,  tricksters too have a place in 
wilderness, where cosmic justice is ensured by the rotation of chances and where order 
leads to stagnation, suffering and death. Because the moomins have no representatives and 
no substitution, there is no order, only chaos. Everyone lives how she sees fit and is free to 
pursue her own desires and dreams whenever and wherever. Moominpappa learns this as 
soon as he grows up and takes off to wander the earth in search of community.  When 
together with his travel companions he comes ashore a kingdom, he discovers that  the 
Autocrat is the biggest joker and the traps and tricks he sets work only on those who fall 
for them and who accept his walls,  borders, and limitations. As the Mymble's daughter 
explains (discussed in part I), these enclosures are associated with language and literacy 
and  they work only for  those  who  believe  in  them and  who  know them as  barriers, 
otherwise,  they are good for  having  picnics  and  playing  pranks.  The  same  applies  to 
children and pedagogy. In wilderness, children are not limited by their parents, but by their 
own needs for proximity,  protection, and care. When they decide that they are ready to 
venture further  from parents and  home,  with  all  the relationships  that  constitute  one's 
feeling of belonging, in order to build their own relationships and acquire knowledge and 
skills, their parents help them prepare for the journey and they know that they have always 
a home to return to, where they might  bring along new members to integrate  into  the 
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family.
Race, or the superficial difference of colour, is another issue that has no meaning 
here aside from what flowers and colours one could experiment with decorating one's hair. 
In  Comet in Moominland, Moomintroll finds out from Snufkin that  there are creatures 
exactly like the trolls,  called the snorks,  who are not only of different colour, but they 
change their colour according to mood. It must be so beautiful, thought Moomintroll, and 
when he meets the colourful Snork Maiden, he finds himself intimately attracted to her. 
Gender roles too here are constantly subverted. As the Snork Maiden likes “girly” stuff, 
such as putting flowers on her hair and admiring herself in the mirror, it does not prevent 
her from being capable of saving Moomintroll from a sea monster with her mirror in the 
same way as he had saved her previously from a carnivorous bush. The Hemulen usually 
wears his aunt's dress, which proves handy for Moomintroll and travel companions when 
it served as a parachute saving them from the apocalyptic wind brought by the comet. All 
they had to do was grab the edges of their new friend's dress and the wind carried them 
home.
The moominbooks offer a wild array of the possibilities of choices. Like Jansson's 
compatriot Nordlund, the moominbook characters recycle and build their own tools, but 
they never become dependent on them as they always have the option to move away, to 
subsist  by gathering and roaming. They are entangled in a  variety of relationships; but 
whenever  these  relationships  lose  the  aspect  of mutuality,  turning  into  claustrophobic 
dependencies,  the  characters  leave,  then return,  and  nothing,  but  an  immense  cosmic 
harmony can contain  or  inform their  trajectories.  Therefore,  in  the  world  of moomin-
wilderness there is simply no room for machines, with the exception of self-made tools 
and experimental devices like the ones that Moominpappa makes in his solitude at Sea or 
during the period of his life described in his Memoirs. The hemulens, the figures who try 
to control and threaten with authority and order, are powerless before the sheer will of the 
rest  of the characters to refuse to  abide by these nags' whims  and when necessary,  as 
Snufkin demonstrates,  flee their prisons and burn their walls.  It  is  such resistance that 
saves moomonwilderness and like real-life wilderness, the moominworld too contains in it 
everything: there is  fear  and misery that  freeze the world around the Groke, authority 
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figures demand submission, threatening to incarcerate the disobedient,  it  has madness, 
sorrow, loneliness, and death, but at the same time, there are the expanses of dimensions 
beyond  this  world  and  possibilities  of  knowledge  beyond  one's  fear,  the  attempts  to 
oppress breed comradeship and togetherness, and just as winter wakes up to spring, so 
does death bring rebirth for those who care for life and love the world. 
. . .
In  this  way,  the  three  children's  books,  A.A.  Milne's  Winnie-the-Pooh,  Nikolai 
Nosov's  trilogy  on  The  Adventures  of  Dunno  and  Friends,  and  Tove  Jansson's  The 
Moominbooks,  that  I  have  chosen for  this  study present  three different  paradigms for 
social relations and cultural systems, issuing radically different socio-environmental and 
political “fictional realities”. Each of these fantasy worlds has its own impact on the living 
world.  In carrying  out  this  research,  one  of my goals  was to  bridge the gap between 
science and literature so as to examine the interconnectedness of fiction and reality as a 
two-way road. Another aim was to engage these narratives in a dialogue with each other as 
I traced their expression in the various disciplines and books written for both children and 
adults as well as the manifestation of fictional narratives in real life. 
The  hardest  aspect  of  this  work  has  been  my  attempt  to  reconcile  with  the 
occasional despair brought by the overwhelming statistical data and the anthropological 
meaning that arises from having a fictional narrative (the myths and mis-representations of 
scientific and political plots) replace wilderness and life itself as well as coming to grips 
with the overwhelming role that fictional narratives play in our lives. In this regard, it no 
longer matters whether the replacement of life by a civilised plot is intentional or whether 
it is the work of a self-replicating meme and doxa that have gone rampant and out of hand, 
because fiction and narrative have come to manipulate and domesticate human and animal 
persons  whatever  their  role  or  socio-economic  background  in  this  hierarchy may be, 
compelling  the  individual  bodies  that  comprise  the  civilised  institutions  to  behave 
specifically in  the interest of civilisation, using tools such as human language, abstract  
thought, machines, and literature. In this way, not only do the narratives project specific 
values and provide idealised and admonitory tales, but they also reconfirm the ideology, 
the habitus, the body hexis, and the  doxa by eliciting the reader's identification with the 
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desires,  suffering,  and  trajectories  of  the  depicted  characters,  while  overwriting  the 
nightmarish lives  of the  billions  of human and animal people  entrapped in  the lower 
echelons  of  this  hierarchy.  The  civilising  mechanism works  smoothly  when  personal 
desires tune in to the domesticated ideology and remain in accord with its narrative. This 
illusion of happiness,  or  satisfaction,  breeds  the  ultimate doom and despair,  since  the 
narrative imposes a structure that a priori dismisses the emotions as “deviant” or “invalid” 
and thereby precludes the very understanding of why the depressed or psychotic person 
feels miserable or rebellious.  Today such people get  antidepressants and anti-psychotic 
medication to align their feelings with the civilised myth.
At the same time, the realisation that it is not the “genetic” heritage that writes our 
narratives,  that  memes and  habitus can be re-imagined,  rewritten and re-inscribed into 
chaos is liberating, is liberating, because we now know that we do not have to be hostages 
of any decision that our ancestors may have taken 17 000 years or even further back, 30 
000 years ago when they first tasted flesh, devised language and art, and moved out of 
Africa to conquer the world. Real agency and freedom reside in the passion that strives to 
bring down these walls of civilisation that, through a narrative that imposes rigidity and 
the doom of permanence, misleads us by promising comfort, safety and pills in exchange 
of our wilderness,  chaos,  and life.  As  the moomintrolls  show us,  freedom,  movement, 
happiness  and  life  dwell  in  the  cracks.  They inhabit  the dimensions  of technological 
inefficiency and, most important, in the community of all forms of deviance. To regain our 
community with life, we must accept the risk of danger, suffering, and madness both as 
resistance to the civilised plot implicit in one's refusal to internalise the prescribed place 
with its social value and as the natural experience of chaos. Accounts of wilderness tell us 
that even when civilisation terms disruptions in  individual or group participation in its 
narrative as “illness” and “disability” – whether “mental”, “physical” or other, including 
the various forms of rebellion and “social deviance” – we can still subvert civilisation's 
attempt  to  differentiate  between the  groups  and  to  uniformalise  their  individuals.  By 
embracing the idiosyncrasies of each while admitting the shared common essence of all 
we  can regain the  forest.  With this  ability to  remember  our  past  we can recover  the 
sentience and empathy lost and re-imagine a wild future. Roaming in this wilderness, we 
can come to share new stories by living them instead of having one story live our dreams.
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